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FOREWORD
The Denver Law Review devotes its third issue each year to the
Tenth Circuit. The purpose of the Tenth Circuit issue is to provide a fo-
rum for scholarship by professors, practitioners, and students on topics
that have particular importance to the Tenth Circuit and its constituent
states-Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyo-
ming. This year's practitioner's pieces focus on an event of profound
national, as well as regional, significance-the death penalty trial of the
Aurora theater shooter James Holmes.
On July 20, 2012, James Holmes walked into a crowded movie the-
ater in Aurora, Colorado, and began shooting. Twelve people were killed
and seventy others were wounded, making the Aurora theater shooting
one of the worst mass shooting events in United States history. After a
three-month trial, Mr. Holmes's insanity defense was rejected, and he
was convicted on all 165 counts, including numerous counts of first-
degree murder and attempted murder. Although Mr. Holmes was eligible
for the death penalty, the jury sentenced him instead to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.
Issue 93.3 features three articles related to the Holmes trial and the
death penalty. Each of these articles is written from the unique perspec-
tive of practitioners who participated directly in the trial. Judge Carlos A.
Samour, Jr. of Colorado's 1 8 1h Judicial District, who presided over the
trial, contributes an article describing the process of capital sentencing
hearings in Colorado and the structure of James Holmes's sentencing
hearing. Tamara Brady, Daniel King, and Kristen Nelson of the Colorado
Public Defenders Office-who defended Mr. Holmes together with Re-
bekka Higgs-contribute a piece about whether the death penalty has a
place in our criminal justice system. District Attorney George Brauchler
and Rich Orman-who prosecuted the case together with Karen Pearson,
Jacob Edson, and Lisa Teesch-Maguire-contribute an article defending
the Colorado death penalty in response to recent calls for its abolition.
The article by Brauchler and Orman engages with an empirical study of
the Colorado death penalty statute that was conducted by Professor Sam
Kamin and Professor Justin Marceau. In this issue, these scholars provide
a short summary of their response to Brauchler and Orman's critique of
their study. You can read their full response, which will be published in
Volume 94 of the Denver Law Review, at 94 DENV. L. REV. 1 (2016)
(forthcoming).
Issue 93.3 also includes three student comments written by mem-
bers of the Denver Law Review. Two of the comments discuss recent
Tenth Circuit decisions, and one discusses a recent Colorado statute.
Haley DiRenzo's comment addresses the Claire Davis School Safety
i
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Act, critiquing new efforts to keep schools safe. Specifically, the com-
ment highlights the danger that threat assessments in schools could pose
to certain students and suggests turning the focus toward building posi-
tive school climates and placing a greater responsibility on the gun in-
dustry as an alternative to harmful threat assessments. Nicole Jones's
comment on Citizens United v. Gessler discusses the current campaign
finance disclosure landscape and argues that the Tenth Circuit's decision
poses a significant risk of expanding the set of existing loopholes to an
uncontrollable level. Kate Stevenson commented on Endrew v. Douglas
County School District, demonstrating how courts applying the some
educational benefit standard fail to properly evaluate the substantive ad-
equacy of an individualized education plan in light of a child's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances and arguing for implementation of
measures that encourage courts to recognize that appropriate educations
vary according to the particular needs of different children.
This issue would not have been possible without the assistance of a
number of terrific people. First, I would like to thank all of the authors
for dedicating a significant amount of time to writing these excellent
articles and comments. Next, I would like to thank Colleen Wort and
Naomi Baez Amos for helping me liaise with the authors. After that, I
would like to thank Professor Ian Farrell for his gracious assistance with
this issue. Finally, I would like to thank all of the members of the Denver
Law Review for their hard work editing these pieces and assisting with a
variety of other tasks that made this issue possible.
The Denver Law Review is grateful for the rare privilege of publish-
ing the observations of those at the heart of the James Holmes trial.
I hope this issue highlights some of the key legal issues arising from this
tragic event and provides some insight into the arguments for both reten-
tion and abolition of the death penalty.
Tyson L. Welch
Tenth Circuit Comments Editor
EFFECTUATING COLORADO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING
SCHEME IN THE AURORA THEATER SHOOTING TRIAL
JUDGE CARLOS A. SAMOUR, JR.'
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses how the court effectuated Colorado's four-
step capital sentencing scheme in the sentencing hearing held in the case
of the People of the State of Colorado v. James Eagan Holmes in July
and August 2015. Although the Colorado Supreme Court has analyzed
on multiple occasions the sequential decisions required by this State's
death penalty statute, it has never had occasion to address the structure of
a sentencing hearing or, more specifically, whether the questions that
must be answered should be presented to the jury one at a time in a fur-
cated proceeding that follows a logical sequence or all at once at the end
of a continuous proceeding that is uninterrupted by intermediate delib-
erations. In the Holmes trial, the court found that trifurcating the sentenc-
ing hearing was the most prudent course of action under the circum-
stances involved, especially considering the defendant's insanity plea.
The court combined the two middle steps of the capital sentencing
scheme into one step, for a total of three steps, and divided the sentenc-
ing hearing into three separate phases, one dedicated to each step. The
jury was required to deliberate at the end of each phase, and it was only
allowed to continue to the next phase if it made certain findings. Of
course, this is by no means the only method of applying the State's capi-
tal sentencing scheme-as the old adage goes, "there is more than one
way to skin a cat." However, I remain convinced that it was the most
appropriate approach in the Holmes case, as it significantly minimized
the risk of confusing the jury, guided counsel in the presentation of evi-
dence and arguments, and allowed the court to maintain optimal control
over the proceedings.
t The Honorable Carlos A. Samour, Jr. is the Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District
in Colorado. He presided over the trial in the case of the People of the State of Colorado v. James
Eagan Holmes, 12CR1522, between January 20 and August 7 of 2015. Judge Samour graduated
from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Order of St. Ives, in 1990. He clerked for the
Honorable Robert McWilliams on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from
1990 to 1991. In 1991, he joined the firm of Holland & Hart as an associate. In 1996, he became a
prosecutor in the Denver District Attorney's Office. Judge Samour was appointed to the district
court bench in the Eighteenth Judicial District by Governor Bill Owens in late 2006, and he took the
bench on January 2,2007. In 2014, he was appointed Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District
by the Honorable Nancy E. Rice, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
577
578 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BACKGROUND .............................................. 578
II. LAW REGARDING CAPITAL SENTENCING...................... 581
A. The Eighth Amendment and Relevant U.S. Supreme Court
Precedent ................................... ..... 581
B. Colorado's Capital Sentencing Scheme ............ ..... 583
III. THE CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING IN PEOPLE V. HOLMES......... 588
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................. 593
I. BACKGROUND
During the early morning hours of July 20, 2012, the community of
Aurora, in Arapahoe County, Colorado, experienced one of the deadliest
mass shootings in this nation's history.' In what is considered the shoot-
ing incident with the largest number of casualties ever in the United
2States, James Eagan Holmes was accused of killing twelve people and
injuring seventy others inside auditoriums eight and nine of the Century
16 Theatres during the midnight premiere of the Batman movie The Dark
Knight Rises. Holmes was charged with two counts of Murder in the
First Degree for each of the twelve deceased victims and two counts of
Attempt to Commit Murder in the First Degree for each of the seventy
injured victims who survived.4 Holmes was also charged with one count
of Possession or Control of an Explosive or Incendiary Device based on
evidence recovered from his apartment, which police officers concluded
had been booby-trapped. Thus, Holmes faced a total of one hundred and
sixty-five substantive counts.
1. CNN Library, 30 Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/20-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-u-s-history-fast-facts/ (last
updated Feb. 5, 2016, 12:11 PM); Editorial, Deadliest U.S. Mass Shootings: 1984-2015, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://timelines.latimes.com/deadliest-shooting-rampages/; Elizabeth
Chuck & Helen Kwong, Tragic List: The Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S. History, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deadliest-mass-shootings-u-s-
history-n437086.
2. See Jeff Glor, Colorado Massacre Could Have Been Worse: Reports, CBS NEWS (July 23,
2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-massacre-could-have-been-worse-
reports/
3. Order: (1) Regarding Defendant's Motion to Revise List of Attorneys and Staff Attached
to Juror Questionnaire; and (2) Attaching Final Juror Questionnaire, Final Judge's Introductory
Remarks, and Final Videotaped Remarks Before Individual Voir Dire (Including Chart) (D-269)
Attachment 2 at 3, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Order D-269].
4. Jury Instructions at Nos. 2, 11, 13, 15, 17, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015).
5. See Jury Instructions, No. 19, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
14, 2015); Order Regarding Motion to Suppress Mr. Holmes' July 20, 2012 Statement to Special
Agent Gumbinner and Detective Appel (D-127) at 22-24, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arap-
ahoe Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2014).
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On April 1, 2013, the District Attorney's Office for the Eighteenth
Judicial District announced that it intended to seek the death penalty
against Holmes.6 A couple of months later, on June 4, Holmes entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to all 165 substantive charges.
Following two extensive court-ordered sanity examinations of the
defendant, as well as related protracted litigation, the case proceeded to
trial on January 20, 2015. The jury was selected on April 14, and counsel
made their opening statements on April 27. A little less than three
months later, on July 16, the jury found the defendant guilty of all the
charges, although the guilty verdicts on six counts of Attempt to Commit
Murder in the First Degree involving three victims in auditorium eight,
an auditorium the defendant never accessed, were for the lesser included
offense of Attempt to Commit Murder in the Second Degree.8 The capi-
tal sentencing hearing on the murder counts commenced on July 22 and
ended on August 7. Because the jury could not unanimously decide
whether the appropriate sentence on each murder count was a life sen-
tence without the possibility of parole or a death sentence, the court was
required to impose a life sentence without he possibility of parole on
each such count.9
Not surprisingly, the selection of the jury was a formidable task and
took almost as long as the guilt portion of the trial and the capital sen-
tencing hearing combined. For multiple reasons, the court felt compelled
to summon nine thousand prospective jurors, reportedly the largest jury
pool ever assembled in the United States.'o First, the case received in-
tense and pervasive pretrial publicity, including local, national, and in-
6. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty People's Motion P-38, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Motion P-38].
7. Advisement Regarding Plea of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity at 1, People v. Holmes,
No. 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 4, 2013).
8. Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015).
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d) (2016) ("If the jury's verdict is not unanimous, the
jury shall be discharged, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment."); see also
Judgment of Conviction, Sentence, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 27,
2015); Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug.
11, 2015) (referencing the Final Sentencing Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts sought against
James Holmes).
10. See Order Amending Juror Questionnaire, Increasing the Number of Prospective Jurors,
and Providing Additional Information About Jury Selection (C-159) at 1, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Order C-159] (increasing the number of
jury summonses from 6,000 to 9,000); Order Regarding Defendant's Request to Continue Trial (D-
245-B) at 2 n.1, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-245-B] (explaining why the court anticipated that selecting a jury would be difficult and
time-consuming); Order Regarding Defendant's Request to Close Jury Selection to the Public (D-
154-a-2) at 1 n.1, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 11, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-1 54-a-2] (referring to 6,000 citizens being summoned for jury service); Order Regarding
Defendant's Motion for Juror Postponements and Excusals to be Made on the Record (D-80) at 2,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Order D-80]
(initially estimating that 5,000 jury summonses would be necessary); Faith Mangan et al., Largest
Jury Pool in US History Gathered as Colo. Movie Gunman James Holmes' Trial Begins, Fox NEWS
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/01/20/jury-selection-to-begin-in-colorado-theater-
shooting-trial/.
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ternational media coverage, and the court realized that almost all of the
prospective jurors would have some information about the case. Second,
the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity meant that the
court would need to screen prospective jurors who had education in or
experience with mental health issues. Third, the prosecution's decision to
seek the death penalty required the court to look for jurors who, in the
event of a sentencing hearing, could conscientiously follow the law and
fairly and impartially decide whether the appropriate sentence was life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. Fourth, the court
and the parties estimated that the guilt portion of the trial and any possi-
ble sentencing hearing would take four to five months, so the court need-
ed to find jurors who were willing and able to make a significant time
commitment. Fifth, given the ubiquitous media coverage the court and
the parties anticipated during the guilt portion of the trial and any sen-
tencing hearing, as well as the expected length of the proceedings, the
court selected twelve alternate jurors, one for each deliberating juror.
Lastly, the decision to order such an enormous jury pool reflected the
court's awareness of the defense's pending motion for a change of venue,
which asserted that the defendant could not receive a fair trial in Arapa-
hoe County with Arapahoe County jurors.1
As expected, jury selection focused on sentencing. The court uti-
lized an extensive jury selection process to achieve the following objec-
tives: (1) learn about prospective jurors' thoughts, beliefs, biases, and
prejudices related to the potential penalties of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole and death; (2) educate prospective jurors on the
law in Colorado regarding capital sentencing hearings and the two poten-
tial penalties; and (3) screen prospective jurors after such education to
ensure that those selected would apply the law conscientiously and
would be fair and impartial.
Colorado jurisprudence on capital sentencing requires that the jury
make certain sequential determinations before it may consider whether
the appropriate sentence is a life sentence without the possibility of pa-
role or a death sentence.12 Based on its decision at each step of the pro-
cess, the jury may either move on to the next step, or it must return a
sentencing verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role. Significantly, the rules governing the admissibility of evidence,
the purpose or purposes for which evidence previously admitted may be
11. See Motion for Change of Venue [D-206] at 1-2, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522
(Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Motion D-206]. The court denied the defendant's
motion to transfer the case to another Colorado county after twenty-four jurors (including twelve
alternates) were selected approximately two months ahead of schedule. Order Regarding Defend-
ant's Motion to Supplement Motion for Change of Venue and Reply in Support of Motion for
Change of Venue (D-206a) at 2, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 23,
2015).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2).
13. Id.
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considered, the burden of proof (if any), and the degree of certainty that
may be required in the decisions the jury is asked to make vary depend-
ing on the step of the sentencing hearing involved.14 As a result, and giv-
en the complexities inherent in the affirmative defense of not guilty by
reason of insanity, which are exacerbated in a capital sentencing hearing,
the court ruled that the sentencing hearing would be trifurcated.15 Ac-
cordingly, the jury was required to deliberate at each step of the process
before it could move on to the next step, although, as explained later, the
court condensed the four steps outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court
into three steps.
In this Article, I first review the law on capital sentencing. I then
discuss the process followed in the capital sentencing hearing held in
Holmes in an effort to minimize the risk of confusing the jury, to guide
counsel as they presented evidence and arguments, and to allow the court
to maintain optimal control over the proceedings.'7
II. LAW REGARDING CAPITAL SENTENCING
A. The Eighth Amendment and Relevant U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Before discussing Colorado's capital. sentencing scheme, it is im-
portant to review the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the
U.S. Supreme Court's cases interpreting and applying the Amendment.
This authority is important because it forms the foundation for Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme.'8
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."' 9 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gregg v.
14. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l}-(2); People v. Dunlap (Dunlap 1), 975 P.2d 723, 735-36 (Colo.
1999).
15. See Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 4-10; Order Regarding Defendant's
Motion for Defense and Prosecution to Have Same Number of Closing Arguments at Any Sentenc-
ing Trial (D-142) at 4-5, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Mar. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Order D-142].
16. Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 4-10; see also Jury Instructions-Phase
Three of Sentencing Hearing, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Phase Three Instructions]; Jury Instructions-Phase Two of Sentencing Hearing, People
v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter Phase Two Instructions];
Jury Instructions-Phase One of Sentencing Hearing, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015) [hereinafter Phase One Instructions]; Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36.
17. See, e.g., Order D-142, supra note 15, at 5.
18. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790 (Colo. 1990) ("The [Colorado] death penalty
statute ... was enacted against a background of decisions of the United States Supreme Court ...
considering whether the death penalty statutes of other states violated the eighth amendment's pro-
scription of 'cruel and unusual punishments' as that proscription is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment." (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIll)).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
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Georgia2 0 that imposition of the death penalty does not constitute "cruel
and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.2 1
However, the Eighth Amendment requires that the death penalty be
"imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all."22 Conse-
quently, where a sentencing body is given discretion "on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to min-
imize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."2 3 The Court, in
Gregg, concluded that "these concerns are best met by a system that pro-
vides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and
provided with standards to guide its use of the information."24 For pur-
poses of addressing Eighth Amendment concerns in capital proceedings,
the United States Supreme Court divides the decision-making process
into two stages: the eligibility decision and the selection decision.25
The eligibility stage narrows the class of convicted murderers who
may be sentenced to death.2 6 "[T]here is a required threshold below
which the death penalty cannot be imposed."27 The states have adopted
two methods to narrow the class of defendants who are eligible to receive
a death sentence: (1) a "weighing" method, and (2) a "non-weighing"
method.28 Under both methods, a defendant must be convicted of murder
in the first degree before he may be eligible for a death sentence. 29In
addition, in order for a defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, both
methods require the trier of fact to find at least one aggravating factor, or
its equivalent, during either the guilt or penalty portion of the proceed-
ings.30
From there, the process diverges, depending on whether a state is a
weighing or non-weighing jurisdiction. In weighing jurisdictions, once a
jury has found that at least one aggravating factor exists, it must weigh
the aggravating factor or factors against all mitigating evidence to decide
if the defendant is death-eligible. ' On the other hand, in non-weighing
jurisdictions, a finding of an aggravating factor automatically makes the
32
defendant eligible to receive a death sentence.
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. Id. at 183-86, 188.
22. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
24. Id. at 195.
25. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 735 (Colo. 1999).
26. Id. at 735-36.
27. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
28. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
29. Id. at 736.
30. Id. at 735 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994)).
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Woldt v.People, 64 P.3d 256, 263 (Colo. 2003).
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In both weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions, if the jury deter-
mines that the defendant is death-eligible, the process moves to the selec-
tion stage, where the jury decides whether the death-eligible defendant
should, in fact, receive a death sentence.33 During the selection stage, the
jury is called to make "an individualized determination on the basis of
the [defendant's] character . . . and the circumstances of [his] crime."34
Because the jury is required to assess the culpability of the individual
defendant, the selection determination in both weighing and non-
weighing jurisdictions "requires the admission of all relevant evi-
dence."35
In a weighing state, the defendant is sentenced to either death or life
imprisonment "based on all relevant information about the individual
defendant."36 "By contrast, in a non-weighing state, 'aggravating factors
as such have no specific function in the jury's decision whether a de-
fendant who has been found to be eligible for the death penalty should
receive it.' 3 7 Indeed, "[i]n a non-weighing state, no special significance
is given to statutory" aggravating factors or statutory mitigating factors
in the selection stage; rather, the jury considers all the evidence presented
in deciding whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty.
B. Colorado's Capital Sentencing Scheme
Fourteen years after Gregg, in 1990, the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty statute in effect in Colo-
rado at that time.39 The Colorado Supreme Court has since upheld death
sentences.4 0
In 1995, the Colorado General Assembly amended the death penalty
statute by substituting "a three-judge panel in place of the jury" during
the sentencing hearing.4' The legislature did so based on a U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Walton v. Arizona,42 that was later overturned in Ring v.
Arizona.4 3 Based on the decision in Ring, the Colorado Supreme Court
declared the three-judge panel capital sentencing statute unconstitutional
on its face.44 In 2002, the Colorado General Assembly reenacted the pro-
visions of the capital sentencing statute in effect before the 1995 amend-
33. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36.
34. Id. at 736 (quoting Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972).
35. Id.; Woldt, 64 P.3d at 263-64.
36. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 264.
37. Dunlap !, 975 P.2d at 735 (quoting Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1992)).
38. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 264 (citing Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 736).
39. People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 170-72 (Colo. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005).
40. See, e.g., People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 483 (Colo. 2000), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
41. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 258.
42. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
43. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 258.
44. Id. at 259.
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ment, again making the jury responsible for both the guilt and penalty
determinations in a capital case.45
Under current Colorado law, in a capital case in which the defend-
ant is found guilty of Murder in the First Degree, the same jury that de-
termined guilt must determine the sentence as soon as practicable by
following the statutory sentencing scheme.4 6 The Colorado Supreme
Court has analyzed the death penalty statute presently in effect in this
State on multiple occasions and has found that Colorado's capital sen-
tencing scheme consists of four steps: finding aggravating factors, find-
ing mitigating factors, weighing the aggravating factors proven against
the mitigating factors that exist, and determining whether a life sentence
without the possibility of parole or a death sentence is the appropriate
47sentence.
During the first step, the jury must determine whether the prosecu-
tion has alleged and proven the existence of at least one of the statutorily
specified aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.4 8 The Colorado
Supreme Court has observed that the use of aggravating factors "is not an
end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-
eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion."49 If the
jury unanimously finds that the prosecution has proven beyond a reason-
able doubt at least one of the alleged aggravating factors, the sentencing
hearing moves on to step two.so Otherwise, "the jury shall render a ver-
dict of life imprisonment" without the possibility of parole.5
During the second step, the jury must decide whether any mitigating
factors exist.52 A mitigating factor is a fact or circumstance which does
not constitute justification or excuse for the crime, but which, in fairness
or mercy, the jury considers as extenuating or reducing the degree of the
defendant's moral culpability. Like aggravating factors, mitigating fac-
tors in Colorado are listed in a statute; however, that list is not inclusive,
as it contains a catchall category: "[a]ny other evidence which in the
court's opinion bears on the question of mitigation."54 If the defendant
presents mitigating factors, the prosecution has an opportunity to present
evidence offered to rebut those mitigating factors.55 Each juror must then
individually determine whether one or more mitigating factors exist;
45. See id.
46. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a) (2016).
47. People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489,496 (Colo. 2007).
48. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999).
49. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790 (Colo. 1990) (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 244 (1988)).
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(d), (2)(b)(II).
51. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(1).
52. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(ll); Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 736.
53. People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 454 (Colo. 1994).
54. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(4).
55. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 739.
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however, jurors need not unanimously agree that mitigating factors exist
or that the same mitigating factors exist.56
During the third step, the final step of the eligibility stage, the jury
must assess whether the mitigating factors that exist outweigh any aggra-
vating factor or factors proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.57 In order to make the required determination, each juror must
first decide what weight to assign to each mitigating factor and then must
individually weigh the mitigating factors that exist and the aggravating
factors proven by the prosecution.5 If the jury unanimously finds, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the mitigating factors that exist are not
sufficient to outweigh the proven aggravating factors, the defendant is
eligible for a death sentence and the jury moves on to the fourth and final
step of the process, the selection stage, to determine whether the defend-
ant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole or death.
During the fourth and final step, the jury must decide what sentence
is appropriate: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
death.60 "[T]he question whether death is the appropriate sentence re-
quires a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant's character and
crime."61 In order to return a sentence of death, the jury must be unani-
mously convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that death is the appropri-
ate sentence.62
At the fourth step, both parties may introduce evidence that is rele-
vant to the nature of the crime, and the character, background, and histo-
ry of the defendant.6 3 In this step, all relevant, admissible evidence is
generally permissible, and it may be presented by both the prosecution
and the defense.4 Indeed, the admissibility of evidence at step four "is
constrained only by familiar evidentiary principles concerning the rele-
vance of the evidence and the potential for that evidence to inflame the
passion or prejudice of the jury. 6 5 Thus, the prosecution may present
evidence relating to any of the statutory aggravating factors, as well as
evidence of aggravating circumstances, which s ould not be confused
with statutory aggravating factors.66 Additionally, the prosecution may
56. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(II); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 736.
58. Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791-92.
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(I1I); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 736.
60. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 741.
61. Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring)).
62. Id. at 796.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(1)(b); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 740.
64. Dunlap I, 975 P.2d at 739.
65. Id. at 741.
66. Id. at 739-40. The Colorado Supreme Court has explained that there is a constitutional
distinction between statutory aggravators and other aggravating evidence. Id. at 739. "Statutory
aggravators are those factors the General Assembly has identified as weighing in favor of imposition
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present evidence known as "victim impact evidence," which is evidence
"relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the impact of
the crimes on the victim's family." 67 On the other hand, the defense may
present more evidence of mitigation.
This stands in stark contrast to steps one through three, where "the
jury may [only] consider the following: (1) evidence related to statutory
aggravating factors; (2) ... mitigating evidence; and (3) prosecution evi-
dence offered to rebut mitigating factors raised by the defendant."68 Oth-
er evidence, including, for example, evidence that purportedly contra-
dicts statutory mitigating factors not raised by the defense, is irrelevant
during those steps.6 9 To hold otherwise would have "the net effect of
introducing evidence relating to aggravating circumstances-not aggra-
vating factors-at the eligibility stage," which, in turn, would risk having
the jury "find a statutory aggravator on the basis of aggravating circum-
stance evidence."70 Aggravating circumstance evidence is not admissible
during the first three steps of a capital sentencing hearing because such
evidence "fails to conform to the strict requirement that eligibility stage
evidence 'minimiz[e] the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion. "71
At any step of the sentencing hearing, a party may generally rely on
evidence previously introduced, either in the guilt portion of the trial or
72in the sentencing hearing. Therefore, during the sentencing hearing, a
party need not reintroduce evidence previously admitted.73
However, during the sentencing hearing, certain evidence previous-
ly admitted may be considered only for a limited purpose or, if previous-
ly admitted for a limited purpose, only for a different limited purpose.
Moreover, consideration of previously admitted evidence is circum-
scribed by the rules governing each phase of the sentencing hearing. For
example, in an insanity case, "evidence acquired . . . for the first time
from a communication derived from the defendant's mental processes
during the course of a court-ordered [sanity] examination . . . is admissi-
ble only" for the limited purpose of considering "the issues raised by the
defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity."74 Such evidence
may be considered only in the second, third, and fourth steps of the sen-
of the death penalty," while "(o]ther aggravating evidence is evidence that is unfavorable to the
defendant, but that does not relate to a statutory aggravator." Id
67. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-1201(i)(b); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825
(1991).
68. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 739.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)).
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b).
73. See id.
74. Id. § 16-8-107(1.5)(a).
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tencing hearing, and only for a different limited purpose: to determine
"the existence or absence of any mitigating factor."75
The steps of a capital sentencing hearing may also differ in the bur-
den of proof, if any, and the level of certainty that may be required in the
decisions the jury is called upon to make. Although the prosecution bears
the burden of proof at step one-it must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors it has alleged-
neither party has a burden of proof during the remaining three steps.
Nevertheless, in step three, "a capital sentencer, in order to deliver a cer-
tain and reliable sentence, must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that any mitigating factors do not outweigh proven statutory aggravating
factors."7 Similarly, in step four, the jury may not return a sentencing
verdict of death unless each juror is "convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant should be sentenced to death."77 The purpose of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in steps three and four "is not
to fulfill the traditional function of providing guidance in fact-finding but
is to communicate to the jurors the degree of confidence they must have
in the correctness of their ultimate conclusion before they can return a
verdict of death." 8
At the end of the sentencing hearing, if the jury returns a sentencing
verdict of death, it is binding on the trial court "unless the court deter-
mines, and sets forth in writing the basis and reasons for such determina-
tion, that the verdict of the jury is clearly erroneous as contrary to the
weight of the evidence, in which case the court shall sentence the de-
fendant to life imprisonment."79 If the jury is unable to reach a unani-
mous sentencing verdict as to the appropriate sentence, the trial court
must discharge the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.80
In sum, the first three steps of Colorado's capital sentencing process
resemble a weighing state.8' However, the fourth step, during "which the
jury [must] consider[] all relevant evidence without necessarily giving
special consideration to [the statutory aggravating factors or mitigating
factors], resembles the selection stage of a non-weighing state."82 This
four-step statutory structure satisfies Eighth Amendment requirements
because the first three steps "constitutionally narrow the class of murder-
ers to those who are eligible for imposition of the death penalty, and the
75. Id. § 16-8-107(1.5)(b).
76. People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 456 (Colo. 1994).
77. Id. (quoting People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 797 (Colo. 1990)).
78. Id. (quoting Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 796).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c).
80. Id § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d).




fourth step affords the sentencing body unlimited discretion to sentence
the defendant o life imprisonment instead of death."
III. THE CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING IN PEOPLE V. HOLMES
In a pretrial order in the Holmes case, the court ruled that, in the
event a sentencing hearing was necessary, it would be trifurcated.8 Dur-
ing jury selection, the court informed prospective jurors about this ruling
and provided detailed instructions related to the three phases into which
it intended to divide any capital sentencing hearing.8 5 Consistent with its
trifurcation ruling and its concomitant jury selection instructions, at the
end of the guilt portion of the trial, following the jury's guilty verdicts on
all of the Murder in the First Degree counts, the court broke up the sen-
tencing hearing into three distinct phases: Phase One, which consisted of
step one; Phase Two, which consisted of steps two and three; and
Phase Three, which consisted of step four.86 To avoid confusion, the
court did not discuss with prospective jurors or seated jurors the four
steps outlined in the case law in Colorado. Instead, the court consistently
referred to the three phases of a sentencing hearing.87
The sentencing hearing was divided in this manner for various rea-
sons. First, the court was concerned that, given the particular circum-
stances of the case, requiring the jury to conduct the entire analysis all at
once would make it difficult to follow the process and to comply with all
of the court's instructions.88 Second, by splitting up the sentencing hear-
ing, the court provided guidance to counsel in terms of the evidence that
could be presented, the purpose for which it could be presented, and the
arguments that could be advanced at each juncture of the sentencing
hearing.89 Third, the procedure employed allowed the court to exert bet-
ter control over the sentencing hearing because veryone understood the
rules that applied at each phase.90
83. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003).
84. See Order D-142, supra note 15, at 4. Neither party raised an objection to trifurcation of
the sentencing hearing.
85. See Order D-269, supra note 3, at Attachment 3, at 5-8.
86. Order D-142, supra note 15, at 4-5.
87. The court consolidated steps two and three into Phase Two because the jury's determina-
tion in step two will necessarily be reflected in its determination in step three. Stated differently, the
jury's finding as to whether any mitigating factors exist will always be a component of the jury's
determination regarding whether it is unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
mitigating factors do not weigh more heavily in the balance than the proven aggravating factors.
Notably, the death penalty statute states that the jury's sentencing verdict must be based on three
considerations: (1) whether at least one aggravating factor has been proven by the prosecution; (2)
"whether sufficient mitigating factors exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found
to exist;" and (3) based on factors (1) and (2), "whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment" without the possibility of parole. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)
(2016).
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Phase One included step one exclusively. Because the jury could
consider evidence presented uring the guilt portion of the trial,91 the
prosecution chose not to present any evidence in Phase One. In light of
the prosecution's decision, and considering that the prosecution had the
burden of proof, the defense did not present any evidence in Phase One
either.92 After the court read the Phase One instructions to the jury, the
prosecution made a closing argument. Since the defense elected not to
make a closing argument, the prosecution did not have an opportunity to
make a rebuttal closing argument.93 Immediately thereafter, the court
asked the jury to deliberate and to determine whether the prosecution had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the
aggravating factors alleged.94
One of the instructions informed the jury that, in reaching its Phase
One sentencing verdicts, it could consider any evidence presented in the
guilt portion of the trial with one exception: it was not allowed to consid-
er any evidence acquired for the first time from a communication derived
from the defendant's mental processes during the course of a court-
ordered sanity examination.95 The court reminded the jury that such evi-
dence had been admitted during the guilt portion of the trial for the lim-
ited purpose of considering the issues raised by the defendant's plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity.96 The court then explained that the issue
of the defendant's sanity was no longer in dispute, as the jury had reject-
ed the insanity defense and had found the defendant guilty on all the
murder counts.
On each murder count, the jury unanimously found that the prosecu-
tion had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, he following four statutory
aggravating factors alleged: (1) that the defendant intentionally, know-
ingly, or with universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life generally killed two or more persons during the
commission of the same criminal episode; (2) that the defendant, in the
commission of the offense of Murder in the First Degree, knowingly
created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the twelve
victims of the crimes of Murder in the First Degree; (3) that the defend-
ant committed the offense of Murder in the First Degree in an especially
91. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b).
92. Since no evidence was presented, neither party was allowed to make an opening state-
ment. However, before the parties' closing arguments, the court did provide some introductory
instructions to the jury. See Phase One Instructions, supra note 16, at 11-13.
93. Pursuant to a pretrial order, the prosecution had the first closing argument and the ability
to make a rebuttal argument in the event the defense elected to make a closing argument. See Order
D-142, supra note 15, at 5. The court reasoned that the prosecution was entitled to make the first
closing argument and a rebuttal closing argument because it had the burden of proof in this phase of
the sentencing hearing. Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(d).
94. See Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 27, 2015)
[hereinafter Phase One Verdict Forms].




heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; and (4) that the defendant committed
the offense of Murder in the First Degree while lying in wait or from
ambush.97 The only statutory aggravating factor alleged by the prosecu-
tion that the jury found was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt was
that the defendant intentionally killed a child who had not yet attained
twelve years of age.98 Given the sentencing hearing Phase One verdicts,
the sentencing hearing continued to Phase Two on all the murder counts.
During Phase Two, which, as indicated, consisted of steps two and
three, each party gave a brief opening statement followed by the de-
fense's presentation of mitigation evidence.99 The defense relied on evi-
dence, presented during both the guilt portion of the trial and the sentenc-
ing hearing, of the following statutory mitigating factors:
(1) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(2) [That] [t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate [the] wrongfulness
of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of
[the] law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to consti-
tute a defense to [the] prosecution [of the crimes];
(3) The emotional state of the defendant at the time [of] the crime[s]
(4) The absence of any significant prior conviction;
(5) The extent of the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement
. . . or agencies; and
(6) [The catchall category relating to] [a]ny other evidence intro-
duced ... bear[ing] on the question of mitigation.00
Additionally, relying on the catchall category in the statute, the defense
submitted an extensive twenty-one page, sixty-two paragraph theory of
mitigation instruction, urging jurors to find additional mitigating factors
in the evidence introduced during the guilt portion of the trial and the
sentencing hearing, as summarized in that instruction.01
The prosecution had an opportunity to present additional evidence
to rebut the mitigating factors presented by the defendant but chose not
to do so. Instead, in its closing argument, the prosecution relied on the
evidence introduced during the guilt portion of the trial to rebut the de-
fense's mitigation. Pursuant to a pretrial order, after the court read the
Phase Two instructions to the jury, the defense made its closing argu-
97. Phase One Verdict Forms, supra note 94.
98. Id.
99. Before the parties' opening statements, the court gave the jury Phase Two introductory
instructions. See Phase Two Instructions, supra note 16, at Nos. 1-3.
100. Id. at No. 3.
101. See id. at No. 4.
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ment, which was followed by the prosecution's closing argument; neither
party was allowed a rebuttal closing argument.102 The court then asked
the jury to deliberate.
Under the court's instructions, during deliberations, the jurors were
required to first individually determine whether one or more mitigating
factors existed (step two). Each juror was then directed to individually
determine what weight to give each mitigating factor and to then weigh
the mitigating factors that existed and the aggravating factors proven by
the prosecution (step three).
One of the instructions informed the jury that, in reaching its Phase
Two sentencing verdicts, it could consider all of the evidence admitted
during the guilt portion of the trial and the sentencing hearing with the
following caveat: evidence acquired for the first time from a communica-
tion derived from the defendant's mental processes during the course of a
court-ordered sanity examination could only be considered for the lim-
ited purpose of determining the existence, or absence, of any mitigating
factors. 103 This was consistent with a contemporaneous limiting instruc-
tion the court provided multiple times during Phase Two of the sentenc-
ing hearing. The court cautioned the jury that such evidence could not be
considered as evidence of aggravation or for any other purpose.'1 Thus,
the jury was instructed that evidence that had been admitted during the
guilt portion of the trial for the limited purpose of considering the issues
raised by the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, which
the jury was prohibited from considering during its Phase One delibera-
tions, could be considered now but for a different limited purpose.
The Phase Two verdict form for each murder count contained a
YES or NO verdict question: "Does the jury unanimously find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors that exist do not outweigh
the aggravating factors proven by the prosecution in Phase [One] of the
sentencing hearing?"10 5 The jury answered "YES" to this verdict ques-
tion on each of the murder counts.'06
102. Because neither party had a burden of proof in Phase Two or Phase Three, the court ruled
that the defense would make the first closing argument, followed by the prosecution's closing argu-
ment, at the end of Phase Two, while the prosecution would make the first closing argument, fol-
lowed by the defense's closing argument, at the end of Phase Three. See Order D-142, supra note
15, at 5-6. The court also decided that at the end of Phase Three, each side would be allowed one
rebuttal closing argument. Id. at 6.
103. Phase Two Instructions, supra note 16, at No. 16.
104. Id.
105. Phase Two Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Phase Two Verdict Forms].
106. The court informed the jury that if it answered "NO" on a verdict form, the sentencing
hearing would end with respect to that count and the court would be required to sentence the defend-
ant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on that count. See Phase Two Verdict
Forms, supra note 105. Because the jury answered all of the Phase Two verdict questions in the
affirmative, the sentencing hearing proceeded to Phase Three on all of the murder counts. See id.
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Following the jury's determination at the end of Phase Two, which
rendered the defendant eligible to receive a death sentence, the sentenc-
ing hearing moved to Phase Three, the selection stage in Colorado's
capital sentencing scheme. At the beginning of Phase Three, each party
gave a brief opening statement.107 Consistent with certain parameters
established by the court, the prosecution presented a limited amount of
victim impact evidence through thirteen witnesses and some exhibits.
The defense chose not to present additional evidence. After reading the
Phase Three instructions to the jury, each side, starting with the prosecu-
tion, made a closing argument. Because the prosecution elected not to
make a rebuttal closing argument, the defense did not have an opportuni-
ty to make a rebuttal closing argument. Therefore, following the de-
fense's closing argument, the court asked the jury to deliberate one final
time to determine the appropriate punishment for the defendant on each
murder count: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
death.
The final verdict forms gave the jury three options on each murder
count:
1. We, the jury, are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appropriate sentence for the defendant, James Eagan
Holmes, on this count is a DEATH SENTENCE.
II. We, the jury, are not unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appropriate sentence for the defendant, James Eagan
Holmes, on this count is a death sentence, and we, the jury, unani-
mously agree that the defendant should be sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE on
this count.
Ill. We, the jury, DO NOT HAVE A UNANIMOUS FINAL
SENTENCING VERDICT on this count, and, we, the jury, under-
stand that, as a result, the Court will impose a sentence of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE on
this count. 108
The jury chose the last option on all the verdict forms, indicating that it
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the murder counts in
Phase Three of the sentencing hearing. Following the reading of the ver-
dicts, the jury was discharged. Approximately two weeks later, in ac-
cordance with section 18-1.3-1201(2)(d), the court held a three-day final
107. Before the parties' opening statements, the court gave the jury Phase Three introductory
instructions. See Phase Three Instructions, supra note 16.
108. Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, supra note 9.
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sentencing hearing to afford all of the victims an opportunity to be heard.
On August 26, 2015, the court sentenced the defendant on the twenty-
four First Degree Murder counts to twelve consecutive life sentences
without the possibility of parole, one for each deceased victim. The court
then imposed a total of 3,318 years in the Department of Corrections and
five years of mandatory parole on the remaining counts, to be served
consecutive to the twelve life sentences without the possibility of pa-
role.1 09
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no direct authority in Colorado on how this State's four-
part capital sentencing scheme should be given effect during a capital
sentencing hearing. When the court decided that any sentencing hearing
in the Holmes case would be trifurcated, it did so, not because either par-
ty requested it-neither did-but because it concluded that it was the
most prudent course of action under the specific circumstances in-
volved. 10 Of course, when the court made this decision, there was no
way to know, with any degree of certainty, whether its assessment of the
potential perils was well-founded. Nor could the Court predict with any
precision whether trifurcation of the sentencing hearing would allay its
concerns.
Now that the proceedings in Holmes have been completed, I am
convinced that, under the circumstances present in the case, dividing the
sentencing hearing into three separate phases, and requiring the jury to
deliberate at the end of each phase, was the wisest approach. While such
trifurcation created more work for the attorneys, the jury, and the court,
and likely extended the length of the proceedings, it was clearly the most
suitable procedure to minimize the risk of confusing the jury. Had the
sentencing hearing not been trifurcated in the Holmes case, the jury
would have received the myriad sentencing rules and instructions all at
once and would have been left to its own devices to navigate through the
capital sentencing labyrinth as it determined whether the defendant
should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role or death.
109. Colorado requires a life sentence without the possibility of parole for any conviction for
Murder in the First Degree. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) (2016).
110. See Order D-142, supra note 15, at 5.
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THE "EVIL" DEFENDANT AND THE "HOLDOUT" JUROR:
UNPACKING THE MYTHS OF THE AURORA THEATER
SHOOTING CASE AS WE PONDER THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN COLORADO
KRISTEN NELSON, TAMARA BRADY, AND DANIEL KINGt
ABSTRACT
On August 7, 2015, after a trial lasting a total of almost seven
months, an Arapahoe County jury returned a verdict that spared our cli-
ent, James Holmes, from the death penalty.' Mr. Holmes was convicted
of killing twelve people and wounding seventy others at a midnight
premiere of The Dark Knight Rises at the Century 16 movie theater in
Aurora, Colorado, on July 20, 2012.2 His crime was one of the most hor-
rific and tragic acts of mass violence in recent American history.3
Following the jury's life verdict, two troubling narratives have been
advanced in the public discourse about the case. The first is that while
Mr. Holmes may suffer from some form of mental illness, he is also
"evil," and his "evil" nature, rather than his mental illness, drove him to
commit these unspeakable acts.4 The second is that a lone "holdout" on
the jury who refused to budge in his or her opposition to the death penal-
ty thwarted the remainder of the jurors from imposing the death sentence
they thought Mr. Holmes deserved.
t Kristen Nelson is a Deputy State Public Defender with the Office of the Colorado State
Public Defender, Tamara Brady is a Chief Trial Deputy for the Office of the Colorado State Public
Defender, and Daniel King is a Chief Trial Deputy for the Office of the Colorado State Public De-
fender. We would like to specially acknowledge the members of the defense team, as well as others
to whom we owe special thanks: Rebekka Higgs, Katherine Spengler, John Gonglach, Kevin Bishop,
Rhonda Crandall, Sherilyn Koslosky, Nova Whorton, Jonathan Coen, Nicholas Sweet, Rachel Fin-
ger, and Jason Middleton.
I. See Final Sentencing Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. Aug. I1, 2015) (referencing the Final Sentencing Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts
sought against James Holmes); Jack Healy, Life Sentence for James Holmes, Aurora Theater Gun-
man, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/us/jury-decides-fate-of-
james-holmes-aurora-theater-gunman.html.
2. See Verdict Forms, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 22, 2015)
(referencing the Verdict Forms for all twenty-four counts sought against James Holmes); Jack Healy
& Julie Turkewitz, Guilty Verdict for James Holmes in Aurora Attack, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/james-holmes-guilty-in-aurora-movie-theater-shooting.html.
3. See Elizabeth Chuck & Helen Kwong, Tragic List: The Deadliest Mass Shootings in U.S.
History, NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/deadliest-
mass-shootings-u-s-history-n437086.
4. See, e.g., Carol McKinley, Coffee with George Brauchler: Theater Shooting Case DA Sits
Back, CU NEWS CORPS (Aug. 22, 2015), http://cunewscorps.com/3579/aurora-theater-trial/coffee-
with-george-brauchler-theater-shooting-case-da-lays-back/.
5. See, e.g., Sadie Gurman, Theater Shooter Spared from Death Penalty by One Juror's
Holdout, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2015, 10:07 AM),
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In this Article, we examine each of these narratives in turn. In doing
so, we first unpack them. We conclude that, while convenient and per-
haps even understandable, they are overly simplistic. Indeed, upon fur-
ther scrutiny, neither of them have a solid factual or legal basis. We then
explain why it is not only unhelpful but problematic to continue to legit-
imize and promote these myths about the case. Finally, in light of our
discussion about these false narratives, we consider what lessons about
the death penalty Coloradoans should draw from the case as we ponder
the future of capital punishment in our state.
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I. THE MYTH OF THE "EVIL" DEFENDANT
In the immediate wake of the tragedy, and long before any infor-
mation about Mr. Holmes's mental health was publicly available, the
phrase "evil" cropped up in the media's coverage of the case. Addressing
a crowd in Fort Myers, Florida, on Friday, July 20, 2012, just hours after
the shooting, the press quoted President Barack Obama as stating, "Such
violence, such evil is senseless. It's beyond reason."6 On July 21, 2012, a
columnist for the Washington Post wrote, "All such crimes can be de-
scribed as senseless, or as the manifestation of evil, but what unfolded
Friday at the midnight showing of the new Batman movie was something
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/theater-shooter-spared-from-death-penalty-by-one-jurors-
holdout 55cf4564e4b0ab468d9d7a8b.
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that so far lacks even a madman's explanation." Just four days after the
shooting, a clinical psychiatrist published an article on Psychology To-
day's website entitled "The Colorado Shooter: Psychotic Victim or Evil
Killer?"8
The phrase continued to appear in headlines once the trial got un-
derway. "Insane or evil? Trial fills in details of Colorado movie gunman
Holmes," questioned the headline of an article published during the mer-
its phase of the trial.9 At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial,
the media's coverage pitted the prosecution's and defense's final closing
arguments as a battle of "'Evil' vs. 'mercy.",to
The narrative that Mr. Holmes was not just mentally ill, but "evil,"
picked up intensity following the final sentencing verdict. "I think he's
got a mental illness," the elected district attorney, George Brauchler, told
a reporter in an interview published online several days before the court
formally sentenced Mr. Holmes." "I don't know what that mental illness
is, but there's no doubt he thinks differently than you or I do and thank-
fully most of the rest of the world."l 2 According to the article, Mr. Brau-
chler then continued:
It's interesting to note that when the first DSM (Editor's note: Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) came out, it had
60 diagnosable afflictions. The one that came out two years ago that
we relied upon heavily in this case has 400. Are people getting more
mentally ill or are we just coming up with ways to diagnose aberrant
behavior and diagnose away evil? One thing is clear about this guy:
Mental illness and evil are not mutually exclusive. Could he have a
7. Joel Achenbach, Motive Still a Blank in Aurora Shooter's Story, WASH. POST (July 21,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/motive-still-a-blank-in-aurora-
shooters-story/2012/07/21/gJQAD69TOW story.html.
8. Dale Archer, The Colorado Shooter: Psychotic Victim or Evil Killer?, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(July 24, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201207/the-
colorado-shooter-psychotic-victim-or-evil-killer. In the article, Archer in fact hypothesizes that Mr.
Holmes is mentally ill and was psychotic at the time of the crime, and he advocates for the early
detection and treatment of mental illness. See id. Still, the article is notable for its sensational head-
line contrasting mental illness against the alternative, "evil."
9. Keith Coffman & Daniel Wallis, Insane or Evil? Trial Fills in Details of Colorado Movie
Gunman Holmes, REUTERS (May 1, 2015, 3:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/01/us-
usa-shooting-denver-idUSKBNONM4D320150501.
10. Maria L. La Ganga, James Holmes Jurors Begin Final Deliberations: 'Evil' vs. 'Mercy,'
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-james-holmes-
deliberations-20150806-story.htmi. This headline was derived from the question the prosecution
posed to the jury during its final arguments: "[W]hat is the appropriate sentence for such horror,
such evil[?]," as well as the defense's argument, "James Holmes i  sick, and he is damaged. ...
Mercy is what puts an end to violence. . . . Justice without mercy is raw vengeance." See id. (fourth
alternation in original) (quoting first Closing Argument of George Brauchler, Arapahoe Cnty. Dist.
Atty.; then quoting Closing Argument of Tamara Brady, Chief Deputy Public Defender).
I1. McKinley, supra note 4.
12. Id.
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mental illness and still make evil decisions knowing they're evil? The
jury said unequivocally and very quickly: Absolutely he could.13
In an online article published by People.com, the narrative of evil
versus mental illness was again advanced:
Holmes' [sic] attorneys had argued that he was mentally ill at the
time of the shooting.
Brauchler disagrees.
"He made a conscious, deliberate decision to do wrong," he says, his
voice rising slightly. "He knew it was wrong. He was writing that in
his journal. He said it was evil and he hated mankind. He knew he
was murdering human beings, and he wanted to do it because he
wanted to be evil."14
A day later, an article covering the conclusion of the formal sen-
tencing proceeding began as follows, "Condemning movie massacre
gunman James Holmes to 12 life sentences and the maximum 3,318
years in prison for his rampage in a midnight screening of a Batman film,
a Colorado judge said on Wednesday that evil and mental illness are not
mutually exclusive."'5 The article continues, "[The judge] said whatever
illness Holmes may have suffered, there was overwhelming evidence that
a significant part of his conduct had been driven by 'moral obliquity,
mental depravity, . . . anger, hatred, revenge, or similar evil condi-
tions. ,,16
And approximately a month later, an online article began, "There is
legal insanity, and then there is pure evil, according to 1 8 th Judicial Dis-
trict Attorney George Brauchler."17 The article, reporting on a speech
Mr. Brauchler gave to Logan County Republicans "[flollowing an after-
noon of golf Sept. 26 at Riverview Golf Course," further reports that Mr.
Brauchler told the group, "When evil showed up there, it had been plan-
ning to do what it was going to do for over 2 /2 months."'
13. Id.
14. Steve Helling, Aurora Shooting Prosecutor George Brauchler: The James Holmes Trial
'Will Always Stay with Me,' PEOPLE MAG. (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:30 PM),
http://www.people.com/article/james-holmes-prosecutor-george-brauchler-talks-emotional-toll
(quoting statements made by George Brauchler to People magazine).
15. Keith Coffman, Colorado Movie Gunman Sentenced to 12 Lifetimes and 3,318 Years,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-usa-shooting-
denver-idUSKCNOQV I RV20150826.
16. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting statement of Carlos Samour, Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct.
Judge).
17. Forrest Hershberger, Prosecutor Says Holmes Case Was 'Pure Evil,' S. PLATTE SENTINEL
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A. What Is "Evil"?
Before we delve into assessing whether there are facts and evidence
to support this narrative of evil, it is worth pondering for a moment what
"evil" means. How is it defined? How is it measured?
There is no question that Mr. Holmes's act of opening fire on a
crowd of innocent moviegoers in the early morning hours of July 20,
2012, was incredibly horrific, shocking, and senseless. Nor can anyone
dispute that his actions damaged and destroyed the lives of hundreds, if
not thousands, of people and caused an incomprehensible amount of
grief and suffering in the community of Aurora and beyond. If the sole
metric by which "evil" is identified and measured was the amount of
harm caused by a person, then there would not be much debate about the
application of this term to Mr. Holmes or to his actions. Even Mr.
Holmes himself, in an online chat with his former girlfriend four months
before the shooting, used the phrase "evil" in an effort to explain that
what his broken mind was urging him to do-kill people-was a very
bad thing.19
But the narrative about evil that has been advanced in the media
seems to be about much more than just the amount of harm caused by
Mr. Holmes or his act in and of itself. Branding Mr. Holmes as "evil,"
regardless of, or perhaps in addition to, any mental illness he suffers
from, implies a judgment about Mr. Holmes's character, his true nature,
and his humanity-or, the proponents of this narrative would likely
claim, his lack thereof. As psychiatrist James L. Knoll puts it, "The word
evil . . . . It is 'emotionally loaded, morally judgmental, full of brimstone
and fire.' . . . Labeling someone as evil suggests that he or she is beyond
redemption. Defining someone as evil also suggests that the person is
permanently beyond human understanding . . .. 20
Yet identifying and labeling someone as "evil" may not be as sim-
ple as we might wish it to be. As Professor Carol Steiker argues in a cri-
tique of a recent book by legal and political philosopher Matthew Kra-
mer, which advances the eradication of evil from society as a moral justi-
fication for the death penalty, "[Tihe essential nature of other people is
more obdurately opaque than Kramer is willing to admit .... She
adds, "[W]hat we think we know about unquestioned evil is, in fact, up
19. Michael Roberts, Read Theater Shooter's Google Chats with Ex-GF: "What I Feel Like
Doing is Evil," WESTWORD (June 16, 2015, 7:01 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/read-
theater-shooters-google-chats-with-ex-gf-what-i-feel-like-doing-is-evil-6810733.
20. James L. Knoll, IV, The Recurrence of an Illusion: The Concept of "Evil" in Forensic
Psychiatry, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 105, 106 (2008) (citation omitted) (quoting June
Price Tangney & Jeff Stuewig, A Moral-Emotional Perspective on Evil Persons and Evil Deeds, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 327, 338 (Arthur Miller ed., 2004)).
21. Carol S. Steiker, Can/Should We Purge Evil Through Capital Punishment?, 9 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 367, 370 (2015) (reviewing MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2011)).
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for questioning and may be quite different from what it appears so bla-
tantly to be."22 Steiker worries "about our ability to distinguish the quali-
ty of moral depravity from the symptoms of defects or diseases that
might not only remove an actor from the realm of the extravagantly evil,
but even place him or her outside the legitimate reach of the criminal
sanction."2 3 She questions whether "the line between 'evil' on the one
hand, and 'sick' or 'broken' on the other, is sufficiently clear."24
Certainly, this is a line we should be concerned with before writing
Mr. Holmes off as "pure evil" because, as we explain below, the evi-
dence presented at trial unequivocally and conclusively demonstrated
that he is seriously and chronically mentally ill.
B. Evidence of Mr. Holmes's Mental Illness
Prior to trial, Mr. Holmes underwent sanity examinations conducted
by four different psychiatrists-two of whom the court appointed and
two of whom the defense retained.25 While the court-appointed doctors
disagreed with defense experts on the issue of whether Mr. Holmes met
the technical legal definition of insanity,26 all four psychiatrists funda-
mentally agreed on two important issues. First, they each concluded that
Mr. Holmes suffers from a serious and chronic mental illness that is on
the schizophrenia spectrum of disorders.2 7 Second, every single one of





25. Mr. Holmes was forensically examined by Dr. Jeffrey Metzner and Dr. William Reid,
both of whom were appointed by the court, and by Dr. Raquel Gur and Dr. Jonathan Woodcock,
who were hired by the defense.
26. In Colorado, a person is insane if the person is (a) "so diseased or defective in mind at the
time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect
to that act," or (b) if the person "suffer[s] from a condition of mind caused by mental disease or
defect that prevented the person from forming a culpable mental state that is an essential element of
a crime charged." COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-101.5 (2016).
27. Dr. Metzner testified that in his opinion, Mr. Holmes's "most likely diagnoses were
schizoaffective disorder, social anxiety disorder, and trichotillomania." Transcript of Record at 83,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CR 1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 8, 2015) [hereinafter June 8 Transcript].
Dr. Woodcock likewise opined that Mr. Holmes suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Transcript of
Record at 142, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 25, 2015) [hereinafter
June 25 Transcript]. Dr. Reid diagnosed Mr. Holmes with schizotypal personality disorder and
testified that he "may well meet the criteria for . . . delusional disorder." Transcript of Record at 63,
People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 4, 2015) [hereinafter June 4 Transcript].
Dr. Gur, an expert on schizophrenia at the University of Pennsylvania, diagnosed Mr. Holmes with
schizophrenia. Transcript of Record at 160, People v. Holmes, 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
7, 2012) [hereinafter July 7 Transcript]. Dr. Reid testified that, "the diagnoses may differ a little, but
I want to make it clear that we're all in the same -- in my opinion -- in the same ballpark." June 4
Transcript, supra, at 112.
28. See, e.g., June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 101-02. The jury also heard testimony from
two neuropsychologists who conducted testing on Mr. Holmes: Dr. Rose Manguso, who is employed
by the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo and conducted psychological testing of Mr.
Holmes along with another psychologist, B. Thomas Gray, at the request of Dr. Metzner, and Dr.
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According to the experts, the most pronounced symptoms of Mr.
Holmes's mental illness at the time of the shooting were delusions and
significant negative symptoms.2 9 A delusion is a "fixed beliefl] that [is]
not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence."30 Mr. Holmes's
primary delusional belief3 was that he could increase his "human capi-
tal" by killing other people.32 Negative symptoms are associated with
disruptions to normal emotions and behaviors. Mr. Holmes's negative
symptoms included a flat affect (diminished emotional expression),
alogia (paucity of speech), avolition (a decrease in motivated, self-
initiated, purposeful activities), anhedonia (decreased ability to experi-
ence pleasure from positive stimuli), and asociality (lack of interest in
social interactions).33 In addition to these symptoms, there was also tes-
timony at trial that Mr. Holmes had unusual perceptual experiences, such
as seeing flickerings or shadows in the months before the shootings,3 4
and exhibited paranoid thinking and excessive and chronic social anxie-
ty.35 Mr. Holmes also experienced a decrease in his level of function-
ing-including in his academic performance-in the period of time lead-
ing up to the shooting, which is consistent with a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia. He further reported to examiners that he felt depressed in the
Robert Hanlon, a neuropsychologist at Northwestern University, who conducted testing at the re-
quest of the defense. See Transcript of Record at 20-263, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 2, 2015) [hereinafter July 2 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Robert
Hanlon); Transcript of Record at 92-206, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
1, 2015) [hereinafter July 1 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Rose M. Manguso); June 8
Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner). The testing
results of all of these doctors were consistent with a psychotic mental illness uch as schizoaffective
disorder or schizophrenia. See July 2 Transcript, supra, at I10-11; July I Transcript, supra, at 144-
45, 154-70. Moreover, the testing revealed absolutely no indication whatsoever that Mr. Holmes
was feigning his illness. See July 1 Transcript, supra, at 120-25; July 2 Transcript, supra, at 77-82.
29. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 23-25, 48-49, 62, 121 (referencing the
testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 100-01, 104 (referencing the
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 149-50, 154-55 (refer-
encing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner); June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 65-66, 70-73
(referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
30. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 87 (5th ed. 2013).
31. Dr. Reid equivocated somewhat bout whether Mr. Holmes technically met the criteria for
delusional disorder. Nevertheless, he testified that "I'm pretty well convinced he has some experi-
ences of delusion. . . . I believe, at various times, he has had them and probably has some chronic
delusions as well." June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 64. With respect to the "human capital"
belief in particular, Dr. Reid questioned whether it may be a "philosophical belief' but ultimately
stated, "I lean toward the idea of delusion." Id. at 65-66.
32. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 136-38 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Raquel Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 164-65 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jona-
than Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 78-79 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jef-
frey Metzner).
33. See, e.g., June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 155, 187.
34. See, e.g., June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 71. Doctors differed in their opinions as to
whether these visual perceptions were, in fact, hallucinations.
35. See id at 71-73.
36. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 140 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 181 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner);
June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 55-56 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid); Tran-
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months leading up to the shooting and had chronic homicidal and suicid-
al thoughts.37
In addition to the symptoms of mental illness he exhibited around
the time of the shooting, Mr. Holmes also became floridly psychotic in
the Arapahoe County Jail approximately four months after his arrest.38
He was transported to the Denver Health Medical Center where numer-
ous physicians and psychiatrists treated him.39 All of these doctors con-
curred that Mr. Holmes was suffering from psychosis and delirium and
was not malingering or feigning his symptoms.40 Evidence of this florid-
ly psychotic episode introduced at trial lent further support to the foren-
script of Record at 44-45, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 3, 2015)
[hereinafter June 3 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
37. See, e.g., June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 140-41 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Jonathan Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 152, 169-70 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Jeffrey Metzner); Transcript of Record at 15-16, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. June 1, 2015) [hereinafter June 1 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William
Reid). Mr. Holmes voluntarily sought mental health treatment in the spring of 2012 and disclosed to
Dr. Lynne Fenton, his treating psychiatrist, that he was having homicidal thoughts three to four times
a day during their first meeting. Transcript of Record at 184, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522
(Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 16, 2015) [hereinafter June 16 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Lynne Fenton).
38. Mr. Holmes began exhibiting bizarre and disorganized behavior in the jail, including lying
naked and catatonic in a frozen position on the floor on his stomach with his arms twisted up and his
legs bent up in the air, smearing feces, licking the walls, speaking gibberish, eating paper cups, and
attempting to do a backwards summersault with a cup on his penis. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at
48-53, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015) [hereinafter June 30
Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Sandra Paggen); Transcript of Record at 178, People v.
Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June 29, 2015) [hereinafter June 29 Transcript] (refer-
encing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland); June 29 Transcript, supra, at 281-82 (referencing
the testimony of Sean Robison). He became unresponsive to jail staff and refused to eat or drink as a
result of auditory hallucinations in the form of voices telling him not to eat. See, e.g., June 30 Tran-
script, supra, at 54-55 (referencing the testimony of Sandra Paggen); June 30 Transcript, supra, at
123-24 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra, at 194
(referencing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland).
39. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 14-34, People v. Holmes, 12CRI 522 (Arapahoe Dist.
Ct. July 6, 2015) [hereinafter July 6 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Christopher Col-
well); June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 115-20 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth
Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 63-70, 113, 171, 174-75 (referencing the testi-
mony of Dr. Rachel Davis, Dr. Phillip Weintraub, and Dr. John Craig Holland).
40. Four doctors from Denver Health Medical Center (three psychiatrists and an emergency
medicine physician) testified at trial. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The psychiatrists
explained that Mr. Holmes exhibited many signs and symptoms consistent with psychosis, including
catatonia, disorganized behavior, nonsensical speech, and auditory and visual hallucinations. See,
e.g., June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 119-20, 123-25 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Eliza-
beth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 73-74, 80-82 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Rachel Davis); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 190-91, 214 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. John Craig Holland). Mr. Holmes was administered antipsychotic medication in the hospital,
which dramatically improved his condition. See, e.g., June 30 Transcript, supra note 38, at 121
(referencing the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Lowdermilk); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 119
(referencing the testimony of Dr. Phillip Weintraub); June 29 Transcript, supra note 38, at 180-81,
199 (referencing the testimony of Dr. John Craig Holland). The emergency medicine physician, Dr.
Colwell, testified that when Mr. Holmes first arrived at the hospital, he responded to questions with
"nonsensical words" and was moderately dehydrated, but his dehydration level on its own was not
severe enough to have caused the delirium and altered mental status Mr. Holmes was exhibiting at
that time. See July 6 Transcript, supra note 38, at 25, 32-33 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Chris-
topher Colwell).
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sic experts' conclusions that Mr. Holmes suffers from a serious and
chronic mental illness on the schizophrenia spectrum of disorders.
There was also uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Holmes was "ge-
netically loaded" to develop a psychotic disorder.42 There is a history of
significant mental illness on both sides of Mr. Holmes's family.4 3 At
trial, the defense introduced evidence that Mr. Holmes's maternal grand-
father suffered from a psychotic illness, for which he was hospitalized,
and that Mr. Holmes's paternal grandfather also suffered from a severe
and disabling mental illness that required hospitalization." In addition,
Mr. Holmes's aunt-the twin sister of his father-has schizoaffective
disorder, which is the same illness with which court-appointed psychia-
trist Dr. Jeffrey Metzner and defense-retained psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock diagnosed Mr. Holmes.45 The experts testified at trial that
schizophrenia is a disease with a strong genetic component and that Mr.
Holmes was at an increased risk of developing schizophrenia s a result
of his family history of mental illness." Mr. Holmes was also twenty-
four years old at the time of the shooting, which is within the age range
during which males most frequently experience the onset of schizophre-
nia and related illnesses.47
C. Did "Mental Illness" and "Evil" Reallv Coexist in This Case?
Nevertheless, even in the face of this strong, unrefuted evidence of
mental illness, the questions evoked by the "evil" narrative remain: Even
if Mr. Holmes is mentally ill, how much of a role did that mental illness
play in the shooting? Did "moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion
growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil
41. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 158-60 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Raquel Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 86, 141-43 (referencing the testimony of Dr.
Jeffrey Meztner); Transcript of Record at 40-42, 125, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe
Dist. Ct. June 5, 2015) [hereinafter June 5 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. William
Reid).
42. See June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153.
43. See June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 157-58 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jona-
than Woodcock).
44. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 82 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Meztner);
June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 87 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
45. See, e.g., July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 83 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 159 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Wood-
cock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner);
June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 83-86 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
46. Dr. Metzner testified:
[T]here's also no question that there's a genetic component to schizophrenia. Doesn't
mean if you have a family history of schizophrenia that you're going to get schizophre-
nia. But you're more likely to get schizophrenia if you have a family history; just like if
you have a family history of heart disease, you're more likely to get it.
June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 153. Dr. Reid noted, "[l]t's certainly true that, if certain kinds of
close relatives have clear schizophrenia, your risk goes up substantially." June 5 Transcript, supra
note 41, at 79.
47. See June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 152 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner).
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conditions,"4 8 rather than mental illness, lead Mr. Holmes to commit this
horrible act of violence?
The prosecution's answer to this question at trial was yes.49 It inti-
mated that Mr. Holmes's motives to commit the shooting were largely
unrelated to whatever mental illness he had.o It suggested that Mr.
Holmes opened fire on the theater, not because of his delusional and psy-
chotic belief that he could increase his human capital by killing as many
people as possible, but because he became angry and disillusioned after
his first and only girlfriend broke up with him in early 2012, and he be-
gan to struggle academically in graduate school.5' In other words, its
theory was that Mr. Holmes somehow set his mental illness aside to
make reasoned decisions rooted instead in anger, hate, vengeance, and
selfishness. The prosecution posited that Mr. Holmes's mental illness did
not cause the shooting; instead, it merely coincided with these preexist-
ing character defects.52
However, none of the experts who forensically examined Mr.
Holmes endorsed this theory. To the contrary, all four of the psychiatrists
who testified at trial agreed that it was Mr. Holmes's mental illness, ra-
ther than some sort of bad character, that caused him to commit these
horrific crimes.
Dr. Metzner-the first court-appointed psychiatrist to examine Mr.
Holmes-made it unequivocally clear that, in his opinion, the tragic and
horrible shooting was a direct result of Mr. Holmes's illness and that,
without the mental illness, the shooting would never have taken place.3
Dr. Metzner further opined that, although Mr. Holmes did not meet the
criteria for legal insanity, it was very clear that his appreciation of the
wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired as a result of his
psychotic thinking.54
48. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101.5(l)(b) (2016). Colorado's insanity statute distinguishes
these conditions from a mental disease or defect that could cause a person to be legally insane. See
id. § 16-8-101.5 (defining "mental disease or defect" for purposes of legal insanity, and noting that
"care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease or defect with moral obliquity, mental
depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred evil condi-
tions").
49. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 196-97, 200-03, 205-09, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015) [hereinafter July 30 Transcript]; Transcript of Record
at 7-18, 20-23, 33-35, 46-48, 54-55, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRl522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
14, 2015) [hereinafter July 14 Transcript] (referencing an uncertified rough transcript); June 5 Tran-
script, supra note 41, at 153-54; Transcript of Record at 70, 85-90, 102, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2015) [hereinafter April 27 Transcript].
50. See, e.g., July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 88-90.
51. See, e.g., July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 210-12, 218-19; July 14 Transcript, supra
note 49, at 7-18, 20-23, 33-35, 46-48, 54-55; June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153-54; April 27
Transcript, supra note 49, at 70, 85-91.
52. See July 30 Transcript, supra note 49, at 88-90.
53. Transcript of Record at 89-92, People v. Holmes, No. 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July
27, 2015) [hereinafter July 27 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner).
54. Id.
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Dr. William Reid-the second court-appointed psychiatrist to ex-
amine Mr. Holmes-likewise testified as follows on cross-examination:
Q: And it's your opinion, sir, that, absent his mental condition, we
wouldn't be here at all, would we?
A: That's a true statement.
Q: This crime would never have taken place without this mental ill-
ness?
A: That's true in my opinion, yes.
Dr. Woodcock and Dr. Raquel Gur, the defense-retained psychia-
trists, also agreed. Dr. Woodcock testified that there was no doubt in his
mind that Mr. Holmes was psychotic when he saw him in the jail just
four days after the shooting and that he saw "no rational reason for the
shooting."56 Dr. Gur testified that she did not find a nonpsychotic reason
for the shooting, and she agreed that "there wouldn't have been a shoot-
ing at all" but for the existence of Mr. Holmes's psychotic illness.
Moreover, even the court-appointed experts who testified on the
prosecution's behalf during the merits phase of the trial roundly rejected
the prosecution's suggestion that Mr. Holmes committed the shooting
because of his failures in school as well as his personal life. Dr. Metzner
explained that, in his opinion, neither Mr. Holmes's breakup with his
girlfriend nor his academic difficulties caused him to commit the shoot-
ing.58 He explained that "it's very common to see someone who is - - has
the underlying genetic predisposition to schizophrenia to have their first
psychosis triggered by stress."59 In other words, the breakup and Mr.
Holmes's academic struggles were not causes of, or motives for, the
shooting, but rather potential triggers that precipitated his first psychotic
break.60 Dr. Reid likewise repudiated these motives as significant con-
tributors to Mr. Holmes's decision to commit the shooting.6 '
55. June 4 Transcript, supra note 27, at 125 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid).
56. Transcript of Record at 165, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. June
26, 2015) [hereinafter June 26 Transcript] (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock);
June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 103 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Woodcock).
57. July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur).
58. June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 151.
59. Id. at 152.
60. See id. at 151. However, Dr. Metzner explained that "I could be wrong on that" and that
Mr. Holmes may have become psychotic at the time that he did even without these stressful events in
his life, as "it could have just been the natural course of his illness," especially given that "the most
frequent onset of schizophrenia [in men] is in the early 20s." Id.
61. The prosecution attempted to downplay Dr. Reid's testimony on cross-examination that,
absent his mental illness, the crime would never have taken place, by asking him on redirect exami-
nation whether he agreed that "[b]ut for his girlfriend dumping him . . . could we say that this
wouldn't have happened?" Dr. Reid responded, "I wouldn't go so far -- he was planning pretty
carefully. Anything's possible. Certain things may have changed, but I don't think that was a big
part of why he did this." June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153-54 (referencing the testimony of
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Additionally, not a single expert testified, or even suggested, that
Mr. Holmes fit the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder,
which is perhaps the mental condition that is most closely aligned with
traits that the average layperson might perceive as "evil." 62 Dr. Reid
agreed that there is "no indication at all" that Mr. Holmes has antisocial
personality disorder,63 and Dr. Metzner testified that he "ruled out anti-
social personality disorder" as a diagnosis for Mr. Holmes.6
Finally, another significant fact cuts against the narrative that the
shooting is attributable to Mr. Holmes's "evil" nature, rather than his
mental illness: Mr. Holmes's behavior in the months leading up to and
including the shooting was entirely inconsistent and completely out of
character with the person he had been for his entire life.
In preparation for trial, both sides conducted an exhaustive investi-
gation of Mr. Holmes's life history. What that investigation revealed was
that he was a happy, social, and affectionate child who came from a lov-
ing and supportive upper-middle-class family.6 5 None of Mr. Holmes's
neighbors, friends, fellow students, teachers, professors, coworkers, or
family who testified at trial identified Mr. Holmes as emotionally reac-
tive, self-important, mean-spirited, attention seeking, or overly sensitive
in the face of rejection. To the contrary: witnesses described Mr.
Holmes, throughout his life and prior to the time period leading up to the
shooting, as self-deprecating, quiet, respectful, and kind. He was never
Dr. William Reid). Dr. Reid gave a similar response to the prosecution's suggestion that Mr.
Holmes's "conclusion that he had no career in science" caused the shooting. Id. at 154. When
pushed on these points, Dr. Reid ultimately reiterated to the jury in no uncertain terms, "I believe
there is a substantial relationship between the presence of the mental illness and the eventual carry-
ing out of the event." Id. at 155.
62. The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is "[a] pervasive pattern of disre-
gard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since age 15 years." AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, supra note 30, at 659. Diagnostic criteria include:
Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for person-
al profit or pleasure, . . . [i]rritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physi-
cal fights or assaults, . . . [r]eckless disregard for safety of self or others, . . . [and] [1]ack
of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another.
Id. The DSM-5 further indicates that persons with antisocial personality disorder "may repeatedly
lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger" and "frequently lack empathy and tend to be callous, cyni-
cal, and contemptuous of the feelings, rights, and sufferings of others." Id at 660.
63. June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 284.
64. June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 82.
65. Transcript of Record at 71-72, 88-89, 163-64, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 29, 2015) [hereinafter July 29 Transcript]; July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at
182-84, 242, 246-47; Transcript of Record at 50-53, 62-63, 122-27, People v. Holmes, No.
12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 23, 2015) [hereinafter July 23 Transcript].
66. See, e.g., July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 223-24, 255-56, 266-67; July 23 Tran-
script, supra note 65, at 64-65, 76, 79, 132, 155-56, 171-72; Transcript of Record at 70-71, People
v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. May 13, 2015) [hereinafter May 13 Transcript];
Transcript of Record at 178-180, 245-47, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct.
May 11, 2015) [hereinafter May II Transcript].
67. See, e.g., July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 172, 246, 253, 263, 265, 267, 269; July 23
Transcript, supra note 65, at 51, 62-63, 103, 146.
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a poor loser, selfish, or self-centered.6 8 He handled rejection and disap-
pointments in his life by withdrawing inward and was a person who
avoided the limelight.
If it is true that Mr. Holmes is not just mentally ill, but "evil" as
well, then either (1) his true "evil" nature suddenly sprang forth when he
experienced some mild personal difficulties during his first year in grad-
uate school and caused him to drop out of school; dye his hair orange;
spend thousands of dollars on weapons, ammunition, and ballistic gear
(despite being a frugal person his entire life who had no prior interest in
guns); build a series of homemade explosive devices in his apartment;
plan and execute a mass murder; and throw his entire life and future
away; or (2) he was secretly sinister his entire life but managed to mas-
terfully fool every person who came into contact with him from a young
age, including his own family, into thinking that he was a good person
until the events of July 20, 2012.
The alternative, of course, is what the evidence actually supports
and what we, his attorneys, sincerely believe: Mr. Holmes's chronic and
serious mental illness caused him to commit this horrific crime. After
years of displaying more subtle, negative symptoms of mental illness that
were mistaken by those who knew him for shyness and other personality
quirks, Mr. Holmes began to exhibit more overt symptoms of psychosis
in early 2012 as schizophrenia began to take hold of his brain during his
first year of graduate school.69 And he was in the throes of his first psy-
chotic break when he planned and committed the terrible and tragic
shooting at the Century 16 movie theater.70
D. The Appeal of the False Narrative of "Evil"
If the narrative of "evil" is not actually supported very well by the
facts in the case, then why has it become such a prominent feature of the
discourse about Mr. Holmes? One obvious explanation is that it is more
justifiable to seek the death penalty against a person who is viewed as
"evil" rather than against someone who is legitimately sick, and the
elected district attorney's attempts to advance this narrative in the media
could be perceived as an effort to defend his decision to spend millions
of taxpayer dollars to push the case to trial and to reject the defense's
offer to plead guilty to all charges in exchange for a life sentence.
However, there is more to it than that. Regardless of what Mr.
Brauchler's intentions were, or whether he genuinely believed Mr.
Holmes was evil, the fact is that this narrative seems to be one that has
been readily accepted and embraced by the media and the public. It
68. See July 23 Transcript, supra note 65, at 95.




seems to be what people want to believe. We think there are several rea-
sons this might be.
First, the narrative of "evil" offers a clear explanation for an other-
wise incomprehensible tragedy. Deciding that Mr. Holmes-or other
perpetrators of mass violence, for that matter-is inherently "evil" allows
us as a society to divide up the world in terms of "good" and "bad" in a
way that makes sense. It offers a simplistic, black-and-white way of
viewing a situation that requires little further discussion. Some people
are just "evil," and so they do terrible things that the rest of us, who are
not "evil," could not even fathom. There is no rehabilitating someone
who is evil, so the best thing to do when we encounter someone like this
is to simply exterminate him or her. End of discussion. This narrative is
particularly appealing in Mr. Holmes's case because, on the face of it, his
crime, which, it turned out, was borne of a psychotic and delusional be-
lief system about "human capital," had no other obvious motive like
*71money, sex, religion, racism, politics, or terrorism.
Second, there is a sense in which branding someone as "evil" makes
us feel safer from ourselves. Even if we do not understand the origins of
"evil," the narrative that people like Mr. Holmes are "evil" reassures us
that we don't have to fear one of our own committing a mass atrocity like
the Aurora theater shooting. While the threat of a horrific crime occur-
ring still exists within this narrative of "evil," at least the threat comes
from people who are outside the bounds of humanity and have nothing in
common with the rest of us. We need not look inward, nor is there any
need-or justification-for feeling any sort of compassion for the "evil"
one. As the psychiatrist Knoll points out,
[D]epicting an enemy as evil helps foster an obligation to oppose and
dispose of him. Because he is evil, there is little need to concern one-
self with his health, welfare, or gaining a better understanding of him.
All of this can be done free of guilt, for those who are evil bring
about their own just desserts.72
Finally, and relatedly, casting someone who has committed a horrif-
ic crime, such as Mr. Holmes, as "evil" absolves us as a society from
playing any role in the horrors that have occurred. A person who is "evil"
is exclusively responsible for his or her own conduct. It is not our fault
they became the way that they are or did the awful things that they did.
Moreover, because they are just "evil," there is nothing we could have
71. See July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133-34 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 26 Transcript, supra note 56, at 140-41 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock).
72. Knoll, supra note 20, at 114.
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done to stop them. In other words, "[T]here is a social virtue to outlining
the face of evil; society is exonerated and bears no responsibility."73
E. The Damage Done by the "Evil" Myth
But labeling a person as "evil," especially a person who is indisput-
ably, seriously mentally ill like Mr. Holmes, comes at a serious cost. It is
problematic and troubling to adopt this way of thinking for a number of
reasons.
As an initial matter, it sets us back several centuries in terms of the
way we think about mental illness in this country. We have historically
treated people with mental disorders with "contempt, fear, and cruelty,
perhaps due to the belief that mental disorders stemmed from parental
misdeeds, demonic possession, or deficient character."74 As of 2009, an
estimated "71% of Americans still believe[d] that mental illness is
caused by mental weakness, 65% believe[d] that mental illness is the
product of poor parenting, and 35% believe[d] that mental illness is a
form of retribution for sinful or immoral behavior."75 We can swiftly
dispose of difficult discussions about seriously mentally ill people like
Mr. Holmes by branding them as "evil" and banishing them from socie-
ty, as the court did during the formal sentencing hearing in this case
when it demanded that the sheriffs deputies "[g]et the defendant out of
my courtroom, please."76 But if we continue to do so, we will ensure that
the American public remains ignorant of essential facts about mental
illness, including how to recognize early signs and symptoms of psycho-
sis and serious mental disorders. While it is certainly the case that most
mentally ill people do not commit tragic acts of violence, a number of
those who do commit such acts, including Mr. Holmes, are mentally ill. 7 7
It does not help us advance efforts to detect mental illness or prevent
mass violence by pretending that this is not true.
Second, clinging to the simplistic narrative of "evil" prevents us
from taking a hard look at the myriad and complex ways that we as a
73. Id. at 109.
74. Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 469, 475 (2009).
75. Id.
76. 'Get the Defendant Out of Mv Courtroom,' Judge Says in Sentencing James Holmes, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-james-holmes-
sentenced-20150826-story.html (quoting statement of Carlos Samour Jr., Dist. Ct. Judge).
77. A 2015 law review article published in the Howard Law Journal notes that "[s]everal
large-scale studies have indicated that serious mental illness is a risk factor for violence" and that
"serious mental illness's greatest effect in increased violent crime is in substantially greater homi-
cide." David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Reforming Mental Health Law to Protect Public Safety
and Help the Severely Mentally Ill, 58 How. L.J. 715, 727, 734 (2015). With respect to mass mur-
ders specifically, the authors cite to "[a] study of 30 adult mass murderers and 34 adolescent (19
years old or younger) mass murderers [which] found a very high rate of serious mental illness among
the adults." Id. at 736. The article also notes that "the killers at the Aurora theater, Sandy Hook
Elementary, Tucson, and the Washington Navy Yard had given clear signs of serious mental illness
problems to police, family, or mental health workers." Id. at 738.
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society do, in fact, contribute to the problem of mass violence. As Steiker
writes,
The communities in which heinous offenders commit their offenses
doubtless have contributed in some ways-often in crucially im-
portant ways-to their characters and their crimes. The collective's
contributions may lie in failing to offer treatment for mental illness or
other defects, in failing to protect an offender from trauma, abuse or
neglect, or more affirmatively in creating institutional or cultural
conditions that promote anti-social violence.8
The point is that our search for the truth about what we are quick to
call "evil" requires us to dig down into the complexities of the causes of
violence and examine missed opportunities. Knoll explains,
The real causes of violent or harmful behavior are always different
from the way people think of evil, because it is myth and illusion that
provide the definition. . . . To the best of our current and limited
knowledge, people are led to commit acts of intentional harm by a
complex interaction of biological, psychological, and social forces in
concert with situational variables.79
For example, it is a fact that the law permitted Mr. Holmes to pur-
chase thousands of rounds of ammunition on the Internet without raising
an eyebrow.80 It is also a fact that Mr. Holmes was able to purchase four
firearms legally and that the law allowed those purchases to take place
unbeknownst to the psychiatrist he was seeing at the time and to whom
he had disclosed having recurring homicidal thoughts.81 In addition, it is
78. Steiker, supra note 21, at 372.
79. Knoll, supra note 20, at 106.
80. See James Holmes Built Up Aurora Arsenal of Bullets, Ballistic Gear Through Unregu-
lated Online Market, CBSNEWS (Sept. 19, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/james-
holmes-built-up-aurora-arsenal-of-bullets-ballistic-gear-through-unregulated-online-market/ ("In a
world where Amazon can track your next book purchase and you must show ID to buy some allergy
medicine, James Holmes spent months stockpiling thousands of bullets and head-to-toe ballistic gear
without raising any red flags with authorities.").
81. Under Colorado law, if an individual has been involuntarily placed on a 72-hour mental
health hold or has been committed against his or her will for short- or long-term treatment, the
person's name is sent to the FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-9-123 (2016). However, Colorado law does not place any restrictions on the pur-
chases of individuals who are being treated for mental illness, nor does it require firearms dealers to
contact mental health providers who are treating potential buyers for mental illness on an outpatient
basis before a purchase can be approved. See id.; see also Nicholas Riccardi, James Holmes'Psychi-
atrist: 'Dark Knight' Shooting Suspect Was Seeing Therapist Before Massacre, HUFFINGTONPOST
(last updated Sept. 26, 2012) ("Authorities said Holmes legally purchased four guns before the attack
at Denver-area sporting goods stores - a semiautomatic rifle, a shotgun and two pistols. To buy the
guns, Holmes had to pass background checks that can take as little as 20 minutes in Colorado. State
law bars from purchasing firearms people who have been found mentally defective by a judge or
have been committed to a mental institution. The statute makes no restrictions on buyers who are
being treated for possible mental illness."). Mr. Holmes told Dr. Fenton he was having homicidal
thoughts three to four times a day but denied specific plans or targets. See June 16 Transcript, supra
note 37, at 114, 117-18 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Lynne Fenton); Ann O'Neill & Sara
Weisfeldt, Psychiatrist: Holmes Thought 3-4 Times a Day About Killing, CNN (June 17, 2015, 9:58
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/james-holmes-theater-shooting-fenton/.
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a fact that this psychiatrist suspected from the first day she met Mr.
Holmes that he might be psychotic and had concerns about his danger-
ousness that led her to contact the University of Colorado's Behavioral
Evaluation and Threat Assessment (BETA) team as well as Mr.
Holmes's mother.8 2 Further, it is a fact that despite these concerns, Mr.
Holmes's psychiatrist never informed his mother that her son was having
homicidal thoughts three or four times a day and also concluded she did
not have enough evidence of imminent dangerousness to involuntarily
hospitalize him.83
There are no easy answers to the issues raised by these facts, but by
pronouncing Mr. Holmes to be "pure evil" and then pushing on in search
of the next "evil" killer to banish from our midst, we disable ourselves
from even having a conversation about them. To be clear, we are not
suggesting that we should blame others for the shooting instead of Mr.
Holmes or that Mr. Holmes himself should not be held accountable for
his actions. What we are arguing is that if we distill the narrative about
this case down to a single word- "evil" -we avoid the difficult task of
investigating society's own contributions to the complex problem of
mass shootings and, thus, how to stop the next one.
The final reason this false narrative of "evil" is so problematic is
that it makes us less human when we dehumanize others. Adopting this
narrative about Mr. Holmes enables us to feel morally superior to him.
But ultimately, the narrative requires us to strip him of his humanity
while we denounce him as evil for stripping the victims of theirs. We
understand that it is a painful and difficult thing to imagine Mr. Holmes
as more than just a "monster." Perhaps for many of those directly
touched by this tragedy, it is impossible. It muddies the water considera-
bly. It may make us feel disloyal to the victims and to the community
that he ravaged. Moreover, accepting Mr. Holmes as sick, rather than
evil, raises the scary possibility that any one of us, or any one of our
loved ones, could be capable of committing unspeakable acts of violence
if we had the misfortune of suffering from a serious psychotic mental
illness that compelled us to commit acts of violence. But the truth is, and
always has been, that Mr. Holmes is sick. Schizophrenia is a complex
brain disorder that, as Dr. Gur explained, "affects almost everything that
is unique to us as human beings."4 While it may have changed Mr.
Holmes, it did not cause him to lose his humanity. But when we pretend
otherwise by adopting this false narrative of "evil," we are at significant
risk of lessening ours.
82. See June 16 Transcript, supra note 37, at 138-39, 142-43 (referencing the testimony of
Dr. Lynne Fenton); O'Neill & Weisfeldt, supra note 81.
83. July 29 Transcript, supra note 65, at 54-56 (referencing the testimony of Arlene
Holmes); June 16 Transcript, supra note 37, at 222 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Lynne Fenton).
84. July 6 Transcript, supra note 39, at 238 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel Gur).
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II. THE MYTH OF THE "HOLDOUT" JUROR
Immediately after the jury returned its verdict on August 7, 2015,
one juror-Juror 17-elected to speak to the media in the parking lot of
the courthouse about the jury's deliberations and verdict.85 Juror 17 made
it clear that while there was one juror who was "solidly in favor of life
imprisonment," there were also two others who "had not made a com-
plete decision."' According to Juror 17, the nine other jurors were in
favor of the death penalty.87 She explained that they "deliberated the
entire time," and that "all the jurors were very respectful, of course, of
others' opinions," but in the end "could not come to a unanimous verdict
on death."88 She also stated very clearly that, for the jurors who were not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate sen-
tence, "mental illness was the issue" and that, while they all agreed that
Mr. Holmes did not meet the narrow legal definition of insanity in Colo-
rado, many of the jurors felt that "the mental illness played into his plans
and actions."89
Despite her explanation that there were three jurors who were con-
sidering a life sentence for Mr. Holmes because of his mental illness,
Juror 17's comments almost immediately produced sensational headlines
about the "lone holdout" juror who was "likely all that stood between
[the] theater shooter and [a] death sentence."90 A handful of examples
from an Internet search for articles published about the Holmes case
shortly after Juror 17's interview reveal headlines such as "One Holdout
Juror Was Likely Why James Holmes Avoided Death Penalty,"91 "Juror
Says Holdout Would Not Budge on James Holmes Death Penalty,"92
"Theater Shooter Spared From Death Penalty By One Juror's Holdout,"93
85. Carly Moore, Juror 17 Reveals Details of Verdict, at Least 1 Theater Shooting Juror Was







90. Peter Holley, A Lone Holdout Was Likely All That Stood Between Theater Shooter and
Death Sentence, Juror Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/08/08/a-lone-holdout-was-likely-all-
that-stood-between-theater-shooter-and-death-juror-says/.
91. Daniel Politi, One Holdout Juror Was Likely Why James Holmes Avoided Death Penalty,
SLATE (Aug. 8, 2015, 2:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2015/08/08/one holdoutjuror was likely whyjames_hol
mesavoided death penalty.html.
92. Phil Helsel, Juror Says Holdout Would Not Budge on James Holmes Death Penalty, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2015, 12:54 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/juror-says-holdout-
would-not-budge-james-holmes-death-penalty-n406346.
93. Sadie Gurman, Theater Shooter Spared from Death Penalty by One Juror's Holdout,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2015, 10:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/theater-
shooter-spared-from-death-penalty-by-one-jurors-holdout_55cf4564e4b0ab468d9d7a8b.
612 [Vol. 93:3
2016]THE "EVIL" DEFENDANT AND THE "HOLDOUT" JUROR 613
and "Juror Says a Single Holdout Prevented Death Penalty for James
Holmes."94
A. The Appeal of the "Holdout" Myth
The explanation for why this "holdout" narrative took hold in the
public discourse is more straightforward than the narrative about "evil."
This narrative appears to have come about by a combination of two fac-
tors. First, the narrative emerged in part as a result of the mainstream
media's attempt to simplify and sensationalize Juror 17's comments.9 5
Second, the narrative took shape as a result of the elected district attor-
ney's aggressive bid to defend his decision to seek the death penalty
against Mr. Holmes against critics who argued that he should have ac-
cepted the defense's repeated offers to plead guilty in exchange for a life
sentence.96 At a press conference immediately after the verdict was an-
nounced, the district attorney pondered, "What was it that hung up the
jurors?"97 It did not take long before explicit misinformation about the
dynamics in the jury room and the opinions of the two so-called fence-
sitters was disseminated through the media.
Following an interview with Mr. Brauchler approximately a week
after the verdict, the Associated Press wrote, "The lone holdout felt just
as strongly that Holmes should get a life sentence as the 11 other jurors
believed he should die for the 2012 shooting, District Attorney George
94. Claudia Koerner, Juror Says a Single Holdout Prevented Death Penalty for James
Holmes, BUzzFEED NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015, 10:05 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/claudiakoemer/single-hold-out-juror-james-holmes-verdict#.yu92YMvXJ.
95. The media has put forth a similar narrative in other high-profile cases involving so-called
"holdout" jurors. For example, in addition to Mr. Holmes's case, fairly recently, the media has
pursued story lines characterizing the outcomes in the cases of Jodi Arias and Pedro Hernandez
(charged with murdering six-year-old Etan Patz in New York in 1979) as the result of a lone "hold-
out" juror who frustrated the majority. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, The Perils of Being the Juror Who
Did Not Want Jodi Arias to Die, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-mix/wp/2015/03/17/holdout-juror-in-jodi-arias-
sentencing-says-shes-getting-threats/ ("The holdout who hung up the jury in Jodi Arias's sentencing
trial earlier this month has spoken out amid backlash from fellow jurors who wanted to sentence
Arias to death."); Jen Chung, Most Etan Patz Jurors Still Hate the Holdout Who Forced Mistrial,
GOTHAMIST (June 11, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2015/06/l l/etanpatzjurorshate.php
("While prosecutors are moving forward with a new trial, many jurors from the last one are still
angry that the previous, grueling trial ended in mistrial because one juror believed that Hernandez
was innocent. The forewoman said, 'There is going to be a retrial because of one individual with a
huge ego and a small heart."').
96. Immediately after the verdict was announced, the media began posing questions to Mr.
Brauchler about his decision to push the case to trial rather than accept a plea deal offered by the
defense. See, e.g., Kirk Mitchell, DA Brauchler Defends Decision to Seek Death Penalty Against
Holmes, DENV. POST (Aug. 7, 2015, 8:54 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/theater-shooting-
trial/ci_28605354/da-brauchler-defends-decision-seek-death-penalty-against ("District Attorney
George Brauchler defended his decision to seek the death penalty, explaining that the community
deserved to have a role in the sentence of a mass murderer who tried to kill hundreds. 'This kind of a
crime cries out for the community to be involved in the sentence,' Brauchler said after the jury
handed down its sentence to James Holmes on Friday.").
97. Id. (quoting statement of George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
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Brauchler said, based on prosecution interviews with some of the pan-
el."98 The L.A. Times reported Mr. Brauchler as stating,
Wobbler is even too strong of a term. They had gone around the
room at some point and said, "OK, how strong are you on your posi-
tion?" They had gotten 10 [on a scale of I to 10 to gauge how strong
the positions were] from everybody and eight on these two.99
According to another article, Mr. Brauchler stated, "What we've
discovered from the other jurors is that 'waffler' may be too generous a
term. These were people who were heavily leaning toward death but they
wanted to continue to deliberate and talk about it."' 00 The article reports
that he added,
[T]he jurors that have spoken to [us] have told us, "You guys put on
a great case. There's nothing you could have done . . . WE were sur-
prised at the hold out juror." They said this juror had never raised any
of the issues that came out at the end during any other phase of the
deliberations. They were frustrated as well.' 0'
This misinformation about the jurors' penalty phase deliberations
finally prompted a second juror to speak to the Denver Post seven weeks
after the trial in an effort to correct the record.102 This juror, who asked to
remain anonymous, identified herself, not as the "holdout," but as one of
the two other jurors who were not convinced that death was the appropri-
ate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt: "There were three," she said.0 3
"Not one."'" She told the Denver Post that "she decided to end her si-
lence because she could no longer bear to watch the weight of public
scrutiny - what she described as a 'witch hunt' - fall solely on the
shoulders of her fellow juror."'05 In stark contrast to the narrative pro-
moted in the media that the two jurors who were unsure of their decision
were leaning heavily towards death, this juror told the Denver Post that
"she is adamant that death was not an appropriate sentence for
Holmes."'06 The juror explained that Mr. Holmes's severe mental illness
"ruled out death" as a punishment in her opinion.107 Its the fact that
98. Gunnan, supra note 93.
99. Maria L. La Ganga, James Holmes Prosecutor Talks About the One Holdout Juror Who
Spared the Killer's Life, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-holmes-da-qa-20150824-story.html (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
100. McKinley, supra note 4 (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
101. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting interview with George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y).
102. Jordan Steffen, Aurora Theater Shooting Juror Breaks Silence, Says 3 Voted for Life,
DENV. POST (Oct. 2, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/theater-shooting-
trial/ci_28911988/aurora-theater-shooting-juror-breaks-silence-says-3.
103. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
104. Id (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. ("While the juror does not feel Holmes deserved a life sentence, his severe mental
illness also ruled out death, she said.").
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mental illness is there," she stated, echoing much of what Juror 17 told
the media about the reason three jurors were not convinced that death
was the appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes.'0 8 While she expressed
deep sorrow for the victims and their families, she maintained, "I know
that it [the verdict resulting in a life sentence] was the appropriate an-
swer."l09
B. The Damage Done by the "Holdout" Myth
Based on the statements of the two jurors who have spoken to the
press, it is clear that the narrative of the single "holdout" who dug in his
or her heels and mystified and shocked the other jurors with his or her
unexplained decision to vote for life is not factually correct. Moreover,
this characterization of the jury's deliberations is detrimental to the pub-
lic's understanding of the issues in the case because it perpetuates an
overly simplistic and legally inaccurate view of the jury's task in a capi-
tal sentencing trial. First, it confuses the kind of decision-making re-
quired of juries in capital sentencing proceedings with those required of
juries in other types of proceedings where an individual's life is not at
stake. Second, this narrative invites speculation that an individual with a
political agenda infiltrated the jury, rather than focusing on the jurors'
actual, stated reason for the life verdict: Mr. Holmes's mental illness.
1. The Task of the Jury in a Capital Sentencing Proceeding
The term "holdout" itself connotes negative images of an individu-
al, determined to stymie the will of the majority, who stubbornly-
perhaps irrationally-refuses to engage with the others and "withholds
agreement or consent upon which progress is contingent.""l0 This term is
arguably appropriate to apply when discussing the dynamics at play in a
non-capital case, or the merits phase of a capital case, where a defend-
ant's guilt or non-guilt is at issue, unanimity is required for the jury to
return a valid verdict, and non-unanimity results in a hung jury and a
potential retrial."' However, it is plainly inappropriate to use this term to
describe a non-unanimous result in a capital sentencing proceeding in
Colorado.
For forty years, the United State Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence has required individualized sentencing in capital cas-
es. In Woodson v. North Carolina,"l2 the Court held "that in capital cases
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
108. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
109. Id. (quoting statement of anonymous juror).
110. Holdout, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/holdout (last visited
May 2, 2016).
111. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-10-108 (2016) ("The verdict of the jury shall be unanimous . .
."); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 31(d) (2016) ("If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury
may be directed to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.").
112. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutional-
ly indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."'
13
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly explained that, unlike the factu-
al decisions a jury makes when deciding whether a defendant is guilty or
not guilty, the jury's task in a capital sentencing proceeding requires
them to give a "reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime."I 14
The Court has likewise held that the moral decisions involving the
assessment of mitigating evidence that jurors must make in a capital sen-
tencing trial are individual decisions, rather than group decisions, and
that jurors need not unanimously agree on the existence of mitigation or
the weight they choose to assign to any particular mitigating evidence."5
Finally, Colorado, like the majority of states in the country that al-
low for capital punishment,116 requires the jury to agree unanimously
before a verdict of death can be returned.'17 By deliberate design, the
Colorado legislature put into place a system in which a capital jury's
non-unanimous sentencing decision is an entirely valid and acceptable
verdict that results in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.18
As the Colorado Supreme Court has acknowledged, "Colorado has tai-
lored its four-step death penalty process to center on the proposition that
113. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
114. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
184 (1988)), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Ab-
dul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263-64 (2007) ("Our line of cases in this area has long
recognized that before a jury can undertake the grave task of imposing a death sentence, it must be
allowed to consider a defendant's moral culpability and decide whether death is an appropriate
punishment for that individual in light of his personal history and characteristics and the circum-
stances of the offense."); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("Unlike the determination of guilt or innocence, which turns largely on an evaluation of objective
facts, the question whether death is the appropriate sentence requires a profoundly moral evaluation
of the defendant's character and crime.").
115. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435, 442-43 (1990) (describing how a
state capital sentencing scheme must allow each individual juror to consider mitigating factors when
deciding whether to impose death penalty, even if factors are not found unanimously by all jurors);
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-76 (1988) (finding that jurors cannot be precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence unless they unanimously agree).
116. The exceptions are Alabama, Florida, and Delaware, which are the only states that allow
people to be sentenced to death when jurors are less than unanimous. See Hurst v. Florida, CHARLES
HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. RACE & JUST., HARV. L. SCH. (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2015/10/hurst-v-florida/ (providing statistics about judicial
override in wake of oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in the Hurst case). The
constitutionality of non-unanimous juries was litigated in Hurst. See Brief for Petitioner at 36-52,
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No. 14-7505). However, the Supreme Court resolved the
case on other grounds and did not address the issue of non-unanimity in its opinion. See Hurst, 136
S. Ct. 616 (2016). Thus, the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury sentencing verdicts in capital
cases remains questionable. See discussion infra note 189 and accompanying text.
117. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d) (2016) ("If the jury's verdict is not unani-
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any individual juror may ultimately trigger life imprisonment by not
agreeing to a death penalty verdict."'
1 9
Moreover, our state supreme court has held that both the cruel and
unusual punishment and due process clauses of our state constitution
require the jury in a capital case to be unanimously convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate sentence before a death
sentence can be imposed.120
In accordance with these very clear legal principles, the jurors in the
Holmes trial were given instructions during the penalty phase of the trial
explaining that the decision regarding the existence of mitigating factors
was an individual decision-not a group decision-and that the jury need
not unanimously agree that mitigating factors exist or that the same miti-
gating factors exist.121 They were told that each juror has the responsibil-
ity and authority to decide for himself or herself what constitutes a miti-
gating fact or circumstance and that "[e]ach juror must use his or her
own personal discretion, life experiences, and reasoned moral judgment
in determining for himself or herself what mitigating factors exist."'22
The court instructed the jurors that they were obligated to consult with
one another and to deliberate, but that they were not required "to agree
with the determinations, opinions, feelings, or thoughts of other ju-
119. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 630 (Colo. 2005) (emphasis added). The Colorado Su-
preme Court has stated,
Colorado's capital sentencing scheme consists of four steps. First, it narrows the group of
individuals convicted of first degree murder at the eligibility stage by requiring that the
jury be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of at least one of the statuto-
rily specified aggravators. At the next stage, the statute contemplates that the jury will
consider evidence to "decide whether any mitigating factors exist." Third, based upon
that evidence, the jury must decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether "mitigating fac-
tors exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found to exist." If the jury
finds that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the statutorily specified aggravators,
then the jury moves to the fourth and final stage of determining whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990)).
120. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 845 (Colo. 1991) ("A death sentence imposed in [the
absence of a unanimous finding that death is the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt]
violates requirements of certainty and reliability and is arbitrary and capricious in contravention of
basic constitutional principles. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute [eliminating the fourth step
of Colorado's capital sentencing scheme] contravenes the prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments under article 11, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution, and deprives the defendant of due
process of law under article II, section 25, of that constitution."); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786,
796 (Colo. 1990) (concluding that he standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is an implicit part of
the statutory scheme, and noting the importance of jurors understanding "the fourth step [in Colora-
do's capital sentencing scheme] is separate and independent and requires that their ultimate conclu-
sion that death is the appropriate penalty be reached only if they possess the degree of certainty that
is communicated by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt").
121. See Jury Instructions-Phase 2 of Sentencing Hearing at No. 5, People v. Holmes, No.
12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. July 30, 2015).
122. Id.
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rors."12 3 The court also explained to them, "You must treat the defendant
as a uniquely individual human being." 2 4
Jurors were further informed during the final phase of the sentenc-
ing proceeding that their final sentencing verdicts were not dictated by
law and that each of them was called upon to deliberate and to make de-
cisions "based on your individual reasoned moral judgment." 25 They
were told that "[n]o juror may ever decide that the defendant should be
sentenced to death unless the juror is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that death is the appropriate sentence" and that "the jury may only
return a sentence of death on a count if every juror is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate sentence on that count." 26
And the judge explained, "None of you individually, nor the jury collec-
tively, is ever required to impose a sentence of death. The law never re-
quires a death sentence."27 In fact, they were told,
If any of you is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death
is the appropriate sentence on a particular count, that ends the inquiry
with respect to that count because, in that situation, the law requires
that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole.128
Likewise, the court explained, "There is no requirement that you
explain or justify to your fellow jurors why your individual reasoned
moral judgment leads you to a particular decision on a count." 29 The
jurors were told, "After deliberating, if a juror disagrees with the rest of
the jurors, that disagreement must be respected by the other jurors and
will be respected by the Court."'30
Based on the accounts of the jurors who have spoken to the media,
the jury conscientiously followed these instructions to the letter.'3 1
In short, given the unique task of the jury in a capital sentencing
proceeding, it is misleading to characterize the jury's verdict as the result
of a lone holdout thwarting a majority vote for death. Even if it were
123. Id. at No. 21.
124. Id. at No. 7.
125. Jury Instructions-Phase 3 of Sentencing Hearing at No. 3, People v. Holmes, No.
12CRI522 (Arapahoe Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015).
126. Id. at No. 4.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at No. 8.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Steffen, supra note 102 ("The juror said deliberations were always cordial. The
group took pride in not rushing anyone and examining key points 'with a microscope,' she said.");
Phil Tenser, Nine of the Theater Shooting Jurors Were in Favor of the Death Penalty, According to
Juror No. 17, 7NEWS, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/movie-theater-shooting/theater-
shooting-jurors-decline-interviews-after-sentencing-james-holmes-to-life-in-prison (last visited Apr.
9, 2016) ("'We all stayed cordial, and the jury instructions were very clear that this was an individu-
al decision that we each had to make with our own moral understanding of what was right and
wrong,' [Juror 17] said.").
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factually true that the jury's sentencing verdict for Mr. Holmes was the
result of one juror's decision that death was not the appropriate penalty
beyond a reasonable doubt, which, the jurors' own statements to the me-
dia reveal, was not in fact the case, that person cannot be fairly character-
ized as a "holdout" that impeded the jury's progress towards a unani-
mous verdict of death. Because each juror is required to make an indi-
vidual, reasoned moral assessment about whether another human being
should live or die,132 the law forbids jurors from pushing each other to-
wards unanimity.33 Instead, jurors are required to respect the moral
viewpoints of other jurors, even if those viewpoints differ from their
own.1 34 A life sentence resulting from one juror's position that death is
not the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt is therefore in
complete harmony with the intentions of the law. It is not the spurious
consequence of a rogue juror who "held out" and "hung up" the other
jurors and improperly prevented them from returning a death verdict.
Even had such a lone holdout juror existed, that person would not have
thwarted the law-he or she would have effectuated and honored it.
In this case, three jurors had doubts as to whether the death penalty
was the appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes, not just one. Under those
facts, there is no question that the law not only required, but desired, a
verdict resulting in a sentence of life without parole.
2. Speculation About the Motivations of Jurors
The second problematic aspect of the "holdout" narrative is that it
encourages the public to speculate that the verdict was the result of a sole
individual who infiltrated the jury with an agenda against the death pen-
alty and distracts from what is most likely the actual basis for the life-
giving jurors' views: Mr. Holmes's mental illness.'35
To begin with, this hypothesis is extremely unlikely to be true for at
least three reasons. First, the court and the parties took incredible care
selecting the jury in this case. The court summoned an unprecedented
9,000 prospective jurors in the case, and by the defense's count, approx-
imately 3,750 citizens of Arapahoe County responded to the summons
and filled out a lengthy jury questionnaire. The process of filling out the
questionnaire alone took fifteen days in court to complete. After the de-
fense and prosecution stipulated to the release of jurors whose question-
naire responses obviously disqualified them from serving on a capital
132. See People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 792 (Colo. 1990) ("This concern for the reliability
of a jury verdict of death finds expression in United States Supreme Court decisions requiring that a
jury's determination to impose the penalty of death reflect the conviction of each juror, guided by
constitutionally sufficient statutory standards." (emphasis added)).
133. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Sadie Gurman, Theater Victim's Granddad Questions Motive of Holdout Juror,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015, 8:13 PM).
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case,13 6 the parties and the court then spent nine weeks and two days in-
dividually questioning prospective jurors under oath about publicity, as
well as their views on the insanity defense and the death penalty. One
hundred eleven jurors were ultimately qualified and participated in a
two-day group questioning session. From that group, twenty-four ju-
rors-twelve deliberating jurors and twelve alternates-were chosen.
Each side had the ability to exercise twenty-two peremptory strikes.'3 7
All of the jurors who ultimately deliberated over Mr. Holmes's fate
withstood this intensive death-qualification process. In fact, none of the
deliberating jurors were subject to a challenge for cause by either the
prosecution or the defense based on their death penalty views. From a
practical standpoint, the odds are extremely low that a person with a spe-
cific agenda to prevent Mr. Holmes from receiving a death sentence and
was one of 3,750 people who responded to their jury summons actually
made it on the jury. Moreover, for that to be true, the juror would have
had to have been a tremendously good liar who managed to successfully
deceive both parties, as well as the court, about his or her ability to fairly
consider both sentences for Mr. Holmes over the course of a three-month
selection process that included a written questionnaire as well as individ-
ual and group questioning.
Second, if an activist had deliberately infiltrated the jury with the
intention of sparing Mr. Holmes from death, then why didn't that person
simply end the process earlier, rather than wait until the very last phase
of deliberations? In addition to its merits phase deliberations about the
issue of insanity, the jury deliberated three separate times during the pen-
alty phase. First, it was required to determine whether it was unanimous-
ly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating
factor existed. Second, jurors deliberated over the existence of mitigation
and were required to weigh mitigation against aggravation to determine
whether they were unanimously convinced that mitigation did not out-
weigh aggravation beyond a reasonable doubt. After answering that
question in the affirmative, jurors went on to the final phase of delibera-
tions where they were required to answer the question of whether they
were unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was
the appropriate punishment. It was only at this last and final phase that
the jury was not unanimous. The fact that the non-unanimous verdict
came at this last phase suggests that the jurors were conscientious about
136. The defense and prosecution conferred with one another after receiving each group of
questionnaires from prospective jurors and agreed to stipulate to excuse those jurors who either
expressed in their questionnaire that they were unalterably opposed to capital punishment or that
they would automatically impose the death penalty on Mr. Holmes if he were convicted of first-
degree murder.
137. The prosecution exercised twenty of their peremptory challenges, leaving two unused.
The defense exercised all twenty-two of their available peremptory challenges.
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resolving the specific issues that the law required them to answer during
each stage of deliberations.
The third reason the hypothesis that a stealth juror with an anti-
death penalty agenda threw the case is most likely false is that it is direct-
ly contradicted by the two jurors who spoke to the media about delibera-
tions.138 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these jurors. Both of
them explicitly stated that mental illness was a significant issue for ju-
rors, including the three who were not convinced that Mr. Holmes de-
served the death penalty.'39
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the death
penalty "must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow cate-
gory of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes
them 'the most deserving of execution."'l40 In theory, the presence of an
aggravating factor or factors elevates a defendant's culpability beyond
that of an ordinary murderer.141 On the other hand, the existence of miti-
gating factors, such as intellectual impairments, a defendant's young age,
mental illness, or childhood abuse and trauma, serves to reduce a defend-
ant's moral culpability.142 This is because it is central to the Eighth
Amendment's concept of individualized sentencing that the punishment
must fit the offender, not just the offense.143 Thus, even for the worst
138. See Moore, supra note 85 (referencing the video interview with Juror 17); see also Stef-
fen, supra note 102 (referencing the text interview with anonymous juror).
139. As stated previously in this Article, Juror 17 told the media that "mental illness" was the
issue for the three jurors who were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the
appropriate sentence for Mr. Holmes. See Moore, supra note 85. Likewise, the other juror who spoke
to media told the Denver Post that Mr. Holmes's "severe mental illness also ruled out death" as a
punishment in her opinion. Steffen, supra note 102.
140. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002)).
141. Notably, a 2013 study of Colorado's capital sentencing statute found serious constitutional
deficiencies in the statute's use of aggravating factors that ostensibly narrows the class of offenders
eligible for the death penalty in Colorado. See Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility in Colorado:
Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1087-88 (2013). The authors exam-
ined every murder case filed in Colorado from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2010, to
determine which of these cases atisfied the Colorado statute's death-eligibility requirements. See id.
at 1070-71. They found that 90.4 percent of the factual or procedural first-degree murders they
examined in Colorado "were death-eligible based on the existence of at least one aggravating fac-
tor." Id at 1070-71, 1107. They noted that to the best of their knowledge, Colorado has "the highest
death eligibility rate of any jurisdiction that has been studied." Id. at 1107. They argue that their
study provides the facts, which are "unmistakably clear," to establish that "Colorado's capital statute
fails to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible offenders." Id. at 1114. They further note that "a
scheme of 'such broad death-eligibility essentially guarantees that some defendants caught in the net
will not be among the truly "worst" offenders."' Id at 1110 (quoting Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capi-
tal Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 415 (1995)).
142. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 558-59, 568-69; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07
(2002); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 106-09 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-08
(1978).
143. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 ("By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus 'on
the characteristics of the person who committed the crime' the rule in Lockett recognizes that 'jus-
tice . . . requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with
the character and propensities of the offender."' (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (first
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crime imaginable, the law limits the application of the death penalty only
to those defendants who jurors find to be the most personally morally
culpable.1 "
While there were clearly some very significant aggravating factors
present in Mr. Holmes's case,14 5 there was also very significant evidence
of mitigation, and of mental illness in particular. While jurors rejected
the notion that Mr. Holmes fit the narrow legal definition of insanity, as
explained in Section I, the experts in the case agreed that Mr. Holmes
would not have committed this horrible crime had he not been mentally
ill.146 Dr. Metzner testified for a second time during the penalty phase of
the trial that it was very clear that, as a result of his mental illness and
psychotic thinking, Mr. Holmes did not have the same ability to appreci-
ate how terribly wrong his actions were that a mentally healthy person
would have.14 7 Rather, Mr. Holmes's ability to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his actions was "significantly impaired" from a clinical perspec-
tive.148
The jurors' rejection of the death penalty in spite of the horrific ag-
gravation present in the case, coupled with the two jurors' post-verdict
explanations of the result, indicates that the jury's verdict came about,
quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976); then quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v.
Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 61 (1937))).
144. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Plunishment [in
capital cases] should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant....
[A]nd the sentence imposed . . . should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime .... ).
145. The jury found that the prosecution proved four out of the five alleged statutory aggravat-
ing factors beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) The defendant unlawfully and intentionally, knowingly, or with universal malice
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, killed two or more
people during the commission of the same criminal episode. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-
1201(5)(i) (2016).
(2) In the commission of the offense of murder in the first degree, the defendant know-
ingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the of-
fense. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(i).
(3) The defendant committed the offense of murder in the first degree in an especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(j).
(4) The defendant committed the offense of murder in the first degree while lying in wait
or from ambush. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(f).
See generally Sentencing Hearing Phase 1 Verdict Form, People v. Holmes, No. 12CR1522 (Arapa-
hoe Dist. Ct. July 27, 2015) (referencing the Sentencing Hearing Phase I Verdict Forms for all
twenty-four counts). The jury failed to find that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Holmes intentionally killed a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age. See
id.
146. See July 7 Transcript, supra note 27, at 133 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Raquel
Gur); June 26 Transcript, supra note 56, at 165 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Wood-
cock); June 25 Transcript, supra note 27, at 100-01, 103 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jonathan
Woodcock); June 8 Transcript, supra note 27, at 72, 163 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner); June 5 Transcript, supra note 41, at 153 (referencing the testimony of Dr. William Reid);
see also supra Section I.B.
147. See July 27 Transcript, supra note 53, at 73-77 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey
Metzner).
148. Id. at 89-90 (referencing the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Metzner).
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not because of a surreptitious death penalty opponent intent on nullifica-
tion, but because of each individual juror's careful assessment of Mr.
Holmes's personal moral culpability. Not only is this a legally permissi-
ble basis on which to reject the death penalty, it is a core value of the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
In conclusion, the trouble with promoting the narrative of a single
"holdout" juror who either got "hung up" on the issue of mental illness
or was a stealth activist with a political agenda is that it misleads the pub-
lic about what the law requires from jurors when they are asked to make
a life or death decision in a capital case. Moreover, this narrative dis-
suades future jurors from following the law and obeying their own indi-
vidual moral conscience, which is exactly what they are supposed to do.
This narrative once again distracts from the real issues in the case and
encourages the public to cling to the misguided notion that justice was
thwarted, rather than served.
Portraying the jury's verdict as the result of the decision of an irra-
tional, isolated individual also wrongly suggests that there is no real di-
versity of opinion with respect to whether Mr. Holmes was deserving of
the death penalty. Thus, the narrative discourages the body politic from
engaging in a dialogue about whether we should continue to have the
death penalty in the State of Colorado. We believe this is an important
conversation to have.
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
One can draw two rather obvious conclusions from our foregoing
discussion. If one is inclined to accept the arguments we made above and
agree with the result the jury reached in the Holmes case, one might con-
clude that our system of capital punishment in Colorado works-or at
least that it worked in this case-and that no further reforms are needed.
If, on the other hand, one disagrees with us and with the result in this
case, then the response would likely be that a system of capital punish-
ment that allows a person who committed a crime as egregious as Mr.
Holmes's to escape the death penalty needs some reform.
There is, however, a third way to consider the issues we have raised
above, which is to question whether we should continue to have a system
of capital punishment in Colorado at all.
A. Who Receives the Death Penalty in the United States?
Recent research confirms what our own up-close observations of
systems of capital punishmentl49 have shown us: by and large, when the
149. Ms. Brady and Mr. King have spent a collective total of eighteen years as Chief Trial
Deputies for the Colorado State Public Defender's Office. In that capacity, they have not only been
involved in numerous capital and potential capital cases in Colorado but have also gained knowledge
about capital sentencing practices in other jurisdictions while conducting and attending national
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death penalty is imposed in this country, it is imposed upon people who,
like Mr. Holmes, have diminished personal culpability. A 2014 study of
the last 100 offenders executed in America revealed that the overwhelm-
ing majority of these offenders, nearly nine of every ten, possessed miti-
gating characteristics that demonstrated significant intellectual or psy-
chological deficits.150
The authors of the study were interested in determining how well
the existing "mitigation-facilitating procedures" for imposing the death
penalty only upon those defendants with the most extreme personal cul-
pability are working in practice.' The United States Supreme Court's
current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence includes the doctrine of indi-
vidualized sentencing discussed above and also categorically exempts
two classes of individuals from the death penalty who have been deemed
to possess insufficient personal culpability-intellectually disabled and
juvenile offenders.152 To examine the effectiveness of this mitigation
regime, the study's authors undertook a review of documentation pertain-
ing to the cases of the one hundred most recently executed capital of-
fenders in the United States.15 3 They pored over state and federal appel-
late decisions in the cases, as well as expert findings, news accounts, and
pleadings, to determine how many of these defendants fell into at least
one of the following mitigation categories: "intellectual disability, youth-
fulness, mental illness, and childhood trauma."'54
The results revealed that over half-fifty-four-of the last one hun-
dred executed offenders had been diagnosed with or displayed symptoms
of a severe mental illness.'55 Fifty percent suffered from complex trauma,
such as "severe physical abuse, sexual molestations, domestic violence,
the violent loss of immediate family and chronic homelessness."56 Thir-
ty-two of the offenders demonstrated evidence of intellectual disability,
either as a result of a borderline IQ or traumatic brain injury.5 7 And
trainings for capital defense lawyers. In addition to her capital experience in Colorado, Ms. Nelson
spent four years as a staff attorney at the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, repre-
senting individuals on Alabama's death row.
150. See Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 1221, 1228-30
(2014).
151. Id. at 1223-24.
152. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) ("[J]uvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002)
(holding that "[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses," mentally impaired offenders "do not act with the level of moral culpability that character-
izes the most serious adult criminal conduct" and are therefore exempt from the death penalty);
Smith et al., supra note 150, at 1222-23.
153. Smith et al., supra note 150, at 1224.
154. Id. at 1224, 1228-29 ("We considered only mitigating circumstances that demonstrate
intellectual and psychological deficits that compare to those that intellectually disabled and juvenile
offenders possess, namely: intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental illness, and childhood trau-
ma.").
155. Id. at 1245.
156. Id. at 1247.
157. Id. at 1234-35.
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more than one-third, or thirty-six percent, of these "offenders committed
a capital crime before turning twenty-five-the age at which the brain
fully matures."15 In total, eighty-seven percent of the last one hundred
executed offenders in the United States fell into at least one of these mit-
igation categories. Fifty-five percent-over half-of these defendants
had mitigation that fell into two or more categories.
To put it bluntly, it appears that in America, we are not just seeking
the death penalty against people who are damaged in some way, as we
did unsuccessfully in the Holmes case'59 as well as the Dexter Lewis
case.160 Rather, when we actually do obtain and carry out death sentenc-
es, we end up executing not evil people, but sick, damaged, and broken
people. At the very least, we are executing people who only became
"evil" because they were sick, damaged, broken, or a combination of
those things, in the first place.
B. Why Are Sick and Broken People Getting Sentenced to Death?
Why is this happening, and what accounts for the different result in
the Holmes and Lewis cases? A full discussion of the answer to this
question is well beyond the scope of this Article, but there are at least
two potentially significant factors at play: the quality of representation
many capital defendants in other jurisdictions receive at the trial level
and variations in the procedures in place that govern capital sentencing
proceedings amongst different states.
The Office of the Colorado State Public Defender is widely recog-
nized as one of the best public defender agencies in the country for
providing high-quality representation to indigent criminal defendants.161
158. Id at 1239.
159. To be clear, in our opinion, spending millions of taxpayer dollars and expending a mind-
boggling amount of effort to seek the death penalty against an obviously mentally ill person like Mr.
Holmes was the wrong decision. Morally speaking, we as a society should not try to kill people for
being sick. We maintain that the elected district attorney should have accepted Mr. Holmes's offer to
plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life without parole instead of dragging the parties, the
victims, and the public through a painful, three-year-long process that ultimately produced the same
result.
160. Mr. Lewis was convicted of stabbing five people to death in a Denver bar. Jordan Steffen
& Matthew Nussbaum, Dexter Lewis Gets Life Sentence for Fero s Bar Massacre, DENV. POST
(Aug. 27, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28713843/jury-deliberating-feros-
bar-massacre-trial. The Denver District Attorney's Office reached plea agreements with Mr. Lewis's
co-defendants, but sought the death penalty against him. Id At trial, Mr. Lewis's attorneys presented
substantial mitigating evidence demonstrating that Mr. Lewis's entire life was marked by significant
trauma, abuse, and neglect. See id On August 27, 2015, a Denver jury could not unanimously agree
beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating evidence in the case did not outweigh the aggravation,
and Mr. Lewis was consequently sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. See id.
161. See, e.g., P. Solomon Banda, Holmes Doesn't React to Talk of Struggling Victims,
CNSNEWS.COM (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/holmes-doesnt-
react-talk-struggling-victims ("Colorado defense attorney David Lane, who has been involved in a
number of death penalty cases, said there is no issue with the public defenders' abilities. 'Colorado
public defenders are the best death penalty lawyers in the United States,' Lane said."); Ben Markus,
Opening Statements to Begin Monday in Colorado Theater Shooting Trial, NPR (Apr. 27, 2015,
3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/27/402480999/opening-statements-to-begin-monday-in-
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Our agency's enabling statute mandates that we provide the same level
of legal services to indigent persons accused of crimes that are available
to non-indigent defendants and that we conduct our office, not only in
accordance with the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, but also
with the American Bar Association standards pertaining to criminal de-
fense.6 2
With respect to capital cases, this requires our adherence to the
American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.163 Under these
guidelines, we have a number of important duties and obligations, in-
cluding the requirement to conduct a full and complete, multi-
generational investigation of our client's life history and background
dating back at least three generations;1 to "consider all legal claims
potentially available; [to] . . . thoroughly investigate the basis for each
potential claim before reaching a conclusion as to whether it should be
asserted; . . . [to] evaluate each potential claim in light of . .. the unique
characteristics of death penalty law and practice;" to present each claim
as forcefully as possible, tailoring the presentation to the particular facts
and circumstances in the client's case and to the applicable law in the
particular jurisdiction;165 to "seek a theory [of defense] that will be effec-
tive in connection with both guilt and penalty;"'66 and "a continuing duty
to investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that
supports mitigation or rebuts the prosecution's case in aggravation."67
The ABA Guidelines are not just hypothetical wish lists for capital
defense lawyers. Not only does our enabling statute require us to abide
colorado-theater-shooting-trial ("Former Colorado prosecutor Bob Grant says James Holmes is
represented by some of the best-trained and best-financed public defenders in the country."); Laura
Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, but He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 2005, 12:47
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-29-cover-indigentsx.htm ("Among the
24 states that fully fund local defender programs, Oregon, Minnesota, Colorado and Massachusetts
are widely recognized for their programs' quality."); Jon Sarche, Karr Could Get Public Defender in
Colo., BOSTON.COM NEWS (Aug. 22, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2006/08/22/karr could get public defender
incolo/ ("Unlike in many states, Colorado's public defender system is well funded and well re-
spected for its work on complicated cases involving DNA evidence."); Max Wachtel, Legal Issues
for the Planned Parenthood Shooting Suspect, 9NEWS (Nov. 30, 2015, 4:50 PM),
http://www.9news.com/story/news/local/colorado-springs-shooting/2015/I1/30/legal-issues-
planned-parenthood/76571388/ ("Colorado's office of the public defender has some of the best death
penalty defense attorneys in the country, and they are dedicated to ending the practice in the state.").
162. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-101(l) (2016).
163. The enabling statute was first enacted in 1979 and references "the American bar associa-
tion standards relating to the administration of criminal justice, the defense function." Id. In 1989,
the ABA first promulgated a set of guidelines specifically devoted to setting forth the obligations of
defense counsel in death penalty cases. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.7 (2005). A new
version of these guidelines was promulgated in 2003. See American Bar Association Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913, 916 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines].
164. ABA Guidelines, supra note 163, at 1024-25.
165. Id. at 1028.
166. Id. at 1047.
167. Id. at 1055.
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by them, but the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly found that
attorneys who failed to abide by the ABA Guidelines in cases in which
the death penalty was imposed provided their clients with constitutional-
ly ineffective assistance of counsel.168 We would be on legally and ethi-
cally shaky ground if we willfully chose to ignore them. And needless to
say, it takes a tremendous amount of time, energy, and financial re-
sources to attempt to fulfill our duties and obligations under these guide-
lines in every case in which the prosecution chooses to seek the death
penalty, including the Holmes and Lewis cases.
Unfortunately, it is no secret that the vast majority of individuals
facing the death penalty in this country do not receive legal representa-
tion that even comes close to satisfying the requirements set forth by the
ABA Guidelines.1 6 9 The jurisdictions that prosecute these individuals are
either unwilling or unable to abide by them for a host of complex rea-
sons.170 To be sure, there are a number of excellent, highly skilled capital
defense attorneys representing defendants at the trial level across the
country. However, stories of underfunded, overworked indigent defense
systems, of capital defendants represented by lawyers who had substance
abuse issues or were later disbarred, and of attorneys inexperienced in
capital litigation botching legal claims and missing filing deadlines are
ubiquitous in the modern era of capital punishment.'7 1 And "[w]hen law-
yers fail to conduct adequate mitigation investigation, jurors are unable
168. See, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) ("[W]e
long have referred [to these ABA Standards] as 'guides to determining what is reasonable."' (quot-
ing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396
(2000).
169. See Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental
Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 686-88 (2015) (providing
numerous examples and citations illustrating "[t]he remarkably poor quality of legal representation
in some capital cases and the even more remarkable indifference of courts" and noting that "[c]ourts
and prosecutors appear to have come to accept this gross ineptness by capital defense counsel, [i]t
has become part of the culture").
170. See id; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839-40 (1994) (discussing interrelated
reasons for the poor quality of legal representation in many capital cases); David Rudovsky, Gideon
and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 L. & INEQ. 371, 394-97,
398-400, 408 (2014) (arguing that the crisis in indigent criminal defense is "the direct result of a
lack of political and judicial responsibility" and providing examples of the complex forces at work in
the battle over the quality of legal representation in capital cases in Pennsylvania).
171. See, e.g., ACLU, SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
AND REMEDY IN AMERICA 7-8 (2010),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRP UPRsubmissionannex.pdf; Ken Armstrong, Death by Dead-
line, Part One, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2014, 4:30 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014//ll15/death-by-deadline-part-one; Ken Armstrong, Death
by Deadline, Part Two, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2014, 5:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/Il/16/death-by-deadline-part-two; Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Part 2: Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 1999),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-991115deathillinois2-story.html; Marc Book-
man, This Man's Alcoholic Lawyer Botched His Case. Georgia Executed Him Anyway, MOTHER
JONES (Apr. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/alcoholic-lawyer-
botched-robert-wayne-holsey-death-penalty-trial?page=1.
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to perform their moral and legal function of deciding which offenders are
truly among the most culpable offenders."l72
Procedurally speaking, while the vast majority of states, like Colo-
rado, require a unanimous jury vote to impose the death penalty, there
are several significant outliers-most notably, Alabama, Florida, and
Delaware-in which the law allows juries to recommend death sentences
even if they are non-unanimous and allows judges to override a jury's
life recommendation and impose the death penalty. Alabama and Florida
have large death row populations: Alabama currently has 185 people on
death row,1 73 and Florida's death row houses a total of 388 inmates.174
According to recent statistics published by the Charles Hamilton Hou-
ston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, in the past
five years, the three states that allow for the imposition of the death pen-
alty following non-unanimous jury verdicts accounted for twenty-eight
percent of all new death sentences in this country.s75 In seventy-seven
percent of those new death sentences, the jury was less than unani-
mous.17 6 Had those states required juror unanimity in order to impose the
death penalty, those states would have had twenty-six death sentences,
instead of 117.177 The viability of these death sentences remains on shaky
ground after the United States Supreme Court declined to specifically
address the constitutionality of non-unanimous capital sentencing ver-
dicts in Hurst v. Florida.178 It remains to be seen whether the practice of
allowing death sentences to be imposed following non-unanimous jury
verdicts will be permitted to continue to exist in the United States or
172. Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2015); see also Emily
Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581, 636 (2012)
("[D]isparities in the kinds of mitigation investigations individual defendants receive are much more
serious than previously thought.").
173. See Alabama Inmates Currently on Death Row, ALA. DEP'T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.doc.state.al.us/DeathRow.aspx (last visited May 2, 2016).
174. See Corrections Offender Network. Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP'T CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/deathrowroster.asp (last visited May 2, 2016).
175. See Hurst v. Florida, CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. RACE & JUST., HARV. L. ScH.
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2015/10/hurst-v-floridal (providing statistics




178. See generally Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In Hurst, the Supreme Court found
Florida's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
because it did not require a jury to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.
Id. at 622. Under Florida's then-existing scheme, the jury merely returned an advisory verdict rec-
ommending a sentence, but was not required to make specific factual findings regarding the exist-
ence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and its recommendation was not binding on the
judge. Id. at 620. Instead, Florida law required any factual findings upon which any death sentence
was based to be made by a judge. See id. The Supreme Court held that this practice violated the
Sixth Amendment but did not address the aspect of Florida's law that authorized the jury to recom-
mend a sentence of death by majority vote. Id. at 621.
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whether it will fail to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment, as have
many other questionable capital sentencing practices in recent years.179
In addition to states that allow for the imposition of the death penal-
ty upon non-unanimous jury verdicts, several states allow the prosecution
multiple tries at obtaining a death verdict in the event of non-unanimity.
California provides one example. California's capital punishment system
is notoriously troubled and dysfunctional.80 Its corrections department
houses a whopping 748 individuals on death row despite the fact that the
state has not executed anyone in nearly a decade.'8' If a California jury
fails to reach a unanimous verdict as to penalty in a capital case, the stat-
ute provides that "the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new
jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be."'82 Even
after the second retrial, this process can continue multiple times unless
the court, in its discretion, decides to impose a punishment of life without
parole. Likewise, Arizona, which houses 119 inmates on its death row,'83
has a capital sentencing statute requiring that a new jury be impaneled in
the event of a non-unanimous verdict on the issue of penalty.'8 4 If the
verdict is not unanimous the second time around, the court is required to
impose a sentence of life without parole.'85
Thus, in jurisdictions like the ones described above, the law makes
it easier for the prosecution to obtain death sentences for criminal de-
fendants in general, either through non-unanimous verdicts or multiple
179. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (finding that Florida rule limiting capital
defendant's ability to show intellectual disability violates Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding Louisiana capital sentencing statute unconstitutional for allowing
for death penalty for the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding imposi-
tion of death penalty on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (Arizona statute allowing judge to find aggravating circumstance violates the Sixth Amend-
ment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding imposition of death penalty on mentally
impaired offenders unconstitutional).
180. In July 2014, a federal judge appointed by President George W. Bush found California's
capital punishment system unconstitutional due to its systemic delay and dysfunction. See Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068-69 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev d, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th
Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed that decision, holding that the petitioner's claim
was barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which generally prohibits federal courts
from announcing a new rule of constitutional law in a habeas case. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538,
546-53 (9th Cir. 2015). However, the appellate court did not address or dispute the underlying facts
pertaining to California's troubled scheme. It ended its opinion by stating, "Many agree with Peti-
tioner that California's capital punishment system is dysfunctional and that the delay between sen-
tencing and execution in California is extraordinary." Id at 553. Nevertheless, it concluded that
"[b]ecause Petitioner asks us to apply a novel constitutional rule, we may not assess the substantive
validity of his claim." Id.
181. See Paige St. John, California's Death Row, with No Executions in Sight, Runs Out of
Room, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:13 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-ff-death-
row-20150330-story.html; see also Condemned Inmate List, CAL. DEP'T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/capitaljpunishment/docs/condemnedinmatelistsecure.pdf
(last visited May 2, 2016).
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (2016).
183. See Death Row, ARIZ. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, https://corrections.az.gov/node/431 (last
visited May 2, 2016).
184. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(K) (2016).
185. Id. § 13-752(J)-(L), (0), (Q).
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opportunities to obtain unanimity. And the easier it is to obtain death
sentences in general, the easier it is to obtain them despite the presence
of significant mitigation in many cases, including evidence of intellectual
disability, youthfulness, mental illness, and childhood trauma.
Even this cursory overview of some of the possible explanations for
why people with diminished culpability like Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lewis
received life sentences in Colorado, while so many other capital defend-
ants throughout the country with significant mitigating factors in their
backgrounds and life histories instead received the death penalty, is trou-
bling.
C. Implications for Colorado
Critics of the verdicts in the Holmes or Lewis cases have suggested
that a variety of reforms could "fix" or "improve" the system. This past
legislative session, Republican State Senator Kevin Lundberg introduced
Senate Bill 64, which would have allowed juries to impose death sen-
tences upon a vote of 11-1.186 Lundberg expressly stated that the reason
he introduced the bill was because the result in the Holmes case "proves
that our system is inadequate."187 Fortunately, the bill died in the Senate
Judiciary Committee on a 3-2 vote.'88 Not only would that change have
placed Colorado in a tiny minority of states that allow for such a practice,
but such a change would have been constitutionally tenuous at best given
that the United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.'18 In
the wake of the Holmes verdict, another Republican lawmaker in Colo-
rado introduced a bill that would have allowed prosecutors the opportuni-
186. Jordan Steffen, Colorado Bill to Allow Death Sentence Without Unanimous Vote Dies,
DENV. POST (Feb. 10, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci 29501405/colorado-
bill-allow-death-sentence-without-unanimous-vote (noting that Lundberg's original proposal would
have allowed a death sentence upon a vote of 9-3 but was ultimately amended at the committee
hearing to require 11 votes for a sentence of death).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). As noted previously, the Supreme Court
invalidated Florida's capital sentencing scheme on other grounds and did not address the constitu-
tionality of non-unanimous capital sentencing verdicts in its opinion. However, it seems likely that
the Supreme Court will ultimately address this issue in the near future. The Delaware Supreme Court
is currently considering the constitutionality of its capital sentencing scheme, including the practice
of allowing the death penalty upon a non-unanimous sentencing verdict. See Jessica Masulli Reyes,
Public Defenders: Death Penalty Unconstitutional, NEWS JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2016, 7:29 PM),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/03/01/public-defenders-del-death-penalty-
law-unconstitutional/81146406/ (discussing litigation in Rauf v. State, No. 39, 2016). On May 2,
2016, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Johnson v. Alabama, an Alabama
capital case, and remanded to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals for further consideration in
light of Hurst v. Florida, indicating that it may consider the constitutionality of Alabama's capital
sentencing scheme in the near future. See Order List: 578 U.S., SUPREME COURT U.S. (May 2,
2016), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/050216zorj4ek.pdf. Moreover, the issue of
non-unanimity remains unresolved in Florida. See generally Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616. On March 7,
2016, following Hurst, Florida enacted a new capital sentencing law eliminating judicial override
but allowing for a sentencing verdict of death as long as 10 out of 12 jurors agree. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.142(3) (West 2016). The constitutionality of this new scheme has, of course, not yet
been tested.
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ty to seek death a second time if the first penalty-phase jury verdict was
non-unanimous.190 That bill, which would have made Colorado's capital
sentencing scheme even more expensive and inefficient than it already is,
also failed to receive adequate support from legislators and died in com-
mittee.1 9'
Another potential change would be to allow for more victim impact
testimony to be admissible during the penalty phase of the proceeding.
We believe in the importance of those stories and understand the desire
for them to be told. However, the jury's ultimate task at a capital sen-
tencing proceeding is to assess the defendant's moral culpability, not to
assess the amount of pain he caused.192 Exposing the jury to more heart-
breaking stories of grief and loss will not assist the jury in determining
how morally culpable a defendant is and will only increase the risk that
the jury's sentencing decision in a case will be based on arbitrary, emo-
tional factors. Moreover, such a change would be unlikely to pass muster
in light of the constitutional limitations on victim impact evidence set
forth by the Supreme Court.'93
Finally, a critic of the result in the Holmes case, claiming that we
had too many resources at our disposal, might even propose cutting our
office's budget. This would inhibit our ability to comply with the ABA
Guidelines and would provide more fodder for later arguments concern-
ing the ineffective assistance of counsel in the event of a future death
sentence. In other words, cutting our budget might increase the odds of a
death sentence, but it would simultaneously increase the risk that a court
would reverse any such sentence on appeal.
Proponents of reform should also bear in mind what happened the
last time the legislature changed Colorado's capital sentencing scheme in
a significant way. In 1995, the Colorado legislature changed Colorado's
190. See Corey Hutchins, Lawmaker: Prosecutors Need Two Chances to Win a Death Penalty
Verdict, COLO. INDEP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/156613/death-penalty-
colorado-second-chance.
191. See John Ingold & Joey Bunch, Bills Inspired by Aurora Theater Shooting Trial Meet
Different Fates, DENV. POST (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:13 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_29577942/bills-inspired-by-aurora-theater-shooting-trial-meet.
192. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) (noting that victim impact evidence is
not offered to encourage jurors to make comparative judgments that "defendants whose victims were
assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived
to be less worthy"); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution ra-
tionale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender.").
193. In Payne, the Court held that that the Eighth Amendment did not erect a per se bar prohib-
iting victim impact testimony in a capital sentencing trial and held that the State may accordingly
offer "'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish,' or demonstrating the
loss to the victim's family and to society which has resulted from the defendant's homicide." 501
U.S. at 822 (citation omitted) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)). Acknowledging that such evidence is likely to be highly emotionally impactful, it noted
that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism
for relief." Id at 825.
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capital sentencing scheme from allowing for jury sentencing to sentenc-
ing by a three-judge panel.194 Proponents of the legislation "believed that
three-judge panels would result in more death sentences."9 5 The reason
for the legislation was that "[a]t the time, many citizens and legislators
felt that Colorado juries had not been aggressive enough in their applica-
tion of the death penalty."'9 6 Of course, in 2002, in Ring v. Arizona,197
the United States Supreme Court invalidated Arizona's capital sentenc-
ing statute requiring judges to make factual findings with respect to ag-
gravating circumstances.198 A year later, the Colorado Supreme Court
struck down Colorado's three-judge capital sentencing statute based on
Ring, and everyone on Colorado's death row who had received a death
sentence from a three-judge panel was resentenced to life without parole
as a result.199
What we really need to be asking ourselves is whether we want to
keep pushing ahead with reforms to make it easier for prosecutors to
obtain death sentences or even whether we want to continue the status
quo of spending extraordinary amounts of money and effort in pursuit of
the death penalty.200 Because even if the State of Colorado succeeded at
194. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 258 (Colo. 2003) ("By means of its 1995 legislation, the
Colorado General Assembly amended Colorado's death penalty statute to substitute a three-judge
panel in place of the jury for the penalty phase of the trial in a capital case; the General Assembly
left the guilt phase of the trial with the jury. What the sponsors and proponents did not anticipate in
1995 was that they were relying on an opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court which would be over-
turned some twelve years after issuance." (citation omitted)).
195. Robin Lutz, Comment, Experimenting with Death: An Examination of Colorado's Use of
the Three-Judge Panel in Capital Sentencing, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 227, 244 (2002).
196. Id. As one author noted,
For example, jurors had recently decided not to impose a death sentence on Kevin Fears,
who was found guilty of crimes which included two counts of first degree murder, one
count of attempted first degree murder, and intimidation of a witness. Jurors had also
failed to impose the death penalty on Michael Tenneson, who had killed two people in
Colorado and was suspected of killing three others in Wisconsin. As of 1994, statistics
revealed that juries in Denver County had only imposed the death penalty in one of nine
capital cases brought by the district attorney in the preceding twenty years. Rates in other
counties were similar: in the ten preceding years Adams County prosecutors attained a
death verdict in one case of five, while Jefferson County prosecutors attained death ver-
dicts in two cases of seven.
Id at 244-45 (citations omitted).
197. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
198. Id. at 609.
199. See Woldt, 64 P.3d at 259.
200. We should also note Colorado's existing capital sentencing scheme, as it is, contains a
number of features that are constitutionally problematic. For example, the scheme as currently inter-
preted by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Dunlap allows for the injection of arbitrary
factors into the criterion for death-eligibility and denigrates the jury's consideration of mitigation,
and that the statute defines death eligibility so broadly that it creates a constitutionally unacceptable
risk that the death penalty is arbitrarily enforced and applied in Colorado. See Marceau et al., supra
note 141, at 1087-88. It is also extremely troubling that all three of the inmates currently on death
row in Colorado are black men, all three were prosecuted by the Arapahoe County District Attor-
ney's office, and all three attended the same high school. See Colorado Death Penalty in Focus as
Massacre Trial Enters New Phase, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2015, 9:47 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/colorado-death-penalty_55af9aeee4b0a9b948530a4d. Alt-
hough we litigated many of these issues extensively in the Holmes case, the result in the case and the
fact that Mr. Holmes is not appealing his conviction mean that an appellate court will not review
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sentencing more people to death, the chances are good that, as a result,
the recipients of a majority of those sentences would be people with sig-
nificant intellectual or psychological deficits.
The alternative is that we could just stop. We could stop trying to
change the rules, we could stop spending all this money, and we could
stop trying to kill. Instead, we could join the chorus of public figures,
including, most recently, Pope Francis,201 Justices Breyer and Gins-
burg,202 and President Barack Obama,203 who are now questioning the
wisdom of continuing with this experiment. The death penalty does not
increase justice, make us safer, or ease the pain caused by violent crime.
The truth is that at its core, regardless of whether it may or may not have
"worked" in a particular case, the death penalty is a broken system.
When it succeeds, it largely succeeds in killing broken people. There is
something profoundly disturbing about that.
them in the context of this case. However, we continue to believe that Colorado's capital sentencing
scheme as it currently stands is vulnerable to invalidation by an appellate court in the future.
201. In a September 24, 2015, address to Congress, Pope Francis called for the abolition of the
death penalty in the United States. See Mark Berman, Pope Francis Tells Congress 'Every Life is
Sacred,' Says the Death Penalty Should Be Abolished, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/24/pope-francis-tells-congress-the-
death-penalty-should-be-abolished/.
202. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755-77 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that it is "highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amend-
ment").
203. On October 23, 2015, The Marshall Project released a video of an interview of President
Obama conducted by Bill Keller, in which Obama calls several aspects of the death penalty "deeply
troubling." Exclusive: Obama Calls the Death Penalty "Deeply Troubling," MARSHALL PROJECT
(Oct. 23, 2015, 3:20 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/23/watch-obama-discuss-
death-penalty-racial-profiling-with-the-marshall-project.
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INTRODUCTION
In Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Cho-
sen (Many Are Called), University of Denver Sturm College of Law
Professors Justin Marceau and Sam Kamin and Rowan University Pro-
fessor Wanda Foglia (the Authors) argue that Colorado's death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because the law permits too many homicide
cases to be treated as death penalty cases.2 In their follow-up article, Dis-
quieting Discretion: Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in
the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century (Disquieting Discretion),
which is based upon the same "original research" as Many Are Called,
the Professors-Marceau and Kamin, Meg Beardsley, and Scott Phil-
lips-claim that Colorado prosecutors are racially motivated in their de-
cisions to seek-or not to seek-the death penalty and that the Eight-
eenth Judicial District is the worst offender.
The original research is goal-oriented, biased, and flawed.4 Even a
cursory review demonstrates that the Authors did not base their "original
research" on a scientific, or even pseudoscientific, methodology. Origi-
nal, honest, and scientific research gathers facts and evidence, examines
the facts and evidence, and then reaches a hypothesis or theory. This
"original research" did the opposite. The Authors cherry-picked conven-
ient "facts" in order to fit those facts into,5 and thus "prove," a precon-
ceived notion. The resulting accusations are not only unreliable, they are
6
demonstrably false. This Article is, in part, a rebuttal to those outra-
geous claims and the biased "data" upon which they are purportedly
based. This Article will not attempt to detail the many justifications for
maintaining the death penalty as a matter of justice and public policy, nor
will it describe the ways in which Colorado's current death penalty laws
2. See Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are
Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2013). Although uncited by the Authors, the phrase
"many are called, few are chosen" comes from Matthew 22:14 (King James).
3. Meg Beardsley et al., Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography & The Colorado Death
Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 431,431,433 (2015).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. For a discussion of the source of the data set used in this study, see Marceau et al., supra
note 2, at 1070 n. 1, and infra Part IV.C.
6. See argument infra Part IV.
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can be improved and made consistent with other states and Federal death
penalty laws.
A. Bottom Line Up Front
In the course of litigation, you sometimes observe things. Here is
what I (Brauchler) observed: the defense attorneys for a double murderer
(one of whose victims was the murderer's infant daughter) facing the
death penalty7 sought, and ultimately found, anti-death penalty academ-
ics to help the defense team in attempting to keep their client from re-
ceiving the death penalty for his second murder.8 These academics had
no experience actually practicing law in Colorado, much less practicing
criminal law in Colorado, and much less practicing capital litigation in
Colorado.9 Indeed, they had negligible experience actually practicing
criminal law at all. The defense attorneys got their handpicked academics
to examine defense selected and screened data in order to reach what to
me (Brauchler), as a participant in the litigation, was a predetermined
conclusion.'o The conclusion sought by the defense would support the
defense's goal of striking down the death penalty statute that their client
faced. Their efforts failed in court. But as the old saying goes, when life
gives you lemons, you make lemonade. So, the academics took the de-
fense provided research-so far rejected by all three Colorado trial court
judges who have been asked to consider it"-and turned it into a law
7. See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. 2007).
8. Cf Karen Aug6, Edward Montour to Get New Trial in Killing of Corrections Officer,
DENVER POST (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_22988352/edward-
montour-to-get-new-trial.
9. Justin Marceau states prior experience as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in Arizona
and as counsel in federal habeas of death penalty cases. Faculty Profile, Justin Marceau, U. DENV.
STURM C. L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/justin-marceau (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
Sam Kamin claims no practical legal experience. Faculty Profile, Sam Kamin, U. DENv. STURM C.
L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/sam-kamin (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). Wanda Foglia
claims experience as a local prosecutor in Pennsylvania for two years in the mid-1980s. C. V. of
Wanda D. Foglia, ROWAN U.,
http://www.rowan.edulopen/RUFaculty/cydf/Dr.%20Foglia's%20CV.pdf (last visited Apr. I1,
2016).
10. The defense attorneys had the selected academics support their motion attacking the
Colorado death penalty in a specific case. This is the essence of the finding of the court in the People
v. Lewis. See Denial of Defendant's Motions DL-D-3, 27, 39 and 102 C-61 at 5-10 , People v.
Lewis, 12CR4743 (Denver Dist. Ct.) [hereinafter Order C-61 ]; see also Marceau et al., supra note 2,
at 1070 n.1.
I1. See Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Declare C.R.S. § 18-1.3-1201 (2012) Uncon-
stitutional Because it Fails to Sufficiently Narrow the Class of Individuals Eligible for the Death
Penalty (D-157), People v. Holmes, 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-157]; Order [2013-05-02] D-181, People v. Montour, 02CR782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct.
May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Order D-181]; Order C-61, supra note 10, at 5-10. Specifically referenc-
ing the Authors' study in their Death Eligibility article, the Holmes court found that "[t]he study
suffers from the . . . flaw . . . [that] its focus is solely on statutory aggravating factors. . . . [I]ts con-
clusion-that at least one aggravating factor potentially applied to 90.4% of first-degree murders
examined-is nothing more than a red herring." Order D-157, supra, at 8-7. Citing the Authors'
study from the Marceau, Kamin, & Foglia, Death Eligibility article, the Lewis court stated "it is clear
it was not an unbiased study, but one designed to provide support for a particular position and de-
signed to reach an anticipated conclusion." Order C-61, supra note 10, at 5. The court went on to
question the bias of a study commissioned by "a defendant facing a death penalty prosecution" and
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review article. Then, the same anti-death penalty academics used the
same incomplete, untrustworthy, and unscientifically gathered data to
impugn the motives of prosecutors throughout Colorado.12 Over the past
fifteen years, budget-not bias-has led to the limitation of capital pros-
ecutions to those metro area District Attorneys' offices that have the re-
sources to match the exploding and unchecked budgets of the Public
Defender and Alternate Defense Counsel.13
B. Our Background and Bias
In any academic paper attempting to influence litigation or policy
through original research or other statistical analysis, the proponents of
the research and conclusions should disclose to the reader their relevant
backgrounds and positions on the ultimate issue of the paper, in other
words: their bias. Only by knowing the bias and background of the Au-
thors can a reader fairly scrutinize the "research" and conclusions pur-
portedly supported by it. Because the Authors fail to do so in either of
their articles, we will do so here.
We are both prosecutors. We are both also former criminal defense
attorneys. Combined, we have practiced criminal law in Colorado courts
for 44 years.
We are pro-death penalty. That is to say, we are in favor of the po-
tential use of the death penalty as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
by a District Attorney elected by the population with whom the District
Attorney works to enforce the law and seek justice. We are both sea-
soned prosecutors who have also worked as defense attorneys. Between
us, we have conducted hundreds of jury trials in Colorado.
George Brauchler has been the elected District Attorney of the
Eighteenth Judicial District, the most populous jurisdiction in Colora-
do,14 since January 2013. He made the decision to seek the death penalty
against the shooter in the Aurora Theater Massacre, a case we both par-
stated "those same defense attorneys, along with paralegals and interns, collected and presented the
data for the authors' review and the participation of the defendant's attorneys and their staff creates
an even greater bias concern." Id. The court likened the methodology used by the Authors as
"GIGO, which stands for Garbage In, Garbage Out." Id at 6. The court also concluded that "the
approach taken to identify death penalty eligible cases was guaranteed to overestimate the instances
in which the death penalty would ever be sought." Id. at 7.
12. Throughout Disquieting Discretion, the word "race" appears twenty-five times, "racial"
appears sixty-two times, and "discrimination" appears fifteen times. See generally Beardsley et al.,
supra note 3. The Authors include a direct statement that Colorado prosecutors' use of the death
penalty "might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to explicit showings of racial discrimina-
tion." Id. at 443 n.62. Conversely, "disparate impact" appears only three times. See generally id.
13. See infra App. E.





ticipated in prosecuting.15 The mass murderer is a highly educated white
man from a privileged background who sought to massacre hundreds of
innocent people, but was successful in "only" murdering twelve-
including six-year-old Veronica Moser-Sullivan-and wounding seventy
others, including paralyzing and causing the miscarriage of Veronica's
mother, who sat next to her in the theater.
The Authors of Many Are Called and Disquieting Discretion are an-
ti-death penalty. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that. However,
they should not be perceived, in any way, as disinterested, unbiased aca-
demics examining a problem and reaching a conclusion. In our opinion,
there is no version, method, or legal procedure involving the death penal-
ty that they would ever support. We believe their goal is to see the death
penalty abolished, and their published research is a means to that end.16 It
is that ideological mindset-undisclosed in their papers-that appears to
have influenced their outcome-based research and analysis.
An unbiased review of all relevant facts and the pertinent law-not
just the Authors handpicked ones-reveals a far different outcome than
that advocated by the anti-death penalty Authors. The specific conclu-
sions are fourfold:
1. Coloradans overwhelmingly want to maintain the death penalty;
2. Colorado's death penalty statutes make the death penalty more dif-
ficult to obtain than in any other state in the United States, or even in
Federal Court;
3. The race of the defendant is not a factor in the determination to
pursue the death penalty in Colorado;
4. The vast disparity between the resources available to District At-
torneys' offices outside of the Denver-metro area, when compared
with the exploding and unscrutinized budget of the statewide public
defender's office, accounts for any geographic disparity in the pursuit
of the death penalty in Colorado.
II. COLORADANS SUPPORT THE DEATH PENALTY
Those who seek to permanently end the death penalty in Colorado
recognize that they are unlikely to do so through the democratic process,
either through the legislature or at the ballot box. A brief history of the
death penalty in Colorado demonstrates Coloradans' strong interest in
maintaining capital punishment in the state.
15. We were both involved in all aspects of the Aurora Theater Case prosecution and will
refer to events in this case based on our own personal knowledge and experience.
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Specifically citing the Authors' study from the
Marceau, Kamin, & Foglia, Death Eligibility article, the Lewis court stated "it is clear it was not an
unbiased study, but one designed to provide support for a particular position and designed to reach
an anticipated conclusion." Order C-6 1, supra note 10, at 5.
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In 1861, "the death penalty was formally instituted as a means of
punishment in Colorado.,"17 Since the beginning, Colorado has historical-
ly used the death penalty sparingly. In the thirty years from 1859 to
1889, "a total of 25 men were legally hanged,"'8 the exclusive method of
execution during that time. From 1890-1933, there were "45 executions
by hanging in Caion City."l 9 A brief period of abolition of the death
penalty beginning in 1897 resulted in new death penalty legislation only
four years later in 1901.20 In the thirty-eight years from 1934-1972, thir-
ty-two men were executed.21 In 1966, the legislature's attempt to repeal
the death penalty by public referendum "failed by a nearly two-to-one
margin."22 After the U.S. Supreme Court's Furman v. Georgia23 decision
in 1972, Colorado voters approved new death penalty legislation-again
by more than 60%-only two years later, in 1974.24 In 1978, the Colora-
do Supreme Court struck down the death penalty, only to have the legis-
lature amend and correct the statute in 1979.25
In September 1991, less than three months after the Colorado Su-
preme Court yet again struck down the death penalty statute, the legisla-
ture repealed the old statute and passed a new one.26 Pursuant to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona,2 7 the General Assembly
passed a statute that permitted a three-judge panel to decide the life sen-
28tence or death sentence issue. However, in June 2002, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Ring v. Arizona29 struck down the three-judge panel used
in death penalty cases since 1995. Less than three weeks later, "Colorado
became the first state to pass legislation that . .. would bring the state
into compliance with Ring."0o
The history that we have discussed above demonstrates that since
before becoming a state, Coloradans have successfully and quickly re-
sisted and reversed every effort to abolish the death penalty.
A. Recent Public Opinion
Recent polling indicates consistent and overwhelming support for
maintaining the death penalty in Colorado. In December 2012, The Colo-
17. Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region And Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-
1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 553 (2006).
18. Id
19. Id at 554.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 554-55.
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 555.
25. Id. at 555-56.
26. Id. at 556.
27. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
28. Colorado Session Laws, Ch. 244, sec. 1, § 16-11-103 (1995); see also Woldt v. People,
64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003); Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 556-57.
29. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
30. Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 557.
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rado Observer published a poll conducted by Dave Sackett, one of the
most well-known public opinion researchers in the United States.31 Six-
ty-eight percent of respondents opposed abolishing the death penalty,
compared with twenty-seven percent who favored ending capital pun-
ishment.3 2 In December 1993, Nathan Dunlap chose to seek revenge for
being fired by the Chuck E. Cheese restaurant in Aurora, Colorado.3 3 He
murdered Ben Grant, Marge Kohlberg, Sylvia Crowell, and 17 year-old
Colleen O'Connor, while she begged for her life.34 A fifth potential vic-
tim, Bobby Stephens, escaped to report Dunlap's crimes.3 5 Support for
the death penalty increased to 69% when respondents were told that
abolishing the death penalty would lead to a commutation of mass mur-
derer Nathan Dunlap's death sentence.36
A poll conducted by the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute
from June 5-10, 2013, found that 69% of Coloradans wanted the death
penalty to remain the law, compared to 24% who opposed the death pen-
alty.37 The same poll found that 67% of Coloradans believed that Gover-
nor John Hickenlooper's decision to reprieve convicted and condemned
38mass murderer Nathan Dunlap less than two weeks earlier was wrong.
Even an informal, online poll by the Denver Post in 2013 indicated
that 67% of respondents believed that mass murderer Dunlap, who mur-
dered four people and seriously injured a fifth, should have been execut-
39ed instead of Governor Hickenlooper granting a reprieve.
In short, Coloradans-by historically wide and consistent mar-
gins-want the death penalty to remain the law of the land.
31. See POLL: Coloradans Favor Keeping Death Penalty by Large Margin, COLO.
OBSERVER (Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter POLL], http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2012/12/poll-
coloradans-favor-death-penalty-by-large-margin/.
32. Id.
33. People v. Dunlap (Dunlap I), 975 P.2d 723, 733 (Colo. 1999).
34. Id. at 734.
35. Id.
36. POLL, supra note 31. Dunlap was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder, at-
tempted murder, robbery, and burglary in 1996 and was sentenced to death and an additional 113
years. See Dunlap v. People (Dunlap III), 173 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2007); People v. Dunlap
(Dunlap II), 36 P.3d 778, 779 (Colo. 2001); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 733. During his sentencing hear-
ing, Dunlap launched into a profanity-laden tirade directed at the family of a murder victim. Con-
demned Killer Unleashes Rage in Court, DENV. POST (Feb. 19, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/arvada/ci_22637314/condemned-killer-unleashes-rage-
court?source=pkg (originally published May 18, 1996).
37. Opinion, What Poll Means for the Death Penalty in Colorado, DENV. POST (June 14,
2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23455324/what-poll-means-death-penalty; Press
Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Colorado Voters Back Death Penalty Almost 3-1, Quinnipiac University




39. Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part I,
PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Mar. 2014, at 28, 30.
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Public opinion matters to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,40 held that public opinion is a factor
in the consideration of what might be "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment.4 1 The Court held that "the Clause forbidding 'cruel
and unusual' punishment 'is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' 4 2
"Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment."43 As the Court indicated in 1976, and continuing to this
day, "[d]espite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century,
over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that
a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an ap-
propriate and necessary criminal sanction."44
Thus, opponents of the death penalty in Colorado have turned their
attention to the courts-unsuccessfully-for years. To understand the
most recently attempted legal attack, it is necessary to understand the
current Colorado death penalty.
III. OVERVIEW OF COLORADO'S CURRENT DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
Colorado's death penalty statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-1.3-1201(2),
is unique. Our opinion is that the statute and case law interpreting the
statute45 make the procedure for obtaining the death penalty in Colorado
the most difficult in the United States. The Colorado statute requires the
jury to proceed through four steps in determining the appropriate sen-
tence after an offender has been convicted of a class-one felony:46
(1) proving statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) considering mitigation limited by only a relevance requirement; (3)
requiring that the jury make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
mitigation does not outweigh the statutory aggravating factors found in
step one; and (4) selecting an appropriate punishment between life with-
out parole or the death penalty, during which any individual juror can
decide that life is the appropriate punishment.47 The court is required to
impose a life sentence if any one of the jurors does not agree that the
prosecution has not proven a statutory aggravating factor, or that mitiga-
tion outweighs the statutory aggravating factors, or by determining that
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41. Id. at 171.
42. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
43. Id. at 173.
44. Id. at 179.
45. See, e.g., Dunlap I, 975 P.2d 723, 735-36 (Colo. 1999) (effectively creating a two-phase
or three-phase sentencing hearing); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990) (setting
forth the procedures for the four-stage process discussed below).
46. Colorado has three class-one felony offenses for which the death penalty theoretically
applies: first degree murder; first degree kidnapping where the victim dies in the course of the kid-
napping; and Treason. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2015); id. § 18-3-301(2); id. § 18-11-101.
47. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36; Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791-92.
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life is the appropriate punishment. According to the Colorado Supreme
Court, the first three are the "eligibility" steps.4 8 The fourth is the actual
imposition of the sentence or "selection" step.49 The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that this statute is constitutional against every attack
against it.50
A. The Colorado Death Penalty Statute Narrows the Pool ofDeath Pen-
alty Eligible Murderers More Than Any Other Statute in the United
States
Only one murderer, Gary Davis, has been executed in Colorado
since 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia death penalty procedure that incorporated a bifurcation of guilt
and punishment and allowed the parties to present additional evidence in
aggravation and mitigation.51 Yet death penalty opponents have argued
that the Colorado death penalty can be applied too often.52 Too often!
University of Denver Sturm College of Law professors Marceau
and Kamin have recently claimed that the death penalty in Colorado has
two main constitutional faults: (1) that it is too broad by failing to narrow
the class of people eligible for the death penalty, and (2) almost comical-
ly, that it is too narrow because it is sought against too few defendants.5 3
Death penalty opponents want it both ways on two issues: that it is un-
constitutional both because it is too broad and because it is too narrow
and that it is unconstitutional because it is imposed too often and not
imposed frequently enough.
Of course, more than just the death penalty statute needs to be con-
sidered in determining whether the Colorado scheme constitutionally
narrows the group of individuals who are eligible for the death penalty.
In fact, Colorado takes extreme, unprecedented, and unique steps to nar-
row the scope of the death penalty.
First, Colorado narrows in the statutory definition of "first degree
murder" more than most other states that have the death penalty for first
degree murder. In the most utilized theory of first degree murder in the
statute, the law requires that the prosecution prove that "[a]fter delibera-
tion and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than himself,
[the murderer caused] the death of that person."54 Of the thirty-three
48. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
49. Id.
50. E.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092-93 (Colo. 2007) (finding the statute constitutional
and in full compliance with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862 (1983)); Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 790-91; People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 170-71 (Colo. 1990),
overruled by People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005).
51. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98, 207.
52. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1113.
53. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
981, 1019-22 (2015); Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071-75.
54. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(l)(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
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states that have the death penalty, seventeen require lesser culpability by
requiring either just an intentional or knowing murder.5 5 In those seven-
teen states (i.e., 51% of states that have the death penalty), a murderer is
thus eligible for the death penalty for what would be second degree mur-
der in Colorado, where the murderer would not be eligible for death pen-
alty consideration at all.
In a nutshell, the sentencing phase of a capital trial can be divided
into two phases, or functions: (1) eligibility for the death sentence and
(2) a decision as to whether the defendant should receive the death sen-
tence or a different sentence.56 This first part, eligibility, can also be re-
ferred to as "narrowing," in that it narrows the class of murderers eligible
for the death penalty, because it "channel[s] and limit[s] the jury's dis-
cretion to ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment and
therefore not arbitrary or capricious in its imposition."57 Constitutionally,
this serves the purpose of providing a "meaningful basis for distinguish-
ing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not."58 Indeed, "[n]o court, not the U.S. Supreme Court, not
any federal inferior court, not any state court, and specifically no Colora-
do court has ever found a death penalty statute to be unconstitutional
based upon the number of aggravating factors in a particular statute."
There are only two requirements for aggravating factors to pass constitu-
tional muster: (1) "the circumstance may not apply to every defendant
convicted of murder, it must apply only to a subclass of defendants con-
victed of murder," and (2) "the aggravating [factor must] not be uncon-
stitutionally vague."60
The Colorado death penalty statute61 (the Colorado Statute) narrows
the pool of death eligible defendants more than any other jurisdiction in
the United States.62 The Colorado Statute provides for both eligibility
55. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. See
infra Apps. B & F.
56. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 296 (1998) ("Petitioner initially recognizes, as he must,
that our cases have distinguished between two different aspects of the capital sentencing process, the
eligibility phase and the selection phase. In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of de-
fendants eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of aggravating circumstances. In
the selection phase, the jury determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible defend-
ant.").
57. Id. at 275-76.
58. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976)) (striking down as unconstitutional an aggravating factor based on a finding that the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.").
59. Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part II,
PROSECUTOR, April- June 2014, at 22 (emphasis omitted).
60. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2015).
62. See infra Apps. B & F. Thirty-five jurisdictions including thirty-three states, the U.S.
Government and the U.S. Military have the death penalty as an option for murder in the first degree.
TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013- STATISTICAL TABLES, at 3,
6 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp I 3st.pdf.
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and sentencing (or selection). The Colorado Supreme Court has found
that the determination of eligibility consists of the first three steps of the
sentencing hearing:
The eligibility phase of a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty. In Colo-
rado, the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty is nar-
rowed by requiring the jury find the existence of one statutory aggravat-
ing factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then considers the exist-
ence of any mitigating factors and must determine whether mitigation
outweighs aggravation. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that mitigation does not outweigh aggravation, the defendant is
eligible to receive the death penalty and the jury moves to the final selec-
tion stage of deliberations.63
Demonstrating a clear understanding of the narrowing requirement
and that this requirement is contained in the jury's progression through
all three steps of eligibility, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The death penalty eligibility determination includes three steps: find-
ing aggravating factors, finding mitigating factors, and weighing ag-
gravating factors against mitigating factors.6
Therefore, just the eligibility phase of the Colorado Statute requires:
1. A unanimous and beyond a reasonable doubt finding that at least
one aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt;65
2. Presentation of any mitigation by the defense and rebuttal to miti-
gation by the prosecution-each individual juror assesses whether
mitigation exists;66
3. A finding as to whether mitigation does not outweigh aggravation
beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Each juror gives whatever weight the
63. Dunlap IH1, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007) (citations omitted).
64. People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. 2007).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(d), (2)(a)(1).
66. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(1 )(d) ("The burden of proof as to the aggravating factors ... shall be
beyond a reasonable doubt. There shall be no burden of proof as to proving or disproving mitigating
factors.").
67. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201. The Colorado Supreme Court on numer-
ous occasions has held that eligibility requires the three steps and that the Colorado Statute is consti-
tutional. See, e.g., Montour, 157 P.3d at 492; Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 264 (Colo. 2003); Dun-
lap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 739 (Colo. 1999); People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 471-73, 476 (Colo. 1998)
(finding no violation right against self-incrimination, due process, effective assistance of counsel,
and equal protection); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 250, 277 (Colo. 1996) (finding no viola-
tion of cruel and unusual or due process clauses); People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 436-41 (Colo.
1994) (finding no violation of due process, cruel and unusual, or ex post facto clauses); People v.
Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 192-95 (Colo. 1990), overruled by People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo.
2005).
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individual juror decides should be given to any mitigation that he
found to exist.68
Currently, an aggravating factor is any one of the seventeen factors
listed by the Colorado General Assembly in the statute.69 When Nathan
Dunlap committed his murders, there were fifteen aggravating factors. A
mitigating factor can be any of eleven statutory mitigating factors or
"[a]ny other evidence which in the court's opinion bears on the question
of mitigation."7 0 Mitigation must be "relevant to the nature of the crime,
and the character, background, and history of the defendant."
Colorado is the only jurisdiction that requires more than mere proof
of one or more aggravating factors at the eligibility stage. Every other
state uses aggravating factors, either in the guilt phase of trial or as the
first step at the sentencing hearing, as the only eligibility requirement.
The consideration of mitigation and the weighing of that mitigation, in
all other jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Virginia, are sen-
tencing factors, not eligibility factors. Colorado's unique procedure,
providing for the jury's consideration and weighing of aggravation and
mitigation at the eligibility stage makes a tremendous difference to the
prosecution and the murderer, as it may lead to an offender escaping the
possibility of a life or death vote.
B. How the Death Penalty Actually Works: Procedures That Narrow
Eligibility Where the Death Penalty Is Sought
The death penalty process and sentencing scheme can be seen as a
pyramid. Multiple levels provide layer after layer of "narrowing," begin-
ning with the crime, then the decision regarding filing of charges, a de-
termination of guilt at trial, the sentencing phase (eligibility and selec-
tion), review by the trial court, post-conviction review, mandatory review
of the death sentence by the Colorado Supreme Court, and other state
and federal appeals. Only after climbing to the apex of the pyramid, and
after any commutation or pardon authority of the Governor, may a court
impose the death penalty.
Elected District Attorneys must consider myriad factors in making
the decision that is consistent with Colorado constitutional, statutory, and
case law.
68. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(a)-(q).
70. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(a)-(1).
71. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978); People v.
District Court, 586 P.2d 31, 34-36 (Colo. 1978).
72. See infra App. F.
73. See infra App. F.
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1. Prosecutor's Decision Making Examples:
1. The bottom layer in the pyramid is the crime itself. The District
Attorney must make a good-faith decision whether he or she can
prove murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. After a District Attorney makes a decision on what to charge the
defendant, or submits the case to a grand jury for a probable cause
determination, and authorities conduct a proper investigation, a Dis-
trict Attorney needs to review the facts to determine whether any
statutory aggravating factors exist and appear to be provable beyond
a reasonable doubt.
3. A District Attorney considers the defendant's prior criminal histo-
ry, or lack of history (can be either aggravating or mitigating).
4. A District Attorney must make a determination after investigation
of what mitigation may exist. This determination usually is per-
formed after a "mitigation meeting" with the defense, where the de-
fense presents the mitigation to the prosecution. Only after consider-
ing mitigation does a prosecutor announce that the People of the
State of Colorado will pursue the death penalty.
5. The prosecutor is required to discuss the case with the victim's
family members.74 There are constitutional, statutory, and practical
requirements concerning victims. Some of those considerations in-
clude:
i. A victim's family's position concerning the death penal-
ty;
ii. Any victim's family's concerns with the length of the ap-
peals and post-conviction proceedings until the ultimate
outcome of the case is determined;
iii. Relationship of the victim to the defendant;
iv. Relationship of the defendant to the surviving victim's
family members who may also need to be witnesses. A con-
sideration of the impact upon the victim-witnesses if they
have to testify;
v. A victim's background, criminal and personal histories,
and level of contribution to their own death; and
vi. Number, age, and vulnerability of the victims.
6. The unique legal and factual issues in the case.
7. The weighing of known aggravating factors and known mitigation
by the prosecutor in making the decision.
74. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16A.
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8. Legal climate-effect of pending legislation and existing appellate
authority.
2. Jury Decision Making
The Colorado death penalty sentencing procedure is set forth in Co-
lo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201. The jury is required to find the defendant
guilty of first degree murder unanimously and beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 A sentencing hearing is then conducted.76 At phase one, the jury
must determine whether a statutory aggravating factor has been proven
by a unanimous decision beyond a reasonable doubt.77 At phase two, the
jury hears mitigation evidence from the defense and any rebuttal to miti-
gation from the prosecution.78 Any individual juror may decide that a
particular mitigating factor exists.79 Also at phase two, the jurors must
determine individually that mitigation outweighs the aggravating factors
that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Each juror decides what is
mitigating and what weight to give any mitigating evidence. The only
items the jurors can consider at this phase in aggravation are the statutory
aggravating factors.80 Only if a statutory aggravating factor has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigation does not outweigh ag-
gravation, as determined individually but unanimously beyond a reason-
able doubt, can the jurors proceed to the final phase, selection of the sen-
tence.81
At the selection phase, the parties can introduce further evidence.
The defendant can introduce other mitigation. The prosecution can intro-
duce aggravating circumstances (i.e., facts that are not statutory factors
but are factors that speak to the impact of the crime on the victims; the
circumstances of the crime; and the character, background, and history of
the defendant).82  The aggravating circumstances, including victim-
impact evidence, can only be presented after the jury finds that the de-
fendant is eligible for the death penalty.8 3 The jurors decide the appropri-
ate sentence between a life sentence and the death penalty.m Despite the
eligibility finding, if any individual juror decides (unconstrained by any
75. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a). Technically, the jury is required to convict the
defendant of a class-one felony offense, which includes first degree murder, id. § 18-3-102, treason,
id. § 18-11-101, first degree kidnapping when death occurs, id. § 18-3-301, and certain assaults
during escape attempts by individuals convicted of class-one felonies, id. § 18-8-206. We have been
unable to find any reference in a Colorado appellate decision to the prosecution seeking the death
penalty for any crime other than first degree murder.
76. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(a)-(b).
77. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(d), (2).
78. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2).
79. See id. § 18-1.3-1201(4); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978); Dunlap
III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092-93 (Colo. 2007); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790-91 (Colo. 1990);
People v. District Court, 586 P.2d 31, 34-36 (Colo. 1978).
80. See Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 790-91.
81. Id.
82. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1.3-1201(1)(b); see also Dunlap III, 173 P.3d at 1092-93.
83. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(b).
84. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a).
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burden of proof) that life is the appropriate sentence, the defendant is
sentenced to life without parole.85
3. Trial Court Decision Making
The trial court is required to review a death sentence to determine
whether "the verdict of the jury is clearly erroneous as contrary to the
weight of the evidence, in which case the court shall sentence the de-
fendant to life imprisonment."86 Further, if the jury verdict is not unani-
mous, the court is required to sentence the defendant to life.87
After a verdict and sentence, the defendant can exercise his rights
under the Unitary Review in Death Penalty Cases.88 The trial court is
required to set a date for execution and then stay that date pending re-
view.8 Two separate proceedings occur: (1) a post-conviction review
similar to that provided by Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c),
and (2) a direct appeal.90 In the People v. Owens91 and People v. Ray9 2
cases, the court appointed for each defendant four taxpayer-funded attor-
neys to do the post-conviction review and four attorneys as direct-appeal
counsel.9 3 Thus, at this point, eight taxpayer-funded attorneys represent-
ed each defendant. Sir Mario Owens filed a post-conviction motion that
was over 1,000 pages in length.94 Hearings on the Owens post-conviction
petition are currently proceeding. Only after the court issues an order can
the defendant then exercise his right to the direct appeal and the post-
conviction-review appeal.
4. Colorado Supreme Court Review
The Colorado Supreme Court not only considers the usual appellate
issues, but must make specific determinations as to the death penalty9 5
Whenever a sentence of death is imposed upon a person pursuant to
the provisions of this section, the supreme court shall review the pro-
priety of that sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the
character and record of the offender, the public interest, and the man-
ner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and
accuracy of the information on which it was based.96
85. See id § I8-1.3-1201(2)(d).
86. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c).
87. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d).
88. Id. § 16-12-201(1).
89. Id. § 16-12-204(l).
90. Id. § 16-12-204(2).
91. 228 P.3d 969 (Colo. 2010).
92. 252 P.3d 1042 (Colo. 2011).
93. See, e.g., id at 1044; Owens, 228 P.3d at 969-70.
94. This motion was filed with court and is being actively litigated in our office.
95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(6) (2015).
96. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(6)(a).
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The court also must review the sentence to determine whether the
sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor or that the evidence presented oes not support
the finding of statutory aggravating circumstances."
97
5. Federal Court Decision Making
A defendant may seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court of any
constitutional holding by the state appellate courts. Further, a defendant
can take advantage of federal habeas proceedings that proceed through
the federal district court, to the circuit court, and to the U.S. Supreme
Court.98
The Colorado Statute constitutionally narrows the class of individu-
als who are eligible for the death penalty by having a three-step proce-
dure of (1) statutory aggravating factors; (2) mitigation; and (3) weighing
of mitigation against statutory aggravating factors. The comprehensive-
ness of the death penalty statutory scheme and its actual application in
Colorado should assuage any moral or legal concerns with random or
arbitrary application, as there are many constitutionally sufficient layers
of discretion and procedural safeguards in Colorado to ensure that death
is the appropriate punishment.
IV. "THE STUDY"
In an effort to support their claims that Colorado's death penalty
was unconstitutional and that its use was motivated by racial discrimina-
tion,99 the Authors rely on self-declared original research, which they
later entitle "the Colorado Narrowing Study" (the Study).00 Examination
of the Study demonstrates that it that suffers from significant subjectivity
on the part of what we can only conclude, based on our interpretation of
the evidence (i.e., in our learned opinions), were nonpractitioner acade-
micians who suffered from bias (whether over, subconscious, or uncon-
97. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(6)(b).
98. See 28 U.S.C. 2241, 2254(a) (2012).
99. In the conclusion to Disquieting Discretion the authors state:
Colorado's system is thus based on a capital statute that vests extraordinary discretion in the hands
of prosecutors. We now know that this essentially unfettered discretion has been exercised in ways
that should trouble anyone interested in the even-handed application of justice. We have demonstrat-
ed that the location of a murder and the color of the killer's skin have far more to do with whether
the death penalty is sought than whether a defendant's crime is among the worst of the worst, as
measured by examining whether the defendant has killed multiple victims.
Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 451. The clear implication is that prosecutors use their discretion in
a racially discriminatory manner.
100. See Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 443 & n.7 (citing to Many Are Called and stating
"We refer to this study as the Colorado Narrowing Study"). In People v. Montour D-181, Appendix
to Montour Brief, the Authors refer to the same study as the Colorado Death Penalty Eligibility
Study (CDPES). See D-181 (2013-3-29) Appendix to Mr. Montour's Brief in Reply to the Prosecu-
tion's Motion to Vacate and to Its Submission of the Prosecution Montour Murder Study (PMMS) at
4, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct., March 29, 2013) [hereinafter D-
181 Appendix].
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scious), and a cart-before-the-horse, outcome-oriented methodology and,
perhaps most importantly, a dearth of real-world, practical experience.
That unchecked and only lightly revealed subjectivity calls into question
the accuracy of the Study and any attempted argument and policy impli-
cations based upon it.
A. "The Experts"
Professors Marceau and Kamin make repeated reference to the "Ex-
pert Review Team (ERT)."'o' They, of course, have made themselves the
"experts." It is unclear why the Authors adopt this moniker, instead of
simply stating that they-the Authors-conducted the review of the in-
formation they requested. Nonetheless, these self-proclaimed experts
then use the defense-anti-death-penalty identification and selection of
cases. The self-titled experts then use their subjective application to the
biased information. It is, therefore, relevant and important to know what
bias and experience they may bring to their chosen task. Unrevealed in
their article is that the Authors are anti-death penalty attorneys who have
spent the majority of their professional careers attempting to defeat and
strike down the death penalty.' 02
One expert, Professor Justin Marceau, a co-author of the Study and
law review article-is the Animal Legal Defense Fund professor at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law-whose prior criminal law
experience was two years fighting the death penalty as an appellate As-
sistant Federal Public Defender in Arizona.' 03 At the time of his self-
designation as an expert for the Study, he had been a licensed attorney
for eight years, four of those as an academician.104
Another expert, Professor Wanda Foglia, is a twenty-year law pro-
fessor from Rowan University who publishes in opposition to the death
penalty and testifies across the country on behalf of defendants facing the
death penalty in an attempt to have the death penalty process declared
unconstitutional.05 Her touted past experience as a criminal law practi-
tioner consists of two years as a prosecutor in the mid-1980s, prior to
entering academia.
0 6
The third expert, Professor Sam Kamin, is the co-author of the
Study and law review article, a law professor from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, and a career academician who has fo-
101. See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 2, at I100.
102. See sources cited supra note 9.
I 03. See Faculty Profile, Justin Marceau, supra note 9.
104. See Curriculum Vitae, Justin Marceau, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF
LAW, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/justin-marceau.pdf
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
105. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1069 n. 1; see also C. V. of Wanda Foglia, supra note 9.
106. C V of Wanda Foglia, supra note 9.
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cused significant time advocating against the death penalty.0 7 It appears
that he has never practiced criminal law anywhere.
It must be noted that, despite the Study's claimed attempt to exam-
ine the entire process for case selection, which is purportedly based upon
an application of Colorado statutes and Colorado appellate opinions to
Colorado criminal cases, none of the experts are licensed to practice law
in Colorado.108 One of the most obvious demonstrations of the impact of
inexperience and bias is the experts' statement hat "[o]nce a defendant is
convicted of first-degree murder and at least one aggravating factor has
been proven to the jury, the selection question-weighing aggravators
against mitigators-is all that stands between a defendant and a death
sentence."l09 As detailed below in the discussion of Colorado's capital
punishment scheme, every part of the expert statement is false and con-
trary to Colorado law.
Additional misstatements of the law appear throughout the Authors'
articles. In criticizing Colorado's first degree murder statute as being
"one of the broadest known in law,"o the Authors claim that Colorado's
inclusion of felony murder "in the definition of first-degree murder is
quite unusual.""' They provide no support for this extreme statement,
which is explained by the fact that the vast majority of States-thirty-
eight of them-in the United States have a felony murder statute and
define felony murder as first degree murder.1 2 Completely contrary to
the claims of the Authors, it is actually unusual for a state to not have a
felony murder statute and not define felony murder as first degree mur-
der.113 The failure to research other states' felony murder statutes before
107. See Faculty Profile, Sam Kamin, supra note 9.
108. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1100. The author's lack of experience in criminal law
in Colorado is revealed throughout the article and prior working copies. For example, footnote 162
of the article states "a defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, which is a
class two felony, could be guilty of first degree murder as an accomplice under Colorado law." Id. at
1100 n.162. This is a misstatement of Colorado law. By statutory definition and practical applica-
tion, conspirators are not a subset of accomplices, nor vice versa. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-
201(1) (2015); id. § 18-1-603. Likewise, the authors make reference to "second-degree felon[ics]"
and "third degree felon[ies]." See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1100, 1115. Colorado does
not classify felonies by degree, but by class. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-206. This is akin to
the "fan" who yells "touchdown!" at a basketball game. Far from mere semantics, this misstatement
of terms used routinely and universally throughout Colorado highlights an unfamiliarity with-and
lack of facility with-the very laws and procedures the authors purport to analyze and critique.
Further, a search of the Colorado Judicial website showed that the authors were not admitted to
practice law in Colorado. See Attorney Lookup, COLO. Sup. CT.,
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/Search/Attylnfo.asp
109. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1090.
110. Id. at 1087.
111. Id.
112. See infra App. A.
113. See infra App. A. Forty-six states have a felony murder rule, or the functional equivalent,
as does the United States Code. Thirty-eight states classify felony murder as first degree murder or
the state equivalent of first degree murder. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1111(a) (2015); ALA. CODE § 13A-
6-2(c) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a) (2015);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
636(a)(2) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2015); IDAHO CODE
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criticizing Colorado's laws is further suggestion of the Authors' bias and
apparent inexperience in the area of criminal law.
The Authors further criticize Colorado's law in claiming that "the
existence of 17 aggravating factors render Colorado's statute broad in the
aggregate."ll4 The Authors do not independently verify their claim, but
rather rely upon a 1998 law review article as support for their conclusion
that "it appears that only California has more aggravating factors than
Colorado.""'5 In reality, six other states (excluding California) have as
many or more enumerated statutory aggravating factors as does Colora-
do.116
B. The Purpose of the Study at the Outset Was to Defeat the Death Pen-
alty in Colorado
In scrutinizing the objectivity of those conducting a Study that relies
upon a substantial amount of subjectivity in developing its data, it is ap-
propriate and necessary to evaluate not just the credentials and the pre-
disposed positions of the experts but also the motivations for conducting
such a Study. Here, the defense attorneys working for convicted infant
murderer Edward Montour"'7 solicited the anti-death penalty Authors of
the article to complete the Study in an effort to defeat the imposition of
the death penalty against heir client."'8 At the time the Authors agreed to
conduct the Study, they knew their work would become the foundation
for the defense team's motion to declare Colorado's death penalty un-
ANN. § 18-4003(d) (2015); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(2) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402(a)(2), (c)
(2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1) (2015) (first-degree murder with intent); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:30.1(A)(2) (2015) (second degree murder, without intent); MISS. CODE ANN. 97-3-19(1)(c)
(2015); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021(1) (2015) (second-degree murder); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
102(l)(b) (2015) (deliberate homicide); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a(l)(b)(2), (3) (2015); N.C.
GEN. STAT. 14-17(a) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.02(B), 2929.02(B)(1) (2015) (murder,
punishable by 15 years to life);OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§
163.115(1)(b), 163.095 (2015) (murder, aggravated murder); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (2015)
(second-degree murder); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(c)(a)(1), 16-3-50 (2015) (felony
murder aggravating circumstance; manslaughter); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4(2) (2015); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West. 2015); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1), (2)(d) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2015) (capital murder);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(l)(c) (2015); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (2015); see also Ben-
nett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) ("[P]articipation in a dangerous felony may
constitute wantonly engaging in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another under circumstanc-
es manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, thus permitting a conviction not only of the
dangerous felony, but also of wanton murder. Intent is not an element of wanton murder. Thus, the
conviction of robbery is unnecessary to prove the mens rea required to convict of murder. Rather, the
facts proving the element of endangerment necessary to convict of first-degree robbery may be the
same facts which prove the element of aggravated wantonness necessary to convict of wanton mur-
der.").
114. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1088.
115. Id. at 1088 n.91.
116. See infra App. B.
117. People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 493-94 (Colo. 2007) (describing that the Office of the
District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District sought the imposition of the death penalty
against Montour, who bludgeoned a prison guard to death while serving a life sentence for murder-
ing his eleven-week old daughter).
118. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1070 n. 1.
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constitutional. In fact, their work-which is nearly identical in content to
their later published article-was used by the defense attorneys for that
very purpose.1 19 The Authors acknowledge that they "are indebted" to
Montour's defense attorneys and even to "Mr. Montour," the convicted
murderer who was pending a possible death sentence at the time of the
Study.120
More than that, the Montour defense team limited the data which
the Authors were to consider, provided the limited date range of cases to
be included, and provided all of the case information and data relied up-
on by the Authors.12 1 The Authors supplemented the list of cases they
were provided by the Montour defense team-purportedly obtained from
the Colorado Judicial Branchl22-with additional cases identified and
provided only by the same Montour defense team. Thus, all of the cases
considered by the Authors in their Study were identified and provided by
the Montour defense team who were working to have Colorado's death
penalty law declared unconstitutional. A fair attempt to review all homi-
cide cases over a limited period would have included seeking supplemen-
tation or amendment of the defense-provided list by seeking input from
the Colorado District Attorneys Council, which maintains a statewide
database of cases, or from the twenty-two individual District Attorneys'
offices in Colorado.
The experts did not do this, instead they decided to rely on infor-
mation provided by, and supplemented exclusively by, defense counsel
working to defeat the death penalty on behalf of their client.
The Authors claim that, through this method, they worked from "a
complete dataset of all homicides in Colorado for a 12-year period.",2 3
C. An Incomplete and Unreliable Dataset ofHomicides
The information relied upon by Montour's defense team and the
Authors to advance their theory was analyzed.124  Specifical-
119. See Justin Marceau, Wanda Foglia, & Sam Kamin, PRELIMINARY MURDER STUDY
REPORT 1 (2012) (submitted by Montour defense attorneys in their motion D-181, filed on July 18,
2012).
120. Marceau et al., Colorado Capital Punishment: An Empirical Study I n.4 (University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, Working Paper No. 13-08, 2013).
121. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1070 n. 1. The Montour defense team provided the list
of cases to be considered by the Authors and chose not to consider any murder cases filed prior to
January 1, 1999 or any murder cases concluded after December 31, 2010. See D- 181 Appendix,
supra note 100, at 17. It is noteworthy that Many Are Called claims in its introductory words that
"This Article reports the conclusions of an empirical study of every murder conviction in Colorado
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010," when their submission to the Montour court
states that only cases "filed and concluded" between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010 were
considered.
122. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098.
123. Id. at 1071 n.5.
124. See infra App. C. Subsequent to Montour's defense team filing the Study as a supplement
to their motion D-181 asking the court to declare Colorado's death penalty statute unconstitutional,
the Prosecution filed with the court a detailed analysis and critique of the Study, entitled Prosecution
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ly, each one of the defense-created "case files" included in the Study was
reviewed for accuracy and reliability. Also the database was evaluated to
determine whether the defense team had captured all of the applicable
cases for the time period examined. The analysis revealed that the Mon-
tour defense team's "database" of 1,350 cases-on which their entire
Study was premised-is fatally flawed and incomplete.
* Seventy-one additional cases were identified from the Eighteenth
Judicial District alone, that were eligible to be included, but they
were not considered.125
* It is unknown how many additional cases from Colorado's other
twenty-one judicial districts were similarly not included or consid-
ered.
* Twenty-two cases included by the Montour defense team should
have been excluded.126
* Twenty-six cases were excluded but should not have been.127
D. Questionable Sources and Quality ofInformation
The Authors relied upon Montour's defense team of attorneys, para-
legals, and interns to build "case file[s]" from which the experts (the
Authors) sought to identify statutory aggravating factors that they subjec-
tively determined would have made the case "death eligible."' 2 8
In addition to the unreliable and incomplete database from which
the Montour defense team began, detailed analysis also reveals a disturb-
ing lack of reliable information considered by the Montour defense team
for each case they selected for additional review by the experts, as well
as an alarming reliance upon questionable sources of incomplete infor-
mation.
* Less than one-third of the reviewed case files contained an affida-
vit or probable cause statement-containing facts that resulted in ar-
rest-routinely filed in every felony case in Colorado.129
Murder Study. Merely for consistency and analysis, the Prosecution used the Defense team's proto-
cols to assess their claimed "complete database." The names and qualifications of those participating
in the Prosecution Murder Study are contained in Appendix C.
125. See D-181 (2012-11-20) Submission of Prosecution Murder Study Report at 7, People v.
Montour, 02CR782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecution Study].
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 7.
128. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098-1102, 1105. Elsewhere in this Article, we dis-
cuss the inaccuracy of the "death eligible" analysis of the authors. See infra notes 149-51 and ac-
companying text.
129. See Prosecution Study, supra note 125, at 20-21.
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* Eighty-nine percent contained no information-or charging docu-
ment-that would have captured the prosecutor's specific charges in
130a case.
* Sixty-six percent of the case files lacked both a charging document
and an affidavit/probable cause statement.131
* Eighty-seven percent contained no motions filed by the prosecu-
tion or defense, sentencing memos, or briefs that would have provid-
ed specific facts of the actual case.132
* Ninety-seven percent contained no orders on motions, bond pa-
perwork, plea paperwork, copies of advisements, sentencing orders,
or other court documents that would provide specific and actual
facts.133
* More than twenty-five percent of the case files rely entirely upon
news articles, press releases, or other press/media document for the
"factual" documents relied upon by the Authors to determine whether
a statutory aggravator existed.134
* Once they culled their list of 1,350 cases, there were 215 cases in
which the Montour defense team misapplied statutory aggravating
factors, or found more aggravating factors than actually existed, re-
sulting in an error rate of thirty-eight percent on aggravating factors
alone. 135
Most concerning is that of the 1,350 cases provided by the Montour
defense team, the Authors provided no information for 420 of the cases
(31.1% of the cases).136 Despite that significant lack of information, the
Montour defense team reached conclusions on how to classify all 420 of
those cases without a single piece of paper from any source related to the
case. Remarkably, the Montour defense team coded only thirty-one cases
as "insufficient information to support a conclusion."1
37
E. A Flawed and Misleading Time Period Chosen for the Study
The database the Montour defense attorneys directed the Authors to
use is seriously flawed and unrepresentative of the death penalty in Colo-






135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 21.
137. D-181Appendix, supra note 100, at 6-7.
138. See Marceauet al., supra note 2, at 1070-71.
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the database excludes the following data from the appellate cases in just
the two years leading up to that date where the death penalty was sought:
Table 1: 1997-1998 Data Excluded by the Study
Name / Cita- Race of Race of Judicial Outcome
tion Defendant Victim(s) District







William White White (3) 1st Death sentence -
Neal cited in reversed by Ring










George White White 4th Death sentence -
Woldt reversed by Ring










139. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002) (holding that a determination of aggravating factors had to
be determined by a jury), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding judge sen-
tencing constitutional). The Colorado General Assembly after the Walton decision enacted a three-
judge panel to sentence in a death penalty case.
658 [Vol. 93:3
2016]LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ANTI-DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH659
P.3d 256
(Colo. 2003)
Francisco Hispanic Hispanic 1st Death sentence -







Thus, a brief perusal of the Pacific Reporter shows that in just those
two years prosecutors sought the death penalty against three Whites, two
Hispanics, and one African-American. Since 1980, according to the ap-
pellate reported cases, prosecutors have sought the death penalty through
trial against twelve Whites, seven African-Americans, and nine Hispan-
* 140ics.'4
In just those two years, the death penalty was sought in the First,
Fourth, and Eighteenth Judicial Districts, and most of those cases were
outside of the Eighteenth Judicial District. If we go back a little farther,
another nine years to 1978, we see that prosecutors ought the death pen-
alty in the First, Second, Fourth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth,
and Twenty-First Judicial Districts.141 The above statistics regarding race
and location would seem to be important when addressing "the risk of
arbitrariness and discrimination"'142 of the death penalty in Colorado, but
inexplicably, these cases are just outside the parameters of the Authors'
Study. The Montour defense team and the Authors chose the best possi-
ble dataset o get the results that they were trying to reach in an effort to
spare Montour from a death sentence, and further, to attempt to declare
Colorado's long-standing death penalty unconstitutional.
The Study likewise does not include more recent decisions where
prosecutors sought the death penalty. For instance, the decision to seek
the death penalty in the James Holmes Case (Aurora Theater Shooting
Case) involved a white male from a privileged economic and educational
background who murdered twelve people.14 3 This case is not included.
Also, the Authors fail to include cases where prosecutors could have
sought the death penalty-or notice was actually filed, in which the de-
fendant agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder with a life sentence
in order to avoid a death sentence. In the Thirteenth Judicial District, a
140. See infra App. D (describing research based upon Colorado appellate reported cases
where the death penalty was sought).
141. See infra App. D (describing research based upon Colorado appellate reported cases
where the death penalty was sought).
142. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1094.
143. People v. Holmes, No. 2012-CR-1522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015).
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rural jurisdiction, the district attorney made the decision to seek the death
penalty against Brendan Johnson,'" a white male, and Cassandra Rieb,14 5
a white female. In the Eleventh Judicial District, a rural jurisdiction, the
district attorney made the decision to seek the death penalty against
Jaacob VanWinkle,146 a white male.
Since 1978, there have been twenty-four verdicts in cases in which
prosecutors sought the death penalty.147 Of the total, eighteen where
White defendants (including five Hispanics) and six were African-
American. Nine were reversed either in the trial court or on appeal be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court, having held that a judge could impose a
death sentence in Walton, reversed that decision in Ring.148
F. Additional Defense Imposed Limitations on the Cases Considered in
the Study
The Montour defense team adopted chronological parameters that
further limited "considered" cases to those that were both filed between
January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2010, and resolved (by verdict, plea,
or dismissal) within that same period of time.149 In the Eighteenth Judi-
cial District alone, twenty-five first degree murder cases filed within the
defense-selected time period were not considered solely because they
were not resolved prior to December 31, 2010."s0 It is unknown how
many additional first degree murder cases throughout Colorado the Au-
thors excluded for similar reasons.
Having created an unreliable, inadequate, and incomplete database,
the Authors misapply to it their misunderstanding of Colorado law.
144. People v. Johnson, No. 2014-CR-99 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015); see also Sara
Waite, Brendan Johnson Pleads Guilty to Grandmother s Murder, Will Get Life, JOURNAL-
ADVOCATE (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/sterling-public-
records/ci_27698160/brendan-johnson-pleads-guilty-grandmothers-murder-will-get.
145. People v. Rieb, No. 2014-CR-98 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2015); see also Sara Waite,
UPDATED: Rieb to Serve 80 Years in Severance Murder Case, JOURNAL-ADVOCATE (May 1, 2015,
10:41 AM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/sterling-public-records/ci_28026226/rieb-serve-80-
years-severance-murder-case.
146. People v. Van Winkle, No. 2014-CR-86 (Fremont Cty. Combined Ct. Sept. 29, 2014); see
also Anastasiya Bolton, Triple-Murder Victims' Family Cries in Court, 9NEWS (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:38
PM), http://www.9news.com/story/news/crime/2014/09/29/canon-city-triple-murder-
court/16429149/.
147. See infra app. D.
148. See infra app. D; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding judge
sentencing constitutional).
149. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098-1104; see also D-181Appendix, supra note 100,
at 17.
150. Prosecution Study, supra note 125, at 8; see also D-181Appendix, supra note 100, at 17.
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V. A FLAWED APPROACH-THE STUDY'S FOCUS ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF
THE "ELIGIBILITY TRIANGLE"-THE "STRAIGHT LINE" VS. COLORADO'S
COMPREHENSIVE THREE-TIERED APPROACH TO ELIGIBILITY
In an attempt to establish the lack of constitutional narrowing of
those murderers eligible for the death penalty, the Study focuses on the
breadth of the Colorado first degree murder statute, as well as what the
Authors claim to be an unduly high number of statutory aggravating fac-
tors. The Authors conclusively state: "Notably . . . Colorado's aggravat-
ing factors are also too broad to be effective at narrowing the class of
death-eligible offenders."'5' Examination of the Authors' illustrative
examples in this area demonstrates that their objectivity is noticeably
lacking.
For instance, the Authors claim that one of Colorado's aggravating
factors, "lying in wait, from ambush, or by use of an explosive" is over-
broad and overinclusive.'52 The Colorado Supreme Court has found that
the specific statutory aggravating factor is constitutional.153 Failing to
cite to any source for their conclusion, the Authors claim that this applies
to almost any first degree murder after deliberation:
For any murderer who kills "after deliberation," it will be the rare
case in which the perpetrator did not also surprise the victim, or at
least wait for an opportune moment to kill. Thus, the lying in wait
aggravator has application in an extremely large number of murder
cases in Colorado.154
Here, the Study seems to suffer from what one can understatedly
call a dearth of practical experience. By contending that the absence of
"lying in wait or ambush" aggravator is rare in a first degree murder
prosecution, the Study demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of
first degree murder prosecutions in Colorado and, likely, any other state.
151. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1088.
152. Id. at 1089 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(f) (2012)).
153. Only People v. Dunlop, Dunlap I, 975 P.2d 723, 751-52 (Colo. 1999), discusses the
meaning of "lying in wait." The Court found that the term has "well-founded roots in common and
legal parlance." Id. at 751. The meaning of the phrase is that "the killer conceals himself and waits
for an opportune moment to act, such that he takes his victim by surprise." Id The Court quoted
from the dictionary that "ambush" means "the act of lying in wait in or of attacking by surprise from
a concealed position," and a California case for the proposition that "lying in wait" is "a waiting and
watching the victim for an opportune time to act, together with the concealment by ambush or some
other secret design to take the victim by surprise." Id. (first quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 67 (1976); then quoting People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 457 (Cal.
1991)). Dunlap I held that "lying in wait" and "ambush" are not unconstitutionally vague-"the
terms 'lying in wait' and 'ambush' have well-founded roots in common and legal parlance, and thus
the aggravator has a 'common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of
understanding."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976)
(White, J., concurring)). California has also found the aggravating factor constitutional in People v.
Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 260 (Cal. 1989). The Indiana Supreme Court has also upheld the constitu-
tionality in Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 626 (Ind. 2004), and Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d
927, 940-41 (Ind. 2001).
154. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1089.
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Indeed, our practical experience, and that of other prosecutors with
whom we have discussed this issue, shows killing from ambush, or lying
in wait, are the rare case. Very rare.
The Study is replete with oversimplifications and misapplications of
U.S. and Colorado Supreme Court precedent to the Colorado Statute.
Perhaps most telling, with the exception of failing to consider the addi-
tional layers of the eligibility phase, is the Study's failure to carefully
and comprehensively compare the Colorado Statute to statutes that have
been held to be constitutional in other states (which have only one level
of eligibility). Unfortunately, given the lack of objectivity, in many in-
stances the Study is guilty of comparing apples to oranges.
With the understanding that there are three phases of eligibility, the
Colorado Supreme Court has stated, "We see no constitutional infirmity
in Colorado's capital sentencing scheme."'15 5 As stated above, the Study
assumes that eligibility includes only aggravating factors, a clearly
wrong assumption.156 The Study begins with a faulty premise: "[T]he
purpose of the study was to determine whether Colorado's statutory ag-
gravating factors meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible offend-
ers."'57 Thus the Study only considers one of the three considerations in
Colorado eligibility determination as far as narrowing is concerned. This
approach is like looking at one side of a triangle, a straight line, and ar-
guing conclusions without considering the other two sides that support
the whole.'58
Even though the Study finds that Colorado allows too many mur-
derers to be eligible for the death penalty, it paradoxically and simplisti-
cally finds reasonable a claim that "a capital sentencing scheme that pro-
duces too low of a death sentence rate is unconstitutional."'5 9 The obvi-
ous deficiency in this reasoning stems from the flawed premise of aggra-
vating factors being the only narrowing condition precedent o a death
sentence in Colorado. The Authors then extrapolated that improper prem-
ise to the conclusion that the low number of death sentences sought and
obtained means the statutory scheme lends itself to intolerable arbitrari-
ness. When one looks at the Colorado scheme comprehensively though,
155. Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007).
156. The Study only mentions in passing the consideration of mitigation and weighing. See
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1086 n.76. This passing consideration flies in the face of numerous
Colorado Supreme Court cases that hold that mitigation and weighing are essential parts of the
"eligibility determination." See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Study ignores long-
standing Colorado law. Further the Study confounds Colorado's eligibility determination by moving
mitigation and weighing from eligibility into the selection phase. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at
1090.
157. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071.
158. See generally EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (6th
ed. 2015).
159. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1082.
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it is clear that the Study is woefully incomplete, as it considers no practi-
cal application of the eligibility criteria.
That the Study finds supportive language from Furman v. Georgia
regarding the arbitrary application of the death penalty is not surprising,
as the Furman court was dealing with an unconstitutional statutory
scheme in Georgia that is incomparable to Colorado's scheme.160 The
Study uses language from this decades old, fact-specific opinion and
applies it broadly to the Colorado Statute-a statute which provides more
protection than the Georgia statute that was enacted post-Furman and
found to be constitutional by the same U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were
being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the
procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were
not directed to give attention to the nature or circumstances of the
crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant. Left
unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only
be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by con-
trast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defend-
ant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory
aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this
way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly
and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed
by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the
Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the con-
cerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here. 161
Relying on the reasoning in Gregg, it is overwhelmingly clear that
the Colorado Statute constitutionally narrows the class of murderers eli-
gible for the death penalty, as the Georgia statute that the Gregg court
found constitutional cannot possibly be said to narrow more than the
Colorado Statute.
The Study reaches an absolutely unsupportable position that
"[t]hese numbers [despite the low amount of cases on which sought and
obtained] compel the conclusion that Colorado's capital sentencing sys-
tem fails to satisfy the constitutional imperative of creating clear statuto-
ry standards for distinguishing between the few who are executed and the
many who commit murder." 62 The Study does not include any analysis
whatsoever concerning the jury's consideration of mitigation and weigh-
160. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
161. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
162. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1072.
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ing of mitigation against aggravation. The Study overlooks the likely
cause and effect of Colorado's more stringent set of eligibility safeguards
and appropriate prosecutorial discretion accounting for the relatively low
percentage of death sentences sought or obtained. Where the Study only
considers one of three stages that are required for eligibility in Colorado,
it is impossible to say that the statute is unconstitutional. Again, it is like









THE COLORADO ELIGIBILITY TRIANGLE
versus
THE STUDY'S STRAIGHT LINE
Statutory Aggravating Factors
In support of the Study, one might argue that only the statutory ag-
gravators should be considered toward constitutional narrowing, as it is
aggravators that are objectively measurable and not subject to juror dis-
cretion. This position would also be symptomatic of flawed reasoning.
The Study, quoting not from the per curiam decision but to a concurring
opinion from the Furman1 6 3 decision, conflates the U.S. Supreme Court's
163. See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A paragraph per curiam opinion holding the death
penalty unconstitutional as a violation of the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual clause, was
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prohibition against unfettered or "untrammeled discretion" with any, or
even guided, discretion by jurors and prosecutors alike.'6"
Fifteen years after Furman, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "Im-
plementation of [death penalty] laws necessarily requires discretionary
judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,
we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that
the discretion has been abused."s65 When an elected District Attorney in
Colorado is called upon to make the decision to seek a death sentence,
that decision must be made after consideration of several factors and
after determining that the case is properly charged as first degree murder.
Those factors include, but are not limited to: (1) Are there any statutory
aggravators-and how many-that the jury is likely to unanimously find
existed beyond a reasonable doubt? (2) What statutory mitigation exists
and what "other evidence which in the court's opinion bears on the ques-
tion of mitigation" 66 will or may be presented by the defense? (3) Will
the mitigation outweigh aggravation beyond a reasonable doubt?
To meet the Colorado eligibility requirement, not only must the jury
determine the aggravating factors, but it also must give those factors
weight; not only must the jury determine any mitigation, but it also must
give those factors weight; and finally, the jurors must determine whether
the weightiness of mitigation outweighs the weightiness of aggravating
factors. This three-step eligibility phase defines the "types of murders"
eligible for the death penalty in Colorado.
The Authors argue that this is not constitutional narrowing at all.
The Authors dismiss the notion that four separate district court judges
and the Colorado Supreme Court have adopted this view of narrowing in
Colorado.16 7 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that narrowing in
Colorado consists of statutory aggravating factors, mitigation, and the
decision whether mitigation outweighs those aggravating factors.168 The
followed by five separate concurring opinions and four separate dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas
held the death penalty unconstitutional because it was discriminatory in practice. Id. at 240 (Doug-
las, J., concurring). Justice Brennan held the death penalty unconstitutional because it was the prod-
uct of uncontrolled arbitrary discretion that was not acceptable to contemporary society. Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart held that it was unconstitutional because it was "wantonly
and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White held it unconstitution-
al because of its infrequency. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall held that it was
unconstitutional because, most importantly, it violated the "evolving standards of decency." Id. at
329 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164. See Marcaeu et al., supra note 2, at 1073.
165. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
166. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(1) (2015).
167. See, e.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d
786, 791 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lewis, No. 2012-CR-4743 (Den. Dist. Ct. Aug. 27, 2015) (presided
over by J. Madden); People v. Holmes, No. 2012-CR-1522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015)
(presided over by J. Samour); People v. Johnson, No. 2014-CR-99 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 12,
2015) (presided over by J. Singer); People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct.
May 2, 2013) (presided over by J. Caschette).
168. See, e.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d at 1092; Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791.
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Authors' articles and arguments have been presented to all three of these
trial court judges, who then unanimously rejected the Authors' view of
narrowing.169 For the Authors to be correct, the Colorado Supreme Court
and three separate district court judges must be wrong.'70
VI. EVEN IF ONE WERE TO ADOPT THE REJECTED AND UNDULY
RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF COLORADO LAW PROPOSED BY THE
AUTHORS THAT ASSUMES ELIGIBILITY IS DETERMINED ONLY BY
LOOKING AT THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS, COLORADO'S
STATUTE IS STILL CONSTITUTIONAL
What is the purpose of narrowing the class of murderers eligible for
the death penalty? In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme
Court found Georgia's death penalty statute unconstitutional.1'7 Furman
harkens one back to the early days of the Republic, when U.S. Supreme
Court Justices were expected to provide their opinions seriatim, as the
five justices in the opinions concurring with the per curiam decision
wrote five separate opinions, and the four dissenting justices filed sepa-
rate dissenting opinions.17 2 The key similarity among the Justices in the
majority was the position that Georgia applied the death penalty arbitrari-
ly under the current statute.173 Under the Georgia and Texas state statutes
at issue in Furman, jurors could consider any factor, once there was a
first degree murder conviction, to impose the death penalty.74 In re
sponse to Furman, a number of states, including Georgia, amended their
death penalty statutes, and in a series of opinions in 1976, the U.S. Su-
preme Court found that these statutes, which included additional specific
limitations and required specific additional findings, were constitution-
al. 175 The thing that made the death penalty constitutional in the eyes of
the U.S. Supreme Court was this series of legislative amendments, which
switched the death penalty procedure from what Furman would have
described as a completely arbitrary system of imposing the death penalty
to one that had specific procedures and limited what the jury could con-
sider in deciding that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment.
Most states adopted a model where the jury would weigh aggravating
factors against mitigation.'76 Colorado added a fourth step, and instead of
a simple model where the jury would weigh aggravating factors in miti-
169. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
170. Of course, the Colorado Supreme Court has no quality of supernatural perfection in its
legal pronouncements, but its status as Colorado's highest court makes its pronouncements regarding
Colorado law dispositive. One is reminded of the oft-quoted phrase from Justice Robert H. Jackson
regarding the U.S. Supreme Court, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
171. Furman v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
172. See id. at 240.
173. See id. at 242-371; see also supra note 163.
174. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
175. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 259 (1976).
176. See infra App. F.
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gation, the Colorado General Assembly added an additional step to pro-
tect the defendant-selection of the appropriate penalty.177
The Colorado statutory eligibility process constitutionally narrows
what the jurors may consider in deciding whether death is the appropriate
punishment. During their determination as to whether the defendant is
even eligible for the death penalty, the jurors must only focus on those
aggravating factors as limited by the General Assembly and that have
been unanimously proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the same time that limitations were placed on what a jury could
consider in favor of a death sentence (i.e., statutory aggravating factors)
there was an expansion of what a jury could consider in favor of a life
sentence (i.e., mitigating circumstances). The Colorado Statute strictly
limits the aggravating factors that the jury can consider.178 In the Theater
Shooting Case, we alleged five statutory aggravating factors, and the jury
found that we proved four beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, there
is no limitation on what the defendant can present as mitigating circum-
stances so long as the judge finds that those circumstances are relevant to
mitigation.179 "All admissible evidence presented by . . . the defendant
that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime, and the charac-
ter, background, and history of the defendant . .. may be presented." 80
No matter the number of statutory aggravating factors, those aggra-
vating factors serve the purpose of limiting what a juror can consider
against the defendant. There has never been a case in Colorado where all
of the statutory aggravating factors have been found to exist or were even
charged. In the reported appellate cases in which prosecutors sought the
death penalty, there were as few as two and as many as six aggravating
factors. 81
177. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 840-41, 846-47 (Colo. 1991) (holding unconstitu-
tional under the Colorado Constitution a procedure that eliminated the fourth step); People v. Tenne-
son, 788 P.2d 786, 788-89 (Colo. 1990) (holding constitutional the four-step procedure). The Gen-
eral Assembly then reenacted the prior, i.e. Tenneson, statute containing the four steps.
178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2015); see also Dunlap III, 173 P.3d at 1092; Tenne-
son, 788 P.2d at 791.
179. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (1)(b), (4)(1).
180. Id. § 18-1.3-1201 (1)(b).
181. For example, People v. White is an example of a case with two aggravating factors (prior
violent felony and heinous, cruel, or depraved)-one of which the Colorado Supreme Court found to
be in considering in error, although a harmless error-was sufficient. However, the death sentence
after being affirmed was vacated because the sentence was imposed by a judge. See People v. White,
870 P.2d 424, 436, 450-51 (Colo. 1994). People v. Petrosky is an example of a case with seven
aggravators, including intentional killing of peace officer, lying in wait, felony murder-intentional
killing, grave risk harm to another, avoid or prevent arrest or prosecution, and killing two or more
people in the same incident. See People's Notice of Statutory Aggravators (DAO15), People v. Petro-
sky, No. 95CR 1171 (Jefferson Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1995). Defendant Petrosky was found guilty,
but after the verdict, he committed suicide. Convicted Colorado Murderer Kills Self, UNITED PRESS
INT'L (May 8, 1996), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/05/08/Convicted-Colorado-murderer-kills-
self/3508831528000/.
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Of course, the Authors are not the first to argue that the presence of
too many statutory aggravating factors renders a death penalty statute
unconstitutional. When the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with an
argument that there were too many statutory aggravating factors in Del-
aware (twenty-two), the court rejected the argument because the defend-
ant did not argue (1) that every aggravator applied to every defendant or
were unconstitutionally vague, or (2) that the aggravators in his case
were constitutionally infirm. 18 2 The defendant had failed to demonstrate
how the number of statutory aggravating factors made "his own sentence
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid."l83 In fact, there are states that have
numerous statutory aggravating factors.184 In another Delaware Supreme
Court case, the court said that the question was never "whether, taken in
combination, Delaware's statutory aggravating circumstances apply to
virtually all defendants convicted of first degree murder."1
In Illinois, the Supreme Court held that each aggravator narrowed
the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty and asked: "Even
assuming that a death penalty statute could have 'too many' aggravating
factors rendering a first degree murder defendant eligible for the death
penalty, how many aggravating factors are 'too many'?[sic]."l86 The
question has never been answered by any court, at least in a way that
would agree with the argument of the Authors.
In Jones v. United States,187 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[i]n
order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, it
must perform a narrowing function with respect o the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentenc-
ing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry."188 The U.S. Supreme
Court has never held that the exclusive method of narrowing the class of
death-eligible defendants was by limiting the number of statutory aggra-
vating factors.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that:
When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to ena-
ble the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment
182. See Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 636, 640 (Del. 1998). The Authors' Study does not
cite to this Delaware case or statute where there are twenty-two aggravating factors. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. I1, § 4209(e) (2015) (listing twenty-two aggravating factors). One must question the schol-
arship that ignores pertinent citations that disfavor the Authors' position.
183. Stevenson, 709 A.2d at 636.
184. See SNELL, supra note 62, at 5. For example, the following states have numerous aggra-
vating factors: Alabama has eighteen; Arizona has fourteen; Nevada has fifteen; Pennsylvania has
eighteen; Tennessee has sixteen; and Virginia has fifteen. Id.
185. Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 12-13 (Del. 1998).
186. People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 817-18 (Ill. 2002).
187. 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
188. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
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from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled
basis for doing so. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an ag-
gravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.
The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Arave v. Creech190 is instructive
on eligibility. In that case, the Idaho statute at issue had a statutory ag-
gravating factor of "utter disregard for human life" defined as being
"cold-blooded [and] pitiless."' The Court examined that factor to de-
termine whether the state appropriately "channel[ed] the sentencer's dis-
cretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed
guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death."l92 The court found that (1) murderers eligible for
capital punishment was broadly defined to include all first degree mur-
derers, and (2) that a sizable class was eligible for the death penalty. The
Court stated that a "pitiless" murder might include every first degree
murderer, but that not all murders are "cold-blooded" and that there must
be some within the broad class who do exhibit feeling.'9 3 The Court
found that because "some" might exhibit feeling, "it has narrowed in a
meaningful way the category of defendants upon whom capital punish-
ment may be imposed." 94
A. Court Rejects the Study Authors' Opinions and Conclusions
The Montour defense team adopted the Authors' Study and legal
arguments about he claimed unconstitutionality of Colorado's death
penalty statute and incorporated them into a pleading filed with the trial
court.195 The Montour defense team and the Authors, consistent with
their article, Many Are Called, argued that eligibility for the death penal-
ty derived exclusively from the claimed existence of a statutory aggravat-
ing factor.' 9 6 The Study and the Authors' legal conclusions are entirely
based on this premise.
The trial court disagreed. The trial court found-consistent with
Colorado statutory construction-that "the finding of a statutory aggra-
vating factor, standing alone, is not sufficient to render a defendant eligi-
ble for the death penalty." 9 7 In rejecting the Authors' legal conclusions,
189. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993).
190. 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
191. Id. at 465 (first quoting IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987); then quoting Creech v.
Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 884 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part by Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993)).
192. Id. at 471 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)).
193. Id. at 475-76.
194. Id. at 476.
195. See D-181 (2012-07-11) Submission of Murder Study Report, People v. Montour, No.
2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013). The prosecution in the Montour case stipulated
to the authors' flawed numbers for purposes of resolving the motion.
196. See id. at 8, 10.
197. Order at 10, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013).
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the trial court cited People v. Montour'98 for the settled Colorado law that
"[t]he death penalty eligibility determination includes three steps: finding
aggravating factors, finding mitigating factors, and weighing aggravating
factors against mitigating factors."'99 Ultimately, the trial court found
that the Study "does not fully capture the relationship between constitu-
tional narrowing and the Colorado death penalty statute."200
Thus, at least one Colorado court agrees that the Study failed to ac-
complish its first stated primary goal, specifically, to determine "what
percentage of first-degree murderers in Colorado were eligible for the
death penalty."201
VI. CLAIMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Having failed to convince the court that Colorado's death penalty
was unconstitutional by design, the Authors then shifted their focus to
attacking prosecutors for their use of the death penalty.
In their follow-up article, Disquieting Discretion, Professors Mar-
ceau and Kamin20 2 use the exact same flawed and biased research in the
Study from the Montour case203 to support the additional and outrageous
suggestion that the application of the death penalty in Colorado is the
product of racism.2 04 The Authors claim that "prosecutors in Colorado
were more likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants
than against white defendants."205
The reliance the Authors put on their prior Study is undeniable, and
given its judicial rejection, inexplicable.2 06 Of the eighty-five footnotes in
Disquieting Discretion, forty reference the Authors' Study, their article
based upon the Study, or their mathematical computations using the
Study's claimed "complete dataset."20 7 The entire basis for the legal con-
clusions advanced by the Authors in their recent article is premised on
complete reliance and faith in the accuracy and integrity of their Study. If
the Study is incomplete and inaccurate, as explained and demonstrated
198. 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007).
199. Id. at 492.
200. Order at I1, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013).
201. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071.
202. Also joining the professors are Meg Beardsley and Scott Phillips, who-like Professors
Marceau and Kamin-have no experience in the practice of criminal law and procedure in Colorado,
nor are they licensed to practice law in Colorado.
203. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 442-43.
204. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
205. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 431. Likewise, the authors proclaim "the death penalty
charging decisions being made by Colorado prosecutors have a strong racially disparate impact." Id.
at 436.
206. The Authors restate their previously rejected position that "nearly every murderer in
Colorado could have been charged with first degree murder and that nearly every first degree mur-
derer could have been sentenced to death." Id at 439.
207. See, e.g., id. at 442 n.57.
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previously, the remainder of the Authors' analysis and conclusions are
suspect and, arguably, unreliable.
Rather than correct the errors and shortcomings of the Study as de-
scribed above, the Authors attempt instead to invent and define the term
"statutorily death-eligible [as] . . . murders for which the death penalty
was permitted as a matter of law under the Colorado first-degree murder
,,208
and death penalty statutes. As demonstrated earlier, the existence of a
statutory aggravator alone does not permit the imposition of the death
penalty "as a matter of law," as claimed by the Authors.
Aside from the Authors' ongoing misunderstanding of Colorado's
death penalty, for the numerous reasons stated earlier in this Article, the
Study cannot be relied upon for accuracy or completeness.
The Authors attempt to justify their adoption of the Montour de-
fense team's dictated and unrepresentative period of 1999-2010, by stat-
ing, "Our work picks up where the Radalet studies left off." 209 Professor
Michael L. Radalet, also a well-known opponent of the death penalty, co-
wrote an article for which a secondary goal was "to compare cases in
which the death penalty was sought with all homicides that occurred in
Colorado during the twenty-year period from January 1, 1980 through
December 31, 1999,"2 10 The Authors' Study did not attempt to further
objectively measure "cases in which the death penalty was sought" since
1999, but rather use the subjectively determined cases in which the death
penalty could have been sought 211 in their questionably expert and sub-
jective opinion. Another distinction between the studies is that Radalet's
was focused "primarily on victim attributes," not the race of the murder-
er. The Study only faintly "picks up" 2 12 where the Radalet studies left
off.2 13
As with their first scholarly endeavor involving Colorado's death
penalty, the Authors again exhibit bias in their analysis and argument.
Take, for example, the manner in which they presented information in
their article. Immediately after a paragraph containing a statement for
which District Attorney Brauchler is referenced by name-not in a foot-
note, but in the body of the article, the Authors then write: "At the same
legislative hearing, some attempted to excuse the racially disparate oper-
ation of Colorado's death penalty by noting that non-whites commit
208. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 438.
209. Id.
210. Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 552 (emphasis added).
211. Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1096-99.
212. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 438.
213. Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 552.
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more of the violent crime in our state and that, as a result, 'African
American[s] tend to be just easier to convict."'
214
The sentence immediately following that one quotes by name Dan
May, the District Attorney from the Fourth Judicial District, not in a
footnote, but again in the body of the article.215 Neither individual whose
names bookend that ridiculous statement made that statement. Yet, with-
out further information, the reader could conclude that this was part of
the testimony of prosecutors or some in favor of maintaining the death
penalty statute. Only in the footnotes do the Authors reveal that the hy-
perbolic and outrageous quote was made by State Representative Jovan
Melton, who happens to be both African-American and the sponsor of a
bill that would have repealed the death penalty.2 16 Clearly, Representa-
tive Melton was not attempting to "excuse" anything about the death
penalty in Colorado. The Authors intentionally mislead the reader about
the nature of the quote cited in the body of their article.
Additionally, the Authors quote a portion of District Attorney Brau-
chler's statements to the Colorado General Assembly House Judiciary
Committee, "It's false to say that every first degree murder case could
arguably be the death penalty . . . . In fact, it requires more than the ex-
istence of an aggravating factor . ... 217 The Authors then mischaracter-
ize this statement as a recognition and concession that "the death penalty
was frequently available but rarely used . . . [and that] there was a great
disparity between those eligible for the [death] penalty and those who
receive it ... 218
The Authors state, "[I]t is beyond the scope of this Article to identi-
fy or isolate the causes of this disparity ... the existence of such dispari-
ty is undeniable."2 19 The Authors continue-in yet another footnote-
"that such disparities might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to
explicit showings of racial discrimination."220 The Authors thus conclude
that the disparity they claim exists is the product of either explicit or im-
plicit racial bias on the part of prosecutors. We deny the existence of the
massive disparity they claim exists. Their claims are unsupported by
their Study, as well as by the actual cases prosecuted in Colorado since
214. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 440 (alteration in original) (quoting Proposal of Repeal
of the Death Penalty: Hearing on H.B. 13-1264 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th
Reg. Sess. 302 (Colo. 2013) (statement of Rep. Jovan Melton)).
215. Id.
216. See Concerning the Repeal of the Death Penalty by the General Assembly, H.B. 13-1264,
69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
217. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 440 (quoting Proposal of Repeal of the Death Penalty:
Hearing on H.B. 13-1264 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th Reg. Sess. 302 (Colo.
2013) (statement of George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y, 18th Judicial District)).
218. Id. at 440.
219. Id. at 443.
220. Id. at 443 n.62.
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1978-not just in the narrow period selected by the Montour defense
team.
The Authors claim that their article "examines the results of the
broad discretion afforded prosecutors under Colorado's capital stat-
ute."221 However, the Study does not include any analysis of cases in
which prosecutors filed the required notice of their intention to seek the
death penalty but later resolved the case through a plea short of trial. This
obvious exercise of discretion is unexplored by the Authors and un-
addressed by their Study. Instead, the Authors backhandedly imply racial
bias based on supposition, innuendo, and as is readily apparent to even a
casual observer, a hard-core anti-death penalty ideology, to wit: "The
disparities found at the intersection of place and race suggest that prose-
cutorial discretion is not a reliable force for ensuring the even-handed
administration of the death penalty in Colorado."222
The Authors rely upon their expert review of an unreliable and
skewed database to attempt to statistically discern in which cases the
death penalty could have been sought, as well as the subsequently ex-
trapolated motivations of prosecutors to seek-or not to seek-the death
penalty. That methodology is wrought with subjectivity and speculation.
When those who are applying their subjective analysis are unlicensed to
practice law in Colorado, unfamiliar with Colorado law, and have never
prosecuted, defended, or litigated a single criminal case in Colorado,
scrutiny is the order of the day.
The anti-death penalty faction suggests that the death penalty is ra-
cially biased, as are the prosecutors who have sought death, by focusing
only on the racial composition of the current death row. Objectively, it is
true that all three defendants currently on death row in Colorado are Af-
rican-American, yet the anti-death penalty crew do not address the five
death penalty convictions (two whites, two Hispanics, and one African
American) which occurred between Dunlap and Owens/Ray; each of
those convictions was overturned as a result of Ring v. Arizona and Wal-
ton v. Arizona.223
A more relevant and objective measure is a review of all Colorado
cases in which a death sentence was rendered since 1975. The entire list
of those cases is found at Appendix D. From that objective list of twenty-
two death penalty convictions, there are several important observations
that can be made.
* The last three murderers sentenced to death were from the Eight-
eenth Judicial District (Montour, Owens, and Ray). Although all
three murderers are minorities (one Hispanic and two African Ameri-
221. Id. at 441.
222. Id. at 445.
223. See infra App. D.
DENVER LAW REVIEW
cans, respectively), all three murder victims were minorities as well
(one Hispanic and two African Americans, respectively).
* Prior to the death sentence imposed in the Fourth Judicial District
by an El Paso County jury in mass murderer Nathan Dunlap's 1993
case, the Eighteenth Judicial District had only one killer sentenced to
death, a white man in 1980.
* Twenty percent of the death penalty convictions (one case) were
against Hispanics, specifically Frank Rodriguez, and it is worth not-
ing that this death sentence was sought and obtained by the African-
American District Attorney of Denver, Norm Early (who also unsuc-
cessfully sought death against Frank Rodriguez's brother and co-
defendant, Chris Rodriguez).224
* The death penalty convictions have been rendered against eighteen
whites (including five Hispanics) and five African-Americans.
Considering those numbers, African-Americans have received
22.7% of the verdicts, far more than the 4.5% of the total Colorado popu-
225
lation they comprise. However, the accurate comparison is between
the percentage of convicted murderers and those murderers receiving
death verdicts. 17.6% of convicted Colorado murderers are African-
American.226 Given the small number of total death penalty convictions
since 1975 (twenty-four) and the number of death penalty convictions
against African-Americans, the 4.9% difference between 22.7% and
17.6% is the result of a single case. If there was only one less African-
American sentenced to death, the difference between the percentage of
murders and the percentage of murderers sentenced to death drops to
0.5%.
The same goes for national statistics. The right comparison should
be percentages of those on death row versus percentages of murderers as
a whole. FBI statistics indicate that nationally in 2014 there were 5,472
murders where the race was either white or black.227 White murderers
numbered 3,021 .228 African-American murderers numbered 2,45 1.229
224. See infra App. D; see also Steve Jackson, Murderer's Row, WESTWORD (June 7, 2001,
4:00 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/murderers-row-5067064.
225. QuickFacts: Colorado, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); see also infra App. D.
226. 2014 Supplemental Homicide Report, CRIME IN COLORADO 2014,
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2kl4/suppleinentalreports/homicide.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2016).
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Thus, although African-Americans make up only 13.2% of the popula-
tion,230 almost 40% of the murders are committed by African-
Americans.23 1 In Colorado, a comparison cannot be made as to Hispanic
murderers or victims because neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) nor the Colorado Bureau of Investigations (CBI) kept statistics
concerning Hispanics. The FBI only recently began keeping a breakout
statistic concerning Hispanic murderers and victims. The CBI has yet to
keep Hispanic breakouts.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of racial disparity in
capital punishment in McCleskey v. Kemp.232 There, the defense argued
that the Georgia death penalty was more often imposed on African-
American defendants and killers of white victims than on white defend-
ants and killers of African-American victims. The court held that the
statistical Study failed to establish any discriminatory purpose by prose-
cutors in the McCleskey case. The Court reasoned that the Study, at most,
indicated a correlation and not a causation and, thus, did not establish a
233constitutional violation.
Given the relative infrequency with which Colorado prosecutors
have sought and obtained the death penalty since 1975, the Authors
could have reviewed each of the death penalty convictions rendered
against African-Americans to assess-in their expert opinions-whether
the case warranted pursuit of the death penalty. For example, three of the
five African-Americans and one of the Hispanics who have been sen-
tenced to death since 1975-including all three current members of death
row-were prosecuted by the District Attorney's Office in the Eight-
eenth Judicial District.234
Nathan Dunlap: A remorseless mass murderer who murdered four,
while trying to murder five, by shooting each helpless victim in the
head at a Chuck E. Cheese's family restaurant.235
Robert Ray: Just prior to his trial on murder, Ray conspired with Sir
Mario Owens to murder an eyewitness to the first murder and his fi-
anc6, both African-Americans.236
230. QuickFacts: USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION
AND HOUSING (2000),
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
231. Crime in the United States 2011, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/201 I/crime-in-the-u.s.-20 11/tables/expanded-
homicide-data-table-3 (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). In 2011, there were 4,729 white, 5,486 black, 256
"other," and 4,077 unknown murder offenders.
232. 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
233. See id. at 314-19.
234. See infra App. D.
235. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 733-34 (Colo. 1999).
236. People v. Ray, 252 P.3d 1042, 1044-45 (Colo. 2011).
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Sir Mario Owens: The double murderer of the eyewitness and Rob-
ert Ray's fianc6 in the Ray case.237
Edward Montour: While serving a life sentence for murdering his
eleven-week-old daughter, Montour used an industrial-sized heavy
metal soup ladle to crush the skull of an unsuspecting prison guard,
who was Hispanic.
238
The Authors do not attempt to explain the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to seek death against a mass murderer, joint murderers of an
eyewitness and his fianc6, or a convicted baby killer who then murdered
a prison guard as the product of racial discrimination.
Subsequent o those cases, the same Eighteenth Judicial District At-
torney's Office (with a new District Attorney as of January 2013) exer-
cised the prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty for the mass
murderer from the Theater Shooting Case. In that 2012 case, a highly
educated white man from a privileged background murdered twelve and
injured seventy others, while trying to murder a movie theater full of
people, after booby-trapping his apartment with explosive and incendiary
devices. Those facts support the pursuit of the death penalty regardless of
the race of the mass murderer. Although we were not involved in the
prosecution, we have no doubt that the Fero's Bar murders in Denver,
resulting in five people stabbed to death and then set on fire, would have
been treated as a death penalty case by any Colorado District Attorney
(except perhaps by a District Attorney morally opposed to the death pen-
alty) regardless of race.2 39 There, the defendant happened to be African-
American.
The Authors completely omit any consideration of these cases in
their analysis.
A. Geography
The Authors state, "If prosecutors were, in fact, using their discre-
tion to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, one would
... expect that neither race nor geography would be statistically relevant
predictors of whether a death sentence is sought."240 In suggesting that
geography matters in the determination of when to seek the imposition of
the death penalty, the Authors attempt to suggest that there is an ulterior
motive, even a sinister one: racial bias on behalf of the prosecutors. The
Authors presuppose, in part, that the decision to seek the death penalty is
unaffected by factors such as available resources and impact on the Dis-
trict Attorney office responsible for prosecuting a case. Of course, any-
237. See id.
238. See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 491 (Colo. 2007).
239. People v. Dexter Lewis, No. 2012-CR-4743 (Denver Cty. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2015).
240. Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 441 (emphasis added).
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one familiar with the vast differences between Colorado's twenty-two
judicial districts knows otherwise.
The Authors began their Study with data collected from a purpose-
driven source: the Montour defense team. They used that questionable
data having already concluded there was a bogeyman: racial discrimina-
tion, and the prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judicial District are the big-
gest offenders. It is no coincidence that the Authors focus their conclu-
sions of racism on the Eighteenth Judicial District, the judicial district in
which the only current members of death row were sentenced.
The suggestion of racism or racial bias, whether explicit or implicit
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is offensive and unsupported
by the facts-all of them, not just the handpicked ones used by the Mon-
tour defense team and the anti-death penalty Authors.
As has been highlighted and critiqued previously, the Authors'
questionable reliance upon the date range 1999-2010, a period specifi-
cally picked by the Montour defense team, lends itself to a false repre-
sentation of death penalty prosecution in Colorado.
A fair presentation of the death penalty across the twenty-two judi-
cial districts in Colorado would be more comprehensive. The list of Col-
orado jurisdictions in which death penalty cases have been prosecuted
since 1978, the year the death penalty was reinstituted post-
Furman/Gregg, is extensive and covers the entire state. Since 1978,
prosecutors have sought the death penalty in the First, Second, Fourth,
Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-First Judicial Dis-
tricts.241
It is fair to explore any possible trend that the death penalty is more
likely to be sought in Denver-metro area offices. Yet, in concluding that
the answer is "racial discrimination or bias" and working backwards with
flawed data, the Authors-who combined have zero capital punishment
trial experience (Professor Marceau appears to have had two years in the
habeas corpus world in the Federal system in another state), as either
prosecutors or defense counsel-fail to consider any race-neutral, but
common-sense and practical explanations. The answer is not the explicit
or implicit racism claimed by the biased interpretations of flawed data.
The answer is money.
It is a matter of common sense that pursuing the death penalty, even
under a death penalty statute that is not the most demanding in the Unit-
ed States, requires more resources from a prosecutor's office than a non-
capital murder case. One of the most significant costs to capital litigation
241. See infra App. D (describing cases based upon the appellate reported cases where the
death penalty was sought).
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is the delay associated with getting the cases to trial. That delay is grow-
ing.
VII. DELAY
"[F]or more than 160 years [in the United States], capital sentences
were carried out in an average of two years or less" from the date of sen-
242tencing. But by 2014, it took an average of eighteen years to carry out
a death sentence.243 In the meantime, there has been a "proliferation of
labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment, promulgated by [the U.S.
Supreme] Court under an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that
empowered it to divine 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."'
244
The observation that capital litigation takes a long time is not of re-
cent vintage. In 1983 the Supreme Court noted in Sullivan v. Wain-
wright:
This case has been in litigation for a full decade, with repetitive and
careful reviews by both state and federal courts, and by this Court.
There must come an end to the process of consideration and recon-
sideration. We recognize, of course, as do state and other federal
courts, that the death sentence is qualitatively different from all other
sentences, and therefore special care is exercised in judicial re-
-245
view.24
When confronted with the assertion that lengthy post-conviction lit-
igation raised by the defense means that the ultimate punishment is cruel
or unusual, or violates some other constitutional provision, the courts
have uniformly disagreed.246
Daniel Edwards, an experienced capital litigator in Colorado, has
made these observations:
A large portion of the delay in death penalty cases is directly attribut-
able to defense attorneys. A former chief deputy public defender has
spread the word in Colorado and throughout the United States that
there are only two rules that apply to defense attorneys in death pen-
alty litigation: "Prison Rules," and "Vegas Rules." Prison Rules mean
that when it comes to defense attorneys in capital litigation, there are
no rules. Defense attorneys are encouraged to play dumb and not fol-
low the rules until and unless the attorney is threatened with serious
penalties. Vegas Rules mean that if you are going to go, go big.
242. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
245. Id. at 112.
246. Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part II,
PROSECUTOR, April- June 2014, at 22, 39.
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Further, a chief deputy public defender indicated in the early 1980s
that the way that the death penalty was going to be defeated in Colorado
was to create the greatest possible expenditure of governmental money,
time, and resources. The objective, therefore, was to build delay. Defense
attorneys in Colorado are facile at building in delay.247
IX. BUDGET, NOT BIAS
The reason death penalty defendants are able to expend such signif-
icant resources in delaying and defending against Colorado's death pen-
alty is money, specifically the unmatched growth of budgets for taxpay-
er-funded defense attorneys compared to the budgets of public prosecu-
tors throughout the state.
Death penalty cases in the modern era are defended by the Office of
the State Public Defender (OSPD) and the Office of the Alternate De-
fense Counsel (OADC). 248 Since before 2000, the budgets of OSPD and
OADC have exploded: the OSPD budget increasing 317.4% and the
OADC budget increasing 289.8%.249 Funding for those two offices have
outpaced the growth in population, violent crime, inflation, the state
budget, and most significantly for the analysis of the death penalty, the
budgets of the District Attorneys throughout Colorado.
A. Vast Disparity in Funding
State taxpayer monies entirely fund the OSPD and OADC. That is
to say that the state legislature annually approves the expenditure of state
general funds to OSPD and OADC. OSPD funds a team specifically des-
ignated and trained to defend death penalty cases. They can-and are-
250
deployed wherever a death penalty case is pursued. In the Theater
Shooting Case, OSPD even paid taxpayer monies to house the defense
team near the courthouse for the duration of the seven-month trial.
By contrast, District Attorneys' offices are funded locally. That is to
say that the county commissioners of the various counties within a judi-
cial district each vote on the budget of their District Attorney. For exam-
ple, in the Eighteenth Judicial District, the Boards of County Commis-
sioners of Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties each scruti-
nize and vote on the budget of the District Attorney; they contribute to
that budget based upon the proportion of the judicial district's population
that resides within each respective county.2 51 The tax base available to
Colorado's sixty-four counties contained in twenty-two Judicial Districts
is far different than that available to the state.
247. Id. at 22, 39-4 1.
248. Based on personal knowledge in death penalty litigation.
249. See infra App. E.
250. Based on the authors' personal knowledge in death penalty litigation.
251. See, e.g., Beacom v. Adams Cty, 657 P.2d 440,444 (Colo. 1983).
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Likewise, the level of public scrutiny to which OSPD and OADC
are subject is non-existent in comparison to the District Attorneys across
the state.252
The result is stark and unjustifiable.
The most straightforward way to assess the explosion of monies
available to taxpayer-funded defense attorneys is to compare the docu-
mented growth of their budgets with other relevant and known variables
over the same time period.
B. Population
Colorado: increased 24.5% from 2000 (4,301,261)253 to 2014
(5,355,866).254
Eighteenth Judicial District: increased by 96% from 2000
(490,722)255 to 2014 (962,585).256
C. Economy
Between 2000 and 2014, the cumulative rate of inflation was
39.5%, with an average of 2.25% annually.257
D. Crime
The number of "major crimes"258 reported in 2000 decreased by
4.6% in 2013.
252. Malia Zimmerman, Public Defender Mum as Taxpayer Tab Mounts for Accused 'Batman'
Killer James Holmes, Fox NEWS (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/02/15/public-
defender-mum-as-taxpayer-tab-mounts-for-accused-batman-killer-james.html. For example, the
public has been denied any information about how much taxpayer money was spent-even in the
aggregate-in the defense of the mass murderer in the Theater Shooting Case, the Chuck E.
Cheese's massacre case, or in the case of the assassination of a murder eyewitness and his flanc6. In
fact, the public has been denied any information about any taxpayer monies spend on any case in
which OSPD or OADC has represented the defendant.
253. Population of Colorado, CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/state/CO (last visited
Jan. 31, 2016).
254. QuickFacts: Colorado, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
255. County and Municipal Population Estimates - Parameters, COLO. DEP'T LOC. AFF.,
https://dola.colorado.gov/demog_webapps/peParameters.jsf~jsessionid=fD5ea58192a950d8109e0088
3f05 (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
256. Id.
257. Based on consumer price index. See Consumer Price Index, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bis.gov/cpi/cpi dr.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
258. Using the classifications of "major crimes" as reported by the Colorado Bureau of Inves-
tigations in 2000, which were limited to homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, and auto theft. Colorado
2000 Statewide Major Offenses, CRIME COLO. 2000,
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2000/statetotals/statewide-offense.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2016). Since 2000, the number of classifications has increased. 2014 Colorado Reported Statewide
Crimes, CRIME COLO. 2014,
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2k I 4/state%20totals/statewide offense.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2016).
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The number of district court criminal (felony) filings for all of Colo-
rado in FY 25 9 2001 (36,860)260 increased by 10.97% in FY 2015
(40,903).261
The number of juvenile delinquency cases filed in FY 2001
(16,986)262 decreased by 48.27% by FY 2015 (8,786).263
The number of misdemeanor cases filed in FY 2000 (7 3,8 5 3)264 de-
creased by 15.87% in FY 2015 (62,13 1).265
E. Budgets of OSPD and OADC
Appendix E captures the annual budgets of OSPD and OADC from
2000-2015 and illustrates the following: 266
Between 2000 ($27,296,931) and 2015 ($86,639,8883), the annual
budget of OSPD increased by 317.4%.
Between 2000 ($10,683,438) and 2015 ($37,980,369), the annual
budget of OADC increased by 289%.
The Eighteenth Judicial District, the most populous judicial district
in the state with nearly one million residents, has a budget that permits
the District Attorney to make decisions about how to seek justice in indi-
vidual cases independent of the resources available to the taxpayer-
funded behemoth OSPD and OADC. Of the other judicial districts, only
the largest, the First (Jefferson), Second (Denver), and Seventeenth (Ad-
ams) have the fiscal ability to withstand the seemingly limitless resources
available to-and used by-those who represent the murderers facing the
death penalty.
F. Additional Inquiries Not Made by the Authors
It is a matter of common sense that increased population and popu-
lation density may provide for a great opportunity and incidence of mul-
tiple and mass murders. Cities such as Denver, Aurora, Colorado
259. FY = Fiscal year. Colorado State Judicial Fiscal Year runs from July I" through June 3 0 h
each year.




261. Id.; COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2015, at 17,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planningand Analysis/AnnualStatistic
alReports/2015/FY201 5%2OAnnual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf.
262. COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 261, at 47.
263. Id.; JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note
262, at 43.
264. COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 261, at 75.
265. Id.; JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note
262, at 65.
266. See infra App. E (containing the delineated Colorado Sessions Laws within the table).
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Springs, and Lakewood have far different societal, historic, and econom-
ic issues related to crime and violent crime rates than do Durango, As-
pen, Glenwood Springs, and Lake City. Nonetheless, the Study's Au-
thors do not address or attempt to explore this issue.
If there is any recent geographic trend regarding the pursuit of the
death penalty, although none has been reliably shown with the Authors'
unreliable data and Study, it is likely due to these non-discriminatory
explanations-and perhaps others never explored by the Authors. The
Authors, having not pursued any explanation other than their predeter-
mined one of racial discrimination, left to hypothetical future research
the determination of whether the Colorado death penalty statute is un-
constitutional on its face or as applied by Colorado prosecutors.
X. CONCLUSION
Colorado should continue to assess and analyze the death penalty.
There is no more grave decision an elected prosecutor can make than to
set the machinery of government in motion to take the life of another
member of society, even one who is a heinous, depraved, and multiple
killer of the innocent. Coloradans have assessed and analyzed the death
penalty since before statehood, and Coloradans have historically and
consistently insisted on having the death penalty available as a discre-
tionary tool of elected prosecutors. The anti-death penalty, "life for kill-
ers" group does what minority opinion groups do every time they fail to
convince the populace of the rightness of their position: they turn to the
courts to override the will of the people. In Colorado, those modern ef-
forts to invite the judiciary to impose public policy on the majority have
failed.
To achieve their goal of lowering the bar of punishment for aggra-
vated murderers, the Authors-at the request of a murderer attempting to
avoid the death penalty for his second murder-have applied their ques-
tionable expertise and nearly complete misunderstanding of Colorado's
death penalty laws to a biased and flawed set of data compiled by the
murderer's defense team to support a theory they had from the outset: the
Colorado law is defective and unconstitutional. That argument having
failed, they then used the exact same data to support another precon-
ceived notion: prosecutors discriminate based on race and the worst of-
fenders are in the Eighteenth Judicial District. The Study does not draw
any reliable conclusions about anything related to homicides or the death
penalty in Colorado.
Colorado's death penalty is the toughest in the United States to
achieve. Taxpayer-funded defense attorneys have turned a historic explo-
sion in funding over the past fifteen years into undeniable and significant
increases in delay and cost associated with capital litigation, and in so
doing, they have priced many non-metro area jurisdictions out of the
ability to pursue the death penalty. Colorado should consider amending
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its statutes to be more consistent with those of the federal government
and the vast majority of states that have death penalty laws.
APPENDIX A
FELONY MURDER RULE SURVEY
State Felony-Murder Felony Murder Capital Pun-
Statute as First-degree ishment for
Murder Felony Mur-
der
Alabama Yes - ALA. Yes Yes - ALA.
CODE § 13A-6- CODE § 13A-
2(a)(3) (2015) 6-2(c) (2015)
Alaska Yes - ALASKA Yes - Only those No - ALASKA
STAT. § enumerated in STAT. §
11.41.100(a)(2)- ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)
(5) (2015); 11.41.100(a) (2)- (2015)
ALASKA STAT. § (5) (2015)
11.41.110(a)(3)-
(5) (2015)
Arizona Yes - ARIZ. Yes - Enumer- Yes - ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. ated Felonies in REV. STAT.
§ 13-1105(A)(2) ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
(2015) ANN. § 13- 1105(D)
1105(A)(2) (2015)
(2015)
Arkansas Yes - ARK. Yes Yes - ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5- CODE ANN. §
10-101(a)(1) 5-10-101(c)
(2015) (2015)
California Yes - CAL. Yes - Only Yes - CAL.
PENAL CODE § those enumerated PENAL CODE
189 (West 2015) in CAL. PENAL § 190(a)
CODE § 189 (West 2015)
(West 2015)
Colorado Yes - COLO. Yes Yes - COLO.




Connecticut Yes - CONN. No - Felony No - CONN.
GEN. STAT. § Murder GEN. STAT.§
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53a-54c (2015) 53a-45 (2015)
Delaware Yes- DEL. Yes Yes- DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. CODE ANN.
11, § 636(a)(2) tit. 11, §
(2015) 4209(a)
(2015)
Florida Yes - FLA. Yes - Only Yes - FLA.
STAT. § 782.04 those enumerated STAT. §
(2015) in FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(a)
782.04(1)(a)(2) (2015)
(2015)
Georgia Yes - GA. Yes Yes - GA.
CODE ANN. § 16- CODE ANN. §
5-1(c) (2015) 16-5-1(e)(1)
(2015)
Hawaii None N/A N/A
Idaho Yes - IDAHO Yes - Only Yes - IDAHO
CODE § 18- those enumerated CODE § 18-
4003(d) (2015) in IDAHO CODE § 4004 (2015)
18-4003(d)
(2015)
Illinois Yes - 720 ILL. Yes - Only for- Yes - Only
COMP. STAT. cible felonies with presence
5/9-1(a) (2015) under 720 ILL. of aggravating
COMP. STAT. 5/9- factor




Indiana Yes - IND. N/A Yes - IND.
CODE § 35-42-1- CODE § 35-
1(2) (2015) 50-2-3(b)
(2015)
Iowa Yes - IOWA Yes - Only for- No - IOWA
CODE § cible felonies CODE §
707.2(1)(b) under lOWA 902.1(1)
(2015) CODE § (2015)
707.2(1) (b)
(2015)
Kansas Yes - KAN. Yes No - KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21- STAT. ANN. §
5402(a)(2) 21-6620
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(2015) (2015)
Kentucky None N/A N/A
Louisiana Yes - LA. STAT. Yes - Only those Yes - LA.
ANN. § 30(A)(1) enumerated in STAT. ANN. §
(2015) LA. STAT. ANN. § 30(C) (2015)
30(A)(1) (2015)
Maine Yes - ME. No - Felony No - ME.
STAT. tit. 17-a, § Murder STAT. tit. 17-a,
202 (2015) § 1251 (2015)
Maryland Yes - MD. Yes - Only those No - MD.
CODE ANN., enumerated in CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2- MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
201(a)(4) (West CRIM. LA W § 2- 2-201(b)
2015) 201(a) (4) (West (West 2015)
2015)
Massachusetts Yes - However, Yes - However, No - MASS.
the felony must the felony must GEN. LAWS ch.
be punishable by be punishable by 265, § 2(a)
life in prison - life in prison - (2015)
MASS. GEN. MASS. GEN. LAWS
LAWS ch. 265, § ch. 265, § 1
1 (2015) (2015)






Minnesota Yes - MINN. Yes - Only those No
STAT. § enumerated in
609.185(a)(3) MINN. STA T. §
(2015) 609.185(a)(3)
(2015)
Mississippi Yes - MISS. Yes Yes - Only
CODE ANN. § 97- those enumer-
3-19(1)(c), (2)(e) ated in Miss.
(2015) CODE ANN. §
97-3-19(2)(e)
(2015)





Montana Yes- MONT. Yes - Deliberate Yes - MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45- Homicide CODE ANN. §
5-102(1)(b) 45-5-102(2)
(2015) (2015)
Nebraska Yes - NEB. Yes - Only those No - NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28- enumerated in REV. STAT. §
303(1)(b) (2015) NEB. REV. STA T. § 29-2502
28-303(1) (b) (2015)
(2015)
Nevada Yes - NEV. Yes - Only those Yes - NEV.
REV. STAT.§ enumerated in REV. STAT. §
200.030(1)(b) NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(a)
(2015) 200.030(1)(b) (2015)
(2015)
New Hamp- Yes - N.H. Yes - Only those No
shire REV. STAT. ANN. enumerated in
§ 630:1-a(I)(b) N.H. REV. STAT.
(2015); N.H. ANN. § 630:1-
REV. STAT. ANN. a(I)(b) (2015)
§ 630:1-b(I)
(2015)
New Jersey Yes - N.J. REV. Yes No - N.J.
STAT. § 2C: 11- REV. STAT.§
3(a)(3) (2015) 2C:11-3(b)
(2015)
New Mexico Yes - N.M. Yes - Called Yes - N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30- Capital Felony STAT. ANN. §
2-1(A)(2) (2015) 30-2-1(A)
(2015)
New York YES -N.Y. No - Second No
PENAL LAW § Degree - N.Y
125.25(3) PENAL LA W §
(McKinney 125.25(3)
2015) (McKinney 2015)
North Caroli- Yes - N.C. Yes Yes - N.C.
na GEN. STAT. § 14- GEN. STAT.§
17(a) (2015) 14-17(a)
(2015)
North Dakota Yes - N.D. Yes No - N.D.
CENT. CODE § CENT. CODE §
12.1-16-01(1)(c) 12.1-32-01(1)
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(2015) (2015)
Ohio Yes - OHIO No - Involun- No
REV. CODE ANN. tary Manslaugh-
§ 2903.04(A) ter - OHIO REV.
(West 2015) CODEANN. §
2903.04(C) (West
2015)
Oklahoma Yes - OKLA. Yes - Only those Yes - OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § enumerated in STAT. tit. 21,
701.7(B) (2015) OKLA. STAT. tit. § 701.9(A)
21, § 701.7(B) (2015)
(2015)
Oregon Yes - OR. REV. Yes - Only those No - OR.
STAT. § enumerated in REV. STAT. §
163.115(1)(b) OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(5)
(2016) 163.115(1)(b) (2016)
(2016)
Pennsylvania Yes - 18 PA. No - Second No - 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § Degree CONS. STAT. §
2502(b) (2016) 1102(b)
(2016)
Rhode Island Yes - 11 R.I. Yes - Only those No - 11 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11- enumerated in 11 GEN. LA WS §
23-1 (2016) R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2
11-23-1 (2016) (2016)
South Caroli- None N/A N/A
na
South Dakota Yes - S.D. Yes - Only those Yes - With
CODIFIED LAWS enumerated in Aggravating
§ 22-16-4(2) S.D. CODIFIED Circumstance




Tennessee Yes - TENN. Yes - Only those Yes - TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39- enumerated in CODE ANN. §
13-202(a)(2) TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-
(2015) § 39-13- 202(c)(1)
202 (a) (2) (2015) (2015)
Texas Yes - TEX. Yes Only if Inten-
PENAL CODE tional - TEX.






Utah Yes - UTAH Yes - Only those No - UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76- enumerated in CODEANN. §
5-203(2)(d) UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-
(2015) § 76-5-203(1), 203(3)(b)
(3)(a) (2015) (2015)
Vermont Yes - VT. Yes - only those No - VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. enumerated in STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 2301 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(a)
(2015) 13, § 2301 (2015) (2015)
Virginia Yes - VA. Yes - Only those No
CODE ANN. § enumerated in
18.2-32 (2015) VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-32 (2015)
Washington Yes - WASH. Yes - Only those No - WASH.
REV. CODE § enumerated in REV. CODE §
9A.32.030(1)(c) WASH. REV. 9A.32.040
(2015) CODE § (2015)
9A.32.030(1)(c)
(2015)
West Virginia Yes - W. VA. Yes - Only those No - W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-1 enumerated in W. CODE § 61-2-
(2015) VA. CODE § 61-2- 2(2015)
1 (2015)
Wisconsin Yes - WIS. No - Sentence No
STAT. § 940.03 Enhancer
(2015)
Wyoming Yes - WYO. Yes - Only those Yes - WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6- enumerated in STAT. ANN. §
2-101(a) (2015) WYO. STAT. ANN. 6-2-101(b)
§ 6-2-101 (a) (2015)
(2015)
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APPENDIX B 267
NUMBERS OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS IN THIRTY-THREE DEATH
PENALTY STATES
Table A6-1 below gives the counts of statutory and specified factors
in the death penalty of thirty-three states, sorted in descending order by
the number of specific factors.
STATUTO
RY SPECIFIC
STATE STATUTE FACTORS FACTORS
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 20 98
(2015)
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 12 62
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 17 62
(2015)
Missouri Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2015) 17 59
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 22 56
(2015)
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2015) 10 55
North Caro- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 11 53
lina (2015)
Indiana IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2015) 16 50
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 10 48
(2015)
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102
(1977) 12 48
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2015) 11 45
Pennsylva- 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 18 45
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 17 44
(2015)
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020
Washington (2015) 14 41
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 10 39
_ (2015)
Florida FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2015) 18 38
California CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (2015) 1 34
South Caro- S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2015) 12 30
Texas TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1903 9 29
(West 2015)
267. This appeared as Appendix 6 to the Prosecution Murder Study filed in response to the
Montour Defense Motion D-181 in People v. Montour, 02CR782. See Prosecution Study, supra note
137, at 30-31. The research was conducted by the Staff identified in Appendix C. See infra app. C.
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Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2015) 15 28
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (2016) 12 27
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 14 25
(2015)
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 8 25(2015) 8_25
Alabama ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (2015) 10 24
South Dako- S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A- 10 24
ta 11 (2015)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025
Kentucky (et21)8 23(West 2015)
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-
303 (West 2016), repealed by
Maryland 2013 Laws of Maryland, c. 156 10 21
(May 2, 2013).
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 9 20
(2015)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 15 20
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6624
Kansas (2015) 8 17
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-303 (2015) 8 17
New Hamp- N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 10 15
shire (2015)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 8 11
TABULATION METHODOLOGY
The goal of this appendix is to present, for comparison purposes, a
list of the number of specific aggravating factors identified in the death
penalty statutes of the thirty-three states that actually have the death pen-
alty. Because the statutes of the states vary considerably in specificity,
each state's list of aggravating factors was converted into a standardized
form, using equivalent levels of aggregation for the specific factors.
The standard for the level of aggregation was based roughly on the
Colorado Statute, with factors (c), (e), (g), and (k) expanded into their
constituent parts. Using this standard, Colorado has seventeen enumerat-
ed factors, (a) through (q), which constitute forty-four specific factors.
This level of aggregation for specific factors was applied consistently
across all thirty-three states.
As an example of this process, a factor that distinguishes between
killing a peace officer and killing a former peace officer was listed as a
single factor. A factor that distinguishes between a prior homicide and a
prior attempted homicide was similarly listed as a single factor. On the
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other hand, a statute that lists within one paragraph the killing of a peace
officer and a fireman was broken down into two specific factors: killing a
peace officer, and killing a fireman.
APPENDIX C
STUDY PERSONNEL268 FROM MONTOUR PROSECUTION TEAM
2 69
1. Loren Cobb is an Associate Research Professor at the University
of Colorado Denver, Department of Mathematical and Statistical Scienc-
es. He has been on the faculty since 2008, teaching mathematical statis-
tics and running the department's statistical consulting service. For fif-
teen years prior to joining the research faculty of the University of Colo-
rado Denver, Dr. Cobb was a consultant, primarily for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense and secondarily for the Ministries of Defense of Swe-
den and the United Kingdom. He has designed and facilitated scores of
high-level international exercises in long-range national strategic plan-
ning, United Nations peacekeeping, disaster-relief operations, complex
humanitarian emergencies, and hemispheric multilateral negotiation.
Prior to this he was an Associate Professor of Biostatistics and Biomath-
ematics in two medical schools. He has taught courses at the doctoral
level in departments of sociology, anthropology, psychology, statistics,
and mathematics. His research has been continuously funded since 1988
by a variety of agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the
National Institutes of Health, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, the U.S. Air
Force, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the author of several doz-
en scientific papers, chapters, and books, and holds a patent for his ana-
lytical software algorithms. His PhD is from Cornell University, 1973, in
mathematical sociology.
2. Paul Wolff (legal expert for the Prosecution Team) received his
BA from Knox College in 1967 and his JD from the University of Colo-
rado Law School in 1973. He served with the United States Marine
Corps from 1968-71, rising to the rank of captain. His work experience
includes seven years with the Denver District Attorney's Office (Deputy
DA, Chief Deputy DA), two years in private practice, ten years with US
West Communications (counsel, senior counsel), and two years with St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (attorney). Mr. Wolff served in
268. Other than Dr. Cobb, all Study personnel are or were licensed to practice law in Colorado,
based on information known to personnel at District Attomey's Office for the 18 1h Judicial District.
269. The report generated by the staff was a component of the Prosecution response to the
Montour Defense Team's motion D-181, regarding the Defense-titled "Colorado Death Penalty
Eligibility Study," dated 9 September 2012, referred to in this report as the Defense Murder Study.
The purpose of their response was to provide the trial court with a critical evaluation of the Defense
Murder Study, an analysis of the Defense and Prosecution databases, a quantification of the process
of narrowing death penalty eligibility in Colorado, and a brief examination of the statistical conse-
quences of severing certain aggravating factors from the Colorado death penalty statute.
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the Colorado Attorney General's Office from 1994-2003, as First Assis-
tant for the Capital Crimes Unit, and then served from 2003-2009 in the
Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office as Chief Appellate Deputy
DA. He retired in 2009.
3. Chris Wilcox received his JD from the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law in 2012. He has been a Deputy District Attorney
in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2012, following nearly two years
during which he worked as a legal intern in the Economic Crimes Unit,
Arapahoe County Court, and as a researcher for the D-181 Research
Team. Chris received his B.S. in Organizational Communications in
Business and Government through the Liberal Studies program at Mon-
tana State University Billings.
Prior to law school, Mr. Wilcox worked on several large-scale, mul-
ti-source, collaborative research projects. In 2003, as an Aide to the Sen-
ate Majority Leader in the Montana Legislature, he developed and im-
plemented a vote-tracking program, which gathered information on every
vote cast by every member of the Montana Legislature on every bill,
analyzing the effects of key legislation and reporting on voting patterns.
He also worked as the Victory Director for the Montana Republican Par-
ty (2005-2006), building and coordinating a massive voter contact opera-
tion, which gathered and analyzed millions of pieces of information on
voters, culminating in a voter-targeting program that was recognized one
of the best in the nation. Chris also worked as the Executive Director of
the Montana Republican Party (2007), which included significant re-
search focused on legislative district targeting, and the Campaign Man-
ager for the Roy Brown for Governor Campaign (2008), which involved
coordinating detailed county and precinct research and strategy devel-
opment.
4. Kristina Lynne Hayden received her BA from Davidson College,
Charlotte, North Carolina, in 2007, and her JD from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law in 2012. Ms. Hayden has been a Deputy
District Attorney in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2013. She pre-
viously worked as a researcher for the D- 181 Research Team of the Col-
orado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office and the Appellate
Department of the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office from
May 2010 to May 2011 as a legal intern, and as a legal intern (under the
Student Practice Act) in the Arapahoe County courts.
5. Ashley Brea Mufioz received her BA from the University of Wy-
oming, Laramie, Wyoming, in 2008, and her JD from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law in 2012. Ms. Munoz has been a Deputy
District Attorney in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2013. Previous-
ly, she worked as a researcher for the D-181 Research Team of the Colo-
rado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office. She previously
worked as a legal intern for the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's
Office (under the Student Practice Act) in the Arapahoe County courts.
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Ryan Stephen Robertson received his BA from the University of
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in 2009, and his JD from the Ohio North-
ern University Pettit College of Law, in Ada, Ohio, in 2012. Mr. Robert-
son has been a Deputy District Attorney in the Fourth Judicial District
since 2012. Previously, he worked as a researcher for the D-181 Re-
search Team of the Colorado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Of-
fice. He previously worked in the Appellate Department of the Eight-
eenth Judicial District Attorney's Office from May 2010 to August 2011
as a legal intern, and as a legal intern (under the Student Practice Act) in
270the Arapahoe County courts.
APPENDIX D
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCES IMPOSED IN COLORADO TRIAL COURTS
1975-2015*
Highlighted are Ring v. Arizona vacated death sentences after Wal-
ton v. Arizona.271
Year Name Judicial Circum- Race Race Vic-




1975 Dean 17th White White
Wilder-
muth
1975 Michael 4th Murder x Black White
Corbett 3
1975 Freddie 4th Kidnap- Black White
Glenn rape-
murder





1976 Ronald 21st Murder of White White
partner in (Hispanic)
270. It should be noted that the Defense Data Collection Team was composed of unidentified
paralegals and intems working for the Montour Defense Team and unrevealed in the Many Are
Called and Disquieting Discretion.
271. This table is intended to show those cases in which the death penalty was imposed from
1975-2015, specifying the race of both the murderer and the victim, as well as a general description
of the murder or murders. See Prosecution Study, supra note 137, at 26-43.
272. Because the FBI and CBI did not keep a break-out of Hispanic murderers from White
murderers, all are classified as White, with a Hispanic notation in parenthesis.
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Ferrell drug deals
1976 Scott -st Felony- White Black
Raymer murder -
x2
1977 Ricky 4th Robbery- White White
Dillon murder
1980 Robert 18th Murder- White
Williams conspira-
cy
1980 Edgar 2nd Robbery- White White
Duree murder
1981 Steven 1st Kidnap- White White
Morin rape mur- (His-
der panic)
1981 Johnnie 19th Robbery- White White





1982 Richard 21st Murder of White White
Drake wife - for
life insur-
ance
1984 Frank 2nd Kidnap- White White
Rodri- rape- (His-
guez murder panic)
1986 Gary 17th Kidnap- White White
Davis rape-
murder




1987 Ronald 1st Multiple White White
Lee murder
White (2)
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1994 Robert 17th Kidnap- Black White
Harlan rape-
murder
1997 George 4th Kidnap- White White
Woldt rape-
murder
1997 Francisco Ist Kidnap- White White
Martinez rape- (His-
murder panic)
1998 William 1st Multiple White White
Neal murder
(3)
2002 Edward 18th Murder of White White



















*Information from JBITS, Colorado DOC Inmate Locator, Colora-
do Appellate Decisions; ** 1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st.
DENVER LAWREVIEW
APPENDIX E
FUNDING FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND ALTERNATE DEFENSE
COUNSEL273
(not including any supplemental appropriation)
2000-2015
Public Defenders 2000 $27,296,931
317.4% 2015 $86,639,883
Average yearly increase 8.019%




Year Colorado Public De- Percent Alternate Per-
Sessions fender increase Defense cent







2000 Chapter $27,296.931 $10,683,438
413 pp
2522-23
2001 Chapter $27,321,931 .09% $10,919,838 2.21%
349 pp
1727-28
2002 Chapter $31,313,247 14.6% $11.973,335 9.64%
399 pp
2819-20
2003 Chapter $31,956,458 2% $11,941,766 (0.3%
273. Compiled October 27, 2015.
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449, pp )
3287-88
2004 Chapter $32,593,660 1.9% $12,443,302 4.2%
427, pp
2517-18
2005 Chapter $34,920,760 7.1% $13,889,280 11.6%
354 pp
2045-46
2006 Chapter $37,171,280 6.4% $18,291,224 31.7%
394 pp
2629-30
2007 Chapter $44,720,097 20.3% $21,640,265 18.3%
466 pp
2698-99
2008 Chapter $50,893,524 13.8% $23,227,619 7.3%
474 pp
2870-71
2009 Chapter $54,583,854 7.25% $23,692,141 1.99%
464 pp
3037-39
2010 Chapter $57,355,891 5% $24,556,665 3.6%
453 pp
2791-2792
2011 Chapter $61,938,317 7.98% $23,248,059 (5.4%
335, pp )
1999-2000
2012 Chapter $62,998,015 1.7% $22,560,446 (3%)
305 pp
2129-30
2013 Chapter $71,148,573 12.9% $22,896,598 1.5%
441, pp
2981-82
2014 Chapter $82,604,070 16.1% $29,645,966 29.5%
420, pp
2513-14





PROCEDURE IN JURISDICTIONS WITH THE DEATH PENALTY
















factor beyond a rea-
sonable doubt
"Aggravation Phase"






and trier of fact
must unanimous-
ly find that an ag-
gravating circum-
stance has been
2- Defendant can provide
mitigating circumstanc-
es-only need to interject
issue if factual problem
and then state must dis-
prove beyond a preponder-
ance; beyond that no as-
signed standard or burden
3- Jury weighs aggravating
circumstances (statutory)
against mitigating circum-
stances; if mitigating out-
weighs, recommend life if
majority would recom-
mend; if aggravating out-
weighs, recommend death
if ten jurors vote for death
4- Judge decides life with-
out parole or death sen-
tence after considering all
the evidence, considering
the jury's advisory verdict,
and making a written find-
ing of his decision. No
burden of proof is assigned




stances must be proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence by the defendant
and the jurors do not have
to unanimously find that
these circumstances have
been proven
The trier of fact shall
impose a sentence of
death if the trier of fact
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proven beyond a unanimously deter-
reasonable doubt mines that there are no
mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently
substantial to call for
leniency
Arkansas: 1-Jury must unani- 2-After the presentation of
ARK. CODE ANN. mously find that a evidence of 
aggravating
statutory aggravating circumstances and mitigat-
(2-4-015) to-605 circumstance exists ing circumstances, the jury
beyond a reasonable must unanimously find
doubt but does not that the aggravating fac-
assign the burden of tor(s) outweighs all miti-
proof gating circumstances
found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt but does





sentence of death beyond a
reasonable doubt but does











1. The jury must
unanimously deter-
mine whether one or
more of the charged
special circumstances
has been found to be
true beyond a reason-
able doubt
2. The trier of fact shall
consider, take into account




3. The jury shall impose a
sentence of death if the
trier of fact unanimously
concludes that the aggra-
vating circumstances out-
weigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances. No burden
assigned to this weighing.
* Jury instructions state:
"To return a judgment
of death, each of you






also so substantial in
comparison to the mit-
igating circumstances









tit. 11, § 4209
(2015)











a burden of proof












1. Jury must unani-
mously find the exist-




4. The jury must determine
the appropriate sentence-
life without parole or the
death penalty. To impose
death, the verdict must be
found unanimously and
beyond d a reasonable
doubt-without the stand-
ard of proof being assigned
to a party
2. Jury must find by a pre-
ponderance of the evi-
dence that the aggravating
factors (statutory and non-
statutory) outweigh the
mitigating circumstances
and report to the court the
number of affirmative and
negative votes
3. The court may impose a
sentence of death if the
jury has found the exist-
ence of one statutory ag-
[Vol. 93:3700








1. Jury must find that
at least one statutory
aggravating circum-
stance has been estab-
lished beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The
statute does not state
if this must be majori-
ty or unanimous.
1. The jury must find
that there is at least
one statutory aggra-
vating circumstance
proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
gravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt
and the court finds by a
preponderance of evidence
that the aggravating cir-
cumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances
2. Jury must decide wheth-
er there are sufficient miti-
gating circumstances such
that they outweigh the
statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances and then de-
termine whether the de-
fendant should be sen-
tenced to death or life
without parole
3. The court enters a sen-
tence of life or death and
may override the majority
of the jury and impose a
death sentence if the facts
suggesting a sentence of
death are so clear and con-
vincing that virtually no
reasonable person could
differ
2. Both the state and the
defendant may put on all
evidence related to aggra-
vating circumstances, stat-
utory and non-statutory, as
well as any mitigating cir-
cumstances. There is no
requirement that the jury
weigh these circumstances
but the jury may consider
them.
3. The jury's verdict as to
penalty must be unani-
mous.
Idaho: 1. The jury must 2. The jury must consider
IDAHO CODE § 19- unanimously find the whether the mitigating
existence of a statuto- circumstances make 
the
























1. The Jury must find





state. The jury in-
structions states that





is meant to include
non-statutory aggra-
vating circumstances.
penalty unjust. Whether or
not the death penalty is
unjust must be a unani-
mous decision although




the existence of mitigating
circumstances need not be
proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.
3. Jury must determine
which sentence is appro-
priate. If there is I statuto-
ry aggravating circum-
stance proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the
jury unanimously agrees
that the mitigating circum-
stances do not make the
imposition of the death
penalty unjust, then the
death penalty will be im-
posed
2. The jury must find that
any mitigating circum-
stance has been proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence, but it does not
have to be unanimous and
the burden is not assigned
3. The jury should consider
whether the mitigating
circumstances outweigh
the aggravating factor be-
fore recommending a pen-
alty to the judge. Jury must




mend a sentence of death.
4. The jury must unani-
mously recommend a sen-
I "
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tence. If they cannot agree,
it proceeds as if the sen-
tencing hearing were to the
court. The judge makes the
final decision as to sen-
tence but a unanimous jury














1. Jury must unani-




State has the burden
here.
2. Jury must determine
whether the mitigating
circumstances outweigh
the proven statutory ag-
gravating circumstances.
No burden of proof but the
jury instructions almost
suggest that the state bears
the burden of showing that
the aggravating circum-
stances is not outweighed
by any mitigating circum-
stances.
3. Jury must make a unan-
imous decision as to
whether or not to impose
the death penalty
Kentucky: 1. Jury must find one 2. Jury must weigh the
Ky. REV. STAT. § statutory aggravating aggravating (statutory and
factor proven beyond non-statutory) and mitigat-
a reasonable doubt. ing circumstances but no
Does not require una- burden is given or as-
nimity or assign a signed.
burden. 3. Jury recommends a sen-
tence-death or life in
prison-to the judge who
imposes the sentence.
Louisiana: 1. Jury must find that 2. Jurors should consider
CRIM. at least one statutory mitigating circumstances
LAO. CODEart aggravating circum- in rendering their verdict
905.3-.i circumstance exists beyond a but there are no presump-3(dreasonable doubt. tions or burdens of proof
Case law suggests with respect to mitigating
that the jury may only circumstances.
consider statutory 3. A sentence of death
aggravating circum- shall be imposed only up-
stances.
on.aJuranimous ditermina













I tion of the iury-f + -, -,
1. Jury must find that
the defendant killed,
attempted to kill, in-
tended a killing take
place, or contemplat-
ed that lethal force
would be employed.
2. Jury must unani-
mously find, beyond
a reasonable doubt,








stance beyond a rea-
sonable doubt
2. The jury must
unanimously find that
the evidence in ag-
gravation of punish-
ment warrants impos-
ing a death sentence
'I +
1. Trier of fact must
find one or more ag-
gravating circum-
stances beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; or
defendant plead
guilty and admitted to
an aggravating cir-
cumstance-
statutes do not limit
this to statutory or
non-statutory aggra-
vating circumstances




stances. No burden of
proof assigned.
4. The jury must unani-
mously decide to impose
the death penalty. No bur-
den of proof assigned.
3. The jury must decide
whether there is evidence
in mitigation of punish-




4. The jury must decide,
under all the circumstanc-
es, whether to impose a
death sentence
2. The Court must consider
whether there are mitigat-
ing circumstances suffi-
ciently substantial to call
for leniency
3. If there is one aggravat-
ing circumstance proven
beyond a reasonable doubt
and insufficient mitigating
circumstances to call for
leniency, the court shall
impose the death sentence
Nebraska: 1. The court must 2. The jury is then dis-
NEB. REV. STAT. conduct an aggrava- missed and a three-judge
§§ 29-2520-2523 tion hearing where a panel is installed to deter-
jury must unammous- mine the sentence. The
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ly find the existence
of an aggravating
circumstance beyond
a reasonable doubt. It
is unclear whether
this is limited to
statutory aggravating
circumstances or if
the jury can consider




1. The jury must des-
ignate the statutory
aggravating circum-
stances it finds be-
yond a reasonable
doubt
court then holds a hearing
to consider the aggravating
factors the jury found and
receive evidence on miti-
gation and sentence exces-
siveness/disproportionality
3. The three-judge panel
must unanimously decide
to impose the death penal-
ty after a careful consid-
eration of:
(1) whether the ag-
gravating circumstances as
determined to exist justify




exist which approach or
exceed the weigh given to
the aggravating circum-
stances; or
(3) whether the sen-
tence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant.
2. The jury must consider
whether any mitigating
circumstances exist
3. The jury must consider
whether the mitigating
circumstances are suffi-
cient enough to outweigh
the statutory aggravating
circumstances
4. The jury may impose a
sentence of death if it
unanimously finds the








N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2000 (2015)
1. The state has the
burden of proving
beyond a reasonable





allows the jury to
consider other aggra-
vating factors so long
as notice has been
given.
2. The jury must
unanimously agree on
the existence of an
aggravating factor




1. The jury must
unanimously find the




yond a reasonable doubt
and that any mitigating
circumstances are insuffi-
cient to outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstance(s)
3. The defendant has the
burden of proving beyond
a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a
mitigating factor
4. The jury then must con-
sider whether the mitigat-
ing factors outweigh the
aggravating factors, or if
the aggravating factors are
sufficient to justify the
death penalty if there are
no mitigating factors
5. If the jury concludes
that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating
factors or that the aggra-
vating factors, in the ab-
sence of any mitigating
factors, are themselves
sufficient to justify a death
sentence, the jury, by
unanimous vote only, may
recommend that a sentence
of death
2. Defendant has the bur-
den of proving any miti-
gating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evi-
dence
3. The jury must unani-
mously, and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, find that the
mitigating circumstances
are insufficient to out-
weigh the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances in
order to impose the death
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Nos. 4-69 , 4-70,
4-72, 4-76, 4-78
1. To be death eligi-
ble, the jury must find
the defendant guilty
of aggravated murder






1. The jury must
unanimously, and
beyond a reasonable
doubt, find the exist-
ence of one or more
statutory aggravating
circumstances. State




2. Defendant has the bur-
den to prove any factors in
mitigation of imposing the
death penalty
3. State has the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statutory
aggravating circumstances
that the defendant was
found guilty of are suffi-
cient to outweigh the fac-
tors in mitigation of im-
posing the death penalty
4. If the jury finds, unani-
mously and beyond a rea-




they shall impose the death
cenalty
2. No burden of proof or
unanimity required to de-
termine existence of miti-
gating circumstances
3. In order to impose the
death penalty, the jury
must unanimously find
that the mitigating circum-
stances are insufficient to
outweigh the statutory
aggravating factors that
were proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt
Oregon: In the sentencing The court also poses a
phase, the jury may fourth question to the jury
OR.1 EV. 6) STA. consider any and all at the close of evidence:
relevant aggravating whether the defendant
and mitigating evi- should receive a death
dence. At the close of sentence.
evidence, three ques- There is no burden of
tions are posed to the proof assigned to this




the conduct of the
defendant that caused





of the deceased or
another would result;
* (B) whether
there is a probability
that the defendant
would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence
that would constitute
a continuing threat to
society;
* (C) if raised
by the evidence,
whether the conduct
of the defendant in
killing the deceased
was unreasonable in
response to the prov-
ocation, if any, by the
deceased.
The state has the bur-
den to prove each of
these issues beyond a
reasonable doubt and
the jury must be
unanimous to answer
yes to any of these
questions.
unanimous in finding
that it is the appropri-
ate sentence
Pennsylvania: 1. State has the bur- 2. Defendant has the bur-
42 PA. CONS. den of proving the den of proving any miti-
STAT. § 9711 statutory aggravating gating circumstances by a
(2016) circumstances beyond preponderance of the evi-
a reasonable doubt. dence. The jury does not
The jury must be have to be unanimous in
unanimous in finding finding any mitigating
the statutory aggra- circumstances.
vating circumstances by a
beyond a reasonableita
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doubt
1. The jury can con-
sider evidence of any
mitigating circum-
stance allowed by
statute and law and




2. The jury must
unanimously find the




1. The jury will re-
ceive and consider
evidence of all miti-
gating circumstances
as well as evidence of
the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances
2. The jury must find




sentence of death if the
jury unanimously finds at
least one statutory aggra-
vating circumstances and
no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously
finds one or more aggra-
vating circumstances
which outweigh any miti-
gating circumstances
Once the jury has found
the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt,
it may impose the death
penalty if the jury unani-
mously agree to impose
that sentence
If the jury finds at least
one aggravating circum-
stance beyond a reasonable
doubt and unanimously
recommends the sentence
to be death, the court shall
sentence the defendant to
death
Tennessee: 1. The jury must 2. The defendant does not
TENN COD ANN unanimously find at have the burden of provingTENN. CODE3 least one statutory a mitigating circumstances
§39-13-204
(2016); aggravating circum- and there is no jury una-stance beyond a rea- nmilty requirement as to
Jury Instructions: sonable doubt. The any particular mitigating
Tennessee Pattern state has the burden circumstance
Jury Instructions - to prove this beyond ary may weigh the
South Carolina:
















At the conclusion of
evidence, the court
will submit two issues
to the jury:








(2) in cases in which
the jury charge at the
guilt or innocence
state permitted the
jury to find the de-
fendant guilty as a
party under sections







any and all evidence of
mitigating circumstances
4. The jury may impose a
penalty of death if they
unanimously find that the
state proved at least one
statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and this
circumstance or circum-
stances outweigh any miti-
gating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
The state also bears the
burden of proving that the
aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating
ones beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The court shall instruct the
jury that if the jury returns
an affirmative finding to
each issue submitted under
Subsection (b), it shall
answer the following is-
sue:
Whether, taking in-
to consideration all of the
evidence, including the
circumstances of the of-
fense, the defendant's
character and background,
and the personal moral
culpability of the defend-
ant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or
circumstances to warrant
that a sentence of life im-
prisonment without parole
rather than a death sen-
tence be imposed.
* The jury must
unanimously answer no to
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death of the deceased
or did not actually
cause the death of the
deceased but intended
to kill the deceased or
another or anticipated
that a human life
would be taken





and the jury must
unanimously an-
swer yes to move
to the next step
1. Jury must find de-






this question to impose the
death penalty and no bur-
den is assigned.
To impose the death penal-
ty, the jury must unani-
mously answer yes to the
two special issues in the
eligibility phase and no to
the issue presented in the
selection phase.
2. Jury may consider all
relevant facts in aggrava-




3. The jury must unani-
mously find that the total
aggravation outweighs
total mitigation beyond a
reasonable doubt. State
bears the burden of prov-
ing beyond a reasonable
doubt that, after consider-





4. Jury must then unani-
mously find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death
penalty is justified and
appropriate in this circum-
stance.
Virginia: 1. Defendant found 2. Jury must consider all
I guilty of an crime I evidence that the court
DENVER LAWREVIEW
VA. CODE ANN. punishable by death deems relevant; admissible
§§ 19.2-264.2, .4, evidence may include cir-
§ 18.2-10 (2015) cumstances surround the
offense, the history and
background of the defend-
ant, and any other facts in
mitigation of the offense
3. The penalty of death
shall not be imposed un-
less the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that:
* there is a probabil-
ity based upon evidence of
the prior history of the
defendant or of the cir-
cumstances surrounding
the commission of the of-
fense of which he is ac-
cused that he would com-
mit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat
to society, or
* that his conduct in
committing the offense
was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or in-
human, in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind
or aggravated battery to
the victim.
4. Jury must find these
aggravating circumstances
proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt and must unani-
mously agree to impose
the death penalty
Washington: 1. The defendant 2. The jury must consider
WASH. REV. CODE must be found guilty whether there are suffi-
§§ 10.95.030 of aggravated first cient mitigating circum-
.050-080 (2015) degree murder, which stances to merit leniency.
.2 is first degree murder
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doubt. State bears this
burden.




of a statutory aggra-
vating factor, or an
aggravating factor the
defendant has been
given notice of. The
state bears this bur-
den.
3. To impose the death
penalty, the jury must find,
unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the
mitigating circumstances
are insufficient to merit
leniency.




and any mitigating circum-
stances relevant to the im-
position of the sentence
3. Any mitigating circum-
stances must be proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence
4. A jury may impose the
death penalty if it unani-
mously agrees on the pen-
alty after unanimously
finding a statutory aggra-
vating circumstance prov-
en beyond a reasonable
doubt and considering the
mitigating circumstances
proven by a preponderance
of the evidence
2. The defendant may pre-
sent mitigating evidence
which must be proven by a
preponderance of the in-
formation.
3. The jury must consider
whether the aggravating
factors found to exist are
sufficient to outweigh the
mitigating factors so as to
impose a death penalty, or
if not mitigating circum-
stances, whether the ag-
gravating circumstance on
its own is sufficient to
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warrant the death penalty
4. The jury must unani-
mously find that the death
penalty is the appropriate
sentence.
TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, ABOUT
COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY
SAM KAM[N & JUSTIN MARCEAU
George Brauchler and Rich Orman begin their critique of our em-
pirical study of the death penalty in Colorado with the word "Lies."
From there, their article descends into ad hominem attack. They refer to
our "study" in scare quotes, they accuse us of being results-driven, and
they claim that our work is dishonest, flawed, and unscientific. What all
of this invective cannot do, however, is change the facts or law regarding
the death penalty in Colorado; as our study shows, Colorado's death pen-
alty statute fails to pass constitutional muster.
Although we wanted to respond fully to the Brauchler and Orman
article in this volume because we take issue with its omissions and mis-
statements of fact, the Law Review's production schedule made that im-
possible. We were given this space, however, to outline the full defense
of our work, which will appear in Volume 94 of the journal at 94 DENV.
L. REV. 1 (2016) (forthcoming). Rather than using either that reply or
this preview to refute, point-by-point, the repeated mischaracterizations
of us and our work contained in the Brauchler and Orman article, we will
instead emphasize the strength and probative value of our study.
Our study showed that nearly every murder in Colorado could have
been charged as first degree murder and that nearly every first degree
murder case contained facts that would make it statutorily eligible for the
death penalty, revealing that Colorado's statutory scheme fails to per-
form the narrowing function required by the Eighth Amendment. Brau-
chler and Orman criticize us for focusing on only one of the findings
necessary to qualify a defendant for a death sentence in Colorado; they
argue that our study is flawed because we fail to empirically examine
every step in Colorado's death "eligibility" process, including the jury's
moral judgment whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.
However, our methodological decision, which they speciously assert
reflects our ignorance of Colorado law, follows directly from U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has repeatedly required leg-
islative narrowing through the statutory definition of murder and the use
of aggravating factors. While the Eighth Amendment permits a jury to
decide for any number of reasons not to impose death (as in the third and
fourth steps of Colorado's process) it also requires that the class of per-
sons against whom that punishment may be imposed be narrowly cir-
cumscribed by statute. We demonstrate in our study that the Colorado
statute fails to do so.
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Having failed to engage with the central constitutional principle in
our study, Brauchler and Orman repeatedly insist that we are unqualified
to conduct an empirical study of the death penalty in Colorado because
we have not practiced law in this state. One can see why career trial law-
yers like Brauchler and Orman might wish to identify this quality as the
sine qua non of empirical legal research, but their complaint has literally
nothing to do with the merits of our empirical study. First, our qualifica-
tions to conduct a study of the death penalty in Colorado are clear and
unimpeachable. One of us has been a capital litigator, the other holds a
Ph.D in Jurisprudence and Social Policy from UC Berkeley, having au-
thored a dissertation on the death penalty decisions of the California Su-
preme Court as well as other empirical studies of the American criminal
justice system. Together we have taught criminal law and procedure for
more than 25 years at the University of Denver. More specifically, we
are experts in the law of capital punishment in the United States. We
have both taught Death Penalty Jurisprudence at DU, we are the co-
authors of one of the leading casebooks in the field of capital punish-
ment, and we have published a number of scholarly articles on the death
penalty in the United States. Second, in conducting our study we benefit-
ted from an extensive literature regarding the best practices for the em-
pirical study of the death penalty in the United States. Our research has
been lauded by other experts, testifying under oath, as having met or
exceeded the best practices employed by prior studies. Brauchler and
Orman completely ignore this methodology and literature, arguing in-
stead that our "study" is invalidated by our personal views on the death
penalty. However, an analysis by Mr. Brauchler's own prosecutors
makes clear that our personal views had no bearing on the outcome of
this study. When our study was first introduced in capital litigation in
this state, the prosecution requested (and received) time and resources to
conduct a parallel study. It had direct, independent access to the same
state database which was used to produce our study. The prosecution
hired, among others, a mathematician to examine and look for any holes
in our study methodology and results. In the end, the court evaluating our
study stated on the record that the differences between the analysis done
by us and the analysis done by members of the prosecution's team were
insignificant. If our study is biased in favor of criminal defendants, the
state and its experts apparently suffer from the same bias.
On the substance of our findings, Brauchler and Orman's central
critique is that we "cherry-picked" the dates for our study in a deliberate
effort to manipulate our results. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Brauchler and Orman are in possession of affidavits from the Colorado
State Judiciary and Alternate Defense Counsel attesting under oath to the
fact that reliable, electronic data searches were not possible prior to
1999. Accordingly, our study's dataset includes every case between Jan-
uary 1, 1999, and the end of the last calendar year before we commenced
our study in mid-2011. In other words, we looked at every murder case
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that could be made available to us by the state. To blame us for not in-
cluding cases, like that of James Holmes, that had not yet occurred,
demonstrates the absurdity of the accusations leveled by Brauchler and
Orman. What is more, we have continued analyzing cases arising after
the end of our original study and will publish those results as they be-
come available.
To summarize: when one ignores the inflammatory language of the
Brauchler and Orman article, one is left with little more than a demand to
be left alone. Only experienced trial lawyers and elected officials we are
told, and certainly not academics and social scientists, can understand the
death penalty process in Colorado. Repeatedly Brauchler and Orman tell
their readers that academics are out of touch; all one has to do is look at
the structure of our state's death penalty statute to see how narrow it is
and how difficult Colorado makes it to sentence a murderer to death.
However, their approach is utterly belied by quantitative data produced
through the best practices for empirical study in this field. They don't
like our study, and we don't blame them, because the objective data is
clear: when one looks at the Colorado statute in action, one discovers a
statute that makes virtually every killer eligible for death prosecution,
something that is unequivocally forbidden by existing Eighth Amend-
ment law. But don't take our word for it. Recall that Mr. Brauchler's own
prosecutors replicated our study with their own team of experts and pro-
duced results virtually indistinguishable from our own. Having failed to
undermine our own assessment of the data, they have now written an
article attacking us and our motives rather than confronting the funda-
mental problems with Colorado's death penalty. Our response in the next
issue will provide a more detailed accounting of the misstatements of
law, mischaracterizations, and factual errors that are now, unfortunately,
published in the pages of this issue of the Denver Law Review.
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THE CLAIRE DAVIS SCHOOL SAFETY ACT: WHY THREAT
ASSESSMENTS IN SCHOOLS WILL NOT HELP COLORADO
ABSTRACT
The United States is struggling with how to prevent the relatively
new phenomenon of mass shootings or attacks, many of them occurring
in schools. Colorado addressed this by passing the Claire Davis School
Safety Act that allows individuals harmed in acts of school violence to
sue the school districts where the incidents occurred. This law intends to
help protect students and keep them safe in schools. However, the law
not only adds an exception to Colorado's Governmental Immunity stat-
ute but also creates what are commonly known as threat assessments,
which are used to identify potential threats in schools and to mitigate any
problems or incidents before they occur.
While this process seems safe and helpful on its face, threat assess-
ments are difficult to implement and have the potential to cause serious
harm to students. Threat assessments may target certain groups of stu-
dents who are not actually threats but exhibit similar behaviors, such as
students suffering from mental illnesses and students with disabilities. In
addition, threat assessments will ikely have a disproportionate effect on
students of color and will strengthen the already dangerous connection
between schools and the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
Threat assessments in schools send the message that schools cannot
be safe without increased security, increased police force, and increased
fear about school attacks, but that message is incorrect. There are other
ways to keep students safe while also protecting their right to a proper
education and without causing additional harm. For example, an alterna-
tive to the Claire Davis School Safety Act is to create positive school
climates where students feel safe, comfortable, and supported in their
environments, and, therefore, are more likely to reach out for help before
problems become larger issues. Most importantly, another alternative is
to shift the focus from what schools can do to prevent these attacks to
what state and national governments can do to prevent these attacks by
placing the responsibility, not on administrators, teachers, and students,
but on the industry that sells and regulates the weapon often used in
school shootings-guns.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2015, the story of fourteen-year-old Ahmed Mo-
hamed spread quickly across the United States.' Mohamed was hand-
cuffed and arrested at MacArthur High School in Irving, Texas, for
bringing a homemade clock to school, which officials suspected was
actually a bomb.2 By the end of the day, even President Barack Obama
and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton were tweeting about Mohamed
and his homemade clock.3
1. Avi Selk, Ahmed Mohamed Swept up, 'Hoax Bomb' Charges Swept Away as Irving
Teen's Story Floods Social Media, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/northwest-dallas-county/headlines/20150915-
irving-9th-grader-arrested-after-taking-honemade-clock-to-school-so-you-tried-to-make-a-bomb.ece
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Officials at Mohamed's school likely reacted with fear and caution
because of the heightened anxiety surrounding school safety due to
school shootings and other violent incidents that have occurred in
schools across the United States. Since 1999, when two students shot and
killed thirteen people at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
the United States has witnessed numerous additional tragic incidents of
mass school violence.4 However, handcuffing and arresting individuals at
any suspicion-like school officials did to Mohamed-is not the answer.
There are more effective ways to prevent school violence and to keep
students safe that do not involve suspecting the worst of students and
subjecting them to constant analysis and scrutiny.
Instead of moving in this direction, Colorado passed the Claire Da-
vis School Safety Act (the School Safety Act), which allows victims of
school violence to sue school districts or charter schools through a lim-
ited waiver of governmental immunity,5 and requires schools to identify
and prevent potential threats to avoid school violence and these legal
claims.6 While this law was passed with the good intention to keep stu-
dents safe, it will be ineffective at preventing school violence, and it will
actually harm many students just as the overzealous policy that allowed
school officials to handcuff and arrest Ahmed Mohamed harmed him.7
While the School Safety Act applies to any act of school violence,
this Comment will focus primarily on research surrounding school shoot-
ings and on the programs and methods used to identify and monitor stu-
dents, more commonly referred to as, threat assessments. Part I of this
Comment will provide an overview of the School Safety Act. Part II of
this Comment will provide background information on Colorado's Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, mass shootings in the United States, the history
and structure of threat assessments, the Second Amendment and gun
culture in the United States, and other countries' approaches to prevent-
ing mass shootings. Part III will analyze why this law will be ineffective,
4. Of the 160 active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013, thirty-nine occurred at
schools, the location with the second highest rate. J. PETE BLAIR & KATHERINE W. SCHWEIT, TEX.
STATE UNIV. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF ACTIVE
SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, at 13 (2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-
incidents/pdfs/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-between-2000-and-2013.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4) (2016). The Act was signed into law on June 3, 2015.
S. 15-213, 70th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015). It was sponsored by Senators Bill Cadman,
Mark Scheffel, Owen Hill, Larry Crowder, Kevin Grantham, Kent Lambert, Kevin Lundberg, Beth
Martinez Humenik, Tim Neville, and Laura Woods, and Representatives Dickey Lee Hullinghorst,
Crisanta Duran, Daniel Kagan, Jovan Melton, Joseph Salazar, and Jonathan Singer. Id.
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a).
7. Mohamed says he will not be returning to his old school after this incident. Dominique
Mosbergen, Ahmed Mohamed Will Not Return to MacArthur High School, Family Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2015, 1:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ahmed-
mohamed-changing-schools_55fb8el8e4bOO310edf691da. While this incident occurred in Texas, a
similar event could occur in Colorado with this new legislation. For analysis of negative effects of
the law, see discussion infra Section III.A.-C.
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how this law will actually harm students, and what alternatives provide
better solutions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHOOL SAFETY ACT
Two separate bills-Senate Bill 15-213 and Senate Bill 15-214-
make up the tenants of the School Safety Act.8 Senate Bill 15-213 creates
a limited waiver of governmental immunity for school districts in cases
of school violence.9 Removing governmental immunity means students
and families harmed from school violence can pursue legal remedies
against the school district.'0 These legal remedies include the ability to
bring a civil suit for damages and to obtain discovery pertaining to the
violent act at the school." Between now and 2017, students and families
can file suits but can only receive discovery as compensation, not mone-
tary damages.12 After July 1, 2017, students and families can file suits
and receive discovery and damages as compensation.'3 Discovery could
include, for example, whether the school had notice that the student who
caused the violent act was dangerous and whether the school failed to
take precautions to prevent violence. Therefore, while Senate Bill 15-213
seems solely about governmental immunity and tort claims, it actually
places an immense responsibility on schools to prevent these legal claims
by stopping any incident that might lead to a claim.14
Preventing incidents is where Senate Bill 15-214 becomes im-
portant. Senate Bill 15-214 created a school safety and youth mental
health committee to address how to prevent acts of school violence. 15
Specifically, the committee has the following responsibilities:
1. "Study issues relating to school safety and the prevention of threats
to the safety of students, teachers, administrators, employees, and
volunteers .. .;"
2. "Study and evaluate programs and methods for identifying and
monitoring students in crisis;"
8. Senate Bill 15-213 and Senate Bill 15-214 were codified in title 24, section 10-106.3 and
title 22, section 15-101(l)(a)(I)-(IV) of the Colorado Revised Statutes respectively. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-10-106.3, 22-15-101. While the Claire Davis School Safety Act officially relates to
Senate Bill 15-213 at title 24, section 10-106.3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, because the two
bills are related, they will be referred to together as the School Safety Act for the remainder of this
Comment.
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4).
10. See id § 24-10-106.3(9).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 24-10-106.3(9)(b)(1). This means families could only obtain information about what
the school knew about the student who committed the act, such as if they failed to take precautions
after identifying a dangerous student.
13. Id. § 24-10-106.3(9). However, the damages are capped at $350,000 per injured individu-
al. See id. § 24-10-106.3(9)(a) (stating that the maximum amount of damages is governed by COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-114(1) (2016), which limits damages to $350,000 for injury to one person in a
single occurrence).
14. See id. § 24-10-106.3(3)-(4), (9).
15. Id. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(I}-(IV).
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3. "Develop standardized criteria for school personnel to use in as-
sessing the potential threat posed by one or more students; and . . . ."
4. Make recommendations to the education committees of the general
assembly.16
The purpose of these two bills is to enforce a stricter duty of reason-
able care from schools to their students to prevent school violence and to
keep students safe.17 Senate Bill 15-213 creates the consequence for fail-
ing to do so,'8 and Senate Bill 15-214 creates a method to prevent that
consequence. 19
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will provide background information on Colorado's Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, mass shooting data in the United States, the
history and structure of threat assessments, the Second Amendment and
gun culture in the United States, and other countries' approaches to pre-
venting mass shootings. This information will provide a foundation for
analyzing the ineffectiveness of the School Safety Act at preventing
school violence, as well as provide a foundation for discussing alterna-
tives to the School Safety Act.
A. Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act
Prior to the School Safety Act, students harmed in an incident of
school violence could not sue their school district because of the Colora-
do Governmental Immunity Act,20 which the Colorado Governmental
Assembly originally adopted in 1971.21 The Act created immunity for all
tort actions against a public entity with six exceptions.22 The six excep-
tions are as follows: (1) automobile accidents; (2) negligent operation of
hospitals and jails; (3) dangerous conditions of public buildings; (4) neg-
ligent construction, operation, or maintenance of public roads; (5) dan-
gerous conditions in public parks and recreational facilities; and (6) wa-
23ter, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. Historically, courts
have interpreted "dangerous conditions of public buildings" to apply
only to injuries from dangerous physical conditions in buildings, not to
24dangerous activities in buildings. Therefore, previously under the Colo-
rado Governmental Immunity Act, someone could not sue a school dis-
16. Id.
17. Id. § 24-10-106.3(3).
18. See id. § 24-10-106.3(3)-(4), (9).
19. See id. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(1)-(IV).
20. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-106 (2016).
21. Anne Whalen Gill, Interpreting the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. LAW.,
Feb. 1997, at 77, 80 n.6.
22. Id. at 77.
23. Id. These exceptions were adopted in title 24, section 10-106(1) of the Colorado Revised
Statutes. Id.
24. Id. at 77-78.
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trict (a public entity) for a tort claim arising from a dangerous activity
(such as a violent student) because this would not fall under one of the
six exceptions in the statute.25 The School Safety Act amended the Colo-
rado Governmental Immunity Act by providing a new statutory excep-
tion for dangerous activities that occur in schools that is not limited to
physical conditions.26
B. Mass Shooting Data
It is important to understand the history of mass shootings in the
United States and the frequency of school shootings in order to provide
context to the intention and the purpose of the School Safety Act. In
2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a study of active
shooter incidents that occurred from 2000 to 2013 .27 Of the 160 active
shooter incidents, thirty-nine (24.4%) occurred at an educational institu-
tion: a pre-K to twelfth-grade school, a place of higher education, or a
school related facility. 28 The second highest rate of shootings when bro-
ken up by location occurred at education institutes.2 9 In the thirty-nine
shootings that took place at education institutes, 117 people were killed
and 120 were wounded.3 0 The two highest death counts from the 160
active shooter incidents, which include incidents at education institutes
and other locations, occurred at Virginia Tech University (thirty-two
killed, seventeen wounded) and Sandy Hook Elementary School (twenty-
six killed, two wounded). Overall, the active shooter study found 1,043
people were killed or wounded in all of the active shooter incidents.32
Everytown for Gun Safety, a national coalition dedicated to ending
gun violence, also reported on FBI research of mass shootings from Jan-
uary 2009 to July 2015.33 Its research concluded that, during this seven
year period, there were 133 mass shootings across thirty-nine states.3 4
With less than one percent of gun homicides in 2012 occurring in inci-
dents with four or more victims, only a small portion of gun violence
overall involves mass shootings.3 5 In addition, there was evidence in only
25. See id.
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4) (2016).
27. BLAIR & SCHWEIT, supra note 4, at 4-5. The study was conducted after President Obama
signed The Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 into law, which aids the attorney
general in investigating acts of public violence, including mass shootings. Id. at 4. The study sought
to "provide further clarity" to the threats that result in incidents of public violence. Id.
28. Id at 13.
29. Id. Shootings occurred at places of commerce at the highest rate, where seventy-three out
of the 160 (45.6%) shootings occurred. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7.
33. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS
1 (2015), http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/09/analysis-mass-shootings.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
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one of the 133 shootings of a serious mental health issue that would have
prohibited the shooter from owning a gun.36
While this data and the number of mass shootings in the United
States seems daunting, a school shooting in the larger context of gun
deaths is a small and rare occurrence.37 In fact, even after the Sandy
Hook school shooting, Arne Duncan, the United States Secretary of Edu-
cation at the time, wrote in response to the incident, "[s]chools are
among the safest places for children and adolescents in our country, and,
in fact, crime in schools has been trending downward for more than a
decade."38 The National Center for Education Statistics' most recent re-
port, Indicators of School Crime and Safety, shows that out of the overall
amount of youth homicides, less than two percent occurred in schools.39
According to the Center's most recent data, in the 2011-2012 school
year there were 1,199 youth homicides, but only fifteen of those occurred
in schools.4 0 This suggests that youth are much more likely to be killed
outside of school than within school.4 1
C. The History and Foundation of Threat Assessments
The School Safety Act will create an assessment framework for
schools to use to identify threatening students to intervene before stu-
dents commit violent acts.42 It is useful to understand the structure and
history of a school threat assessment to better understand how schools
will use them.
The most recent report by the United States Secret Service (the Se-
cret Service) and the United States Department of Education (the De-
partment of Education) studied forty-one school shooters between 1974
and 2000.43 This report, known as the Safe Schools Report, found that
students who commit a school shooting possess a wide range of charac-
teristics and that "[t]here is no accurate or useful 'profile' of students
who engaged in targeted school violence."" Students involved in school
36. Id. at 5.
37. Todd A. Demitchell, Locked Down and Armed: Security Responses to Violence in Our
Schools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 275, 278 (2014).
38. Arne Duncan, Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis,
HOMEROOM: OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/12/resources-for-schools-to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/.
39. SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. &




42. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(1I1) (2016).
43. BRYAN VOSSEKUIL ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE FINAL
REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2004) [hereinafter SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT],
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf.
44. Id. at 19.
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shootings had a range of attributes: some had straight As, some were
"bullies," and some suffered from social issues.45
The Safe Schools Report is based on a study the Secret Service pre-
viously conducted called the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP).6
The ECSP focused on behaviors of people who assassinated, attacked, or
attempted to assassinate or attack public officials in the United States.47
The ECSP led to the Secret Service's more thorough and robust use of
threat assessments to identify individuals who might harm public offi-
cials.48 The success with these threat assessments led the Secret Service
to extend this idea to students in schools.4 9
Following the Safe Schools Report, the Secret Service and the De-
partment of Education created Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to
Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates,
based on the Safe Schools Report's findings.50 The guide states that
threat assessments hould not include assessment of characteristics but
should focus on the facts for each individual case.5' The guide also cau-
tions that threat assessments should not be a tool to survey the entire
student body, but instead should be a tool to identify additional infor-
mation about a student after the student has exhibited some form of con-
cerning behavior.52
Colorado developed the Colorado School Safety Resource Center's
Essentials of School Threat Assessment as a guide to implementing threat
assessments in Colorado schools (the Colorado School Safety Hand-
book). This handbook is based in part on the Threat Assessment in
Schools guide.54 Therefore, threat assessments used in Colorado will be
based on similar studies and recommendations as threat assessments cre-
ated by the Secret Service and the Department of Education.
45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id at 5-6.
50. ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THREAT
ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING
SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES, at iii (2004),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 45.
53. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, ESSENTIALS OF SCHOOL
THREAT ASSESSMENT: PREVENTING TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE (2015),
http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/CSSRC%20Documents/CSSRC%20Essentials%2Oof%2TA
%202014.pdf.
54. Id. at 6 (citing FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 29) (discussing the "[s]ix principles" that
"form the foundation of the threat assessment process").
55. See id.
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D. The Second Amendment and Gun Culture
This Comment addresses gun legislation and gun control as alterna-
tives to the School Safety Act, but to do so effectively, it is important to
understand the constitutional protections related to guns in the United
States as well as the culture and perceptions surrounding these protec-
tions. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 5 6
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Second Amend-
1 .~~57 Ti en
ment to include an individual right to own certain weapons. This means
that, unlike other countries that have dealt with gun violence by categori-
cally banning weapons and guns, solutions must look different in the
United States.
In addition to constitutional protections, there is a strong cultural
opposition to gun control in the United States.5 9 Recently, more people
are in favor of gun rights and more people believe owning guns is a safe
solution to gun violence.60 The Pew Research Center conducted studies
that indicate a broad increase in support for gun rights and a decrease in
support for gun control, including the belief that gun ownership makes
people's homes safer and that gun ownership protects people from
-61crime.
E. Other Countries' Solutions to Mass Shootings
Comparing the School Safety Act to other countries' solutions to
mass shootings helps to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the School Safety
Act and to lay the foundation for discussing more successful alternatives.
Other countries have successfully decreased mass shootings without laws
like the School Safety Act.6 2 Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Japan all have lower gun violence rates than the United States.6 3
Years ago, when thirty-two people were killed in a mass shooting in
Australia at Port Author after a string of mass shootings from 1979 to
56. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
57. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008) (holding that the District of
Columbia's ban on handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment).
58. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II.
59. Andrew Kohut, Despite Lower Crime Rates, Support for Gun Rights Increases, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/17/despite-lower-crime-rates-
support-for-gun-rights-increases/; Growing Public Support for Gun Rights, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/10/growing-public-support-for-gun-rights/.
60. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59.
61. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Mark B. Melter, The Kids Are Alright; It's the Grown-Ups Who Scare Me: A
Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GoNZ. J. INT'L L. 33,
44-45 (2012); see also Walter Hickey, How Australia and Other Developed Nations Have Put a
Stop to Gun Violence, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2013, 8:07 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/canada-australia-japan-britain-gun-control-2013-1.
63. Hickey, supra note 62.
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1996, the Australian government passed strict gun control reform.M The-
se reforms banned assault style weapons and magazines, initiated a coun-
trywide gun buyback program, and banned owning a gun without a legit-
imate reason for the weapon.6 5 Since that incident, Australia has not had
another mass shooting.6 6
In the United Kingdom, any person who owns a gun must first
complete the process to obtain a certificate, and there are bans on many
types of guns.67 In Canada, there are also bans on many types of guns,
and owners must complete a similar process to obtain a gun license.68 In
addition, license agents are required to notify the gun purchaser's spouse
or next of kin that the person is purchasing a gun." In Japan, only hunt-
ing rifles and shotguns are legal, and an owner must first pass a class
with a written and practical exam and complete a mental health analy-
sis.70 While not all of these restrictions would be possible in the United
States because of constitutional protections, these xamples demonstrate
that passing gun restriction legislation has an effect on preventing mass
*71shootings.
III. ANALYSIS
Part III will explain the faults of the School Safety Act and recom-
mend alternatives to keep students safe in schools that avoid these faults.
First, this Part will discuss why the School Safety Act will be ineffective,
focusing on the problems with using threat assessments to identify and
prevent threats and on the lack of support the law has within the larger
field of gun regulation legislation. Next, this Part will explain the most
detrimental effects the School Safety Act will have-harming students
through overly broad assessments, perpetuating racial bias, and strength-
ening the connection between the school system and the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. Finally, this Part will discuss alternatives to the
School Safety Act, including passing gun regulation legislation and
strengthening school climate within schools, both of which can help cre-
ate a safe environment for students without producing the negative ef-
fects of the School Safety Act.
A. The School Safety Act Will Be Ineffective at Preventing School Shoot-
ings
The School Safety Act will be ineffective because threat assess-
ments will be unsuccessful at identifying threatening students and be-
64. Melter, supra note 62, at 44-45.
65. Id. at 45, 49.
66. Id. at 45.




71. See Melter, supra note 62, at 44-46; see also Hickey, supra note 62.
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cause the School Safety Act is unsupported by laws outside school walls
to address mass shootings. Threat assessments are ineffective because it
is difficult to identify students who pose a threat based on characteristics
or behaviors, yet the nature of using threat assessments requires schools
to do so.72 In addition, a comparison of the School Safety Act to other
countries' solutions to mass shootings suggests that larger efforts, such
as restriction and regulation of guns, are necessary to have a substantial
effect on preventing mass shootings.73
1. Threat Assessments Will Be Ineffective Because They Do Not
Successfully Identify Students Who Pose a Potential Threat
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide recommends that threat as-
sessments focus on individual facts and not be used as a tool to survey
the entire student body.74 This section will first explain why it is difficult
to identify students who pose a potential threat by focusing on character-
istics and behaviors. Next, it will explain why, despite the Threat As-
sessment in Schools guide's recommendations, threat assessments are
unlikely to focus on the facts of each individual case and are unlikely to
be used on individual students rather than the entire student body.
Many studies find that it is difficult to identify the specific charac-
teristics and behaviors of school shooters before they commit the act.7 5
While the general public might have a preconceived notion of who a
school shooter is based on past incidents or bias (for example, an antiso-
cial student with poor grades and few friends), the Safe Schools Report
mentioned above illustrates this bias is not correct.76 In fact, most of the
shooters surveyed in the Safe Schools Report were performing well in
school, and many were receiving grades of As and Bs at the time of the
attack.7 Some students in this group were enrolled in advanced courses
or were on the honor roll. 78 At the same time, some of the shooters stud-
ied were receiving grades of Cs, and Ds, or were failing school. While
student shooters fall into these categories, students who do not pose any
threat also fall into all of these categories, lessening the effectiveness of
grades (or any one characteristic or behavior) in identifying threatening
students.8 0 In fact, for any conduct that seems to define a school shoot-
72. See discussion infra Section III.A.I.
73. See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
74. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
75. See SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19; see also Malcolm Gladwell, Thresholds
of Violence. How School Shootings Catch On, NEW YORKER, Oct. 19, 2015, at 30, 32-33,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/thresholds-of-violence; N. R. Kleinfield et al.,
Mass Murderers Fit Profile, as Do Many Others Who Don't Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/us/mass-murderers-fit-profile-as-do-many-others-who-dont-
kill.html.
76. See SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19-20.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Kleinfield et al., supra note 75.
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er's behavior or personality, there are people who are not and will never
be a dangerous threat but who will fall into the same categories.8
For example, in response to the school shooting at Umpqua Com-
munity College in Roseburg, Oregon, the New York Times published an
article comparing various school shooters.82 The analysis led the authors
to remark that "[w]hat seems telling about the killers, however, is not
how much they have in common but how much they look and seem like
so many others who do not inflict harm."83 While many of the shooters
shared behaviors such as depression, loneliness, and general isolation
from others, the article also notes these behaviors depict tens of thou-
sands of Americans." Criminologist James Alan Fox from Northwestern
University, who has studied mass murderers, summarized this point say-
ing, "[w]e can't round up all the people who scare us."85
In Thresholds of Violence: How School Shootings Catch On, an ar-
ticle published by the New Yorker, Malcolm Gladwell further elaborated
on the idea that it is difficult to define and identify the characteristics or
behaviors of a school shooter.8 6 Gladwell applied the "Granovetterian
model" to the phenomenon of school shooters to illustrate how those
who commit the acts now no longer possess the same attributes thought
to be associated with a psychopathic killer as the shooters before and up
to the Columbine incident.87 To illustrate this point, Gladwell profiled
John LaDue, a young man who planned to shoot up and bomb his own
high school.88 LaDue, unlike many of the shooters before and up to Col-
umbine, did not have a history of suspicious behavior, problems in
school, a traumatic background, or mental health issues.89 When given
the standard psychological evaluation for a school shooter, LaDue did
not demonstrate any sign of a threat." Yet, LaDue had purchased guns
and materials to create dangerous bombs and had created detailed plans
specifying how he would carry out his attack.91 The fact that LaDue did






86. Gladwell, supra note 75, at 32-33.
87. Id. at 34-38. The Granovetterian model is the idea that when people join riots (or in the
case of school shootings, revolutions, or phenomenon, as Gladwell explains them), the further re-
moved the person is from the beginning of the incident, the less likely he or she will individually
possess the same characteristics or motivations for joining. Id. at 34-35. Instead, the person's joining
is a reaction to the people who joined before. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 36-38.
89. Id. at 33, 36.
90. Id. at 36-37.
91. Id at 30, 32.
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evaluation further illustrates that the assumption that threat assessments
can accurately identify people who pose a threat is misguided.92
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide's recommendations to
avoid focusing on characteristics and to avoid surveying the entire stu-
dent body likely stem from the above difficulties in using those tactics to
identify threats. While the recommendations seem great on paper, it is
difficult to understand how they would actually work in practice.
First, it is difficult to analyze facts without conflating them with
characteristics. For example, the Threat Assessment in Schools guide
explains that to focus on facts of an individual case, the analysis should
be based on behaviors.93 However, behaviors are very similar to charac-
teristics because both can relate to how a person acts.94 In addition, a
focus on behavior over characteristics will not necessarily make identify-
ing a suspect any easier because school shooters do not always exhibit
the same behaviors,9 5 and because people who do not pose a threat may
exhibit the same behaviors as a school shooter.96 Second, while threat
assessments hould not be a tool to survey the entire student body, the
Threat Assessment in Schools guide states, "Any student with the motive,
intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at
school."9 7 Starting with the assumption that anyone is capable seems to
steer away from the recommendation that threat assessments not be used
to survey all students.98
Colorado's approach to threat assessments does not resolve these
concerns. The Colorado School Safety Handbook states, "An inquiry
should be initiated immediately in any situation of concern."99 The pre-
sumption to begin an inquiry at any hint of threat suggests that threat
assessments are likely to be used overzealously, which will result in
threat assessments used to survey the entire student body because offi-
cials will constantly be on the lookout for threats.1m In addition, the
handbook includes questions to identify students who are potential
threats, such as questions about their behaviors in class, their interactions
with peers, and whether they feel comfortable speaking with adults. The-
se questions suggest that threat assessments are still likely to be used by
92. See id. at 33, 36-37.
93. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32.
94. The definition of "behavior" according to the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary is, "[T]he
manner of conducting oneself." Behavior, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/behavior (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). The definition of "characteristic"
according to the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary is, "[A] distinguishing trait, quality, or property."
Characteristic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/characteristic
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
95. See Gladwell, supra note 75, at 32-33.
96. See Kleinfield et al., supra note 75.
97. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32.
98. See id.
99. COLo. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
100. See id.
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focusing on characteristics and behaviors of students.'0 Therefore, the
recommendations to focus on individual facts instead of the entire stu-
dent body do not resolve the problems with threat assessments, and at-
tempting to avoid these outcomes while still using threat assessments i
not likely to be successful.10 2
In addition, the Threat Assessment in Schools guide is also prob-
lematic because the Safe Schools Report it stems from is based on a
study the Secret Service previously conducted called the Exceptional
Case Study Project, which focused on behaviors of adults who attacked
or attempted to attack United States public officials.0 3 A guide based on
a study for adults used for students is problematic because there is ex-
tended research that youths' psychological development differs greatly
from adults'.' 04
For example, young people "are more susceptible to influence, less
future oriented, less risk averse, and less able to manage their impulses
and behavior."'os In addition, the area of the brain that controls rational
and risk-averse decision-making is not fully developed until the early
twenties. o0 From this, one can infer not only that youth cannot be as-
sessed in the same way and will not respond in the same way to an as-
sessment as adults, but that the reasoning behind an attack is likely dif-
ferent for an adolescent than for an adult.'07 Because the brain develop-
ment, psychology, and decision-making of the two greatly differ, the
connection between adult attackers and students is too tenuous to con-
clude that a threat assessment designed for students will work in the
same way as a threat assessment designed for adult terrorists.0 8
101. See id. at 10, 12.
102. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra
note 53, at 10, 12 (illustrating the shortfalls described above).
103. SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 4; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
104. See, e.g., BRITTANY KINTIGH, MICH. COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT: JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT THAN ADULTS 1 (2012), http://www.miccd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Youth-Dev-Issue-Brief.pdf; NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION (2011),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-still-under-construction/teen-
brain 141903.pdf; Teen Brain: Behavior, Problem Solving, and Decision Making, AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Dec. 2011),
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/FamiliesandYouth/Facts forFamilies/FFF-Guide/The-Teen-
Brain-Behavior-Problem-Solving-and-Decision-Making-095.aspx.
105. KINTIGH, supra note 104, at 2 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013 (2003)).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 2-6.
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2. The School Safety Act Will Be Ineffective Because it is Unsup-
ported by Other Laws That Have a Greater Effect on School
Shootings and Gun Violence, as Demonstrated by a Comparison
to Other Countries Whose Laws Have Been Effective in Prevent-
ing These Incidents
In addition to the difficulties of threat assessments, the School Safe-
ty Act will be ineffective because the law lacks support in the larger field
of gun regulation legislation. A comparison to laws in other countries
that have lower incidents of mass shootings demonstrates why a law like
the School Safety Act will be ineffective at preventing mass shootings
without support from gun regulation legislation.
Laws like the School Safety Act as a response to mass shootings are
unique to the United States.109 Other countries addressing mass shootings
focus on gun regulation and reducing the number of guns rather than on
identifying students who might be threatening. 0 The common justifica-
tion for these types of solutions to gun violence, as opposed to legislation
at a larger level, is that gun violence and products of it, such as school
shootings, are largely a mental health issue rather than a gun regulation
issue." The School Safety Act corroborates this idea by placing the re-
sponsibility on schools to prevent violence by focusing on characteristics
and behaviors of students through threat assessments.' This presuppos-
es that mitigating the problem through other means is too difficult or will
be ineffective. Other countries, however, have proved that is incorrect."3
For example, while the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Aus-
tralia all have lower gun violence rates than the United States, none of
these countries focus their efforts on threat assessments in schools to
prevent mass hootings.'14 Instead, these countries have stricter gun regu-
lation laws and lower numbers of guns per person."5 Each country bans
certain weapons and requires a certification or application process before
obtaining a gun.116 The fact that there are lower instances of mass shoot-
ings and lower gun deaths per year indicates that, in those countries, reg-
ulation of the weapon leads to lower instances of gun violence."7 Look-
109. See Sarah Boseley, High Gun Ownership Makes Countries Less Safe, US Study Finds,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/18/gun-
ownership-gun-deaths-study; see also Hickey, supra note 62 (discussing laws from other countries
which do not include anything similar to the School Safety Act).
110. See Boseley, supra note 109; see also Hickey, supra note 62.
111. Hickey, supra note 62 (alluding to the common justification by stating other countries
have similar mental health problems but do not have the same rates of gun violence).
112. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(I)-(lV) (2016).
113. See Hickey, supra note 62; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
114. See Hickey, supra note 62 (explaining the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Austral-
ia's gun restriction laws, none of which include threat assessments in schools as a solution to mass
violence or public shootings).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
117. See Hickey, supra note 62.
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ing at Australia as an example is most interesting because Australia suf-
fered from a series of mass shootings and public violence similar to the
United States and was able to prevent similar incidents from happening
in the future once it passed stricter gun regulation laws."8
While there may be other reasons why gun violence rates in the
United States differ from other countries, the United States cannot simp-
ly point to its citizens' mental health issues when there is a clear differ-
ence between gun laws in the United States and in countries with lower
rates of gun violence." 19 In How Australia and Other Developed Nations
Have Put a Stop to Gun Violence, Walter Hickey pointedly states, "Other
countries all over the world play the same video games and have the
same mental health problems as the United States, but manage to avoid a
sky-high gun murder rate and frequent public shooting massacres," sug-
gesting the laws that regulate guns and gun ownership in other countries
play a larger role in reducing gun violence than focusing on mental
health.2 0
Despite the documented success other countries have found through
gun regulation, Colorado has failed to pass similar legislation that would
have a positive effect on preventing mass shootings. 121 This calls into
question whether the School Safety Act can be successful at preventing
gun violence and mass shootings in schools when other countries' suc-
cess relates to legislation the United States and Colorado do not have.122
For example, the National Rifle Association's state profile illus-
trates that citizens of Colorado do not need a permit to purchase most
guns and do not need to register most guns.123 This is in contrast with the
laws from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, which all
require some sort of certificate, application, or protocol before obtaining
a gun.124 This lack of restrictions impinges on Colorado's ability to re-
duce mass shootings, even with laws like the School Safety Act, as
demonstrated by the research that shows stricter gun regulations correlate
with lower gun violence, while looser gun regulations correlate with
higher gun violence.125 Meaningful gun legislation has failed to pass at
the federal level as well.12 6 For example, Congress introduced the Fix
118. See Melter, supra note 62, at 44-45; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
119. Hickey, supra note 62.
120. Id.
121. See Colorado State Profile, NAT'L RIFLE Ass'N AM., INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 7,
2014), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-gun-laws/colorado/.
122. Compare Hickey, supra note 62 (explaining restrictions on gun ownership in the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Australia), with Colorado State Profile, supra note 121 (explaining
restrictions on gun ownership in Colorado).
123. Colorado State Profile, supra note 12 1.
124. See Hickey, supra note 62.
125. See id.
126. See Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Text of the Fix
Gun Checks Act of 2013, GovTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/llI 3/s374/text#
(last updated Mar. 12, 2013).
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Gun Checks Act in 2013, which was designed to strengthen background
checks, but it died in committee without even reaching a vote.127
Comparing the United States' efforts to reduce gun violence and
school shootings with other countries' efforts that have been successful
in lowering gun deaths per year illustrates why the problem cannot be
fully addressed without regulating the weapon itself. The failure to pass
legislation that would likely have a more targeted effect on reducing
school shootings suggests that the School Safety Act is an outlier that
will struggle to be effective without support from other legislation work-
ing collectively to accomplish the goal of reducing school shootings.
B. The School Safety Act Will Be Harmful to Students
Not only will the School Safety Act be ineffective, but it will actual-
ly be harmful to many students by (1) targeting students who are not a
threat to their schools or communities through overly broad assessments;
(2) perpetuating the racial bias in schools; and (3) strengthening the al-
ready dangerous pipeline between schools and the juvenile and criminal
justice systems.
1. Threat Assessments Will Target Students Who Are Not Actually
a Threat Through Overly Broad Assessments
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide explains that threat as-
sessments should be based on facts and should not be used to survey all
students.128 However, as noted above, actually performing threat assess-
ments in such a way will be unsuccessful.12 9 Therefore, because threat
assessments are still likely to be used on the entire student body and like-
ly to focus on characteristics and behaviors, threat assessments will be
particularly harmful to those students who may possess behaviors that
could be perceived as "threatening" but are not in fact threats, such as
students suffering from mental illness and students with disabilities.
The Colorado School Safety Handbook suggests the following
questions to identify what threat a student poses: "Is the student experi-
encing hopelessness, desperation or despair?"; "Does the student have a
trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?"; "Has the stu-
dent come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what? (Email,
texting, website, posters, papers, class assignments, rule-breaking, vio-
lence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression r despair, acting-
out behavior, etc.)"; and "Has the student experienced serious difficulties
or been in distress?"130 These questions are overly broad and could in-
clude nonthreatening students, uch as students with mental illness.
127. See S. 374.
128. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
129. See discussion supra Section IlIl.A. 1.
130. COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
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For example, on September 22, 2015, students from local high
schools in Colorado came to speak to the School Safety and Youth Men-
tal Health Legislative Committee about youth mental health.131 All six of
the students present shared that they had either felt depression or some
other form of mental illness or knew friends who had.132 These students
described attributes of high school students struggling with mental health
issues, which included feeling depressed, antisocial, and unable to con-
fide in a trusted adult about their problems.3 3
In addition to these students' own personal stories, statistics on de-
pression suggest between ten and fifteen percent of teens suffer from
depression at any one time.' 34 In 2011, "a nationwide survey of college
students . . . found that . .. [thirty] percent of students reported feel-
ing . . . depressed at some time."' 35 This demonstrates that a mental
health issue such as depression is common among young people.3 6
However, because of the limited number of students who actually com-
mit an act of school violence, it also demonstrates that the majority of
students suffering from a mental health issue are not a threat.',3  Yet,
many of the behaviors of students suffering from mental illness-such as
feelings of depression and hopelessness, inability to confide in an adult,
experiencing serious difficulties, or acting out in class-could be used to
identify potential threats.3 8
Students with disabilities are another group of students that could
possess some of the behaviors on a threat assessment without actually
being a threat. Concerning questions from the Colorado School Safety
Handbook that relate to these behaviors include the following: "Has the
student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what?
(Email, texting, website, posters, papers, class assignments, rule-
breaking, violence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression or des-
pair, acting-out behavior, etc.)"; "Has the student been a victim and/or
initiator of hostile, harassing or bullying behavior directed toward other
students, teachers, or other staff?"; "Does the student see violence as an
131. 1 attended this meeting on Sept. 22, 2015, at the Colorado State Capitol in room 271, from
9:00 AM to 11:00 AM. This committee was created by the School Safety Act, and it was responsible
for studying issues related to youth mental health and school safety and developing assessments and
protocols to assess students and identify threats. School Safety and Youth in Crisis Interim Commit-
tee: Meeting on S.B. 15-214, 2015 Leg., 70th Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2015) (statements of Reps., Colo.
Youth Advisory Council & Colie's Closet).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Therese J. Borchard, Why Are So Many Teens Depressed?, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 4,
2010), http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2010/03/04/why-are-so-many-teens-depressed/.
135. NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DEPRESSION AND COLLEGE STUDENTS 2 (2012),
https://infocenter.nimh.nih.gov/pubstatic/NIH%2012-4266/NIH%2012-4266.pdf.
136. See id.
137. For information on the infrequency of school shootings, see discussion supra Section II.B.
138. COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
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acceptable or desirable way to solve problems?"; and "Is the student's
conversation and 'story' consistent with their actions?" 39
Students with disabilities can have a range of mental, physical, or
developmental disabilities, but many forms of educational disabilities
manifest behaviors associated with the threat assessment such as Atten-
tion Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, which might cause one to act out in
class,140 to Social Anxiety, which might make a student more prone to
violent outbreaks.141 Nationwide, there are an estimated 5.7 million stu-
dents who are considered special education students because of some sort
of disability.142 However, again, the infrequency of violent school inci-
dents such as school shootings suggests there are many students with
disabilities who might exhibit potentially threatening behavior according
to the Colorado School Safety Handbook who are not actually a threat.14 3
2. Threat Assessments Will Exacerbate the Racial Bias Already
Present in Schools
Racial bias has historically existed in Colorado schools. 4 One ex-
ample that demonstrates racial bias in schools is discipline assessments
and protocols, which have a disproportionately negative impact on stu-
dents of color.145 Looking at discipline assessments in schools illustrates
the inherent racial bias that still exists, which should caution schools,
administrators, and lawmakers against using other assessments that could
have a disproportionate effect on students of color, such as threat as-
sessments.146
A study done by Padres & J6venes Unidos (Padres), a leading or-
ganization on school discipline issues, found that, in the 2003-2004
school year, "black students . . . were over five times more likely to be
expelled, and over twice as likely to be referred to law enforcement"
when compared to white students, and "Latino students were .. . almost
three times as likely to be expelled and referred to law enforcement
139. Id.
140. See Caroline Miller, What's ADHD (and What's Not) in the Classroom, CHILD MIND
INST. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.childmind.org/en/posts/articles/2015-3-10-adhd-classroom-guide-
teachers-parents.
141. See Caroline Miller, How Anxiety Leads to Disruptive Behavior, CHILD MIND INST. (Mar.
26, 2013), http://www.childmind.org/en/posts/articles/2013-3-26-anxiety-and-disruptive-behavior.
142. CANDACE CORTIELLA & SHELDON H. HOROWITZ, THE STATE OF LEARNING
DISABILITIES: FACTS, TRENDS, AND EMERGING ISSUES 12 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.ncld.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/2014-State-of-LD.pdf.
143. For discussion on infrequency of school shootings, see discussion supra Section II.B.
144. See PADRES & J6VENES UNIDOS & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, LESSONS IN RACIAL
JUSTICE AND MOVEMENT BUILDING: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN








[when] compared to [w]hite students.",4 7 Padres explains that one of the
reasons for these disproportionate results is the conscious and uncon-
scious idea that students of color are "[m]ore threatening and prone to
violence" and "[1]acking self-discipline." 48
Padres's study, which is aligned with numerous other studies, illus-
trates how racial bias in school discipline goes beyond how schools treat
students of color but is a part of "a powerful manifestation of an entire
system of oppressive and regressive cultural, political, and social forc-
es."1 49 This means racial bias in schools stems from various other racially
biased policies throughout history such as the "Tough on Crime" era, the
elimination and stigma of social welfare programs, the animosity toward
immigrants, and more.15 0 Because racial bias is a systemic problem, it is
more deeply ingrained in society and, therefore, will be more difficult to
eradicate and will require more than just an understanding that it oc-
curs.'5' Inherent, systemic racial bias is problematic for implementing
threat assessments because threat assessments focus on whether students
exhibit behaviors associated with bullying, violence, or acting out in
class.152 Bias toward which students exhibit those behaviors could result
in a disproportionate number of students identified as threats, just as bias
results in a disproportionate number of students identified with discipline
issues. 1
In response to efforts to address racial bias in school discipline,
Colorado's use of out of school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to
law enforcement are dropping in percentages, yet are still dropping faster
for white students than students of color.154 Though racial bias has de-
creased within school discipline, bringing in a threat assessment will
exacerbate racial bias in schools because it will target behaviors that are
commonly thought to be associated with students of color, such as vio-
lence and lack of discipline. 15 We need not look further to find evidence
of this than the story of Ahmed Mohamed, mentioned at the beginning of
147. Id.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 10; see also Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba & Pedro A. Noguera, The Achievement
Gap and the Discipline Gap. Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 59, 62-63
(2010) (discussing that minority students were more likely to be "differentially selected for disci-
pline consequences"); THOMAS RUDD, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, THE
OHIO STATE UNIV., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2-3 (2014),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/racial-disproportionality-schools-02.pdf
(discussing that teachers are implicitly biased towards African Americans in the classroom and this
results in "racial disproportionality in school discipline").
150. LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9-10.
151. See id.
152. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
153. See LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6.
154. PADRES & JOVENES UNIDOS, COLORADO SCHOOL DISCIPLINE REPORT CARD 5-6 (2015),
http://www.padresunidos.org/files/media-root/ES2JT/PJU-
01_Report2015 web%20v2%204_6_15.pdf.
155. Id. at 6; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12 (instructing
teachers to evaluate the behavior of students).
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this Comment.'56 After Mohamed's incident, sources suggested that
school officials were likely motivated by racial bias in their treatment
and inquiry of Mohamed's behavior.15 7
3. Threat Assessments Will Exacerbate the School-to-Prison Pipe-
line by Strengthening the Connection Between Schools and the
Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems
The School Safety Act will exacerbate the school-to-prison pipeline,
a phenomenon that involves overzealous disciplinary practices, including
out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, tickets, and arrests.'5 8 This is be-
cause the School Safety Act will inevitably involve more law enforce-
ment in students' lives and more strongly connect schools to the juvenile
and criminal justice systems.159
The school-to-prison pipeline happens when schools use discipline
tactics such as suspensions, expulsions, tickets, and arrests, all of which
lead students out of schools, into the streets, and into the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.1so This is a pipeline effect because high num-
bers of out of school suspensions and expulsions correlate with high
numbers of student referrals to law enforcement.161 In addition, students
who have been suspended or expelled are more likely to drop out and
never graduate from high school.162 Students who drop out or never
graduate from high school are more likely to end up in the juvenile jus-
tice system, and many students who drop out or never graduate from
high school end up in the adult criminal justice system.1 63 In addition,
because students of color are more likely to receive harsher punishment
in school, including tickets, suspensions, and expulsions, the school-to-
prison pipeline disproportionately affects students of color.'6
156. See James Edwards, Ahmed Mohamed and the Lingering Effects of Racial Profiling, PRI
(Sept. 18, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-18/ahmed-mohamed-and-lingering-
effects-racial-profiling; see also Dexter Thomas, #IStandWithAhmed Lesson: Curiosity Is for White
Kids, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015, 8:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/community/la-
ahmed-mohamed-racism-20150916-htmlstory.html.
157. See Edwards, supra note 156; see also Thomas, supra note 156.
158. See LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6-7.
159. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6 (urging school officials to contact
police force at any time); see also ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., POLICE IN SCHOOLS ARE NOT
THE ANSWER TO THE NEWTOWN SHOOTING 5 (2013),
http://www.advancementproject.org/resources/entry/police-in-schools-are-not-the-answer-to-the-
newtown-shooting (explaining how police are overzealous with their practices in schools).
160. LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6-7.
161. Id. at 6 (reflecting the amount of out of school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to
law enforcement through chart).
162. See Robert Balfanz et al., Sent Home and Put Off-Track: The Antecedents, Disproportion-
alities, and Consequences of Being Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 1, I
(2014).
163. TASK FORCE TO STUDY HIGH SCH. DROPOUT RATES OF PERSS. IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SCHOOL DROPOUTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2012), http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/GOCCP/SB755Ch286_2011.pdf.




This phenomenon is likely to be exacerbated with the use of threat
assessments because th y include communication and close relationships
between schools and law enforcement.165 For example, the Colorado
School Safety Handbook states, "If at any time information suggests the
need for law enforcement assistance, that assistance should be requested
immediately."'66 In addition to the handbook, which encourages law en-
forcement involvement, law enforcement is also likely to be overzealous-
ly used in threat assessments because historically, law enforcement is
involved in Colorado schools even when students have not actually
committed a serious offense.1 6 7 For example, "between 2007 and 2012,
the majority of referrals to law enforcement [in Denver] were for detri-
mental behavior, drug violations, 'other' violations of Code of Conduct,
and disobedience/defiance - not for serious weapons or other school
safety concerns."l68
While there may be incidents where law enforcement presence is
necessary, as the study above demonstrates, many times law enforcement
is notified when they do not need to be, which means students are receiv-
ing tickets and being arrested when they do not need to be.16 9 Therefore,
there is a large risk that the School Safety Act, which will require more
communication between schools and law enforcement, will result in a
strengthening of the school-to-prison pipeline because school officials
are encouraged to notify law enforcement at any time, and law enforce-
ment is already notified too frequently for frivolous, subjective, and su-
perficial situations.170 While the connection between a threat assessment
and youth incarceration might at first seem tenuous, research demon-
strates there is a long-standing correlation between overzealous disci-
pline polices and youth incarceration, and this connection has serious
repercussions for youth and communities.' 71
165. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
166. Id.
167. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 5.
168. Id.
169. See id
170. See id.; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES, CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
171. See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF
DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE
FACILITIES 4-9, 12-14 (2006), http://wwwjusticepolicy.org/images/upload/06-
I _repdangersofdetention jj.pdf. In addition to students ending up in the school-to-prison pipeline,
actual time in detention as a juvenile is problematic on its own because of the dangerous effects of
juvenile detention. Id. For example, detention can actually increase recidivism for a juvenile rather
than reduce it. Id. at 4-6. In fact, detention is the highest predictor of recidivism, greater than being a
gang member, carrying a weapon, or having a poor relationship with one's parents. Id. In addition,
research finds that at least one third of detention centers are overcrowded, which has a negative
impact particularly on youth with mental illness, and detaining youth does not actually reduce crime
in the community as it is meant to. Id. at 8. Juvenile detention also has a negative impact on the
youth's ability to return to school and to gain employment. Id. at 9-10.
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C. Alternatives to the School Safety Act
It is possible to have safe schools without increased use of threat as-
sessments and law enforcement involvement. While the motivation to
implement legislation that attempts to reduce school violence is under-
standable, for all of the reasons stated above, the School Safety Act will
be ineffective and is likely to do more harm than good. In light of this,
the following are some recommendations for alternatives: (1) addressing
the root of the problem by passing gun regulation legislation that focuses
on restricting access to guns, and (2) implementing research and evi-
dence-based practices to improve school climate.
1. Gun Regulation Legislation
It is unfair and unusual to ask and expect schools to take on the en-
tire responsibility of safety when the problem extends beyond school
walls.172 To make the greatest impact on preventing mass shootings,
whether in schools or out of schools, legislatures need to reform gun
regulation laws to make access to guns more difficult, which will in turn
reduce the number of guns in the United States.173 While the most effec-
tive way to do this might be to institute countrywide bans or to criminal-
ize the ownership of guns, the constitutional right to bear arms-and the
societal norms that follow from it-would prevent these restrictions.17 4
Therefore, the remainder of this Comment will focus on solutions that
would not unduly burden the Second Amendment. Part a will discuss a
universal background check procedure so all gun purchasers obtain a
background check, and Part b will discuss a more rigorous and thorough
background check procedure.'75 With these outside supports in place,
schools can more effectively focus on keeping their students safe know-
ing those outside school walls are also doing their part in this important
job.
a. Universal Background Checks
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICBC
System) is the federal background check system currently in place, creat-
ed by the Brady Act, and supported by many politicians, including Presi-
dent Obama. The NICBC System prohibits those with a felony or do-
172. See discussion supra Section Ill.A.2.
173. See discussion infra Section 11I.C. 1.
174. For a discussion on gun control and gun culture in the United States, see supra Section
II.D.
175. These restrictions have been suggested and considered by the President and by Congress,
suggesting they are not unduly burdensome to the Second Amendment. WHITE HOUSE, Now IS THE
TIME: THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING
GUN VIOLENCE 3 (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh-now is the-timefull.pdf; see, e.g., Fix
Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013).
176. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3. The Brady Act was passed on November 30,
1993, and created a five-day waiting period before a person could officially purchase a gun in states
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mestic violence conviction from obtaining a gun, and it has prevented 1.5
million people from purchasing guns. However, there are many ways
to buy a gun without undergoing this background check.' 8
For example, many people purchase guns at a pawnshop or other re-
sell location where background checks generally do not occur, and many
private retail sellers are exempt from running a background check.'79 In
addition, only sellers who are "engaged in the business of selling guns"
are required to obtain a federal license, which in turn requires them to
administer background checks on their purchases.'8 0 However, many
sellers circumvent this requirement because they do not fall under the
strict definition of selling guns "regularly."'8 This allows shops that only
occasionally sell guns, or sell guns not as their primary purpose, to skirt
the federal license requirement, enabling them to sell guns without con-
ducting background checks.18 2 The first step in tightening regulations is
to ensure background checks do occur at these locations for all gun sales.
One way to do this is to broaden the definition of "engaged in business"
to ensure that even those who sell guns occasionally must obtain a feder-
al license and conduct background checks.'83 While buyers could still
avoid a background check when a gun is sold or transferred among fami-
ly members, close friends, or within another unregulated purchase, ensur-
ing that established sellers use background checks will tighten the securi-
ty around gun purchases.184
b. More Rigorous and Thorough Background Checks
While more strictly implementing a universal background check
would help tighten regulations in gun purchases, there are some prob-
lems with relying on the current background check procedures alone.
Requiring background checks under the current procedures will not pre-
vent all people who pose a threat from obtaining a gun.85 Many of the
shooters in recent mass shootings obtained their guns legally and passed
a federal background check, including the Umpqua Community College
that did not have an acceptable alternative background check system. Bradv Law, ATF,
https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/brady-law (last updated July 29, 2015). Therefore, this
measure incentivized states to create background check systems. Id.
177. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3.
178. Id.; see also Larry Buchanan et al., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-shooters-got-their-guns.html (last
updated Dec. 3, 2015) ("The vast majority of guns used in 15 recent mass shootings ... were bought
legally and with a federal background check.").
179. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3.
180. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, BEYOND GRIDLOCK: How WHITE HOUSE ACTION ON
GUN VIOLENCE CAN SAVE LIVES 2, 4 (2015),
http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/1 0/beyond-gridlock-white-house-action-gun-violence-
can-save-lives.pdf.




185. See Buchanan et al., supra note 178.
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shooter in Oregon, the news station shooter in Virginia, the Sikh temple
shooter in Wisconsin, and the movie theater shooter in Colorado.186
At the time James Holmes, the man who attacked the audience at a
movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, in July of 2012, purchased four guns
at a store, he had already purchased rounds of ammunition for different
types of weapons on the Internet, and he was currently seeing a psychia-
trist for mental health issues.187 Yet he was able to purchase the addition-
al guns at a store without any problems.'88 Under the current background
check system, even a serious mental health issue would not have pre-
vented him from purchasing these materials.189
To prevent people who pose a threat from obtaining guns, back-
ground checks need to include more than simply running someone's
name through a list. They need to make sure the person is not purchasing
the gun for the purpose of an attack and make sure the person is able to
safely own a gun.190 This should be a longer, more intensive process to
ensure that past suspicious behavior, such as recent purchase of guns,
ammunition, or other weapons, is identified and assessed prior to pur-
chasing a gun.191 While mental health may also be a relevant factor, as
demonstrated above, it is difficult to identify a person who poses a threat
based solely on behaviors associated with mental health issues.192 The
fact that mass shooters in the past have been able to pass a background
check and purchase a gun even with mental health issues corroborates
this.193 It is possible, however, to identify the number and types of guns a
person already owns and the time that person purchased those guns.
While it may seem ironic to suggest stronger assessment for gun
purchasers while advocating against it for students, more strictly as-
sessing potential gun purchasers is different from conducting threat as-
sessments on students for many reasons. First, there is a greater risk of
danger for gun purchasers than for students at school because, as re-
search demonstrates, school shootings are a small and rare occurrence in
the context of larger gun violence.194 In addition, gun purchasers seek out
a gun, and in doing so, understand that some restrictions come with this
purchase. It is similar to the understanding that someone will assess us
186. Id In Oregon, a man killed six people at a college he attended. Id. In Virginia, a man shot
and killed a television reporter and a cameraman while they reported on live television. Id. In Wis-
consin, a man shot and killed six people at a Sikh temple during a Sunday service. Id. In Colorado, a





191. See id. (discussing specifically how James Holmes's past suspicious behavior of purchas-
ing guns and ammunition online did not prevent him from purchasing more in person).
192. See discussion supra Section III.A.I.
193. Buchanan et al., supra note 178.
194. See Demitchell, supra note 37, at 278-79; see also ROBERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 6.
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when we obtain a driver's license or a license to practice a particular
profession. There is an understood pattern of assessments when people
take on a responsibility, such as owning a gun or driving a car, that is not
present when a student attends school.
In addition, focusing on prior purchases of a gun owner can accu-
rately determine information that is relevant to an attack, unlike as-
sessing personality or even mental health.195 If a background check sys-
tem required the logging of all purchases, sellers would be able to tell
which guns people owned and when they purchased them. While this
would not in itself prevent people who pose a threat from obtaining guns,
it could make it more difficult if certain limits were imposed, such as a
maximum number of weapons a person could purchase at one time, a
time period between purchases, or a waiting period before each purchase.
We could also learn from other countries' efforts by implementing simi-
lar tactics, such as more rigorous application or certification processes.196
It is impossible to meaningfully consider these reforms without ad-
dressing the difficulties the gun lobby in the United States poses. The
National Rifle Association (NRA) contributed over twenty million dol-
lars to political campaigns from 1990 to 2016.197 It also spends a signifi-
cant amount of money on lobbying efforts.'9 8 These efforts help the gun
lobby defeat legislation by influencing politicians on the inside to vote
against bills or to keep bills from being introduced.'99 For example, the
use of paid lobbyists on the outside to further encourage politicians to
vote or act a certain way and the promise or withdrawal of campaign
money hanging over politicians' heads proved to be effective tools of
- 200
persuasion.
In addition, the NRA and the gun lobby as a whole are part of a
broader, cultural opposition to gun control. This opposition includes
more people who are in favor of gun rights and are opposed to gun re-
strictions and who believe owning guns keeps people and homes safer.2 01
These perceptions are relatively new,202 and with each horrific shooting
195. See Buchanan et al., supra note 178 (discussing the purchase of dangerous materials made
by someone with the intent to perform a mass attack); see also Gladwell, supra note 75, at 30, 32
(discussing the purchases of dangerous materials made by someone with the intent to perform a mass
attack).
196. See discussion supra Sections IIE., 11I.A.2.
197. National Rifle Assn: Total Contributions, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/totals.php?id=D000000082&cycle=2014 (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
198. National Rifle Assn: Lobbying Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG [hereinafter Lobbying],
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000082 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
199. See id.; see also Why the Gun Lobby Is Winning, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21647627-prevent-gun-deaths-politicians-offermore-
guns-why-gun-lobby-winning.
200. See Why the Gun Lobby is Winning, supra note 199.
201. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59; see also discus-
sion supra Section II.D.
202. Kohut, supra note 59.
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unable to sway people's opinions, one must wonder if the political agen-
da has anything, or everything, to do with this. It is no surprise then that
gun reforms like the ones suggested above would have a difficult time
gaining momentum in Congress, let alone passing into law.203 Fully ad-
dressing how to dismantle the political capital of the gun lobby is worthy
of its own complete analysis that is beyond the scope of this Comment,
but it is at least necessary to acknowledge this difficult barrier.
2. Improving School Climate
Another way to keep students safe in schools without using threat
assessments is to improve school climate. School climate is the cumula-
tive perception among teachers, administrators, and students about "the
quality and character of school life." 204 A positive school climate exists
when schools support students, foster development, and students and
adults at school feel cared for and safe.205
Laws like the School Safety Act that call for threat assessments and
increased police presence in schools are not effective at keeping schools
and students safe, despite widely held misperceptions,206 and will actual-
ly work together to have a paramount negative ffect on school climate.
A better way to keep schools and students safe is to take substantial steps
207to improve school climate.20 In fact, even the Threat Assessment in
Schools guide included a section about improving school climate, calling
school climate the "foundation" of safe schools.208 This demonstrates that
even those advocating for threat assessments understand that they are not
always necessary, particularly when schools employ alternate practic-
es.209
Evidenced practices demonstrate that one of the best ways to im-
prove school climate is to focus on relationships.2 10 Relationships are
important because they help cultivate an environment of trust where stu-
203. In fact, in 2013, the 113th Congressional Session introduced the Fix Gun Checks Act of
2013, which proposed two very similar restrictions as the two mentioned above, but did not make it
to a vote after dying in committee. See Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013).
204. NAT'L SCH. CLIMATE COUNCIL, NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE STANDARDS:
BENCHMARKS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE TEACHING, LEARNING AND COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL
IMPROVEMENT 2, http://www.schoolclimate.org/climate/documents/school-climate-standards.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
205. Id.
206. See discussion supra Section III.A.
207. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 9, 11 (calling school cultural climate the foundation to
safe schools).
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at II ("The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a lasting effect on
the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is implemented in the larger context of
strategies to ensure that schools offer their students safe and secure learning environments. The
principal objective of school violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates
ofsafety, respect, and emotional support within educational institutions.") (emphasis added).
210. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 14.
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dents feel comfortable discussing problems they face.2 11 Ways to culti-
vate relationships and improve school climate include implementing al-
ternative conflict resolution programs, connecting students with adults,
ensuring respect in those relationships, and encouraging safe and appro-
priate avenues for students to confide in adults about personal issues or
concerns for their peers.212
One popular form of conflict resolution that schools use effectively
is peer mediation, where students work together with a trained mediator
to resolve problems.213 This form of conflict resolution reduces tradition-
al punishments, such as suspension and expulsion.214 This is important
because harsh disciplinary practices actually interfere with a school's
ability to create a positive school climate.215
Making efforts to connect students and adults at school, and ensur-
ing that all students have a trusted adult they can confide in, also im-
proves school climate.216 These relationships help keep schools safe be-
cause adults are better able to focus on students' needs, including emo-
tional needs.217 In addition, strong relationships between students and
adults help foster a culture of respect and tolerance, and therefore bully-
ing, shaming, and harassment occur less often.2 18 These relationships also
enable students to reach out to trusted adults when a peer or they them-
selves are suffering or struggling.219 When students feel their voices are
heard and the adults in their school care about hem, problems that could
result in violence are properly addressed and mitigated before they be-
come more serious issues. In addition, this way does not involve the
problems associated with threat assessments mentioned above.220
CONCLUSION
Relying on ineffective threat assessments without gun regulation
legislation from outside school walls will not keep students safe. Not
only will the School Safety Act be ineffective at keeping students safe
but it will harm students-particularly special education students, stu-
dents with mental illness, and students of color-by subjecting them to
211. Id.
212. Id.; FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 11-13.
213. Linda Stamato & Sanford Jaffe, Conflict Resolution at School and on the Playground,
RUTGERS CTR. FOR NEGOT. & CONFLICT RESOL., http://cncr.rutgers.edulconflict-resolution-at-
school-on-the-playground/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
214. Id.
215. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 1-2, 15 (urging legislators and
administrators to not place more police in schools because of the negative effects it has); see also
ELORA MUKHERJEE, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY
SCHOOLS 27 (2007), http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/criminalizing theclassroom_report.pdf (discussing
the encroachment of police involvement in school activities).
216. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 12.
217. Id. at 11-12.
218. Id. at 12.
219. Id. at 13.
220. Id.
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constant biased analysis and scrutiny. In addition, threat assessments
could push students out of school and into the juvenile and criminal jus-
tice systems. To keep students and schools safe, Colorado should instead
focus on passing gun regulation legislation to restrict access to guns out-
side school walls and building positive school climates.
Doing otherwise places the responsibility of safety substantially on
the schools and the students, who should not be solely responsible for
preventing school violence. If we are serious about keeping students and
communities safe, we need to abandon laws that would actually harm
students, and make more serious, evidenced based efforts to improve
school safety. Then, schools can focus on educating students, knowing
the laws in place will not harm them, and are instead effective, robust,
and smart laws that will protect them. The School Safety Act was created
with good intentions, but it is not enough, and it in fact will move us in
the opposite direction of where we need to be.
Haley DiRenzo
* Haley DiRenzo is a May 2017 J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. She would like to thank Denver Law Professor Alexi Freeman for her wisdom and guidance
in helping to make this comment better and the Denver Law Review team for their hard work in
doing the same. Haley is especially grateful to all the mentors, colleagues, friends, and supporters
who instilled in her a passion for students' rights and juvenile justice, inspiring her to write on this
topic and to be a future advocate in this field.
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CITIZENS UNITED ROUND 11: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
DISCLOSURE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND EXPANDING
EXEMPTIONS AND LOOPHOLES FOR CORPORATE
INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS
ABSTRACT
In the wake of Citizens United, campaign finance regulation is in a
state of flux. Disclosure regulations have rightfully taken the spotlight as
a last means of regulating the influence of money on politics. With
spending likely to reach record highs in the 2016 election cycle and the
percentage of undisclosed spending continuing to rise, disclosure regula-
tions are increasingly important. Reforms, however, are necessary to
protect the important purpose of providing the electorate with infor-
mation regarding who is attempting to influence its votes and to ensure
the effectiveness of such disclosures.
This comment argues the Tenth Circuit, through its recent decision
in Citizens United v. Gessler, further degraded the current campaign fi-
nance regulation scheme by creating yet another avenue for organiza-
tions to avoid disclosure. By granting Citizens United a media exemp-
tion, the court opened the door to endless challenges on a case-by-case
basis. Consequently, the court posed the significant risk of expanding the
set of existing loopholes to an uncontrollable level. Without proper re-
forms on both the federal and state level, these loopholes and exemptions
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INTRODUCTION
As one of the preeminent rights of democratic theory, the Judiciary
considers the freedom of speech as "the touchstone of individual liber-
ty,"' characterized by Justice Cardozo as "the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."2 "The First Amend-
ment affords the broadest protection to . . . political expression . . . 'to
assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas . . . . and "[d]iscussion of
1. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.2 (5th ed. 2013). Freedom of expression is one of the basic prin-
ciples that our system of government is founded on. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 896 (1963) ("It represents, indeed, one of the
major contributions of our political system to the democratic way of life.").
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (applying the First Amendment to the
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957)), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United v. FEC (Citizens United l), 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Justice Brennan coined this phrase,
which would come to be quoted as the objective of protecting political speech, based on a letter of
the Continental Congress in 1774. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 ("The last right we shall mention, regards
the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Govern-
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public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates,' which are
integral to the system of government established by the United States
Constitution.5 Consequently, the freedom of speech afforded by the First
Amendment has sparked bitter public controversy throughout history.
Campaign finance laws that seek to impose limits and restrictions on
spending-both through contributions and expenditures-and the corre-
sponding disclaimer and disclosure regulations frequently implicate such
freedoms. More recently, First Amendment protections have given rise
to new challenges in the campaign finance arena predominately by non-
profit corporations regarding disclosure regulations.8
This Comment argues the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's recent
decision in Citizens United v. Gessler (Citizens United II)9 was wrongly
decided. In its decision, the court granted the nonprofit advocacy group a
preliminary injunction against Colorado's campaign finance disclosure
regulations finding that it qualified for media exemption.10 By granting
Citizens United a media exemption, the court opened the door to addi-
tional opportunities for avoiding campaign finance disclosure, which
undermines the purposes and diminishes the effectiveness of such regula-
tions.
Part I of this Comment traces the history of campaign finance laws
and the major decisions that shaped the current campaign finance land-
scape leading up to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Citizens United II.
Part II provides a brief summary of the facts of Citizens United II, as
well as the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III analyz-
es how the court's expansion of the media exemption creates an addi-
tional avenue for entities to avoid disclosure and the corresponding im-
plications. Finally, Part IV considers campaign finance disclosure reform
models and proposes a balanced approach. The proposed reforms incor-
porate aggregated data concerning small donors, higher thresholds and
ment, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of
union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable
and just modes of conducting affairs." (quoting I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108
(1774))).
4. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
5. Id. Buckley, the landmark case that deemed provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, unconstitutional marks the beginning of the modem
era of campaign finance jurisprudence. Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The
Challenges for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC,
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 329, 351 (2012).
6. See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applica-
tion of Campaign Finance Laws-Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2007) (collecting and
discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases in which the Court considered campaign finance laws that
were challenged on First Amendment grounds).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Gessler, 71 F. Supp. 3d. 1194, 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (seek-
ing declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding reporting and disclosure requirements for
electioneering communication under Colorado law based on First Amendment protections).
9. 773 F.3d 200 (10th Cir. 2014).
10. Id. at 219.
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more comprehensive disclosure of large donor information, increased
disclosure of "social welfare" organization and super PAC donors, and
refined standards regarding earmarking and media exemptions to effec-
tively address the loopholes provided by current disclosure laws.
I. BACKGROUND
Out of concern that corporations posed problems for democracy,
campaign finance laws restricting corporate participation in electoral
politics have existed since the late 1800s.11 These laws have evolved into
a complex set of regulations concerning campaign contributions, expend-
itures, and corresponding disclosures and disclaimers in an attempt to
lessen the impact of the almighty dollar on political power.'2 This Part
first discusses the history of campaign finance laws and First Amend-
ment challenges. Second, it explores the marked change in First
Amendment jurisprudence through the landmark decision in Citizens
United v. FEC (Citizens United I)13 and its progeny. Next, this Part ex-
amines legislation in response to Citizens United I and, lastly, it consid-
ers recent challenges to campaign finance disclosure laws leading up to
the Tenth Circuit's shift in Citizens UnitedII.
A. Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment
The battle between corporate interests in participating in electoral
politics and governmental interests in limiting the influence of wealth on
elections has resulted in a constantly evolving body of campaign finance
laws on behalf of the Legislature and shifting First Amendment jurispru-
dence on behalf of the Judiciary. History reveals changing viewpoints
with recent developments reflecting the Judiciary's growing partiality for
the deregulation of campaign finance and stronger protection for First
Amendment rights.
1. Initial Legislation
In response to increased corporate spending and in fear of wealth's
potential power over politics, Congress first banned contributions from
corporations to federal candidates through the Tillman Act of 1907,14 and
I1. Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 337, 339 (2011) (discussing the history of campaign finance laws and corporate
spending in elections).
12. See id. at 339-40 ("The ban on the use of corporate treasury funds in election campaigns
is based on the idea that corporations pose a special problem for democracy.").
13. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
14. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006),
transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30118). The Act made it unlawful for:
[A]ny national bank, or any corporation ... to make a [money] contribution or expendi-
ture in connection with any election to any political office . . . or for any corporation
whatever ... to make a [money] contribution . .. in connection with any election at
which [P]residential and [V]ice [P]residential electors or a Senator or Representative
in . .. Congress are to be voted for . . . .
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over the next twenty years many states followed.5 In 1925, Congress
enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which mandated that
certain information about contributions to presidential campaign commit-
tees be reported.'6 In upholding these disclosure requirements, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the disclosure of political contributions
would "prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections."n Years
later, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 expanded the federal contribution ban
to apply to labor unions' independent spending.'8 Similarly, approxi-
mately two-dozen states enacted legislation prohibiting corporate spend-
ing in support of or in opposition to election candidates.'9 This focus on
regulating corporate spending through campaign finance laws was born
out of the idea that corporations were able to aggregate wealth, symbol-
ized as corporate "war chests," and that their "special 'advantages' in the
legal realm may translate into special advantages in the market for legis-
lation."20
Following financing scandals in elections and based on concerns re-
garding the effects of the "spiraling costs of election campaigns,"21 Con-
gress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Three
years later, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974 add-
ed more stringent disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and estab-
lished the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as the administrative and
Id. at 864-65. President Theodore Roosevelt supported reform after controversy arose regarding his
campaign funding, the majority of which was comprised of large donations from corporations.
Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After Citizens Unit-
ed, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1035-36 (2011).
15. Briffault, supra note I1, at 339 (citing EARL R. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-
PRACTICES LEGISLATION 127-28 (1928)). New York was the first state to pass a disclosure law that
required candidates to disclose their contribution sources and campaign expenditure recipients. See
Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How
2012 Became the "Dark Money" Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 383, 400
(2013) (citing An Act to Amend Title Five of the Penal Code Relating to Crimes Against the Elec-
tive Franchise, 1890 N.Y. Laws 265 § 41(d)). Shortly thereafter, Colorado, Michigan, Massachu-
setts, California, Missouri, and Kansas enacted similar legislation. Id. (citing LOUISE OVERACKER,
MONEY IN ELECTIONS 289, 291-94 (1932)). By 1927, campaign disclosure laws had been enacted
by all but three states. Id.
16. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-48, repealed by Pub. L. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1972) (requiring
presidential campaign committees to report information, including names and addresses of contribu-
tors, to the clerk of the House of Representatives).
17. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).
18. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947) (codified as amended by 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012)).
19. See Life After Citizens United, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx (last
updated Jan. 4, 2011). Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming enacted
laws banning political activity by both corporations and unions. Id.
20. See Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 471 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
659 (1990), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
21. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1, § 20.51(a).
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enforcement agency.22 In addition, FECA provided the framework for
political action committees (PACs), which allowed for federal campaign
donations from corporations and unions through segregated funds.2 3 The
United States Supreme Court considered First Amendment challenges to
central provisions of FECA shortly after its amendment in the seminal
case Buckley v. Valeo.24
2. Early First Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding Campaign Fi-
nance
Buckley set the stage for the concept that "money talks."25 The opin-
ion depended upon the precept that the inherent relation between cam-
paign contributions and expenditures and speech placed First Amend-
ment restrictions on funding regulations.26 The Court distinguished cam-
paign contributions from campaign expenditures reasoning that the cor-
responding speech interests warranted limitations on contributions but
not on expenditures.27 Additionally, the Court held that disclosure re-
quirements must survive exacting scrutiny,28 which requires finding a
"substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the infor-
mation required" by the disclosure to justify infringing on First Amend-
ment rights.29 The governmental interests validated by the Court were
three-fold: first, disclosure provides the electorate with information that
aids voters in evaluating candidates; second, disclosure deters corruption
and the appearance of corruption; and third, disclosure aids in the detec-
tion of contribution limit violations.30 Regarding the potential burdens on
First Amendment rights that disclosure could invoke, the Buckley Court
22. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 8, amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; see S.
Rep. No. 93-689, 93rd Cong., at 1743 (1974) ("There is no question that the public appreciates the
pervasive evils of our present system for campaign financing. The potentials for abuse are all too
clear. Americans are looking to Congress for comprehensive, effective reform, not for halfway
measures that only reach a small part of the problem or which may make some present problems
even worse.").
23. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 302(a)-(O, 86 Stat. 3, 12
(1972) (laying out the proper organization of political committees).
24. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), overruledby Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens Unitedl), 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
25. See id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. See id. at 19-23 (majority opinion) (discussing the potential impacts that limitations on
campaign contributions would have on speech).
27. See id. ("In sum, although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both impli-
cate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more
severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limita-
tions on financial contributions.").
28. Id. at 64-66 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958)) (reasoning that exact-
ing scrutiny "is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing
the exercise of First Amendment rights").
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 66-68 (relying on Congressional records that discussed the different governmental
interests in disclosure).
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assessed previous decisions31 in crafting an exemption that would be
applicable where a party could demonstrate a "reasonable probability"
that disclosure would result in "threats, harassment, or reprisals."32
Two years after Buckley, the Court in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti33 struck down a Massachusetts law banning corporate spend-
ing in support of or in opposition to ballot propositions.34 The Bellotti
Court opined that the value of speech "in terms of its capacity for in-
forming the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual,"35 raising doubts
about the constitutionality of the corporate contribution ban. Neverthe-
less, these doubts did not surface until more than thirty years later. 36 Ra-
ther, the Court addressed the ability of corporations to make campaign
expenditures, not contributions.3 7 In FEC v. National Right to Work
Committee (NR WC),38 the Court upheld a federal law that restricted non-
stock corporations from soliciting contributions from nonmembers.39 In
its decision, the Court found the corrupting effects of large financial con-
tributions and the corresponding erosion of public confidence justified
the restrictions on corporate contributions, the requirement that corpora-
tions use PACs, and the restrictions on solicitations to fund PACs.40
Shortly thereafter, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL)41 the Court distinguished the special advantages of the corporate
structure from nonprofit corporations formed expressly for the purpose
of promoting political ideas, that have no shareholders, and that do not
31. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (holding an ordinance that prohibited
distribution of anonymous handbills was unconstitutional as abridging the freedom of speech and
press because the "fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance"); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 517-18, 523-24, 527 (1960)
(reversing convictions for failure to comply with an ordinance requiring disclosure of contributions,
"by whom and when paid," because the disclosure "would work a significant interference with the
freedom of association of their members .. . [who] had been followed by harassment and threats of
bodily harm"); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63, 466 (holding that a production order compelling disclo-
sure of the organization's membership was a denial of due process as a restraint upon the freedom of
association because the organization had "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostili-
ty").
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74 (discussing examples of evidence that would provide sufficient
proof to invoke the exemption and concluding that a blanket exemption was not required).
33. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id. at 777.
36. See generally Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (relying heavily on the Bellotti
opinion in reasoning that the corporation contribution bans were unconstitutional).
37. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-95.
38. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. Id. at 201-02, 207, 209-10 ("[T]he 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities
'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process."'
(quoting Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))).
41. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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accept contributions from business corporations or labor unions.42 The
Court reasoned that these attributes "prevent[] such corporations from
serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to
the political marketplace."A In so doing, the Court held the FECA re-
strictions on independent spending were unconstitutional as applied to
the nonprofit, non-stock corporation and, consequently, created an ex-
ception for similar entities.44
3. A Shift Toward Stronger Restrictions on Campaign Finance
Applying similar reasoning as in NRWC and MCFL, the Court in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce45 upheld a Michigan law that
prohibited corporate independent expenditures in support of or in opposi-
tion to candidates based on "the corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's sup-
port for the corporation's political ideas."4 6 The Court reasoned that,
despite its status as a nonprofit, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did
not fall under the MCFL exception because most of its funding came
from business corporations emphasizing the exception's narrow applica-
tion.47 Moreover, the Court found the laws' media exemption from dis-
closure requirements justified the compelling purpose of "informing and
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for dis-
cussion and debate."4 8 Although the Court recognized that this unique
role did not "entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitu-
tion,"49 it also distinguished the press by recognizing its involvement "in
the regular business of imparting news to the public." 0
Two cases challenging the constitutionality of state disclosure laws
followed in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission5 1 and Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF).52 McIntyre involved a
law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature and an
42. Id. at 264.
43. Id. at 264-65 ("[The] government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to
meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the
danger that has prompted regulation.").
44. See id. at 263-64.
45. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
46. Id. at 660.
47. See id at 661-65 (finding the Chamber's purposes were not inherently political, the
Chamber lacked shareholders, but its "members are more similar to shareholders of a business cor-
poration than to the members of MCFL," and was greatly influenced by business corporations as
more than three-quarters of its members were business corporations).
48. Id. at 666-68 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978)).
49. Id. at 668.
50. See id (reasoning that the restriction, if applied to the news media, "might discourage
incorporated news broadcasters or publishers from serving their crucial societal role" and that the
"exception ensures that the Act does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on,
and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events").
51. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
52. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
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unsigned leaflet regarding a ballot initiative.53 Produced with personal
funds, the leaflet focused solely on a proposed tax levy.5 4 ACLF involved
a law that required individuals circulating petitions regarding a proposed
ballot initiative to wear identification badges that included the individu-
al's name and status as a paid or unpaid volunteer. By finding the in-
formation required by the disclosure regulations provided little value to
the voters' education and decision-making regarding the elections, while
posing the threat of discouraging political activity, the Court struck down
the disclosure laws as unconstitutional.6
Despite the holdings of McIntyre and ACLF, campaign finance dis-
closure continued to serve the important governmental interest of inform-
ing the electorate in the eyes of both the Judiciary and the Legislature.
To further "purge national politics of what [was] conceived to be the
pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions,"58 Congress
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which
contained several amendments to FECA.59 By redefining what campaign
activity was subject to regulation, the BCRA expanded Buckley's "'mag-
ic words' of express advocacy."60 Specifically, Buckley determined that
"funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate," or express advocacy, was the
kind of campaign expenditures that FECA applied to.6 1
Consequently, the words used as examples of advocacy language,
such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "defeat," and "reject" became the
53. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
54. Id.
55. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 200.
56. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348, 355-57 ("The simple interest in providing voters with
additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit."); see also ACLF, 525 U.S. at 197-200. "Listing paid circula-
tors and their income from circulation 'forc[es] paid circulators to surrender the anonymity enjoyed
by their volunteer counterparts,' no more than tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure
serves .... " Id. at 204 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Constitutional Law
Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997)).
57. See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 992 (2011) (noting that the Supreme
Court easily upheld disclosure laws following McIntyre and ACLF).
58. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003) (quoting United States v. Int'l Union United
Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)), overruled by Citi-
zens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
59. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.) (declar-
ing that it was "[a]n Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide bipartisan
campaign reform"). The BCRA, commonly known as McCain-Feingold, also sought to eliminate
"soft money" from political campaigns. Jason M. Shepard, Campaigning as the Press: Citizens
United and the Problem of Press Exemptions in Law, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 137, 140
(2010-11).
60. See Briffault, supra note 11, at 342-43 (discussing the ability to easily evade FECA's
disclosure requirements under the express advocacy standard and Buckley's "magic words").
61. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), superseded by
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized
in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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"magic words" of express advocacy and created a separate category of
campaign activity exempt from regulation known as "issue advocacy."62
The BCRA expanded the scope of express advocacy by defining a new
category termed "electioneering communications" as "(i) broadcast, ca-
ble or satellite communications (ii) that refer to a clearly identified can-
didate, (iii) are targeted on that candidate's constituency, and (iv) are
aired within thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general
election in which that candidate is running."6 3 Additionally, the applica-
tion of FECA's disclosure requirements extended to such communica-
tions.
Shortly thereafter, McConnell v. FEC 5 involved a challenge to the
BCRA to no avail-the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ban on
corporate independent spending and the corresponding disclosure re-
quirements. McConnell officially closed the loophole between express
advocacy and issue advocacy by finding the BCRA's new category of
electioneering communications avoided vagueness and rectified Buck-
ley's "functionally meaningless" magic words requirement.67 The
McConnell Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the ban on corporate
and union campaign spending by finding that the ability to spend through
PACs provided corporations "sufficient opportunit[ies] to engage in ex-
press advocacy."68
4. The Pendulum Begins to Swing
A few years later, the departure of Justice O'Connor (who Justice
Alito succeeded) marked a drastic shift in campaign finance jurispru-
dence69 beginning with the Court's decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc. (WRTL).70 In WRTL, the Court reasoned that he corporate
spending ban could apply to the "functional equivalent of express advo-
cacy," which required a communication be "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
62. See id at 44 n.52; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 102-03 (discussing "issue advocacy").
63. Briffault, supra note I1, at 342-43 ("In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), Congress responded by defining a new category of campaign speech-'electioneering
communications'-for purposes of the ban on corporate and union campaign expenditures as well
for determining the scope of disclosure.").
64. Id. at 343.
65. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
66. Id. at 201-03, 219 (reasoning that because the disclosure requirements "d[id] not prevent
anyone from speaking," they were not unconstitutional (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003))).
67. See id at 193-94 ("[T]he presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully dis-
tinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad.").
68. Id. at 203.
69. See Briffault, supra note 57, at 993 (discussing the "Supreme Court's campaign finance
U-tum" following the retirement of Justice O'Connor).
70. 551 U.S. 449, 481-82 (2007).
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candidate." 7' In adopting this test for as-applied challenges and holding
that the BCRA's electioneering communication definition was unconsti-
tutional as applied to WRTL's advertisements-financed with funds
from its general treasury-the Court narrowed the scope of the election-
eering communication's application and constricted McConnell's expan-
sive approach to prohibition72 setting the stage for Citizens United I.
B. Citizens United v. FEC and its Progeny
In the highly controversial opinion in Citizens United I, the Court
struck down the sixty-year federal ban on corporate independent expend-
itures in federal elections out of general treasury funds, overruling Austin
and overruling the portion of McConnell that upheld the BCRA's elec-
tioneering communications provisions.73 Citizens United, a nonprofit
corporation, sought exemption for its film, Hillary: The Movie, from
classification as an electioneering communication and from the required
disclosures.74 The majority opinion noted the complexity of campaign
finance regulation and opined that the FEC was controlling what political
speech could become public.75 Based on the burdensome nature of PACs,
the Court declared the option to form PACs did not sufficiently allow
corporations to speak and, therefore, the prohibition on corporate inde-
pendent expenditures constituted an outright ban on speech.76
The Court relied heavily on Buckley and Bellotti in overruling Aus-
tin and stressed that "[p]olitical speech is 'indispensible to decisionmak-
ing in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual.'"77 Addressing the media
exemption, the Court noted that media corporations similarly amass large
amounts of wealth through the advantages of the corporate form in find-
ing the law invalid. Moreover, the Court stated differential treatment of a
media corporation and some other corporation cannot comport with the
First Amendment.78 The Court did, however, uphold the disclosure and
disclaimer requirements based on the importance of transparency.79 Alt-
71. Id at 466-67, 469-70 (stating that such communications would be considered the "func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate").
72. See id. at 460, 476-82. Rather than interpreting "electioneering communication[s]" as
those "that refer to a clearly identified candidate," the Court returned to the narrower express advo-
cacy interpretation of the years prior to the enactment of the BCRA as an "appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate." Id. at 469-70, 484 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(a) (2000)).
73. See Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66, 372 (2010).
74. Id. at 319-21.
75. Id. at 335-36 (stating that the "FEC has created a regime that allows it to select what
political speech is safe for public consumption" resulting in "an unprecedented governmental inter-
vention into the realm of speech").
76. Id. at 337-39.
77. Id. at 345-56 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
78. Id at 352-54.
79. Id. at 371 ("[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give
proper weight to different speakers and messages."). Only Justice Thomas dissented from the hold-
2016] 759
DENVER LAWREVIEW
hough such requirements may impose burdens on speakers, the majority
opined they serve the interest of providing the electorate with infor-
mation without imposing a ceiling on campaign activity or preventing
anyone from speaking.80 Accordingly, the Court held the requirements
survived the exacting scrutiny standard and thus did not violate the First
Amendment.8 1
A decision out of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit further shifted the campaign finance landscape in
SpeechNow.org v. FEC (SpeechNow).8 2 The court held that limits on
contributions to organizations that intended to make only independent
expenditures were unconstitutional because such spending does not pose
sufficient risks of corruption.8 3 As a result, the super PAC was born,
which would lead to significant increases in corporate spending.84 None-
theless, the court upheld the reporting and disclosure requirements as
imposing a minimal burden on speech compared to the important interest
of the public "in knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is
funding that speech."85
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Doe v. Reed8 6 concluded
the disclosure of names and addresses of petition signers, who sought to
subject legislation that extended "all but marriage" benefits to same-sex
couples to a voter referendum, served the state's interest of preserving
the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, discovering
invalid signatures, and also by promoting accountability in elections.8 7
Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter,8 8 but five Justices wrote concur-
ring opinions focusing on the reasonable probability of harassment
ing that the disclosure and disclaimer requirements were constitutional. See id at 480-85 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 366 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized
in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United l, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
81. Id. at 367-71.
82. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
83. Id. at 689, 695-96 ("[B]ecause Citizens United holds that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law, then the government can have no
anticorruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only organizations.").
84. See, e.g., Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra note 5, at 338.
85. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 698.
86. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
87. Id. at 192-93, 197-99.
88. See id. at 228-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In my view, compelled disclosure of signed
referendum and initiative petitions . .. severely burdens those rights and chills citizen participation
in the referendum process. Given those burdens, I would hold that Washington's decision to subject
all referendum petitions to public disclosure is unconstitutional because there will always be a less
restrictive means by which Washington can vindicate its stated interest in preserving the integrity of
its referendum process." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
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standard for exemption,89 with only Justice Alito calling for a lower evi-
dentiary burden.90
The Supreme Court again narrowed the importance of regulating
campaign finance in McCutcheon v. FEC91 by striking down the aggre-
gate limits on contributions made to candidates, parties, and connected
political committees in federal elections.92 The Court reiterated that the
only interest in protecting against actual or apparent corruption is that of
quid pro quo corruption, a distinction that was emphasized in Citizens
United J.93 In its 5-4 decision, however, the Court opined that disclosure
presents less restrictions on speech than contribution bans and provides
the public with information while deterring corruption by exposing large
donations.94
C. Legislation in Response to Citizens United v. FEC
In response to the Citizens United I decision, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill entitled Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting
Light on Spending in Elections, known as the DISCLOSE Act." This
Act increased disclosure of corporate and organizational independent
expenditures by providing for the following:
(i) disclosure of donations to nonprofits earmarked for electoral use,
(ii) the creation of an optional Campaign Related Activity Account
(CRAA) as the exclusive account for campaign spending and the dis-
closure of only donations above a high $6,000 threshold to the op-
tional CRAA, (iii) a mechanism for donors to nonprofits to provide
that their funds will not be used for electoral purposes; and (iv) a re-
quirement that if a nonprofit does not create a CRAA and undertakes
independent expenditures or electioneering communications that all
donations of $600 or more to the organization would be subject to
89. See id at 202 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 212 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg); id. at 230 (Stevens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice
Breyer); id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 202-04, 212 (Alito, J., concurring) ("As-applied challenges to disclosure require-
ments play a critical role in protecting First Amendment freedoms. To give speech the breathing
room it needs to flourish, prompt judicial remedies must be available well before the relevant speech
occurs and the burden of proof must be low.").
91. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
92. Id. at 1448, 1456-57, 1462 ("An aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees
an individual may support through contributions is not a 'modest restraint' at all. The Government
may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspa-
per how many candidates it may endorse.").
93. Id. at 1441 ("Any regulation must instead target what we have called 'quid pro quo'
corruption or its appearance." (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010))).
94. Id. at 1459-60 (recognizing that disclosure "offers a particularly effective means of arm-
ing the voting public with information" and at the same time can "deter actual corruption and avoid
the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publici-
ty" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))).
95. See generally Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, 111 th Cong. (2010).
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disclosure except for contributions from donors who had expressly
directed that their donations not be used for electoral purposes.96
One commentator has suggested that because the CRAA presents
attributes similar to a PAC and Citizens United I determined that corpo-
rations cannot be compelled to funnel their campaign spending through
PACs, it would likely be subject to constitutional challenges. Even so,
the complex and controversial DISCLOSE Act was never enacted after
the Senate filibustered twice.
98
In similar fashion, a number of states responded to Citizens United I
by repealing or re-writing campaign finance laws.99 In the Tenth Circuit,
upon the request of Governor Bill Ritter to determine the constitutionali-
ty of two provisions of the Colorado Constitution that Citizens United I
put into question, the Colorado Supreme Court held the provisions were
unconstitutional.100 Moreover, the Colorado legislature enacted Senate
Bill 10-203, which requires corporations and labor unions to register
election campaign donations, including the identity of the donor and the
amount of the donation, with an independent agency.'0' Under the Bill,
corporations and labor unions are able to make expenditures expressly
advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate and to make contribu-
tions for electioneering communications.102
Although corporations may contribute to political committees, they
are prohibited from making direct corporate contributions to candidate
committees and political parties. o3 Corporations that are formed to pro-
96. Briffault, supra note 57, at 1011 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. (proposing a solution based on the DISCLOSE Act that the author argues would be
constitutional, although it would likely face constitutional challenges).
98. See Rosalind S. Helderman, DISCLOSE Act, New Donor Transparency Law, Blocked in
Senate, WASH. POST (July 16, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/disclose-act-new-donor-transparency-law-
blocked-in-senate/2012/07/16/gJQAbm7WpW blog.html; see also Ted Barrett, Senate Republicans
Block DISCLOSE Act for Second Straight Day, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/politics/senate-disclose-act/ (last updated July 17, 2012).
99. See NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 19 ("In 17 of the 24 states with laws
affected by the Citizens United decision, legislation has been introduced to amend the law.").
100. In re Interrogatories Propounded by Governor Ritter, Jr., Concerning Effect of Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) on Certain Provisions of Article XXIII of Constitution of State
(In re Interrogatories), 227 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2010).
101. S. 10-203, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ I-
45-107.5, -109, -111.5 (2016).
102. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-45-107.5(2).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103.7; COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(a) (2015) (held un-
constitutional) ("It shall be unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make contributions to
a candidate committee or a political party, and to make expenditures expressly advocating the elec-
tion or defeat of a candidate; except that a corporation or labor organization may establish a political
committee or small donor committee which may accept contributions or dues from employees,
officeholders, shareholders, or members.") Only the expenditure was held unconstitutional by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In re Interrogatories, 227 P.3d at 894 ("To the extent section
3(4) ... makes it unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make expenditures expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, it violates the dictates of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution . . . .").
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mote political ideas, however, are exempt from this restriction.' Several
other states have enacted similar legislation in the wake of Citizens Unit-
ed I.05 This new legislation, particularly the disclosure requirements, has
been subject to First Amendment challenges since its enactment.06
D. Recent Challenges to Campaign Finance Disclosure in the Tenth Cir-
cuit
Soon after Citizens United I, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
two nonprofit corporations that were formed to educate youth about po-
litical issues, including healthcare, campaign finance, the economy, and
voting records of governmental representatives, constituted political
committees.0 7 In determining the applicable reporting and disclosure
requirements under New Mexico law, the court also addressed whether
the corporations' mailers that criticized several incumbent state legisla-
tors constituted express advocacy or its functional equivalent. os Because
the organizations were not under the control of a political candidate, the
court applied the "major purpose" test to determine whether the organi-
zations operated primarily for a political purpose.109
An entity's major purpose can be determined by either examining
its central organizational purpose or through a comparison of its elec-
tioneering spending with its overall spending."0 Where contributions for
express advocacy or to candidates represent a preponderance of the or-
ganization's expenditures, the major purpose is deemed political."' The
court found that neither were satisfied and also recognized that a small
dollar amount of expenditures could not constitutionally serve as a trig-
ger, standing alone, for classification as a political committee.'1 2 Coupled
with the implications of Citizens United I, this classification would in-
creasingly degrade the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations and
serve as a loophole to disclosure regimes.1 3
In Free Speech v. FEC,114 the Tenth Circuit subsequently upheld the
FEC's disclaimer and disclosure requirements as necessary to provide
voters with information and "the transparency that 'enables the electorate
104. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(b)(l)-(III) (2015). This exception refers to corporations
like Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. See generally FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),
479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
105. See NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 19 (stating that Alaska, Arizona, Con-
necticut, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia laws enacted in response to
Citizens United I are very similar to Colorado's law).
106. See discussion infra Section 1.D.
107. See N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 671 (10th Cir. 2010).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 677.
110. Id. at 678.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 678-79 (discussing the court's previous reasoning and holding in Colorado Right to
Life Committee, Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007)).
113. See discussion infra Section IlI.B.
114. 720 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2013).
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to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers
and messages.""'5 In addition, the court reasoned that the FEC's func-
tional equivalent and major purpose tests were essential in determining
whether an organization would be subject to the reporting, disclaimer,
and disclosure requirements, which it found to be more important after
Citizens United .1'16
The Tenth Circuit carved out another potential avenue for avoidance
of disclosure in Sampson v. Buescher,117 which involved a campaign
committee that formed only to oppose the annexation of a neighbor-
hood.'18 In Sampson, the court held that applying Colorado's campaign
reporting and disclosure requirements to such a committee violated the
members' rights to freedom of association.119 Applying exacting scruti-
ny,120 the court determined there was a legitimate interest in providing
the public with financial disclosures, but distinguished ballot issues from
candidate elections.1 21 The court found the burdens of the disclosure re-
quirements could not be justified by any governmental interest where a
ballot-initiative committee raises or expends a small amount of money,
which in this case was less than $1,000.122 The court, however, refused to
draw a bright-line to mark when contributions and expenditures need not
be reported by ballot-issue committees.123
In response to Sampson, the Secretary of State, Scott Gessler,
promulgated a rule increasing the contribution and expenditure threshold
for triggering the status of an issue committee from $200 to $5,000.124
Two election watch organizations petitioned for review challenging
Gessler's authority in passing the rule.125 The Colorado Supreme Court
held that Gessler acted beyond his authority and that, because the rule
115. Id. at 798 (quoting Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010)).
116. Id.
117. 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010).
118. Id. at l261.
119. Id.
120. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
121. See Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1256-59 (reasoning that the interest of facilitating detection of
violations was moot by the prohibition on contribution limitations regarding ballot-issues, the inter-
est of deterring corruption was irrelevant because "quid pro quo corruption cannot arise in a ballot-
issue campaign," and that the informational interest of reporting and disclosure requirements was
"significantly attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a single ballot issue and when
the contributions and expenditures are slight").
122. Id. at 1249, 1261.
123. Id. at 1261 ("We do not attempt to draw a bright line below which a ballot-issue commit-
tee cannot be required to report contributions and expenditures. The case before us is quite unlike
ones involving the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars on ballot issues presenting 'complex
policy proposals.' We say only that Plaintiffs' contributions and expenditures are well below the
line." (citation omitted) (quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th
Cir. 2003))).
124. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 327 P.3d 232, 233-34 (Colo. 2014).
125. Id. at 234.
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promulgated conflicted with provisions upheld in Sampson, the rule was
unlawful. 126
The Colorado Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a bright-line rule
became a point of frustration in Coalition for Secular Government v.
Gessler.127 The opinion declared the need to adjudicate the applicability
of Colorado's campaign finance disclosure laws on a case-by-case basis
"itself offends the First Amendment."l28 The court concluded that the
informational interest in mandating minimal to virtually nonexistent con-
tribution and expenditure disclosures could not justify the burdens that
compliance placed on speech and association rights.129 In doing so, the
court raised the issue surrounding small entities' ability to comply with
the detailed record keeping and administrative costs of disclosure obliga-
tions. 130 The court suggested the lack of established precedent in the
Tenth Circuit posed the risk of endless litigation in contradiction to the
intent of the disclosure requirements.'3 '
II. CITIZENS UNITED V. GESSLER
A. Facts
Citizens United is a Virginia non-stock corporation formed for the
principal purpose of promoting "traditional American values," such as
limited government, national sovereignty and security, the free market
economy, and strong families through grass roots efforts, advocacy, and
education.132 It has become well known for releasing documentaries that
address political and religious topics, which are produced by Citizens
United's in-house production and marketing arm Citizens United Produc-
tions. 133 Films are distributed through DVDs, television, online digital
streaming and downloading, and theatrical release; sold for retail and
wholesale bulk purchase; shown at movie theaters; licensed to television
broadcasters and digital streaming companies; and occasionally made
available for free screenings to educational institutions, the public, and
126. Id. at 235-38 (concluding that the court's as-applied remedy in Sampson did not render
the provisions unconstitutional on their face).




131. See id. at 1183 ("Unfortunately, given the Tenth Circuit's refusal 'to establish a bright line
below which a ballot issue committee cannot be required to report contributions and expenditures'
and the Supreme Court's election not to answer the certified questions, I must make a ruling on the
specific facts of this case based on what I determine, sui generis, to be reasonable. I say 'unfortu-
nately' because this state of affairs means that no precedent has been established and the stability
this matter of considerable public importance so needfully requires will have to await another day or
days and even more lawsuits." (quoting Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir.
2010))).
132. See Citizens United v. Gessler (Citizens United Hl), 773 F.3d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 2014);
see also Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-are.aspx (last visit-
ed Feb. 3, 2016).
133. Citizens United I, 773 F.3d at 202.
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members of the news media.134 Citizens United "advertises its films on
television, in newspapers, on billboards, by electronic and regular mail,
and on the Internet."l35
Citizens United produced a film titled Rocky Mountain Heistl36
with plans for distribution throughout the United States "through DVD,
television broadcast, and online digital streaming and downloading," and
marketing through television, radio, and Internet advertisements.'3 7 The
documentary was scheduled for release in October 2014 ahead of the
Colorado General Election held on November 4, 2014. 38 Rocky Moun-
tain Heist and the advertisements promoting the film unambiguously
referred to elected Colorado officials running in the general election and
included footage of participants advocating for their election or defeat.,39
As a result, it fell under provisions of Colorado campaign laws that re-
quire disclosure in regard to such electioneering communications and
independent expenditures.140 In April 2014, Citizens United sought a
Declaratory Order with the Secretary of State (the Secretary) requesting a
ruling that Rocky Mountain Heist and its marketing be exempted from




136. The film focused on the "alleged impact of various advocacy groups on Colorado gov-




140. Id. Under Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution and the Fair Campaign Practices
Act (FCPA), an "[e]lectioneering communication" is defined as follows:
[A]ny communication broadcasted by television or radio, printed in a newspaper or on a
billboard, directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences or otherwise dis-
tributed that:
(1) Unambiguously refers to any candidate; and
(II) Is broadcasted, printed, mailed, delivered, or distributed within thirty days before a
primary election or sixty days before a general election; and
(Ill) Is broadcasted to, printed in a newspaper distributed to, mailed to, delivered by hand
to, or otherwise distributed to an audience that includes members of the electorate for
such public office.
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a) (2015); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9) (2016). An
"[e]xpenditure" is defined as follows:
[A]ny purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money by any
person for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate or
supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question. An expenditure is made when the
actual spending occurs or when there is a contractual agreement requiring such spending
and the amount is determined.
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(8)(a); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(10). Further, Article
XXVIII and the FCPA define "[ijndependent expenditure [as] an expenditure that is not controlled
by or coordinated with any candidate or agent of such candidate." COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII,
§ 2(9); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(11).
141. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 207.
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B. Procedural History
In its request, Citizens United noted that it had been granted an ex-
emption from the disclosure provisions of FECAl 4 2 in an advisory opin-
ion issued by the FEC in June 2010.143 Citizens United used this exemp-
tion as support for its Petition for a Declaratory Order because the defini-
tions of electioneering communication and expenditure under the federal
statute are similar to Colorado's definitions.'4 Additionally, the press
exemption under the federal statute is comparable to the media exemp-
tions under Colorado law.145 Nonetheless, the Secretary denied Citizens
United's request and ruled that because it was not a broadcast facility,
Citizens United's film and advertising did not fall under the media ex-
emption.14 6 Further, the Secretary ruled that Citizens United's communi-
cations did not qualify for the regular-business exemption, which applies
142. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126 (2012).
143. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 207 (citing FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL
3184266 (June 11, 2010)).
144. Id Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) (defining "electioneering communication" as
"any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office" and is made within "60 days before a general, special, or runoff election" in which
the candidate is seeking office or "30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention
or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate" in which the candidate is
seeking office, and where a communication "refers to a candidate for an office other than President
or Vice President [and] is targeted to the relevant electorate"), and 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A) (defin-
ing "expenditure" to include "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office" and any "written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure"), with
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a), 2(8)(a), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9)-(l0).
145. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(B)(i) (providing an exception from the definition of
electioneering communication for "a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are
owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate"), and 52 U.S.C.
§ 30101(9)(B)(i) (providing an exemption from the definition of expenditure for "any news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any
political party, political committee, or candidate"), with COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(b)(I)-
(Ill), 2(8)(b)(l)-(IIl) (providing an exemption from the definition of electioneering communication
for "[a]ny news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commentary writings, or letters to the
editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned or controlled by a candidate
or political party" or "[a]ny editorial endorsements or opinions aired by a broadcast facility not
owned or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[alny communication by persons made in
the regular course and scope of their business or any communication made by a membership organi-
zation solely to members of such organization and their families" and providing an exemption from
the definition of "expenditure" for "[a]ny news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commen-
tary writings, or letters to the editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned
or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[a]ny editorial endorsements or opinions aired by
a broadcast facility not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[s]pending by
persons, other than political parties, political committees and small donor committees, in the regular
course and scope of their business or payments by a membership organization for any communica-
tion solely to members and their families"), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9)-(10) (providing
that the meaning of electioneering communication and expenditure is in accordance with COLO.
CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7), 2(8)).
146. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 208 (citing Suzanne Staiert, Deputy Sec'y of State, State of





to persons and businesses whose primary purpose is distributing con-
tent. 147
Following the Secretary's denial of its request, Citizens United
sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado to enjoin the enforcement of the disclosure require-
ments.14 8 The action was brought against the Secretary to challenge the
disclosure provisions as violating the First Amendment, both facially and
as applied to Citizens United, because the provisions included media
exemptions.149 The district court denied the motion for preliminary in-
junction, and Citizens United appealed.50
C. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, authored by Circuit Judge Harris L. Hartz
and joined by Circuit Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich, the court declined
to address Citizens United's facial challenge and considered the district
court's denial of the preliminary injunction regarding the as-applied chal-
lenge under an abuse of discretion standard.'5 ' In considering the consti-
tutionality of Colorado's disclosure requirements, the court applied the
exacting scrutiny standard.152
First, the court found the disclosures relating to electioneering
communications and independent expenditures served the purpose of
"providing the electorate with information about the source of election-
related spending."'53 The court, however, rejected the Secretary's argu-
ment that anticorruption was an important governmental interest in re-
quiring the disclosure of independent expenditures.'54 In so doing, the
court distinguished coordinated contributions to candidates from inde-
pendent expenditures lacking such coordination because the latter present
147. Id. The Secretary relied on the court's interpretation of the regular-business exemption in
Colorado Citizens for Ethics in Government v. Committee for the American Dream, 187 P.3d 1207,
1216 (Colo. App. 2008). In this case, the court interpreted the exemption narrowly "as limited to
persons whose business is to broadcast, print, publicly display, directly mail, or hand deliver candi-
date-specific communications within the named candidate's district as a service, rather than to influ-
ence elections." Id. Thus, the exemption does not apply to those seeking to influence election out-
comes. Id. The court reasoned that because "[b]roadcasters and publishers do not seek to influence
elections as their primary objective, except where they are 'owned or controlled by a candidate or
political party,"' the reporting requirements are not applicable. Id (quoting COLO. CONST. art.
XXVIII, § 2(7)(b)(I)-(II)).
148. Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 202.
149. Id. at 202, 208.
150. Id at 208.
151. Id. at 202, 209 (holding that under the First Amendment, the Secretary must treat Citizens
United and the exempted media the same, which negated the need for the court to address the facial
challenge).
152. See discussion supra Section I.A.2. The exacting scrutiny standard requires finding "a
substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental
interest." Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 210 (quoting Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010)).
153. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 2 10.
154. Id. at 211.
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no risk of quid pro quo corruption and do not give rise to the appearance
of corruption.'55
Next, the court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens
United I in rejecting the Secretary's justification-that the First Amend-
ment provides greater protection for the press-for the media exemp-
tions.156 The court concluded that the Secretary could not rely on the
First Amendment to differentiate between the news media and other
speakers.157 The Secretary argued that the public's ability to evaluate a
message's credibility served as the line distinguishing "single-shot
speakers" with misleading names from the exempted media that perform
press functions, which provides context for the electorate.s58 The court
relied on factors that correlate with the public's opportunity to evaluate
the speaker, such as an extended period of time and regular intervals of
publication, to determine what provides context for evaluating messag-
es. 159
The court held that the Colorado government lacked a sufficiently
important interest to justify imposing disclosure requirements on Citizens
United because its history of producing films allowed the public to eval-
uate its messages.1 60 In so holding, the court relied on the Secretary's
justification for the media exemption that the public's familiarity with
the media enables sufficient evaluation of its reports and opinions.i1i In
fact, the court stated that the electorate would more easily be able to
evaluate a Citizens United documentary than an editorial in a newspaper
or magazine that does not frequently address controversial political top-
ics.162 The court further recognized that the "presence of ... exemptions
can cast doubt on the validity and extent of the asserted governmental
interest because the exemptions may indicate that the statutory command
is not based on the asserted interest but on a qualified, more narrow in-
terest."'63 Lastly, the court held that Citizens United's advertisements for
Rocky Mountain Heist did not fall under the exemption because it could
not show it was being treated differently than the media in respect to
advertisements.'64 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's
ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction and remanded with in-
structions to issue an injunction.165
155. Id. (citing Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. at 356-57).
156. Id. at 212 (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. at 352).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 213.
159. Id. at 215.
160. Id at 210.
161. Id. at 213-15.
162. Id. at 215-16.
163. Id. at 216.
164. Id at 217-18.




Circuit Judge Gregory A. Phillips authored an opinion concurring in
the judgment regarding the requirement that Citizens United comply with
the Colorado disclosure laws for the advertisements for Rocky Mountain
Heist, but dissented from the reversal of the district court's ruling that
Citizens United did not qualify for exemption from all other disclosure
requirements.166 In disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that Citi-
zens United be afforded exemption from the disclosure requirements,
Judge Phillips opined that the court was rewriting Colorado law to in-
clude additional exemptions without the authority to do So.167 He rea-
soned that the governmental interest in ensuring the electors are able to
determine the source of political messages and helping them to make
informed choices was sufficient to uphold the disclosure requirements.16 8
Judge Phillips criticized the court's as-applied analysis and recalled
the district court's statements regarding Citizens United's arguments that
seemed to focus on equal protection.169 He then went on to debase Citi-
zens United's claims under a First Amendment-Equal Protection legal
theory and reasoned that the court, in allowing Citizens United to be
treated as a media entity, second-guessed the Colorado voters' need for
information regarding donors.'70
Additionally, Judge Phillips determined that Citizens United was
not being treated differently than the exempted media, who would also
have to comply with the disclosure requirements were they to produce a
film considered an electioneering communication.171 He noted that news
organizations do not normally raise funds for electioneering communica-
tions or seek donations from subscribers in support of specific messag-
es. 172 Lastly, Judge Phillips disagreed with the majority's remedy and
opined that the appropriate action would be to "either sever the tradition-
al media's exemption from disclosure or strike the entire disclosure
scheme." He reasoned that the majority had written in a third category
of entities for exemption and risked increased case-by-case litigation.1 74
III. ANALYSIS
Following the drastic shift in campaign finance jurisprudence
marked by Citizens United I, disclosure laws were turned to as campaign
finance reformists' saving grace and as opponents' new challenge to
166. Id. (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id at 220.
170. Id. at 221.
171. Id at 221-22.
172. Id. at 222.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 222-23.
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eviscerate.'75 Moreover, as corporate America embraced its newfound
ability to influence elections through unlimited political spending, loop-
holes to disclosure laws were increasingly discovered and exploited.17 6
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Citizens United II opened yet an-
other door to the avoidance of campaign finance disclosure, increasing
implications of the growing ineffectiveness of disclosure requirements
and posing a greater risk to defeat the purposes behind the laws.177 This
Part first recognizes that Citizens United I's real legacy has been the im-
portance of disclosure. Next, it considers the existing loopholes to cam-
paign finance disclosure laws and their expansion following Citizens
United I. Lastly, this Part explores the numerous implications of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Citizens Unitedll.
A. Disclosure Becomes the New Focus
Disclosure has long been a central theme in regulating campaign fi-
nance. Justice Brandeis captured the essence of the underlying princi-
ple of disclosure in stating, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."7 9 Indeed, this oft-
quoted aphorism reflects the philosophy that disclosure sheds light on
situations to facilitate informed decision-making, to act as a deterrent,
and to uncover unlawful activity.iso Embraced as the last hope in
175. See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 557 (2012) ("Everywhere you look, campaign finance
disclosure laws are under attack."); see also Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9
ELECTION L.J. 273, 297-98 (2010) (discussing "the power of the ever-more disclosure idea" sup-
ported by campaign finance reformists).
176. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 459-63 (discussing the narrowed disclosure re-
quirements applicable to organizations other than political committees following the FEC's 1980
independent expenditure rule and recognizing "[n]ow that following Citizens United corporations
and labor organizations were permitted to make independent expenditures, what had previously been
a flaw in the Commission's regulations ofvery limited applicability became a significant loophole").
177. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 222-23 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 670-71 (2011); Briffault, supra note
175, at 274-76; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 665-66 (2012);
Shepard, supra note 59, at 148.
178. See, e.g., Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 388 ("Mandated public disclosure of the
funds spent to influence elections has long been the 'essential cornerstone' of campaign finance laws
in the United States, and is widely recognized as 'fundamental to the political system."' (quoting
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 164
(4th ed. 1992))).
179. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1932); Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
180. Although Justice Brandeis was discussing the centralization of financial power within a
few banks and the need for financial services regulations, his quote became the origin for the Sun-
light Foundation, a nonprofit organization that advocates for open government, and the Government
in the Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b (2015)), which requires meetings of Government agencies to be open to the public. Addition-
ally, his statement became the rallying cry in support of campaign finance regulation. See Briffault,
supra note 175, at 273-74 ("Disclosure generally gets high marks from the public, academics, and
the courts. Opinion polls find very high levels of public support for campaign finance disclosure.
Among academics, both campaign finance reformers and campaign finance skeptics have endorsed
7712016]
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strengthening the campaign finance laws following the landmark deci-
sion of Citizens United I, disclosure fittingly moved center stage.isi In
his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama cautioned that the
lift on the corporate independent expenditure ban would "open the flood-
gates for special interests--including foreign corporations--to spend
without limit in our elections."l8 2 The House of Representatives respond-
ed by passing the DISCLOSE Act, which was typified by the President
as allowing "the American people [to] follow the money and see clearly
which special interests are funding political campaign activity and trying
to buy representation.,,183
At the same time, disclosure laws also became the new focus of op-
ponents.184 The Senate shot down the DISCLOSE Act with the help of
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell who fervently opposed the Act.185
The Chamber of Commerce strongly opposed the Obama Administra-
tion's consideration of imposing disclosure provisions on federal con-
tractors regarding political donationsl8 6 as threatening to subject Ameri-
can businesses to government harassment.'8 7 Pressure built on the FEC to
impose disclosure requirements on super PACS, 8 8 and the agency faced
disclosure." (footnote omitted)); see also Ellen L. Weintraub & Alex Tausanovitch, Reflections on
Campaign Finance and the 2012 Election, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 541, 550 (2013) ("Disclosure is
one of the pillars of the Federal Election Campaign Act. In passing both the original Act and the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, it appears that Congress wanted every electoral message to con-
tain an identifiable source who can be held accountable by the public for the content of that mes-
sage.").
181. See Ortiz, supra note 177, at 663-65 ("As the debate stands today, reformers defend
disclosure as one of the few means left to discipline money in politics and help police against cor-
ruption, while deregulationists attack it as undermining the democracy its supporters claim it pro-
tects.").
182. Press Release, President Barack Obama, United States of America, Remarks by the Presi-
dent in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
183. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, United States of America, Statement by the
President on the DISCLOSE Act (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-disclose-act.
184. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 388-89 ("Opponents of disclosure have recently
mounted numerous challenges to state and federal political disclosure laws . . . . [and] have increased
their public criticism of disclosure.").
185. See Floor Statement: Sen. Mitch McConnell on the DISCLOSE Act,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/politics/mcconnell-disclose-act-statement/ (last updated July 17,
2012, 8:54 PM); see also discussion supra Section IC.
186. Congress later "approved a provision in a spending bill that effectively killed the intent
behind the draft executive order. The language, which sets forth that campaign contribution disclo-
sure could not be required for companies bidding for federal contracts, has been reauthorized in
every appropriations bill since." Megan R. Wilson, Obama Urged to Impose Rules on Campaign
Spending Disclosure, THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/234437-obama-urged-to-impose-rules-on-campaign-spending-disclosure. Recent requests
for action would require disclosure only from companies that win federal contracts. Id.
187. See Coalition Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to President Obama (May 15,
2011), https://www.uschamber.com/letter/coalition-letter-president-obama-draft-executive-order; see
also Eric Lichtblau, Lobbyist Fires Warning Shot over Donation Disclosure Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/us/politics/27donate.html?partner-rss&emc=rss&_r-0.
188. See Robin Bravender, Dems: Crack Down on Super PACs, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:19
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/02/dem-senators-want-super-pac-crackdown-073136.
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attacks for gutting campaign finance law,189 but these views continued to
be strongly opposed.'90 Political groups filed multiple suits challenging
state campaign finance disclosure laws on constitutional grounds,'91 and
Target Corporation faced boycotts and protests after the public learned of
its donation to a political group that was considered to be anti-gay mar-
192riage.
Disclosure has also been in the spotlight of the campaign finance
policy debate.193 Some scholars have criticized disclosure laws for
chilling speech,19 4 posing a threat to privacy, 195 inadequately deterring
corruption or even exacerbating it,' 96 and ineffectively providing the pub-
lic with valuable information.'97 Others have argued that disclosure still
fulfills its intended purpose of providing voters with important infor-
mation, furthering the public interest,198 and solving the problem of quid
pro quo corruption.199 As evidenced by the ongoing debate, this focus on
disclosure is well-founded.
B. Expanding Loopholes to Disclosure
After the ban on corporate independent expenditures was invalidat-
ed, political spending skyrocketed particularly by "social welfare organi-
zations," which enjoy tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code and are not required to disclose donor infor-
mation. 200 Undisclosed spending by nonprofit groups topped $308 mil-
189. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The FEC is as Good as Dead: The New Republican Commis-
sioners are Gutting Campaign Finance Law, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andpolitics/jurisprudence/201 1/01/thefec_is_as good as dea
d.single.html.
190. See Luke Rosiak, Republicans Oppose Super PAC Disclosure, WASH. TIMES (June 20,
2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/20/republicans-oppose-super-pac-ad-
limits/.
191. See Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real-legacy-of-citizens-united-
case.html.
192. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contribu-
tions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696.
193. Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff 98
IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2013).
194. The chilling affects of compelled disclosure laws have been recognized to varying de-
grees. The concept that disclosure chills speech has become conventional wisdom. See id. at 1849.
195. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election
Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 873 (2011).
196. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 290-91; see also Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin F.
Aiken, Disclosure and Corruption, 14 ELECTION L.J. 148, 154 (2015).
197. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REv. 255, 275 (2010).
198. See Hasen, supra note 175, at 559.
199. See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 103-04 (20 10).
200. "To be tax-exempt as a social welfare organization described in Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) section 501(c)(4), an organization must not be organized for profit and must be operated
exclusively to promote social welfare." Social Welfare Organizations, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Social-Welfare-Organizations (last
updated Nov. 18, 2015). "The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect partici-
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lion in the 2012 election cycle compared to $69 million in the 2008 elec-
tion cycle.20 1 These figures do not even account for donations by these
organizations to super PACs, which spent a total of $609 million in the
2012 election cycle but only $62 million in 2010.202 Even more telling is
the marked decline in transparency of outside spending-of the roughly
$1.03 billion spent by outside groups in 2012, an estimated 40.8% of the
sources of funds expended were publicly disclosed that year, while just
six years prior, an estimated 92.9% of outside spending was fully dis-
closed.203 Because this type of spending by 501(c)(4) organizations is not
subject to disclosure, commentators have labeled it "dark money."204
1. Political Committees and Super PACs
Organizations formed solely for the purpose of influencing candi-
date elections and those created specifically to raise funds to make inde-
pendent expenditures for that purpose, or super PACs, are subject to dis-
closure requirements and must remain independent of candidates and
political parties.2 05  Although, political committees, including super
PACs, are not required to ensure the original sources of their contribu-
tions are disclosed.206 Consequently, an avenue for avoiding disclosure
by passing contributions through super PACs evolved. Organizations and
207
individuals could form shell corporations to pass contributions through
to super PACs while disguising the original source of the funds from the
public.208 Moreover, because the timing of filing requirements can be
pation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office. However, a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization may engage in some political activi-
ties, so long as that is not its primary activity." Id. For a discussion regarding the major purpose test,
see infra Section IIIB.
201. Compare 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt-V&disp=O&type=U
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016), with 2008 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&chrt=V&disp=0&type=U
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
202. Compare 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016), with 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
203. Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php?range=tot (las visited Jan. 23, 2016);
see also Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php?range=tothttp://www.opensecrets.org/ne
ws/reports/citizens united.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
204. See, e.g., Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 385.
205. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC (SpeechNow), 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (creating
the super PAC).
206. Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 461-62 (discussing the transparency flaws of the
FEC's disclosure rules).
207. Shell corporations are companies that lack significant assets or operations of their own
and, instead, serve as a vehicle for their owners to transact business through. See Richard Briffault,
Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 708-09 (2012).
208. See id (recounting several examples of the use of shell corporations to pass money
through to super PACs and avoid disclosure).
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manipulated by super PACs, donors could remain undisclosed until after
the corresponding election concluded.209
2. Social Welfare Organizations and the Major Purpose Test
Following Citizens United I, 501(c)(4) organizations became the
most attractive way for corporations to avoid disclosure of election con-
tributions.210 501(c)(4) status allows organizations formed for the pur-
pose of promoting social welfare to engage in substantial political activi-
ty while not being subject to disclosure requirements.211 Despite the In-
ternal Revenue Code's requirement that social welfare organizations
"operate[] exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,"2 12 the Treas-
ury Regulations do not prohibit such organizations from engaging in
political activity so long their "primary purpose" is not to influence can-
didate elections.2 13
Moreover, based on Buckley's narrowing of the term "political
committee," organizations whose major purpose does not involve influ-
214encing elections can avoid disclosure. Many practitioners argue that
the major purpose test, while not setting forth a particular numerical re-
quirement, is satisfied so long as an organization's political activity con-
stitutes less than 50% of its total expenditures.2 15 Because the major pur-
pose test has allowed organizations to engage in significant political ac-
tivity while avoiding disclosure, 501(c)(4) status has remained an ex-
216
ploited loophole in the campaign finance arena.
209. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463 ("For example, if a super PAC simply opted
for a monthly-as opposed to quarterly-reporting schedule, contributions to the super PAC made
leading up to the January 10, 2012 New Hampshire Republican Primary were not required to be
disclosed until the super PAC filed its January 31, 2012 disclosure report with the FEC.").
210. See Paul Blumenthal, 'Dark Money' in 2012 Election Tops $400 Million, 10 Candidates
Outspent by Groups with Undisclosed Donors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2012, 1:36 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-election-400-
million n 2065689.html.
211. "Due to the Court's narrowing of the term 'political committee' in Buckley to include
only those groups with the 'major purpose' of influencing elections, 501(c) groups could engage in
substantial political activity without risking triggering political committee status and its accompany-
ing disclosure requirements." Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463. Additionally, even though
501(c)(4) organizations must disclose the source of annual donations in the amount of $5,000 or
more to the IRS, the Agency is prohibited from making donor information public. Id. at 464 (citing
26 U.S.C. § 6033 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006)).
212. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (2016).
214. Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463.
215. Id. at 465; see also N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 678-79 (10th Cir.
2010) (applying the major purpose test to an organization involved in, among other activities, politi-
cal activity).
216. See Matea Gold, Groups Backed by Secret Donors Take the Lead in Shaping 2016 Elec-




3. Issue Advocacy and Earmarking
Even if an organization is subject to disclosure requirements, addi-
tional loopholes exist for avoiding such disclosure.2t 7 Although Citizens
United I relaxed the BCRA's definition of express advocacy or election-
eering communications regarding corporate spending, it found the defini-
tion applicable to disclosure essentially closing the decades old issue
advocacy loophole.2 18 Donors to political committees, however, can
avoid disclosure where the donor does not earmark its contribution for
independent expenditures or electioneering communications.2 19
For instance, in Citizens United I Secretary Scott Gessler discussed
his interpretation of Colorado's disclosure regulations.22 0 Any amount
spent toward producing an electioneering communication was not re-
quired to be disclosed.221 Further, donors would only need to be dis-
closed if their donation was earmarked specifically for an electioneering
222communication. Thus, "[i]f a donor permits the recipient to use the
donation for electioneering communications and other purposes, and the
entire donation could be used for the other purposes, the donor need not
be disclosed."22 3
While disclosures for independent expenditures are slightly more
rigid, donations must be disclosed only if directed to be used solely for
the purpose of attacking or supporting a Colorado candidate.224 Thus,
money donated to Citizens United for general use would not have to be
disclosed nor would a donation that was to be used at Citizens United's
discretion for films attacking or supporting candidates.225 Thus, the rules
regarding earmarking have allowed donors to relatively easily evade
disclosure.
217. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
218. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 700-03; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 129
(2003) (discussing the 1998 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Investigation), overruled by
Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The reports concluded "that the 'soft money loophole' had
led to a 'meltdown' of the campaign finance system that had been intended 'to keep corporate, union
and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process."' Briffault, supra note 207,
at 700 n.75 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-167, vol. 4, at 4611, 7515 (1998)). Additionally, courts have
upheld the applicability of disclosure requirements to "issue ads." See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Gessler,
71 F. Supp. 3d. 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) ("The Independence Institute seeks to change the dis-
tinction, to require an exception for 'pure issue advocacy' as compared to 'campaign related advoca-
cy.' Yet the plaintiff presents no authority that would require, let alone allow, this Court to find a
constitutionally-mandated exception for its advertisement on the grounds that it constitutes 'pure
issue advocacy."').
219. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
220. 773 F.3d 200, 204-05 (10th Cir. 2014).
221. Id. at 204.
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Id at 205.
225. Id
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4. Disclosure Exemptions
The Supreme Court first allowed for an exemption from campaign
finance disclosure in NAACP v. Alabama22 6 back in 1958. Later, relying
on NAACP, the Buckley Court held that an exemption would apply only
upon a showing that there was a reasonable probability that disclosure
would result in threats, harassment, or reprisals.227 This evidentiary
standard has remained high and difficult to satisfy, and although exemp-
tions from disclosure requirements have been sought over the years, they
have very rarely been granted.22 8
More recently press exemptions have afforded organizations, such
as Citizens United, another form of avoidance of disclosure regula-
tions.229 The Supreme Court considered whether a press exemption ap-
plied in MCFL based on its regular production of a newsletter and a spe-
cial edition that amounted to a campaign flyer.23 0 Because the special
edition was not comparable to any issue of the newsletter, the Court de-
clined to consider whether the newsletter qualified for press exemp-
* 231tion. Years later, the Court touched on the FEC's media exemption in
rejecting Austin's antidistortion argument232 recognizing that "[t]here is
no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corpo-
rations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those
which are not."233
Nonetheless, following the decision in Citizens United I, the FEC
issued an advisory opinion that granted Citizens United press exemption
for both its film and the advertisements promoting its film. 234 The media
226. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
227. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
228. See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200-02 (2010) (holding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals despite the argument that
"once on the Internet, the petition signers' names and addresses 'can be combined with publicly
available phone numbers and maps,' in what will effectively become a blueprint for harassment and
intimidation" (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 46, Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (No. 09-559))).
229. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
230. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1986).
231. Id.
232. In Citizens United I the Court explained the antidistortion rationale as follows:
To bypass Buckley and Bellotti, the Austin Court identified a new governmental interest
in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest. Austin found a compelling govern-
mental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have lit-
tle or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
Citizens United I, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (20 10)).
233. Id. at 352.
234. FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL 3184266, at *1-3 (June 11, 2010). Finding the
advertisements promoting the film were covered by the exemption, the FEC noted that "courts have
held that where the underlying product is covered by the press exemption, so are advertisements to
promote that underlying product." Id. at 6 (first citing FEC v. Phillips Pub., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1308,
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exemption became critically important to the court's decision in Citizens
United II.235 Considering the Secretary's broad interpretation of the ex-
emptions, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Citizens United qualified for
exemption based on its "extended history of producing substantial work,
comparable to magazines or TV special news reports," but the adver-
tisements promoting its films would still be subject to the disclosure re-
quirements.236 By following the FEC's lead, the Tenth Circuit expanded
the opportunity for organizations to avoid campaign finance disclosure
lessening the effectiveness of such disclosures. Consequently, the court's
decision further undermined the corresponding purposes of deterring
corruption and the appearance of corruption, discovering violations of
other campaign finance laws, and providing voters with vital infor-
mation.
C. The Implications of Citizens United v. Gessler
In Citizens United I, the Tenth Circuit leaned sharply against the
transparency movement and created an opportunity for endless organiza-
tions to bring as-applied challenges to disclosure laws, to qualify for ex-
emptions, and to eviscerate the line between the "press" and advocacy
groups seeking to influence elections.2 3 7 The court posed significant risks
to the effectiveness of campaign finance disclosure laws in four signifi-
cant ways: (1) by failing to consider the constitutionality of the media
exemption on its face; (2) by rejecting the Secretary's anticorruption
argument; (3) by concluding that the public would not further benefit
from the information that Citizens United's disclosures would provide;
and (4) by broadly interpreting the media exemption to cover Citizens
United.
1. The Refusal to Consider a Facial Challenge
Voters' distaste for the growing influence wealthy donors have on
politics and elections has become a central issue in the 2016 election
cycle.238 With spending "significantly outpacing recent election cycles in
contributions"23 9 and outside groups taking the lead, the 2016 presiden-
tial campaign will likely present all-time highs in terms of dollars ex-
pended. Based on the lack of action by the Internal Revenue Service
1313 (D.D.C. 1981); and then citing Reader's Digest Ass'n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210, 1215
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
235. 773 F.3d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 2014).
236. Id. at 206-07, 215-18.
237. See id; see also discussion infra Section C.3.
238. Matea Gold, Big Money in Politics Emerges as a Rising Issue in 2016 Campaign, WASH.
POST (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/big-money-in-politics-emerges-as-
a-rising-issue-in-2016-campaign/2015/04/19/c695cbb8-e5 Ic-Il e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html
(citing Daniel Weeks, executive director of the New Hampshire Rebellion, "a project to make money
in politics a major topic in the state's presidential primary").
239. See Editorial, Which Presidential Candidates Are Winning the Money Race, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/election-2016-campaign-money-
race.html?_r-0 (last updated Apr. 5, 2016).
[Vol. 93:3778
CITIZENS UNITED ROUND H
(IRS), the Department of the Treasury, and the FEC, proponents of cam-
paign finance reform have recently urged the Department of Justice to
get involved.24 0 As suggested by Circuit Judge Phillips, the court's as-
applied challenge was inappropriate in Citizens United II and risks future
case-by-case litigation where a considerably important and contentious
issue looms.241
According to the Coalition for Secular Government court, an as-
applied analysis-where a facial challenge can be and should be ad-
dressed-is offensive to the First Amendment itself.2 42 In so finding, the
court reasoned that failing to resolve the uncertainty precipitating the
litigation "chills robust discussion at the very core of our electoral pro-
cess."243 Based on this reasoning and recognizing the current landscape
of campaign finance disclosure, the Tenth Circuit has engendered further
uncertainty in place of providing critical guidance for political commit-
tees, their potential donors, and the public that relies on disclosure in-
formation in making crucial political decisions.
The Supreme Court, in Citizens United I, recognized the troubling
consequences of addressing an as-applied challenge in lieu of a facial
challenge in the context of campaign finance and First Amendment rights
where one speaker is potentially preferred over another.244 The Court
opined that drawing and redrawing constitutional lines on the basis of the
media used to distribute a particular speaker's political message would
necessarily compel continuous litigation and "create an inevitable, perva-
sive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech" in the interim.2 45 The
Court emphasized that under the First Amendment, courts must resolve
any doubts in favor of protecting speech rather than stifling it. 24 6
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Phillips concluded that the court should
have either struck down the disclosure scheme or severed the media ex-
240. See Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senate, Sen. Whitehouse Urges
DOJ to Take Action on Dark Money (July 15, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sen-whitehouse-urges-doj-to-take-action-on-dark-
money.
241. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 220 n.l (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I say that Citizens United hasn't made a traditional as-applied challenge because it admits
that the disclosure law would be valid against it if the law also applied against the exempted tradi-
tional media. By then arguing that the disclosure law becomes unconstitutional by treating traditional
media differently, Citizens United, in my view, veers to an equal protection challenge, not an as-
applied challenge under the First Amendment.").
242. Coal. for Secular Gov't v. Gessler, 71 F. Supp. 3d 176, 1178 (D. Colo. 2014).
243. Id.
244. See Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010) (declining to address Citizens United's
as-applied challenge to FECA's application to movies shown through video-on-demand and con-
cluding that "[s]ubstantial questions would arise if courts were to begin saying what means of speech
should be preferred or disfavored").
245. Id. at 326-27.
246. Id. at 327.
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emption.2 4 7 By instead providing Citizens United with an exemption
from campaign finance disclosure requirements, the Tenth Circuit creat-
ed a third category248 and drew a constitutional line based on the particu-
lar speaker's choice of media-those entities that the court determines
have "spoken sufficiently frequently and meaningfully . .. over an ex-
tended period of time."249 Moreover, the court left open what constitutes
speech that has been disseminated "sufficiently frequently" and "mean-
ingfully" and what period of time would qualify as "an extended period
of time."250 Rather than keeping with the legislature's determination of
what disclosure is needed to evaluate a speaker's message, the court has
251
weighed in on what should be left to the democratic process.
Because the court's as-applied approach has created such uncertain-
ty, absent filing suit on a case-by-case basis, no one will know who qual-
ifies for exemption from Colorado's campaign finance disclosure re-
252
quirements. Consequently, organizations are encouraged to challenge
the Secretary's determinations and the disclosure provisions' application,
donors may be reluctant to contribute, and voters will be left in the dark.
2. Deterring Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
Despite disclosure serving the governmental interest of deterring
corruption or the appearance of corruption for decades,253 the Citizens
United H court rejected the anticorruption rationale for reporting inde-
pendent expenditures.254 The court relied on Citizens United I's narrow-
247. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d 200, 222 (10th Cir. 2014) (Phillips, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson,
236 F.3d 174, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000)).
248. Id. ("But in my view, the majority takes a long stride toward lawmaking when it instead
takes a pen to Colorado's Constitution and statutes and writes in a nebulous third category of entities
that the Court believes have a First Amendment right o the same exemption because those entities
supposedly are sufficiently similar to traditional media.").
249. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
250. See id at 217 ("Finally, we cannot justify shirking our constitutional duty because of the
dissent's concerns about determining who qualifies for the media exemptions. To be sure, there
could be challenging questions about what entities are entitled to the same relief as Citizens United.
But those challenges are inherent in the exemptions expressed in Colorado law."). Accordingly, the
court should have addressed the disclosure scheme as a whole, in which case, Citizens United makes
an equal protection argument. See id. at 219-21 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). If the court were to find the disclosure exemption constitutional in this regard, the legislature
would be the proper avenue for emedying any statutory flaws.
251. See id at 222-23 ("1 would rather trust Colorado citizens to know when they need or do
not need disclosure to evaluate a speaker's message.").
252. Id.
253. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) ("[D]isclosure requirements
deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions to the
light of publicity."), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (2014)
(concluding that disclosure requirements may "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity" (quoting Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 67)).
254. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 211.
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ing of the anticorruption interest to direct contributions to candidates
excluding the rationale's applicability to independent expenditures.25 5 In
doing so, the court distinguished contributions and expenditures coordi-
nated with candidates-and those lacking such coordination-reasoning
that precisely because of the absence of prearrangement, independent
expenditures do not give rise to corruption.256 The court concluded that
this "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate."25 7 Thus, the need for
disclosure of such uncoordinated spending cannot be justified by an anti-
corruption rationale.25 8
On the contrary, the court's dismissal of the possibility of corrup-
tion through independent expenditures contradicts conventional wis-
dom 259 and current practices regarding "uncoordinated" independent
expenditures.260 With the rise of super PACs following Citizens United I
261
and SpeechNow, candidates flocked to assist with fundraising efforts,
and based on the relative ease with which independence from candidates
and political parties can be preserved under the FEC's regulations, it is
fairly simple for super PACs to keep their fundraising activities from
being deemed "coordinated."2 62
In fact, candidates are able to "endorse and solicit contributions for
groups that run ads benefitting their candidacy," and groups are permit-
ted to plan an ad's messaging with a candidate, as well as feature a can-
didate in an ad and target the candidate's electorate.2 63 Moreover, candi-
dates are free to attend super PAC hosted fundraisers and to use common
vendors including fundraising consultants.26 In addition, super PACs are
able to solicit contributions, potentially based off of a list of possible
donors provided by a candidate, from a candidate's friends and family
for amounts above the candidate's own ability.2 65
255. See id. at 211 (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 356-57 (2010)).
256. Id
257. Id. (emphasis omitted).
258. See id.
259. See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 196, at 149 ("The theory that disclosure combats corrup-
tion has become conventional wisdom.").
260. See Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with
Super PAC Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1484-87 (2015).
261. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). SpeechNow essentially created the super
PAC. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
262. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 460.
263. Id. at 461.
264. See Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 91,
96-97 (2013).
265. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE
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Super PACs are also not required to determine or ensure the original
source of funds received are disclosed.26 6 Thus, individuals and corpora-
tions have disguised contributions to super PACs by passing funds
through shell corporations.2 67 Additionally, social welfare organizations,
like Citizens United, are able to avoid disclosure completely and even to
make transfers to super PACs engaged solely in independent expendi-
tures all the while allowing donors to go undisclosed to the public. 26 8
With the continually evolving avenues for avoiding disclosure, coordi-
nated efforts between organizations and candidates, which at least give
rise to the appearance of corruption, fly under the public's radar.
Perhaps even more concerning, coordinated activities between can-
didates and super PACs are reflected through single-candidate super
PACs, which one commentator argues are the "alter egos for the official
campaign committees of the candidates whom they existed to serve."269
According to one report, more than half of the super PACs operating in
2012 existed solely for the advancement of specific individual candidates
or were closely allied with a national party accounting for nearly 75% of
super PAC spending that year.2 70 These groups frequently maintained
"close structural relationships with the candidates they backed" and were
often organized and directed by the particular candidate's former staff-
271ers.
For instance, several of Mitt Romney's former aides formed Restore
Our Future; two of Barack Obama's former White House aides set up
Priorities USA Action; and Newt Gingrich's former press secretary and
spokesman served as a senior advisor for Winning Our Future, the
founder of which also used to work for a group Gingrich previously
ran.272 Moreover, numerous single-candidate super PACs and candidate
committees have relied on common vendors including "pollsters, media
266. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12, 22 (2013).
267. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Short-Lived Firm 's $IM Donation to GOP Fnd Raises Concerns
over Transparency, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/short-
lived-firms-I m-donation-to-gop-fund-raises-concern-over-
transparency/2011/08/04/glQAvczrulstory.htrml.
268. See, e.g., Robert Maguire, Obama's Shadow Money Allies File First Report,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/01/obamas-shadow-
money-allie/ ("One donor alone gave more than 80 percent of Priorities' total revenue in 2011, or
$1.9 million of about $2.3 million. . . . Whether the donors were corporations, individuals, unions or
other nonprofits that also don't have to disclose their donors is impossible to know from the form.").
269. See Briffault, supra note 264, at 91.
270. TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN, SUPER CONNECTED: OUTSIDE GROUPS' DEVOTION TO
INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES DISPROVES THE SUPREME COURT'S KEY
ASSUMPTION IN CITIZENS UNITED THAT UNREGULATED OUTSIDE SPENDERS WOULD BE
'INDEPENDENT,' at 9-10 (2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/super-connected-march-2013-
update-candidate-super-pacs-not-independent-report.pdf
271. Briffault, supra note 264, at 90.
272. Id. at 90-91 (citing Outside Spending Summary 2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php? cmte=C00490045&cycle=2012 (last visited
Apr. 19, 2016)).
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,273
buyers, television ad producers, and fundraisers." Even more telling,
super PAC contributors frequently have interests that would be impacted
by those that they are advocating for or against and have been "actively
engaged in lobbying over a wide range of tax, regulatory, and other legis-
lative issues."274
Super PACs are virtually coordinating with candidates on every
level.2 75 With the intended purpose of influencing elections and the prev-
alence of single-candidate super PACs, the reasoning that independent
expenditures do not give rise to corruption27 6 because of the lack of coor-
dination can no longer stand. At minimum, the aftermath of Citizens
United I has resulted in the appearance of corruption, which the Tenth
Circuit failed to even consider as a governmental interest in the disclo-
277sure requirements.
3. Providing the Public with Valuable Information
By concluding that the Secretary failed to show "a substantial rela-
tion between a sufficiently important governmental interest and the dis-
closure requirements that follow from treating Rocky Mountain Heist as
an 'electioneering communication' . . . under Colorado's campaign
laws,"278 the Tenth Circuit undermined the importance of providing vot-
ers with information regarding who is speaking and who is funding that
27
speech. Consequently, the court has provided organizations additional
opportunities to avoid disclosure regarding their funding sources and
further diminished the effectiveness of campaign finance disclosure laws.
The Citizens United II court first recognized that disclosure can
"help citizens make informed choices in the political marketplace."280
Additionally, the court opined that the disclosure requirements were not
expansive, noting the many limitations and the information required to
be disclosed only consisted of those donors who specifically earmarked
their contributions to be used toward electioneering communications or
273. Id. (citing T.W. Farnam, Vendors Finesse Law Barring 'Coordination' by Campaigns,
Independent Groups, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/vendors-finesse-law-barring-coordination-by-campaigns-
independent-groups/2012/10/13/69dcb848-f6d9-1 lel-8398-0327ab83ab91 story.html).
274. Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1691 (2012).
275. See id at 1669-70, 1680-82, 1685-87 ("To be sure, these oversized contributions are
going to committees that are technically independent of the candidates, and are not allowed to coor-
dinate their activities with the candidates. But in practice a committee is part of the campaign of the
candidate it is aiding." (footnote omitted)); see also Briffault, supra note 264, at 89-92 ("In virtually
all respects, then, these single-candidate Super PACs were alter egos for the official campaign com-
mittees of the candidates whom they existed to serve."); Note, supra note 260, at 1484-87 (discuss-
ing the growth of super PACs and their increased fundraising collaboration with candidates).
276. See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
277. See Citizens United 1, 773 F.3d 200, 211 (10th Cir. 2014).
278. Id. at 203.
279. See SpeechNow, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
280. Citizens United!!, 773 F.3d at 210 (quoting Citizens United , 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010)).
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independent expenditures. 28 Nevertheless, the court accepted that the
public would be able to properly assess statements made by the media
based on its familiarity with such sources as justification for the media
282
exemption.
Yet, the court acknowledged that the public could no longer count
on traditional media outlets for providing transparent, balanced, or objec-
tive information with accountability.2 8 3 If the media does not provide the
public with information transparently or accountably, How does sup-
posed familiarity with a source because of its periodic speech negate any
need for further information regarding who is behind that speech? The
electorate is left with nothing but its familiarity to determine who might
be attempting to influence its vote in an upcoming election? The court's
reasoning does not follow from decades of jurisprudence relying on the
interest of providing the public with information in upholding disclosure
284regimes.
Furthermore, in light of Citizens United I, greater significance has
been attributed to disclosure in regulating campaign finance28 5 with the
informational benefit serving as its most important function and pur-
286
pose. The court, however, determined that the electorate would not
benefit from Citizens United being subject to the disclosure requirements
that were intended to apply to electioneering communications such as
Rocky Mountain Heist.287 Instead, the court relied on Citizens United's
history of producing politically driven films as providing the public with
"the requisite context for its messages" and information "that is at least
as accessible to the public as donor lists reported to the Secretary."28 8
Can the messages of Citizens United's films actually provide the public
with the same information as its donor lists would provide?289 The con-
tent of these two different forms of information cannot be compared as
equal. Furthermore, as Circuit Judge Phillips noted, Citizens United had
never before produced anything focusing on Colorado politics or draw-
ing particular attention to Colorado.290
281. Id.at2ll-12.
282. Id. at 213-15.
283. See id at 212.
284. Even the Citizens United I court easily found the governmental interest of providing the
public with information was sufficiently important to justify infringing on speech through compelled
disclosure. Citizens United!, 558 U.S. at 367-71.
285. See Hasen, supra note 175, at 559 (arguing that "disclosure laws remain one of the few
remaining constitutional levers to further the public interest through campaign finance law").
286. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 258-59.
287. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 221 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I do not believe this Court acts within its proper sphere by second-guessing Colorado voters
about the information they need to evaluate express advocacy such as made in Rocky Mountain
Heist.").
288. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
289. "If voters know who puts their money where their mouth is, they will be able to make
more intelligent estimates about the policy positions of candidates." Hasen, supra note 175, at 571.
290. Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 222 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
784 [Vol. 93:3
CITIZENS UNITED ROUND II
The court's conclusion that "[b]ecause Colorado has determined
that it does not have a sufficient informational interest to impose disclo-
sure burdens on media entities, it does not have a sufficient interest to
impose those requirements on Citizens United"291 cannot be reconciled
with the intent behind the campaign finance disclosure requirements
promulgated by the Colorado legislature and adopted by the state's citi-
zens.29 2 This irreconcilability reflects the implication that the purpose
behind the disclosure requirements has been degraded and the effective-
ness of providing the public with information diminished.
4. Interpreting the Media Exemption and Assessing its Validity
In validating corporations' limitless political spending ability in Cit-
izens United I, the Supreme Court remarked that media corporations, just
as other corporations, benefit from the corporate form in amassing im-
mense aggregations of wealth and express views that "have little or no
correlation to the public's support."293 The Court emphasized that there is
no legal support for distinguishing between corporations that re exempt
as media entities and those that are not and, again, "rejected the proposi-
tion that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond
that of other speakers."2 94 Thus, the Court suggested that the distinction
between media and non-media corporate speakers created by the exemp-
tion offends the Constitution and refused to consider whether Citizens
United qualified for such exemption.295
Yet, the Tenth Circuit considered just that in Citizens United l con-
cluding that the media exemption was applicable to the nonprofit organi-
296
zation. The court considered it reasonable for Colorado to provide a
media exemption on the grounds that the public has no informational
interest in disclosure by media entities because their history of reporting
and offering opinions affords the public adequate means to evaluate these
291. Id. at 216 (majority opinion).
292. See id. at 221 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Colorado voters
have determined at the ballot box that the identity of Citizens United's donors who earmark financial
contributions to produce or advertise a political film helps them evaluate the film's message.").
293. Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruledby Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
294. Id. at 352 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing First Nat'l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978))).
295. See id at 351-53. Although the Court discusses the media exemption to justify lifting the
ban on corporate independent expenditures, it also stressed the importance of disclosure laws and
reasoned that they "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," and "d[o] not prevent anyone
from speaking." Id. at 366 (alteration in original) (first quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64
(1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); then quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201(2003), over-
ruled by Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Accordingly, the application of disclosure regula-
tions to all speakers, including media corporations, would serve sufficiently important governmental
interests without imposing overly intrusive burdens. See id. at 366-67.
296. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 216.
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speakers.2 97 By accepting the Secretary's justification that the public
would be able to properly assess speech disseminated by the media based
on familiarity, the court essentially found that the exemption did not of-
fend the Constitution despite its earlier remarks that the First Amend-
ment does not provide greater protection based on the identity of the
speaker as part of the institutional press.298
Moreover, the court called into question the validity of the govern-
mental interest in the disclosure requirements "because the exemptions
may indicate that the statutory command is not based on the asserted
interest but on a qualified, more narrow interest."299 This doubt flies in
the face of the court's easy acceptance of the disclosures' importance in
"ensuring that Colorado's electors are able to discern who is attempting
to influence their votes."300 Then again, the court opined that the media
exemptions reflected Colorado's interest in disclosure based on the iden-
tity of the speaker.30 1 Indeed, the court essentially made an as-applied
determination based on equal protection grounds by considering whether
it would be unlawful to require Citizens United to disclose information
that the traditional media need not disclose.302
Recognizing the difficulty in determining whether various media
entities should be afforded exemption from disclosure, the court provided
little guidance regarding who will be covered by the media exemption
moving forward.303 The only relevant factor discussed by the court was
in regard to the frequency of which an entity disseminated information to
the public noting that "30-second sound bites" miss the mark.m Aside
from true "drop in" speakers, this interpretation of the media exemption
provides countless entities with a way out of disclosure. Can the public
really be expected to discern who is attempting to influence its vote
amongst the thousands of blogs, periodicals, cable broadcasters,
filmmakers, and radio talk shows that exist today? As the Supreme Court
recognized-"the line between the media and others who wish to com-
ment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred"305-this
line will soon be nothing more than a mirage.
297. See id. at 215-16.
298. See id at 212.
299. Id. at 216.
300. Id. at 210.
301. See id. at 217 ("Colorado's law, by adopting media exemptions, expresses an interest not
in disclosures relating to all electioneering communications and independent expenditures, but only
in disclosures by persons unlike the exempted media.").
302. Id. at 220 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("After hearing that
position, the district court remarked that '[i]t sounds like you're making an equal protection argu-
ment, and yet you keep telling us, no, we're not."' (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of
Record at 19:9-11, Citizens United v. Gessler, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 14-cv-
002266-RBJ), rev d, Citizens United II, 773 F.3d 200 (10th Cir. 2014))).
303. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
304. Id.
305. Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
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In the wake of Citizens United I, disclosure remains as the predomi-
nant source of campaign finance regulation and continues to provide a
less restrictive means of regulating speech than alternative measures.30 6
With little else left in the campaign finance arena, loosening disclosure
requirements poses the significant risk of completely eviscerating the
entire campaign finance landscape. By adopting a broad interpretation of
the media exemption,3 07 the Tenth Circuit has provided yet another ave-
nue for avoiding disclosure and posed such a risk to the campaign fi-
nance scheme.
IV. CLOSING LOOPHOLES, COMBATTING CORRUPTION, AND THE VALUE
OF INFORMATION
While Citizens United I set the stage for the current state of dimin-
ishing campaign finance laws, it also turned the spotlight on disclosure as
a constitutionally valid means to regulating the influence of money on
politics. 308 The Supreme Court reinforced the importance and legitimacy
of disclosure as an effective balance to a campaign finance system that
allows for unlimited corporate independent expenditures, recognizing
that with the assistance of technology, citizens have access to timely in-
formation necessary to hold elected officials accountable.309 As an essen-
tial tool to combat the potential effects of striking down the corporate
expenditure ban, the Court laid the framework for the structural change
to the campaign finance landscape: "The First Amendment protects po-
litical speech; and isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency ena-
bles the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages."3 10
Hence, disclosure is critical to the field of campaign finance in light
of Citizens United I. Finding the proper balance to ensure the effective-
ness of disclosure in combating corruption and providing the electorate
with important information while protecting First Amendment rights and
encouraging unfettered iscussion is the challenge that lies ahead. As one
commentator has suggested, "'[r]ightsizing' disclosure to enable voters
to understand the financial forces behind our election campaigns requires
that we both raise the monetary thresholds for disclosure and extend the
ambit of disclosure to include the donors paying for independent spend-
ing." 311 This Part addresses possible ways to mend the damage done to
campaign finance regulation by proposing reforms to the information
required to be disclosed, disclosure-triggering thresholds, and the stand-
306. Id. at 369 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986)).
307. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 213-16.
308. See Briffault, supra note 177, at 667-68.
309. See Citizens United I, 558 U.S. at 370-71.
310. Id. at 371.
311. Briffault, supra note 207, at 690-91.
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ards regarding social welfare organizations, super PACs, earmarking,
and media exemptions.
A. Full-Disclosure v. Anonymity
On opposite ends of the spectrum, two predominant models for
campaign finance disclosure have been proposed and have garnered sup-
port: full-disclosure and anonymity.3 12
1. Deregulate and Disclose
The call to "deregulate and disclose" has gained significant atten-
tion in recent years. 313 Even traditional opponents of campaign finance
regulation have endorsed disclosure as a substitute for more restrictive
regulation.3 14 One of the main criticisms of full disclosure, however, re-
gards its practical effectiveness.1 Critics have noted that voters' actual
reliance on information is overstated.3 16 With the mass amount of infor-
mation flooding citizens' daily lives, it is unlikely that most citizens uti-
lize websites dedicated to campaign finance disclosure.3 17 Instead, voters
rely on news outlets for information regarding elections, which rarely
focus on campaign finance aside from the volume of contributions as an
318indication of who is winning the race. Moreover, disclosure laws have
recently allowed the concealment of the "giant influence of financially
and politically powerful entities," while exposing small-scale citizen
participation in campaign finance effectively defeating the informational
purpose behind the laws.319 Implementing a comprehensive disclosure
system impounds these absurd results. Endless, detailed information
312. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 100.
313. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 286.
314. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663, 688 (1997).
315. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 101-02 ("First, there is substantial reason to question
whether the full disclosure model actually works as well in practice as it does in theory."); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 1705, 1727-28 (1999); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of
Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 24-29 (2003); Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REv. 893, 901-04 (1998).
316. See, e.g., Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 315, at 1717-18.
317. Raymond J. La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on
News Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 237 (2007).
318. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 288 ("Although today's enhanced disclosure has led to
marginally increased press coverage of campaign finance, press attention to campaign finance is still
very limited, and a good deal of the coverage that is provided tends to focus on the 'horse race'
aspect of campaign money-that is, what the volume of contributions and expenditures reveal about
the relative strengths of the candidates-rather than what the money says about the candidates'
backers or views."); see also McGeveran, supra note 195, at 863 ("In the past, disclosed data entered
general circulation only if conventional media outlets considered it especially newsworthy. Tradi-
tional news judgment involved choosing individual political actions of special relevance to highlight,
and surrounding this information with extensive context. This occurs rarely: even in jurisdictions
with strong campaign finance disclosure regimes, for example, newspapers publish very few stories
about political fund-raising." (footnote omitted)).
319. McGeveran, supra note 195, at 864 (arguing the "upside-down rules reached their absurd
climax" during the 2010 election cycle).
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about donors will become insurmountable-both minimizing the value of
information regarding influential donors and increasing privacy concerns
for small donors.
In particular, the detailed nature of full disclosure presents chal-
lenges that may be overly burdensome, which can, in turn, deter do-
nors.320 A full disclosure regime would mean more comprehensive and
detailed disclosure requirements, which would impose heavy burdens on
donors and would likely deter those wishing to make smaller donations
from doing so. 32 1 With the Internet and increased use of digital technolo-
gy, the landscape of disclosure laws has "qualitatively transformed."32 2
While the laws have remained the same, their effect has completely
changed-campaign finance data is easily accessible, searchable, sorta-
ble, and downloadable online-thus, anyone can quickly pull the contri-
bution information of their neighbors, friends, coworkers, and so on.3 23
Small donors are much more likely to be deterred to voice their political
beliefs through contributions knowing that their name, address, contribu-
tion amount, and oftentimes their employer will be disclosed online.32 4
Furthermore, the movement toward deregulating campaign finance
and requiring full disclosure relies too heavily on disclosure as a means
to prevent corruption. Although disclosure can deter corruption or the
325-
appearance of corruption, it does not-and will not-on its own ac-
complish this goal. For example, before unlimited soft money donations
were prohibited by Congress, which were subject to disclosure, political
party committees received an average of $375,000 in contributions from
some eight hundred individuals in the 2000 election cycle.326 Disclosure
did not deter these arguably corrupting donations.327 Rather, they in-
creased until they were prohibited by the BCRA.328 Likewise, wealthy
individuals continue to flood super PACs with large donations, which at
least give rise to the appearance of corruption despite being subject to
disclosure requirements.329
Standing alone, campaign finance disclosure laws cannot serve the
purpose of deterring corruption. Moreover, a full disclosure system de-
creases the value of disclosure by providing the public with an indiscern-
ible amount of information. Furthermore, it creates a chilling effect on
320. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 102-03.
321. See McGeveran, supra note 195, at 13-24 (discussing the privacy costs of disclosure).
322. Id. at I 1-12.
323. Id.; Briffault, supra note 175, at 290-91.
324. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 291.
325. See discussion supra Section 111.C.2.
326. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1182-83 (2002).
327. Briffault, supra note 175, at 286.
328. Id.
329. See discussion supra Section 111.C.2.
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speech of the majority of citizens who wish to or would typically make
small contributions in elections.
2. An Anonymous Donation System
The opposite approach to the full-disclosure model is to replace dis-
closure with a regime of anonymous donations or to establish a "secret
donation booth." To limit the influence of large donors, Professors Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres proposed the secret booth in their book Voting
with Dollars.330 This system is premised on the theory that politicians'
inability to verify the sources of political contributions would greatly
reduce the possibility for quid pro quo corruption, as complete anonymi-
ty makes it more difficult to sell access or influence.33 1 Similarly, some
scholars have asserted that full disclosure can exacerbate corruption ra-
ther than combat it because it provides candidates with potential donors'
detailed information and correspondingly provides donors with infor-
mation regarding who supports a particular candidate.332 This arguably
allows corrupt actors to identify those that may be more open to striking
a deal and facilitates their ability to assess each others' credibility
through voting and contribution records.333
The effectiveness of this model, however, would depend largely on
the operation and integrity of a blind trust, which could itself give rise to
corruption.3 34 Although Professors Ackerman and Ayres proposed many
precautions to address the risk of imperfect anonymity, such as "cooling-
off periods" allowing donors to revoke their donations within a specified
period of time and a "secrecy algorithm" preventing the blind trust to
which payments are made from crediting contributions all at once, per-
330. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). Voucher systems had previously been proposed, but
Ackerman & Ayres book drew attention as a paradigm shift to disclosure. See DAVID W. ADAMANY
& GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA
189-92, 201-04 (1975) (proposing voucher systems); see also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1208-11 (1994)
(citing Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM.
PROSPECT (Spring 1993), http://prospect.org/article/crediting-voters-new-beginning-campaign-
finance) (comparing his proposal to a previous voucher proposal by Ackerman); Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance
Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1996) (proposing a voucher plan).
331. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 330, at 6 ("The voting booth disrupts vote-buying
because candidates are uncertain how a citizen actually voted; anonymous donations disrupt influ-
ence peddling because candidates are uncertain whether givers actually gave what they say they
gave. Just as vote-buying plummeted with the secret ballot, campaign contributions would sink with
the secret donation booth.").
332. See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 196, at 153-56.
333. See id. (noting that while disclosure "can raise the expected cost of corruption by increas-
ing the likelihood of detection . . . it can also raise the expected benefit by making conspirators more
confident that their counterparts will follow through and, more generally, by resolving information
asymmetries in the market for favors" in arguing that disclosure has "crosscutting effects").
334. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 330, at 99.
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fect anonymity is simply not possible.335 Of course, no system will meet
the expectation of perfection, but the risk "that the anonymity system
would break down, resulting in the worst of all worlds-one which the
contributors were known to the recipients but not disclosed to the public"
poses far too great of a threat to the integrity of elections.
This model would also provide little insight regarding the effect of
wealth on politics337 and largely ignores the important purpose behind
disclosure laws, specifically the informational value they provide the
electorate. Adopting a campaign finance system based on anonymity
would result in a complete loss of information regarding contributions,
cutting off the voters' ability to "follow the money [to] see clearly which
special interests are funding political campaign activity,",338 which the
Supreme Court has consistently found to serve an important interest that
allows the electorate to evaluate candidates.3 39
B. A More Balanced Approach
Although the full-disclosure and anonymity models for reform pre-
sent valid arguments, to protect the First Amendment rights of political
speakers and to enable voters to make informed decisions through trans-
parency, a more balanced approach is necessary. To effectively address
the loopholes provided by current disclosure laws, including earmarking,
the major purpose test, coordination with super PACs, fund pooling, and
press exemptions, comprehensive reform efforts on both the federal and
state level need to take place. First, to provide voters with the most valu-
able information, large contributions should require more detailed disclo-
sure while disclosure regarding smaller donations should be focused on
aggregated data. Furthering this goal, disclosure triggering thresholds
should be raised, and guidelines surrounding social welfare organizations
require amendments. Lastly, earmarking provisions, coordination stand-
ards, and media status parameters should be redefined.
335. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Voting with Votes, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1971, 1985-94 (2003)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002), and recognizing the importance of a contributor's reputation in estab-
lishing trust with candidates, allowing a credibility assessment to accurately determine who is a
contributor to the candidate's campaign).
336. Id. at 1994 ("It is therefore especially disappointing that Ackerman and Ayres do so little
to explore the foundations of their proposals and that they rely on relatively wooden conceptions of
human conduct and motivation, thereby missing some of the most interesting questions raised by
their proposals.").
337. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 106.
338. Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 183.
339. See, e.g., Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
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1. Aggregate Data of Small Donor Information
Several scholars have recently proposed aggregate data as an alter-
native to individual donor information.34 0 For example, rather than focus-
ing on a contributor's name and address, aggregate statistics could be
compiled based on "more general characteristics, such as the donor's
occupation, income bracket, race, or geographic region."34 1 Additional
aggregate statistics regarding percentages of donations based on different
data sets, such as political party affiliation, could also provide voters
with helpful information in evaluating candidates.3 42 This type of infor-
mation avoids providing specific donor identifying information, which
prevents quid pro quo corruption, the risk of harassment or retaliation
and, thus, chilling speech.343 Moreover, the personal information of the
vast majority of contributors does not likely provide the vast majority of
voters with any real educational value because most contributors are rela-
tively unknown to the public. 3
Instead, providing voters with data sets aligns the information dis-
seminated with the candidate rather than the contributor, which will
prove more valuable in educating voters.345 For example, if a candidate
or political group is heavily supported by out of state contributors, or
large food corporations rather than local farmers, or employees of the
tobacco industry, voters can use these heuristic cues to assess the candi-
date or group's policy positions. Whereas, individual contributors' names
and addresses on their own provide voters with little to no insight.34 6
While some intermediary organizations filter, sort, and publish contribu-
tor information in data sets, they can easily selectively highlight certain
information to further a particular agenda or bias.347 At the same time,
"[a]ggregate disclosure can provide a rich and valuable source of politi-
cally relevant information . . . [including] information on patterns of po-
litical support that may prove insightful to both voters and policymakers
alike."348 To ensure accurate, unbiased, and consistent publication of
aggregated data, collection and dissemination should be handled by fed-
eral and state agencies through reporting reforms.
340. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 175, at 276 ("Campaign finance reports should be treated
more like Census data or income tax returns, with the focus for the most part not on the activities of
specific individual donors and more on the behavior of demographic or economic aggregates.").
341. Noveck, supra note 199, at 106.
342. See id at 107-08.
343. See id at 108-10.
344. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 265-66.
345. See id at 267.
346. See id
347. See id at 268-70; see also La Raja, supra note 317, at 248.
348. Noveck, supra note 199, at 108.
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2. Higher Thresholds, Original Source Disclosure, and Earmarking
In a similar vein, to provide the electorate with information useful
in determining candidates' and groups' policy positions and what special
interests are attempting to influence elections, disclosure triggering
thresholds should be raised.34 9 As the Tenth Circuit and Colorado courts
have suggested, there is little educational value in providing voters with
donor information regarding small donors and ballot-issue committees
expending relatively small amounts.3 50 Additionally, small contribution
amounts pose little potential of corruption but are more apt to expose
donors to retaliation, threats, and harassment.35' Significantly higher
thresholds will ensure that the most influential donors, which will pro-
vide the electorate with more important information, are captured.352
Donations at these higher levels would warrant more detailed disclosure
requirements, beyond aggregate reporting, as the majority of voters are
more likely to be familiar with wealthy individuals, celebrities, and issue
organizations contributing large amounts and, thus, more readily able to
utilize the information in their decision-making.5
Perhaps even more essential to effective disclosure, with campaign
funds increasingly being moved through independent committees, all
campaign spending by such committees should be traceable to the origi-
nal source.354 Those contributions above the threshold and utilized in
support of independent expenditures or electioneering communications
should be subject to disclosure. In addition, because these social welfare
organizations are being used as conduits for donations to super PACs,
requiring disclosure of these donations is equally important.355 Thus,
disclosing the original source for applicable spending above correspond-
ing thresholds should also be required. Because the IRS has failed to
349. Several scholars have called for higher thresholds and recognized that the identity of
contributors making small donations does not provide the electorate with sufficiently helpful infor-
mation. See id. at 107; see also Mayer, supra note 197, at 280-81; Briffault, supra note 207, at 690-
91; McGeveran, supra note 315, at 53-54; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Re-
form, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 327 (1998).
350. See, e.g., Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding the bur-
dens of compliance did not warrant the disclosure of small expenditures by a ballot-issue commit-
tee).
351. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 283; see also McGeveran, supra note 195, at 873-78.
352. Thresholds should be based on research and current spending norms and adjusted for
inflation on an annual basis. One commentator has suggested a donor who makes a donation of more
than $10,000 to an independent committee or more than a threshold fraction of the committee's
funds should be subject to disclosure requirements. Briffault, supra note 207, at 709.
353. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 265-66 ("[A] voter might be able to use the fact that, for
example, Jane Fonda or Rush Limbaugh contributed to a particular candidate's campaign or to an
organization that opposed a particular candidate to intuit correctly something about the relevant
candidate's qualifications for office or policy positions . . . .").
354. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 707-10 ("With limits on spending by and donations to
independent committees gone, disclosure of the individuals behind the independent committees
becomes more critical.").
355. Id. at 685-87.
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adopt amendments to the 501 (c)(4) guidelines,3 56 and the FEC is not like-
ly to amend current guidelines concerning the independence of super
PACs,357 these original source disclosures will work to combat pooling
efforts of wealthy individuals and to close the existing loopholes that
allow dark money to increasingly influence elections.
Lastly, earmarking standards should be applied in an opt-out fash-
ion rather than an opt-in fashion. Hence, rather than allowing donors to
avoid disclosure unless they specifically earmark their donations to be
used in support of electioneering communications or for independent
expenditures, any donations that do not opt out of such electoral activi-
ties would be subject to disclosure so long as they are above the corre-
sponding threshold.3" This distinction would make it more difficult to
avoid disclosure by funneling donations through social welfare organiza-
tions. In conjunction, raising threshold amounts, requiring social welfare
committees and super PACs to disclose original donors, and redefining
standards for earmarking will provide for more effective and comprehen-
sive disclosure of important campaign finance information and plug the
existing gaps in current election laws.
3. Interpreting Press Exemptions
Lastly, the FEC and the Tenth Circuit's broad application of the
media exemption to Citizens United35 9 is problematic and does not allow
for practical application of the exemption in future cases. In Citizens
United I, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]here is no precedent sup-
porting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are
deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not."360
Moreover, the Court recognized that "the advent of the Internet and the
decline of print and broadcast media" further blurred "the line between
the media and others who wish to comment on political and social is-
sues."36' With this line continuing to blur as social media and blogs rise
as outlets for political speech, the legal categorization of press entities
will continue to present challenges.
356. The IRS proposed amendments in 2013, which would have redefined the "exclusive"
versus "primarily" discrepancy, but after receiving a record amount of comments during the notice
and comment period, failed to adopt the proposal. See generally Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social
Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535-01 (proposed
Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
357. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 686 (discussing the independence of super PACs from
candidates as meaning "that they are barred from consulting with candidates concerning the specifics
of the decisions of which ads to air and what to say in those ads").
358. See id at 698 (suggesting issue committees set up non-electoral spending accounts, which
could not be used for electoral spending and would not be subject to disclosure, allowing donors to
opt out of disclosure).
359. See FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL 3184266 (June I1, 2010); see also Citi-
zens United II, 773 F.3d 200, 213-15 (10th Cir. 2014).
360. Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
361. Id.
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The reasoning applied in Citizens United 11 does not provide a
workable framework for evaluating whether an entity qualifies for the
exemption.36 2 Relying on the public's "ability to evaluate the credibility
of a particular message"363 to determine an entity's status forces courts to
second-guess the public's judgment on a case-by-case basis.36 Moreo-
ver, the press exemptions make little sense in light of current campaign
finance disclosure. As Circuit Judge Phillips noted in Citizens United II,
media organizations do not normally engage in electioneering communi-
cations or make independent expenditures and would be subject to the
same disclosure requirements in advertising such express advocacy piec-
es.365 Furthermore, should the Court find media exemptions to be uncon-
stitutional, as it suggested in Citizens United 1,366 they should be severed
from disclosure laws and media corporations should be treated the same
as non-media corporations.
CONCLUSION
Political speech is at the core of the First Amendment protections
reflecting our "profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."36 7
This constitutional guarantee is most applicable to political campaign
activity because the ability of the electorate to make informed decisions
is essential as "the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation."368
Based on the current landscape of campaign finance regulation, ef-
fective disclosure schemes on both the federal and state level are critical
to ensuring that the electorate has the information necessary to make
these important decisions. In the wake of Citizens United I and the Tenth
Circuit's recent decision in Citizens Unitedl, disclosure reform is of the
utmost importance as political spending, particularly dark money, con-
tinues to rise with another election on the horizon. In particular, in Citi-
zens United II the court improperly granted the organization media ex-
emption resulting in additional opportunities for entities to avoid cam-
paign finance disclosure. In consequence, the court's decision under-
mined the purposes behind disclosure regulations and has risked mini-
mizing the effects of such regulations.
362. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 214.
363. Id.
364. See id. at 221-23 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365. See id. at 222.
366. 558 U.S. at 351-54.
367. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
368. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Monitor Patri-
ot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-73 (1971).
2016] 95
DENVER LAW REVIEW
By raising thresholds and limiting disclosure in regard to small do-
nors to aggregated data, along with requiring social welfare organizations
and super PACs to disclose the original sources of their donations, and
redefining earmarking and media exemption standards, existing loop-
holes that allow increasing amounts of donations to go undisclosed can
be closed. Consequently, campaign finance disclosure laws would serve
their intended purpose of combatting corruption, detecting contribution
violations, and providing the public with important information in evalu-
ating political candidates.
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A CADILLAC, CHEVROLET, PICKUP TRUCK, OR
CONVERTIBLE: ENDREwF. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT RE-I AND A NOT-SO-INDIVIDUALIZED
EDUCATION UNDER THE "SOME EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT"
STANDARD
ABSTRACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act guar-
antees a child with disabilities a free appropriate education tailored to the
needs of that child through an individualized education plan. However,
as the Tenth Circuit's decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School
District RE-1 demonstrates, courts applying the "some educational bene-
fit" standard fail to properly evaluate the substantive adequacy of an In-
dividualized Education Plan in light of a child's unique needs, abilities,
and circumstances. To ensure that children with disabilities receive the
truly individualized education to which they are entitled, courts, state
legislatures, and Congress must implement measures that encourage
courts to recognize that education comes in all makes and models and
varies according to the particular needs of different children.
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INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (the
IDEIA) seeks to improve the education of children with disabilities with-
in public school systems.' The IDEIA requires states to provide a child
with disabilities with a free appropriate public education (FAPE), which
is tailored to the specific needs of the child through an Individualized
Education Program (IEP).2
Although the IDEIA puts forth detailed procedural requirements
that an IEP must adhere to, the statute delegates the responsibility for
establishing the content of an IEP to parents and educators.3 Consequent-
ly, the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Rowley put
forth the standard by which the substantive adequacy of an IEP is meas-
ured.5 A majority of federal circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, adhere
to Rowley's "some educational benefit" standard, which requires that an
IEP be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive [some] edu-
cational benefits."6 Under the some educational benefit standard, an IEP
is only required to "provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable
1. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012) (discussing the
purposes of IDEIA, including ensuring that children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate
public education," protecting children with disabilities, and assisting states and localities with
providing children with disabilities an education).
2. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-I (Endrew II), 798 F.3d 1329, 1332-33
(10th Cir. 2015) (noting that IDEIA makes federal education funding to states conditional "on the
states' provision of a [FAPE]" to children with disabilities and that "[IDEIA] ensures a FAPE for
each child . . . [through] the development and implementation of an [IEP]"); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (describing an IEP as a written statement hat is developed particularly "for each
child with a disability"); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A) (discussing how the IEP team, when developing
an IEP, considers "the strengths of the [individual] child" and "the academic, developmental, and
functional needs of the child").
3. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 ("[IDEIA] put in place detailed procedural require-
ments by which a child's IEP must be created and maintained. . . . [H]owever, Congress 'left the
content of th[e] programs entirely to local educators and parents."' (third alteration in original)
(quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008))).
4. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
5. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
6. Id. at 1333-34, 1338 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207); Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley
Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 W. EDUC. L. REP.
1, 1(2009).
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Chevrolet" and need not "provide a Cadillac."7 However, under Rowley,
even courts adhering to the some educational benefit standard must con-
sider the substantive adequacy of an IEP in light of a child's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances.8 Therefore, courts assessing the sub-
stantive adequacy of an IEP must not focus just on "Chevrolets" versus
"Cadillacs." Instead, given that every child with disabilities will require
different services to receive an educational benefit,9 courts must ask
whether the child needs the educational equivalent of a pickup truck, or a
minivan, or a convertible.
This Comment argues that, as the Tenth Circuit's decision in En-
drew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-] 10 demonstrates, courts
applying the some educational benefit standard often fail to properly
consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when as-
sessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP. First, while courts rely on
expert witness testimony to evaluate the substantive adequacy of IEPs,
parents are disadvantaged in terms of retaining expert witnesses.1 To
have better access to expert witness testimony concerning their child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, parents could request that a
school district perform an independent education evaluation (IEE) before
requesting reimbursement under the IDEIA. Ultimately, however, states
must shift the burden of proof to schools in IDEIA actions, or Congress
must amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
Second, courts often hold that an IEP is substantively adequate if it is
modeled after a past IEP under which a child made minimal progress
even if, considering the child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstanc-
es, the progress under the past IEP did not afford the child any educa-
tional benefit.12 Instead, courts applying the some educational benefit
standard must evaluate whether a child progressed under the tutelage of
the entire IEP in the classroom, rather than considering progress towards
one goal or objective in isolation. Third, by refusing to consider func-
tional behavior assessments (FBAs) and the substantive adequacy of
behavior intervention plans (BIPs), courts fail to assess all relevant ac-
tions taken by schools in response to a child's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances.13 To ensure that courts properly account for schools' re-
sponses to behavioral problems, the IDEIA must be amended to include
detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs and should
7. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that while the "Chevro-
let" education offered by the child's private school placement is most likely a better education, "the
[school] is not required to provide a Cadillac, and ... the proposed IEP is reasonably calculated to
provide educational benefits to [the child], and is therefore in compliance with the requirements of
the IDEA").
8. See infra Section I.E.
9. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
10. 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015).
I1. See infra Section III.A.i.
12. See infra Section III.B.i.
13. See infra Section IlI.C.i.
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require FBAs and BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior
impedes his learning or that of others.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the legislative and procedural
history of the IDEIA, describes its relevant provisions, and discusses the
Rowley decision and how courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have inter-
preted its requirement for evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP.
Part II details the factual background, procedural history, and the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Endrew. Part III describes how the Endrew decision
demonstrates how courts applying the some educational benefit standard
fail to properly consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circum-
stances when evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP. Part III spe-
cifically focuses on expert participation, past progress as an indicator of
the substantive adequacy of a disputed IEP, and the role of FBAs and
BIPs in evaluating the substantive adequacy of IEPs. Part III also pro-
poses measures that legislatures and courts could implement that would
promote consideration of a child's unique needs, abilities, and circum-
stances under the some educational benefit standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historic Treatment of Children with Disabilities in Public Schools and
Early Legislation
Historically, children with disabilities have been denied access to
public education because of their disabilities.14 For example, in 1970, a
significant number of state laws excluded children with mental disabili-
ties from schools, and only one in five children with disabilities were
educated in public schools.15 Children with disabilities were forced to
live in state institutions, which provided minimal basic needs, such as
food and clothing, but not education.16 The IDEIA's short title described
the educational challenges children with disabilities faced absent federal
legislation protecting their right to receive public education:
[T]he educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were
not being fully met because-
(A) the children did not receive appropriate educational services;
(B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school sys-
tem and from being educated with their peers;
14. Megan McGovern, Note, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA,
21 WIDENER L. REV. 117, 118 (2015).
15. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS
OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 3 (2010).
16. See id ("In 1967 ... state institutions were homes to almost 200,000 persons with signifi-
cant disabilities. Many of these restrictive settings provided only minimal food, clothing, and shelter.
Too often, persons with disabilities received care for basic needs rather than education and rehabili-
tation.").
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(C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having suc-
cessful educational experience; or
(D) a lack of adequate resources within the public school system
forced families to find services outside the public school system.'7
Congress's first response to fostering the education of children with
disabilities was in 1966, when it established a grant program under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act.' In 1970, the Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA) repealed the 1966 grant program but re-
placed it with a substantially similar program.19 The EHA provided states
with funds that were required to be used "for programs and projects (in-
cluding the acquisition of equipment and where necessary the construc-
tion of school facilities) which are designed to meet the special education
needs" of children with disabilities.20 However, the EHA did not offer
more specific guidelines on what the grant money should be used for,
and its primary purpose was limited to pushing the states to provide "ed-
ucational resources and to train personnel for educating" children with
disabilities. Consequently, the grant program did not significantly im-
prove the educational prospects of children with disabilities.2 2
B. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Improvement Act
Recognizing the inadequacy of its preliminary efforts to encourage
the education of children with disabilities, Congress passed the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).23 The
17. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 601(c), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(D)
(2012).
18. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750,
§ 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966) (repealed 1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80
(1982).
19. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970); Rowley, 458
U.S. at 180.
20. Education of the Handicapped Act § 105.
21. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180.
22. See id. Congress was "[d]issatisfied with the progress being made under these arlier
enactments . . . ." Id
23. McGovern, supra note 14, at 19. Rowley also notes that the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia's decision in Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972), and the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's decision in Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), have been
"identified as the most prominent of the cases contributing to Congress's enactment of [EAHCA]."
458 U.S. at 180 n.2. Both court cases addressed the inadequacy of the education of children with
disabilities in public schools under the existing regulatory scheme and recognized that children with
disabilities should receive access to an individualized public education that provides educational
benefit. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874 (holding that "the Board of Education has an obligation to
provide whatever specialized instruction that will benefit the child" and by failing to provide the
plaintiffs, who were children with disabilities, individualized educations, "the Board of Education
violates the [District of Columbia Code] and its own regulations"); see also Pa. Assn for Retarded
Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1266 (ordering Pennsylvania schools to provide all children with disabili-
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EAHCA was intended to address the systematic denial of children with
disabilities from the public school system and to provide these children
24with access to public education. In 1990, Congress reauthorized the
EAHCA under the new name: the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).25
In 2004, Congress reauthorized the IDEA again under another new
name: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(IDEIA). 2 6 Under the IDEIA, federal funding for education is condi-
tioned upon a state's provision of a FAPE to children with disabilities.2 7
The IDEIA ensures a FAPE for a child with disabilities through the de-
velopment and implementation of an IEP. An IEP tailors a FAPE to the
specific and unique needs of an individual child with disabilities.2 8 An
IEP contains, among other requirements, statements of the child's current
education level, specific goals, services that will be provided, and objec-
tive criteria for determining if the goals of the IEP are being met.2 9
Schools are required to provide each child with a disability with an IEP
ties between the ages of six and twenty-one access to a free education "and training appropriate to
his capacities").
24. Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Enough Is No Longer Good
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley Defi-
nition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 5, 11 (2012); see also McGovern,
supra note 14, at 119.
25. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1141,
1141-42 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012)). The IDEA was also reauthorized in
1997. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012)).
26. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012)).
27. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2015). The IDEIA defines a FAPE as the
following:
[S]pecial education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meets the standards of
the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)-(D).
28. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(l)-(VI).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(l)-(IV), (VI)(aa). Section 1414(d) states that an IEP must
contain the following items:
"[A] statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional per-
formance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(1).
"[A] statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional
goals . . . and a description of how the child's progress toward meeting [these] annual
goals . .. will be measured," including the frequency of periodic reports. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(ll)-{HIl).
-"[A] statement of the special education and related services . . . based on peer-reviewed
research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child . . . ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(I)(A)(i)(IV).
"[A] statement of any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to
measure the academic achievement and functional performance of the child on State and
districtwide assessments. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VI)(aa).
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that conforms to the IDEIA's requirements at the beginning of each
30school year.
C. Cases Challenging the Provision of a FAPE Under the IDEIA
Under the IDEIA, a school district does not have to pay for a child's
private school placement if the school district provided the child with a
FAPE.31 However, if the parents of a child with disabilities believe that
the school district has not provided the child with a FAPE because, for
example, a proposed IEP for a given school year is allegedly inadequate,
the parents could pull the child from public school, enroll the child in
private school, and request reimbursement from the school district for the
cost of private school enrollment.3 2 If the school district refuses to issue
reimbursement, the parents may request a due process hearing to review
the school district's denial of reimbursement in administrative court.3 3
For a court to find that the school district has provided a FAPE, the
school district and the proposed IEP must comply with the IDEIA's pro-
cedural requirements, and the IEP must be "substantively adequate."34
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer v. Weast,35 the child,
who is most often represented by her parents, that brings a challenge
under the IDEIA bears the burden of proving that the proposed IEP was
procedurally and substantively inadequate, and the child was denied a
FAPE.36 If the administrative law judge (ALJ) determines that the pro-
posed IEP is inadequate and the public school did not provide the child
with a FAPE, then the school district must reimburse the parents for the
cost of the child's private school enrollment.37 Under the IDEIA, prevail-
ing parents may recover attorneys' fees. However, pursuant to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Arlington Central School District Board of
30. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)-(ii).
32. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)) ("IDEA allows
parents who believe their children are not receiving a FAPE in state schools [the] option [to] . . . pull
their children from public school, [and] enroll them in private school . . . .").
33. See id. (discussing the proceedings and results at a three-day due process hearing); see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (stating that if the parents of a child with disabilities file a complaint
concerning the child's education, "the parents or the local educational agency involved in such
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing").
34. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1334 (describing the "two-step analysis" courts use to deter-
mine whether a FAPE as been provided, which asks "(1) whether the district complied with the
Act's procedural requirements, and (2) whether the IEP developed by those procedures is substan-
tively adequate such that it is 'reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational bene-
fits').
35. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
36. Id. at 62 (holding that "[t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an
IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief," and because the party seeking relief was the
disabled child represented by his parents, the child bore the burden of proof).
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (requiring schools to reimburse parents for the cost of
private school tuition "if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school] had not made a [FAPE]
available to the child").
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
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Education v. Murphy,39 parents are barred from recovering expert witness
fees.40 If the parents or school district appeal an AL's decision regarding
the provision of a FAPE, district courts and appellate courts use a "modi-
fied de novo standard of review."41 Reviewing courts must give "'due
weight' to the administrative proceedings" and the findings of fact from
such proceedings "are considered prima facie correct."42
When assessing the procedural and substantive sufficiency of an
IEP, courts consider how school districts address behavioral problems
related to a child's disability.4 3 Under the IDEIA, when a child's behav-
ior interferes with his ability to learn, the IEP team, which includes the
child's parents and special education teacher," must "consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to
address that behavior."4 5 The IDEIA makes reference to two proce-
dures-FBAs and BIPs-that schools could use to address behavioral
problems.46 An FBA is "a systematic process" that identifies the source
and purpose of problem behaviors through an examination of related
"environmental factors."4 7 An FBA is the foundation of a BIP, which is a
"plan of action for" addressing and eliminating behavioral problems, and
is "dictated by the particular needs of the student."48
However, the IDEIA only requires schools to "consider the use of'
FBAs and BIPs when a child's behavior interferes with his own learning
or that of others and does not require these measures to be implemented
in every instance in which a child exhibits behavioral problems.4 9 Rather,
39. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
40. Id. at 296-97, 300 (holding that under the IDEIA, "prevailing parents may not recover the
costs of experts or consultants" because while the IDEIA provides "clear notice" that prevailing
parents may recover "reasonable attorneys fees," the statute does not unambiguously state that
prevailing parents may recover expert witness fees).
41. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (citing Jefferson Cty.
Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2012)).
42. Id. (quoting Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d at 1232).
43. See id at 1336-38, 1342.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii) (2012) (noting that the IEP team is composed of, in
part, "the parents of a child with a disability," the child's special education teacher, and "a repre-
sentative of the local education agency").
45. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 (Endrew I), No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL
4548439, at *ll (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).
46. Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Interven-
tion Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 175, 175 (2011) (describing behavior
intervention plans (BIPs) and functional behavior assessments (FBAs) as "[a]n interrelated pair of
procedures that have come into favor in the field of special education for proactively addressing the
behavior problems of students with disabilities"); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) ("A child
with a disability who is removed from the child's current placement . .. shall ... receive, as appro-
priate, a functional behavioral assessment, behavioral intervention services and modifications, that
are designed to address the behavior violation so that it does not recur.").
47. Zirkel, supra note 46, at 175 ("An FBA is a systematic process of identifying the pur-
pose-and more specifically the function-of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting
environmental factors that have served the purpose of these behaviors.").
48. Id.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i) ("[I]n the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's
learning or that of others, (the IEP team must] consider the use of positive behavioral interventions
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FBAs and BIPs are only required when there has been "a disciplinary
change in placement of the student."50 Further, there are no requirements
regarding the contents of FBAs and BIPs, and there is no standard by
which courts assess the substantive adequacy of FBAs or BIPs.5 In Alex
R. v. Forrestville Valley Community Unit School District #221,52 the
Seventh Circuit refused to follow the lead of an Iowa hearing officer who
developed a test for assessing the appropriateness of a BIP.53 Neither
Congress nor the Department of Education had identified the "specific
components" of BIPs and, therefore, had not created substantive re-
quirements for FBAs or BIPs.54 Considering this, the Seventh Circuit
refused to create such requirements. Consequently, the court declined
to assess the substantive sufficiency of the BIP at issue because the BIP
"could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist."56
Other circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the Seventh
Circuit's holding that there is no substantive standard by which to meas-
ure the contents of FBAs and BIPs.57
When evaluating the procedural sufficiency of an IEP, courts look
to the IDEIA's specific and detailed procedural requirements that an IEP
and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior .... ); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d
1329, 1337 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[Nloting the operant verb [in the IDEIA] is 'to consider,' and not 'to
develop or implement."' (quoting Zirkel, supra note 46, at 186)).
50. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337 ("The statute only requires school districts (and even then,
only 'as appropriate') to conduct an FBA or to implement a behavioral plan if there is a disciplinary
change in placement of the student." (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii))). "A child with a disa-
bility who is removed from the child's current placement ... shall . .. receive, as appropriate, an
[FBA and) behavioral intervention services . . . that are designed to address the behavior violation so
that it does not recur." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii).
51. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337 (citing Susan C. Bon & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Does the
Failure to Conduct an FBA or Develop a BIP Result in a Denial of a FAPE Under the IDEA?, 307
W. EDUC. L. REP. 581, 581 (2014)) ("And even where an FBA or BIP is required, the IDEA does
not impose any substantive requirements as to what they must include."); see also Alex R. v. For-
restville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2004).
52. 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004).
53. See id at 613-14; see also Zirkel, supra note 46, at 203-04, 203 n.179 (noting that the
Alex R. decision rejected the test put forth by the Iowa hearing officer in Mason City Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 36 IDELR 150 (Iowa SEA Dec. 13, 2001)).
54. Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 (first alteration in original) (quoting Mason City, 36 IDELR at
199) ("[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with devising the implementing regulations for
the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any specific substantive requirements for the
behavioral intervention plan contemplated by § 1415(k)(1) or § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).").
55. Id. ("Although we may interpret a statute and its implementing regulations, we may not
create out of whole cloth substantive provisions for the [BIP] contemplated by [the IDEIA].").
56. Id. (holding that "as a matter of law" the BIP "was not substantively invalid under the
IDEA" because "the [BIP] could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist").
57. See Zirkel, supra note 46, at 203-04 (noting "the reaffirmation ofAlex R. in otherjurisdic-
tions's judicial rulings"); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1342 n.12 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Although
the parents take issue with the substance of the BIPs put in place by the District in prior years, nei-
ther the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prescribe substantive requirements for what should
be included in BIPs. '[T]he District's behavioral intervention plan could not have fallen short of
substantive criteria that do not exist . . . ."' (alterations in original) (quoting Alex R., 375 F.3d at
613)).
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must adhere to. 58 Whether a school district has procedurally violated the
IDEIA also informs a court's "determination of [the] substantive adequa-
cy" of an IEP.59 Compliance with the IDEIA's procedural requirements
will generally "assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the
way of substantive content in an IEP.
Even in the absence of a procedural violation, a child could still be
denied a FAPE if an IEP is substantively inadequate.6 1 However, unlike
the IDEIA's procedural requirements, because each IEP must be based
on the individual needs of the particular student,6 2 the IDEIA does not
contain detailed provisions concerning the substantive contents of a
FAPE.63 Instead, parents and educators are responsible for establishing
the substantive content of an IEP. 4 Nevertheless, federal courts have
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley as creating the
measure by which courts determine the substantive adequacy of an IEP.
D. Board of Education v. Rowley
In Rowley, the parents of Amy Rowley, a Deaf first-grade student,
sued the school district, claiming that the school's refusal to provide
Amy with a sign language interpreter, and its associated failure to incor-
porate the provision of an interpreter in Amy's IEP, resulted in denying
Amy a FAPE. 66 The district court agreed with Amy's parents, citing evi-
dence that Amy understood less of what was happening in the classroom
than she would if she was not Deaf.67 By working with an interpreter to
understand everything that was said in the classroom, Amy could have
reached her full potential. Considering this, and defining a FAPE as "an
58. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (noting that the IDEIA has "in place detailed procedural
requirements").
59. C.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the school's
procedural violation of "producing an inappropriately vague [BIP] without producing [an FBA]"
could not be "separated from" the school's "substantive inadequacy" of placing the child in a class-
room with an inappropriate student to teacher ratio); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (em-
phasizing "the importance of the" IDEIA's "procedural safeguards" and noting that "[w]hen the
elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in [the IDEIA] are contrasted with the
general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the [IDEIA] ... the im-
portance Congress attached to [the] procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid" (first, second, and
fifth alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982))).
60. C.F., 746 F.3d at 81 (quoting A.C. v. Bd ofEduc., 553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009)).
61. See Endrew 11, 798 F.3d at 1334.
62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1332-33 (noting that IDEIA "put in place detailed procedural
requirements by which a child's IEP must be created and maintained" but the IDEIA "does not
prescribe the substantive level of achievement required for an appropriate education").
64. Id. ("Congress 'left the content of [IEPs] entirely to local educators and parents."' (quot-
ing Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008))).
65. Id. at 1333 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)) ("[T]he substantive
adequacy of an IEP is determined by a standard articulated by the Supreme Court [in Rowley] .
66. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
67. Id.
68. Id. (discussing how Amy "understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she
could if she were not deaf and thus 'is not leaming as much, or performing as well academically, as
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opportunity [for the disabled student] to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children," the dis-
trict court held that the school district had denied Amy a FAPE.69
The Supreme Court70 reversed, holding that the school district had
not denied Amy a FAPE.71 Through the passage of EAHCA, which was
the statute in effect at the time of the Court's decision, Congress did not
intend to "maximize the potential" of children with disabilities.7 2 Rather,
the congressional intent behind EAHCA was to provide children with
disabilities access to a free public education.73 Therefore, a state com-
plies with its duty to provide a FAPE when it "provid[es] personalized
instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit
educationally from that instruction."74 Further, the education provided to
the child must "be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the
... child.""
Considering these principles, the Court held that the school district
76had complied with the substantive requirements of the EAHCA. Amy
was "advancing easily from grade to grade" and "perform[ed] better than
the average child in her class."n Further, the school provided Amy with
"personalized instruction and related services" that were calculated to
"meet her educational needs."7  Consequently, because the school district
had also complied with EAHCA's procedural requirements, the Court
held that Amy had been provided a FAPE.79
she would without her handicap"' (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. (Rowley I), 483 F. Supp. 528,
532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev d, 458 U.S. 176 (1982))).
69. Id at 185-86 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. at 534)
("[The] disparity between Amy's achievement and her potential led the [district] court to decide that
she was not receiving a [FAPE] . . . ."). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second District
affirmed the district court's holding. Id. at 186.
70. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hat is meant by
[EAHCA]'s requirement of a 'free appropriate education."' Id. at 186.
71. Id. at 209-10 (reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and holding that "Amy was
receiving personalized instruction and related services calculated ... to meet her educational
needs").
72. Id at 189-90 ("[Tlhe language of [EAHCA] contains no requirement... that States
maximize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children."').
73. Id. at 200 ("Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate [children with
disabilities], and to provide them with access to a free public education.").
74. Id at 203.
75. Id. at 200 ("Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a 'free appropri-
ate public education' is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient
to confer some educational benefit upon the . . . child.").
76. Id. at 209.
77. Id at 209-10 (quoting Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
78. Id. at 210.
79. See id. (holding that the "evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an 'adequate'
education," and the EAHCA does not "require[] the provision of a sign-language interpreter" (quot-
ing Rowley 1, 483 F. Supp. at 534)).
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E. The Some Educational Benefit Standard v. The Meaningful Benefit
Standard
The Rowley decision created a two-step analysis for determining
whether a school district has provided a child with a FAPE.so First,
courts must determine whether school districts have complied with the
IDEIA's procedural requirements.81 Second, courts must determine
"whether the IEP developed by those procedures is substantively ade-
quate."82
Rowley also created the standard that courts use to measure the sub-
stantive adequacy of an IEP . However, courts cite Rowley as creating
two different substantive standards: the "meaningful benefit" standard
and the "some educational benefit" standard.4 Some federal circuits ad-
here to the meaningful benefit standard, holding that, under Rowley, to be
substantively adequate, an IEP must confer a "meaningful educational
benefit."8 5 Circuits adhering to the meaningful benefit standard cite the
following language from Rowley in support of this heightened standard:
"By passing the [EAHCA], Congress sought primarily to make public
education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide
such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the States
any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to
make such access meaningful."86 However, a majority of federal circuits
adhere to the lower some educational benefit standard, holding that
under Rowley, an IEP must merely be "reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive [some] educational benefits."88 These circuits cite the
following language from Rowley in support of the some educational ben-
efit standard:
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free
appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to
which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational
80. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
84. See generally Wenkart, supra note 6.
85. Id. at I (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). Wenkart noted that "[tihe Third Circuit is the
only circuit that has utilized exclusively the 'meaningful educational benefit' standard," and four
circuits-the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth-have utilized both standards. Id. at 3, 17.
86. Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J.L. & EDUC.
25, 29-30 (2012) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).
87. See generally Wenkart, supra note 6 (noting that the Third Circuit exclusively adheres to
the meaningful educational benefit standard, four circuits have utilized both standards, and the
remaining seven circuits, the D.C., First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, have
exclusively utilized the some educational benefit standard).
88. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338-41 (10th Cir. 2015) (reconfirming the Tenth Circuit's
adherence to the some educational benefit standard, which "measure[s] . .. whether the IEP is rea-
sonably calculated to guarantee some educational benefit"); see also Wenkart, supra note 6, at 6-17
(discussing application of the some educational benefit standard in circuits that exclusively apply
that standard).
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benefit upon the handicapped child. . .. [T]he "basic floor of oppor-
tunity" provided by the Act consists of access to special-
ized instruction and related services which are individually designed
to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.89
The Tenth Circuit is among the majority of circuits that adhere to
the lower some educational benefit standard.90 For example, in Thomp-
son R2-J School District v. Luke P.,91 the Tenth Circuit noted that previ-
ous Tenth Circuit cases have held that a child's educational benefit "must
merely be 'more than de minimis."'92 Similarly, in Systema v. Academy
School District No. 20,93 the Tenth Circuit held that an IEP must be
"'reasonably calculated' to provide the child with 'educational bene-
fits"' 94 and emphasized that the child's education need not be "guaran-
teed to maximize the child's potential."9 5 The Tenth Circuit's decision in
Endrew F. affirmed the Circuit's adherence to the some educational ben-
efit standard.96
However, the Rowley Court did not attempt "to establish any one
test for determining" whether an IEP is substantively adequate.97 Rather,
89. Johnson, supra note 86, at 27-28 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201). Courts adhering to
the some educational benefit standard also point out that Congress did not change the definition of a
FAPE in the IDEA or IDEIA, suggesting Congress's intention to not explicitly raise the standard for
measuring the substantive adequacy of an IEP to the meaningful benefit standard with its reauthori-
zations of the EAHCA and IDEA. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339 (noting that it is "inconsequential
that Rowley had analyzed the statutory precursor to the IDEA because Congress has maintained the
same statutory definition of a FAPE from its initial inception ... and in each subsequent amendment
to the Act").
90. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339 ("This circuit ... has continued to adhere to the Rowley
Court's 'some educational benefit' definition of a FAPE.").
91. 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
92. Id. at 1149 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d
720, 727 (10th Cir. 1996)). In Thompson, the parents of a child with autism argued that the child was
denied a FAPE. Id. at 1145. The parents specifically took issue with the proposed IEP's failure "to
address adequately [the child's] inability to generalize functional behavior learned at school to the
home." Id. at 1150. While the ALJ and district court agreed with the parents that the child's IEP was
substantively inadequate, the Tenth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1145, 1148. The court noted that while a
child's self-sufficiency and generalization skills are important and consistent with the IDEIA's
goals, the some educational benefit standard does not "guarantee . . . self-sufficiency for all disabled
persons." Id at 1151. Further, the child was making some progress towards some of the goals and
objectives in his IEPs. Id. at 1153. Consequently, regardless of whether this progress could not "be
transferred outside of the school environment," the child did receive some educational benefit. Id. at
1154 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., No. 05-cv-2248-WDM-CBS, 2007 WL
1879981, at *8 (D. Colo. June 28, 2007), rev'd, 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, while
the Tenth Circuit "sympathize[d] with [the child's] family," the court ultimately held that the IEP
was substantively adequate, and the child was not denied a FAPE. Id. at 1154-55 (holding that "the
school district met its IDEA obligations in this case," given that the child was making "some educa-
tional progress," and his IEP was "generated in a manner that represented . .. [an] effort to continue
such progress").
93. 538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008).
94. Id. at 1313 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982)).
95. Id. (quoting Urban, 89 F.3d at 727).
96. Endrew Il, 798 F.3d 1329, 1339-41 (10th Cit. 2015) (noting that the ALJ and district
court were correct in applying the some educational benefit standard, since that is the standard that
the Tenth Circuit "continue[s] to adhere to").
97. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202.
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given that the abilities and needs of children with disabilities differ great-
ly, "determining the adequacy of educational benefits" provided to an
individual child must account for the circumstances of the child's partic-
ular situation.9 Consequently, the Rowley Court sought to confine its
analysis to the situation the Court was presented, which involved a child
that was receiving specialized instruction and, most notably, was "per-
forming above average in the regular classroom of a public school sys-
tem" and "advancing easily from grade to grade."99 This is consistent
with the IDEIA's requirement that an IEP be tailored to the specific and
unique needs of an individual child.10 0 However, the Endrew F. decision
demonstrates how courts applying the some educational benefit standard
fail to take into account a child with disabilities' unique needs, abilities,
and circumstances when assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP.
II. ENDREWF. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1
A. Facts
Endrew (Drew), a student in the Douglas County Public School
System, was diagnosed with autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder as a young child.'0 ' Drew's school provided him with special
education services and IEPs.'02 Drew struggled to communicate his needs
and emotions and to engage with others.'0 3 Drew also exhibited behavior
that interfered with his ability to learn,'0 and during his fourth-grade
year his behavioral problems worsened.0 5 Drew's behavioral problems
led his parents to conclude that he was not making any educational pro-
gress under the tutelage of the public school's special education teach-
ers.'1 Consequently, Drew's parents rejected the IEP that the school
98. Id.
99. Id. at 185, 202 ("[The EAHCA] requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum
of handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and pal-
sied. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramat-
ically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between. . . . We
do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits
conferred upon all children covered by [EAHCA]. Because in this case we are presented with a
handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who
is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system; we confine our
analysis to that situation."); see also Perry A. Zirkel et al., Creeping Judicialization in Special Edu-
cation Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 47 (2007)
("[T]he IDEA is peculiarly individualized in its orientation, thus running counter to the generalizing
goal of stare decisis . . . .").
100. See Endrew I, 798 F.3d at 1333.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).
104. Id. Drew's behaviors included using perseverative language, picking and scraping him-
self, having an intense fear of dogs and flies, "eloping, dropping to the ground, climbing, loud vocal-
izations ... and using a new or public bathroom." Id.
105. Id. at *2. During his fourth-grade year, Drew often ran out of the classroom and school
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district proposed for his fifth-grade year and enrolled him in a private
school for children with autism. 107
B. Procedural History
Drew's parents, contending that the school district failed to provide
Drew with a FAPE, requested that the school district reimburse them for
the private school's "tuition and related expenses."08 When the school
district refused, Drew's parents exercised their right to a due process
hearing reviewing the school district's denial of reimbursement in ad-
ministrative court.109 However, an ALJ, applying the some educational
benefit standard, found that the school district had provided Drew with a
FAPE and denied the parents' request for reimbursement.n"0
1. District Court Opinion
Drew's parents sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision in fed-
eral court.'' The district court affirmed the AL's conclusion"2 and
found that, while Drew's IEPs did not demonstrate "immense education-
al growth," they did show that he was making "minimal progress."' 1
The court cited the rule that, under the some educational benefit stand-
ard,
[a]lthough the controlling question is whether, going forward, the
IEP proposed by the District was reasonably calculated to confer
some educational benefit, past progress on the IEP goals "strongly
suggests" that when a proposed JEP is modeled on prior IEPs that
had succeeded in generating some progress, the proposed IEP "was
reasonably calculated to continue that trend."' 14
After reviewing the testimony of experts at the administrative pro-
ceedings"'5 and thoroughly examining Drew's past IEPs,16 the district
107. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333.
108. Id.
109. Id. (discussing the proceedings and results at a three day due process hearing); see also 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that if the parents of a child with disabilities file a complaint
concerning the child's education, "the parents or the local educational agency involved in such
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing").
110. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333, 1338.
Ill. Id. at 1333; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing that a party aggrieved by the
ALJ's conclusion has the right to bring a civil action for review of that conclusion in a district court
of the United States).
112. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1333.
113. Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).
114. Id. at *6 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir.
2008)).
115. Id. at *8. Drew's parents' retained expert had conducted a neuropsychological evaluation
of Drew after he enrolled in the private school. Id. The expert testified that after a review of Drew's
school records, she could not find any "measurable progress." Id. Further, Drew's IEPs' goals were
"vague ... hard to measure, and the progress reports lacked quantifiable data." Id. The school dis-
trict retained two experts, both from within the school system. Id. Drew's special education teacher
explained that although the IEP goals were similar from year to year, the "objectives were changed
to accommodate [Drew's] progress." Id. The school district's Director of Special Education testified
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court found that, while some of the objectives in the IEPs stayed the
same from year to year and others were "only slightly modified, . . . the
expectation in the objectives increased over time."''7 For example,
Drew's fourth-grade IEP contained the following math objectives:
1) given a variety of coins and dollars, he will accurately count mon-
ey up to $5.00 and then hand over the correct amount counted;
2) when identifying an object he wishes to purchase, he will be able
to answer the question "is that enough?";
3) he will understand time related vocabulary and concepts as it re-
lates to the calendar;
4) given an analog clock, he will be able to tell the correct time;
5) given a word problem, he will be able to identify which operation
(addition, subtraction, multiplication or division) to use to solve the
problem;
6) he will learn his multiplication facts 6-10; and
7) he will learn his division facts 0-5.118
The proposed fifth-grade IEP that was rejected by Drew's parents
contained the following math objectives:
1) given a variety of coins and dollars, he will accurately count mon-
ey up to $5.00 and then hand over the correct amount counted;
2) when identifying an object he wishes to purchase, he will be able
to answer the question "is that enough money?";
3) given a word problem, he will be able to identify which operation
(addition, subtraction, multiplication or division) to use to solve the
problem;
4) he will learn his multiplication facts 6-12; and
5) he will learn his division facts 0-5.19
While Drew did not make progress on every goal or objective in the
IEPs, he made progress towards some goals and objectives.120 Therefore,
that ideally, the IEPs would have contained more "entries" and more detailed progress reporting. Id.
The Director also testified that "the goals and objectives" in the IEP rejected by Drew's parents
"contained only 'some slight' changes" from Drew's last IEP. Id However, considering the IEPs as
a whole, "the progress reporting . . . met the required standard." Id.
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the fifth-grade IEP that was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP under
which Drew made some progress "was reasonably calculated to continue
that trend" of progress.121
Next, the court rejected Drew's parents' argument that the IEP did
not sufficiently address Drew's behavioral problems because the school
district did not conduct an FBA nor did it "implement an adequate
,,122BIP. Drew's parents did not dispute the fact that, under the IDEIA,
the school district was not required to conduct an FBA or develop a
BIP.123 However, Drew's parents felt that the school district's failure to
properly implement these measures worsened Drew's behavioral prob-
lems and prevented him from making any progress on the goals identi-
fied in the IEP.124 The court disagreed, holding that, although the school
district was unable to "manage [Drew's] escalating behavioral issues at
the time" that he was enrolled in the private school, the district was
working to address those issues.12 5
The district court ultimately held that Drew's parents failed to meet
their burden to prove that the school district violated the IDEIA by fail-
ing to provide Drew with a FAPE.12 6 Consequently, Drew's parents were
not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of Drew's private school tui-
-127tion.
I disagree with [Drew's] parents' argument that the modifications were insufficient to
show any meaningful progress. Rather, I agree with the ALJ that Petitioner made pro-
gress towards his academic and functional goals in his IEPs and although this does not
mean that he achieved every objective, or that he made progress on every goal, the evi-
dence shows that he received educational benefit while enrolled in the District. As such,
Petitioner's parents have failed to show that the District's IEPs-both past and proposed
for the future-were not reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational
benefit.
Id.
121. Id. (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)).
122. Id. at *11.
123. Id. at * 12 ("Whether or not the District failed to conduct a functional behavioral assess-
ment or implement a BIP in this case, at any particular or specific time, is mainly irrelevant to this
decision as [Drew] does not dispute that the IDEA does not require such assessment or plan.").
124. Id. at * 11. Although Drew's second-grade and fourth-grade IEPs contained BIPs, Drew's
parents alleged that the BlPs were inadequate. Id.
125. Id. at * 12. The court supported its holding through evidence that the school district "was
in the process of reassessing [Drew's] BIP" when Drew was withdrawn from public school. Id. For
example, the court cited testimony from the school district's expert, Drew's special education teach-
er. Id. The teacher testified that "[Drew]'s behavioral issues interfered with his ability to learn," and
"her interventions with [Drew]'s escalating disruptive behaviors were not effective." Id. at *IL.
However, Drew's teacher was working to address Drew's behavioral problems, including identifying
problem behaviors and their triggers and scheduling an autism specialist to come in and work with
the IEP team. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (first citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012); then citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c)
(2016)).
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit's unanimous opinion began by discussing the
IDEIA's procedural requirements. 28 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding that the school district's failure to conduct an FBA
did not result in "a substantive denial of a FAPE" and that the BIP suffi-
ciently addressed Drew's behavioral issues.129 "As a matter of proce-
dure," given that Drew was not subject to a disciplinary change in
placement, the school district was required to merely "consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports."'3 0 The school district
was under no affirmative statutory duty to conduct an FBA or to develop
BIPs, and the record contained examples of the school district's "consid-
eration of Drew's behavioral issues."'31 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
found "no procedural defect that amounted to denial of a FAPE."l 32
The Tenth Circuit then addressed Drew's parents' argument that the
IEP proposed by the school district was "substantively inadequate."33
The panel began by rejecting Drew's parents' argument that he Tenth
Circuit had done away with the some educational benefit standard and
instead adopted the meaningful educational benefit standard.134 The
Tenth Circuit stated that language from the Rowley decision indicated
that the appropriate standard is the some educational benefit standard.35
128. Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the court found "no proce-
dural defect that amounted to a denial of a FAPE"). In addition to addressing the school district's
failure to conduct an FBA and Drew's BIPs in the context of the IDEIA's procedural requirements,
the Tenth Circuit also found that the school district's progress reporting deficiencies did not amount
to a "denial of a FAPE." Id. at 1335-36. The Tenth Circuit did stress the importance of "diligent
progress reporting on IEPs" and noted "that the progress reporting ... could have been more ro-
bust." Id. However, considering the ALJ's finding that the reporting deficiencies "did not have an
adverse impact on the IEP team's ability to craft and implement Drew's IEPs," the minimal and
vague progress reporting did not result in denial of a FAPE. Id. (citing Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1273-75 (S.D. Ala. 2005)).
129. Id. at 1336. This holding was in response to Drew's parents' "argument .. . that the Dis-
trict's handling of Drew's behavioral needs amounted to a substantive denial of a FAPE." Id "Spe-
cifically, [Drew's parents] criticize[d] (I) the District's failure to conduct a functional behavior
assessment (FBA) before implementing a behavior plan for Drew, and (2) even absent the FBA, the
District's failure to put in place an appropriate behavioral intervention plan (BIP) to address Drew's
increasing behavioral issues." Id.
130. Id. at 1337 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)).
131. Id. at 1338 (citing R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 813 (5th Cir.
2012)) ("Finding the school district complied with federal law where the district considered behav-




134. Id. Drew's parents' specific argument was that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's
decision in Jefferson County School District R-1 v. Elizabeth E., 702 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir.
2012), adopted the meaningful educational benefit standard. Id. The only analysis specific to that
case that Judge Tymkovich considered in making his determination that the Tenth Circuit continues
to abide by the some educational benefit standard was that the Elizabeth E. court mentioned the
meaningful educational benefit standard simply to outline the different approaches taken by other
circuits, not to adopt the heightened standard. Id.
135. Id. Judge Tymkovich stated that the Supreme Court in Rowley "determined that Con-
gress's aim had been to set a 'basic floor of opportunity' for children with disabilities by 'providing
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Further, the Tenth Circuit, citing Rowley, previously held that Congress's
intent behind the IDEIA's precursor was "to set a 'basic floor of oppor-
tunity"' by providing children with disabilities "some educational bene-
fit."l 3 6 The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the some educational benefit
standard "to mean that 'the educational benefit mandated by [the IDEIA]
must merely be more than de minimis."" 37 The Tenth Circuit was bound
by these standards set forth by previous Tenth Circuit decisions, "absent
en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Su-
preme Court." 38
Applying the some educational benefit standard,13 9 the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the ALJ and the district court that the proposed IEP was
"reasonably calculated to enable Drew to receive educational bene-
fits."l 40 First, the panel found that Drew had made sufficient progress
under past IEPs that were materially similar to the disputed IEP to render
the disputed IEP "substantively adequate."l4' For example, "the objec-
tives and measuring criteria" included in Drew's annual goals became
increasingly difficult each year he was in school.142 Despite the fact that
Drew was not reaching his full potential at the public school and was
"thriving" at his private school, Drew was making some academic pro-
gress, which is all that the some educational benefit standard requires of
a public school.143 Further, the ALJ found that Drew was making pro-
individualized services sufficient to provide every eligible child with "some educational benefit."'
Id. (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008)). "Con-
gress did not 'guarantee educational services sufficient to maximize each child's potential."' Id.
(quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149).
136. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotations omit-
ted)); see also Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (10th Cir. 1996).
137. Id at 1338-39 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149),
138. Id. at 1340 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th
Cir. 2000)). The court also discussed how it was "inconsequential that Rowley had analyzed
[EAHCA] because Congress has maintained the same statutory definition of a FAPE from its initial
inception . . . and in each subsequent amendment o the Act." Id. at 1339 (citing Thompson, 540 F.3d
at 1149 n.5). Further, post-Rowley Supreme Court decisions favorably cited the Rowley Court's
definition of a FAPE. Id (citing Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1149 n.5). Finally, although Judge Tym-
kovich acknowledged that other circuits have relied on different language in Rowley to adopt the
apparently heightened standard of requiring "meaningful educational benefit," commentators suggest
that the difference between the two standards is imprecise and negligible. See id. at 1339 n.8 (citing
Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008)). "[H]ow much more
benefit a student must receive" for the benefit to be meaningful rather than just "some" benefit is
unclear. Id. Therefore, although the meaningful benefit standard purports to be a heightened stand-
ard, the difference between it and the "some benefit" standard is unclear. Id. Further, despite the fact
that there is a split among the different circuits concerning the applicable standard, "which circuit
falls on which side varies depending on which commentator you read." Id.
139. Id. at 1341. Judge Tymkovich also offered clarification of the standard, noting that under
the some educational benefit standard, "the measure is whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to
guarantee some educational benefit, not whether it will do so." Id.
140. Id. at 1343.
141. Id. at 1342.
142. Id. at 1341.
143. Id. at 1342 ("The Act does not require that States do whatever is necessary to ensure that
all students achieve a particular standardized level of ability and knowledge. Rather, it much more
modestly calls for the creation of individualized programs reasonably calculated to enable the stu-
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gress towards the goals on his IEPs, and the ALJ's "finding of progress"
was a "factual finding" that the court "owed a presumption of correct-
ness.""14
Second, the Tenth Circuit found that the school district and the ALJ
adequately addressed Drew's behavioral issues.14 5 However, citing Alex
R., the panel declined to assess the "substance of the BIPs" developed for
Drew throughout his education, as there is no "substantive requirements
for what should be included in BIPs."l 4 6 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
focused on how the school district addressed Drew's behavioral prob-
lems outside of the provisions included in his BIPs.147 The panel cited the
ALJ's finding that the school district collaborated "with [Drew's] parents
and other service providers to address [his] behaviors as they arose." 4 8
For example, when Drew's behavioral issues began to detrimentally af-
fect his prospects of advancing to the fifth-grade, the school district
brought in a specialist to evaluate Drew's existing BIP.149
Consequently, because Drew made some academic progress and the
school district worked to address his behavioral problems, Drew's par-
ents did not meet their burden of proving that the IEP was not reasonably
calculated to enable Drew to receive educational benefits.150
Given that the school district and the proposed IEP met the IDEIA's
procedural requirements and that the IEP was substantively adequate, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Drew was not
denied a FAPE.' 5' Considering this, the school district was not required
to reimburse Drew's parents for his private school tuition.152
III. ANALYSIS
By seeking to confine its holding to the facts presented by Amy
Rowley's education, and stressing the wide array of disabilities students
dent to make some progress towards the goals within that program." (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at
1155)).
144. Id. at 1341.
145. See id. at 1342-43.
146. Id. at 1342 n.12 (citing Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375
F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004)) ("Although the parents take issue with the substance of the BIPs put
in place by the District in prior years, neither the IDEA nor its implementing regulations prescribe
substantive requirements for what should be included in BIPs.").
147. See id. at 1342, 1342 n.12 (declining to assess the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs
and instead evaluating how the school district "work[ed] to address" Drew's behavior problems
outside of the contents of the BIPs).
148. Id. at 1342 (second alteration in original) (quoting Record on Appeal at 13, Vol. 1, Endrew
I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *ll (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1342-43.
151. See id. ("For the foregoing reasons, we find the District provided Drew a free appropriate
public education.").
152. Id. at 1343 ("Because the IDEA provides that reimbursement is due only where the school
district has not made a FAPE available to the child, we find the parents are not entitled to the com-
pensation they seek.").
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may have, the Rowley decision made it clear that an evaluation of the
substantive adequacy of an IEP should take into account a child's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances.15 3 This suggests that, even under the
some educational benefit standard, courts must determine whether the
IEP was reasonably calculated to benefit the child, given the child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.154 However, despite the Tenth
Circuit's purported reliance on Rowley,155 its evaluation of the substan-
tive adequacy of the proposed IEP failed to properly consider Drew's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances. The Tenth Circuit's failure is
indicative of how courts-especially those utilizing the some educational
benefit standard-handle cases in which parents have challenged a
school district's provision of a FAPE.1 56
There are three notable ways in which the Tenth Circuit and the dis-
trict court failed to take into account Drew's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances in its assessment of the substantive adequacy of the fifth-
grade IEP. First, Drew's parents were disadvantaged in terms of retaining
important expert witnesses.'5 7 Second, the Tenth Circuit based its deci-
sion in part on the finding that Drew made minimal progress towards
some goals in his IEP'58 despite that, considering Drew's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances, his progress really afforded him no benefit.
Third, by refusing to consider the school district's failure to conduct an
FBAl 59 and assess the substantive adequacy of the BIPs,160 the Tenth
Circuit failed to assess all relevant actions taken or not taken by the
153. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 87-88, 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing the educational benefit
standard and suggesting adherence to the principles set forth in Rowley).
155. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1339-40 (applying the some educational benefit standard
because it is the standard adopted by the Rowley Court to assess the substantive adequacy of an IEP
and is also the definition of a FAPE that the Rowley Court adopted).
156. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the child had exhibited academic progress and the IEP was substantively adequate
under the some educational benefit standard, despite that the child could not apply the skills he
learned in school to other environments, rendering the academic progress meaningless outside of the
classroom); see also M.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 320, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that the school district's provision of "12.75 hours per week of individual instruction" was suffi-
cient to render the IEP substantively adequate because "the IDEA does not require a perfect educa-
tion," despite that the child "made little progress while enrolled" in the public school, and his abili-
ties to speak and write were severely impaired); A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315, 318, 325-26 (4th
Cir. 2004) (holding that the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the child with some benefit
because the IEP "focused on the child's difficulties in reading and writing," the school officials'
"professional judgment" were consistent with state law, and the school district was not required to
consider extensive xpert reports concerning the child's intellectual ability).
157. See infra Section III.A.i.
158. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
159. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342. The Tenth Circuit failed to discuss the school district's
choice not to conduct an FBA during its analysis of whether the school district's responses to Drew's
behavioral problems rendered the fifth-grade IEP substantively inadequate. See id. Instead, the
school district was under no statutory duty to conduct an FBA and, therefore, its failure to do so did
not result in a substantive denial of a FAPE. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
160. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342 n. 12 ("Although the parents take issue with the substance
of the BIPs put in place by the District in prior years, neither the IDEA nor its implementing regula-
tions prescribe substantive requirements for what should be included in BIPs.").
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school district in response to Drew's behavioral problems. However, the
courts, state legislatures, and Congress could implement solutions that
would ensure that courts properly consider a child's unique needs, abili-
ties, and circumstances when assessing the substantive adequacy of an
IEP.161
A. Expert Participation
Both the Tenth Circuit's and the district court's decisions reflect the
need for expert participation in cases assessing the substantive adequacy
of an IEP, as well as the advantage school districts have in terms of re-
taining experts. To correct this inequality, parents could request that
school districts perform an IEE. Ultimately, however, states must pass
legislation shifting the burden of proof to schools, or Congress must
amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
1. The Importance of Experts and Parents' Disadvantages in Cases
Challenging the Substantive Adequacy of an IEP
As the Tenth Circuit's decision demonstrates, experts play a signifi-
cant role in cases assessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP and assist
courts in evaluating a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
Full-time administrative law, district court, and appellate judges are usu-
ally inexperienced in the field of special education and ill-equipped to
unilaterally make decisions regarding the appropriate education for a
child with disabilities.1 62 Consequently, courts often rely on expert testi-
mony when making their decisions regarding the substantive adequacy of
IEPs.163 For example, the district court in Endrew F. extensively cited
testimony given at the due process hearing from Drew's parents' and the
school district's retained experts during its evaluation of Drew's progress
under the goals and objectives listed in the IEPs.16" While the Tenth Cir-
161. See infra Section III.B.ii.
162. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-08 (1982) ("[C]aution[ing] that courts
lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult ques-
tions of educational policy."' (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973))); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for "Free Appropriate Public Educa-
tion?," 28 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397, 416-17 (2008) (comparing hearing officers
that are trained in special education "best practice" with "hearing officers with a strictly legal train-
ing" in the context of enforcement of the IDEIA's requirement that IEPs be based on peer-reviewed
research).
163. See Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs ofa "Free" Education: The Impact of Schaffer
v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation under the IDEA, 57 DUKE L.J. 457, 470, 474 n.101
(2007) (noting that "the presentation of expert evidence is an indispensable part of' parents carrying
their burden of proof (quoting Brief The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S.
291 (2006) (No. 05-18))); see also Kathryn H. Crary, Comment, Necessary Expertise: Allowing
Parents to Recover Expert Witness Fees Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 967, 968 (2004) (noting that using "expert witnesses" in IDEA actions is "neces-
sary").
164. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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cuit's reliance on expert testimony was less explicit and extensive than in
the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit decision did reference tes-
timony from Drew's special education teacher, who was one of the
school district's experts.
Despite the importance of expert testimony, in The Costs of a
"Free" Education: The Impact of Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v.
Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, Kelly D. Thomason discusses
how the Supreme Court's decisions in Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v.
Murphy disadvantage parents in terms of retaining expert witnesses that
are necessary for parents to carry their burden of proving that an IEP is
substantively inadequate.166 Thomason explains that the Schaffer deci-
sion places the burden of proof in an IDEIA action on the party seeking
relief, which is a child with disabilities, represented by his parents.,6 7
Parents thus bear the burden of countering the strong presumption in
favor of the IEP's appropriateness.1 68 Considering the importance of ex-
pert testimony, it is critical that parents retain expert witnesses to carry
their burden of proof.'69 However, in Arlington, the Supreme Court held
that prevailing parents are barred from recovering expert witness fees.'7 0
Thomason notes that, while school districts have special education ex-
perts on staff that can easily and cheaply be retained to testify on their
behalf, parents must seek out and hire an independent expert witness.17'
Further, even if parents successfully find a compelling expert advocate,
they must pay exorbitant expert witness fees that, under Arlington, can-
not be recovered.172 Consequently, Thomason concludes that the com-
bined effect of the Schaffer and Arlington decisions indicates that parents
may not have the resources necessary to carry their burden of proof.17 3
165. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1335, 1341-42.
166. See generally Thomason, supra note 163.
167. Id. at 470; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that "[t]he burden
of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking
relief," and since the child, who was being represented by his parents, was the one seeking relief, the
child bore the burden of proof).
168. Thomason, supra note 163, at 472.
169. See id. at 483 (noting that parents bearing the burden of proving that an IEP is substan-
tively deficient "increaseles] parents' need for expert witnesses").
170. Id. at 475-76; see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
297, 300 (2006) (holding that under the IDEIA, "prevailing parents may not recover the costs of
experts or consultants" because while the IDEIA provides clear notice that prevailing parents may
recover "reasonable attorneys' fees," the statute does not unambiguously state that prevailing parents
may recover expert witness fees (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2012))).
171. Thomason, supra note 163, at 472-73 ("As school districts typically have experts on staff
in the form of special education teachers, child psychologists, and educational specialists, they have
ready access to experts who will support the IEP provided for the child ..... (footnote omitted)).
172. Id. at 472, 483-84 (discussing how, while the school district's experts are employed by
the school district and would testify on the school district's behalf for free, parents must incur "exor-
bitant fees for the retention of expert witnesses"); see also Arlington, 548 U.S. at 297-300 (discuss-
ing how parents are precluded from recovering expert witness fees).
173. Thomason, supra note 163, at 483-84 (discussing how parents of children with disabilities
"tend to earn less" than other parents, which "illustrates that the majority of parents with children in
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Data out of Colorado corroborates Thomason's conclusion. For ex-
ample, of the fifteen due process hearings brought under the IDEIA in
Colorado in 2013, eleven were dismissed or resulted in a finding of no
violation, and only one resulted in a violation.1 74 This is consistent with
Thomason's argument that parents seeking to prove the inadequacy of an
IEP are unable to match the power of the school district's experts and
cannot bear their burden of proof.75
The difficulty parents face in overcoming the power of school dis-
tricts' experts and proving the substantive inadequacy of an IEP is evi-
dent in the Endrew F. decision. Although Drew's parents retained an
expert to testify at the due process hearing, the school district had two
experts testify on its behalf.17 6 The school district's experts-Drew's
special education teacher and the school district's director of special edu-
cation-were both employed by the school system.'77 Further, the ALJ
agreed with the school district's experts' testimony. For example, the
school district's experts testified that, while the progress reporting in
Drew's IEPs could have been more detailed, the progress reflected in the
IEPs was still adequate.'78 Similarly, the ALJ held that, although the
school's progress reporting "could have been more robust . . . the ab-
sence of more detailed reports [did] not amount to a substantive denial of
a FAPE," and Drew had made some progress towards some of the IEPs'
goals. 79 Pursuant to the standard of review in an IDEIA action, the Tenth
Circuit was required to accept the ALJ's finding that Drew had made
progress towards the goals in his IEPs as prima facie correct.s0 It is
probable that the school-district-favorable rule relating any minimal past
progress to the substantive adequacy of a proposed IEP undoubtedly con-
tributed to the ALJ's decision.'8' However, experts play significant roles
in IDEIA actions'82 and the school district had two experts who were
intimately familiar with the provisions in Drew's IEPs, while Drew's
parents had only one expert that merely reviewed Drew's academic rec-
special education do not have sufficient income to hire expert witnesses necessary to carry their
burden of proof at IDEA hearings").
174. EXCEPTIONAL STUDENT SERVS. UNIT, COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2013 DUE PROCESS (2014),
http://www.cde.state.co.us/spedlaw/2013dueprocess (noting that two due process claims were still
active at the time of the survey).
175. Thomason, supra note 163, at 483-84.
176. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
178. See Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).
See supra note 115 and accompanying text, for a discussion regarding how the school district's
experts conceded that the progress reporting could have been more adequate, but concluded that
Drew still made progress and the IEPs "met the required standard."
179. See Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *3.
180. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2015).
181. See Endrew I, 2014 WL 4548439, at *6; see also infra notes 206-14 and accompanying
text (discussing how courts applying the some educational benefit standard consider even minimal
progress under a past IEP sufficient to indicate that a disputed IEP modeled after that past IEP is
substantively sufficient).
182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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ords.183 Therefore, it is likely that the ALJ was also persuaded by, and
relied on, testimony from the school district's experts.
Finally, data suggests that parents' inability to recover expert-
witness fees not only inhibits them from carrying their burden of proof'8 4
but also discourages parents from challenging a school district's provi-
sion of a FAPE in the first place. "Only five out of every ten thousand
[parents of] children . . . receiv[ing] special education services under the
IDEA request due process hearings."'8 5 Further, the vast majority of
school districts do not experience due process hearings or IDEIA litiga-
tion in a given year,'86 and ninety-four percent of school districts have
never had an IDEIA hearing.'87 For example, in 2013 only fifteen due
process hearings in Colorado involved disputes under the IDEIA.'1 8 This
number is negligible considering that there are over ninety-thousand stu-
dents with disabilities receiving services pursuant to the IDEIA in Colo-
rado.189 The significant discrepancy between the number of children re-
ceiving disability-related services under the IDEIA and the small number
of due process hearings suggests that parents might be discouraged from
incurring the costs necessary to prevail in a challenge to a school's provi-
sion of a FAPE.
Therefore, although experts are an important way in which courts
assess a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, parents cannot
recover expert witness fees in an IDEIA action and often lack the re-
sources necessary to retain expert witnesses. Consequently, parents are
discouraged from bringing actions challenging a school district's provi-
sion of a FAPE. When such actions are brought, expert testimony tends
to favor school districts and parents are often unable to carry their burden
of proof.
183. See Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *8 (discussing how Drew's special education teacher
helped develop Drew's IEPs, while Drew's parents' expert merely reviewed Drew's academic rec-
ords).
184. Thomason, supra note 163, at 483-84.
185. Id. at 484-85 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF
FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER
STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 13 (2003)).
186. Brief for the National Disability Rights Network and the New York Lawyers Interest for
the Public Interest as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 552
U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637), 2007 WL 2088644 ("90% of school districts had no due process hear-
ings at all in 2004-2005, and only 4% of school districts were involved in IDEA litigation of any
kind."). There also is not a trend towards more due process hearings. Id. ("From 1999 to 2005, the
10% of school districts that had any ongoing formal dispute resolution procedures had a median of
only one dispute per year, a rate that did not change over time.").
187. Thomason, supra note 163, at 485.
188. EXCEPTIONAL STUDENT SERVS. UNIT, supra note 174.
189. COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES BIRTH: TOTAL STUDENTS SERVED
ON DECEMBER COUNT (2013), http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdespedfin/sped-datareports- I (reporting
on the number of students with disabilities receiving special educational services from school dis-
tricts in Colorado in 2013).
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2. Shifting the Burden of Proof to Schools and Allowing Parents to
Recover Expert Witness Fees
To lessen the disadvantage parents face in terms of presenting con-
vincing expert witness testimony to prove the substantive inadequacy of
an IEP, parents could request that school districts perform IEEs before
bringing an action seeking tuition reimbursement under the IDEIA.1 90
Under the IDEIA, if the parents of a child with disabilities disagree with
the results of a school's evaluation of the child's education, such as an
IEP9' or an FBA,192 the parents have the right to request an IEE at public
expense.193 An IEE is "an evaluation conducted by a qualified examiner
who is not employed" by the school district.19 4 In Schaffer, the Supreme
Court cited IEEs as procedural safeguards that would prevent its decision
to allocate the burden of proof to parents from favoring school dis-
tricts.'9 The Court reasoned that IEEs provide parents with access to an
expert that can evaluate the school's performance and "give an inde-
pendent opinion."l 96 Therefore, parents have the "firepower" to match
the school district's experts1 97 and can submit the IEE as evidence in a
due process hearing.198
However, in practice, IEEs fall short of providing parents with the
type of expert involvement necessary to carry their burden of proof. If a
parent requests that an IEE be performed, school districts have the option
to file a due process hearing defending the adequacy of the evaluation
instead of conducting an IEE.1 99 Further, even if a school consents to
190. See Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA: Collaborative in Theo-
ry, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 423, 435 (2012) (describing IEEs
as "outside evaluation[s] [that] can be an important way for parents to challenge the expertise of
school districts with independent experts of their own").
191. See Edie F. ex rel. Casey F. v. River Falls Sch. Dist., 243 F.3d 329, 333-36 (7th Cir.
2001) (discussing attorneys' fees in the context of a case in which parents had requested an IEE in
response to disagreement with some of the provisions and services provided to their child under an
IEP).
192. See Harris v. District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
an FBA is an "educational evaluation" for purposes of 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, given that an FBA
"plays an integral role in the development of an IEP" and is "fundamental . . . to the quality of a
disabled child's education" (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2016))).
193. Chopp, supra note 190, at 435; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1).
194. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(a)(3)(i).
195. Thomason, supra note 163, at 479-80 (discussing how the Schaffer Court "cited the many
procedural safeguards of the IDEA," such as IEEs, that would prevent "carrying the burden of proof
[from] harm[ing] parents"); see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2005).
196. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60-61.
197. Id. (discussing how parents' ability to request an IEE at public expense means that parents
"are not left to challenge the government without a realistic opportunity to access the necessary
evidence, or without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition").
198. Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to Parents of Tuition and Other Costs Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 171, 210 (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(2) (permitting the results of an IEE to
be "presented by any party as evidence at a hearing on a due process complaint").
199. Chopp, supra note 190, at 435-36; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)-(b)(3) ("(2) If a
parent requests an independent educational evaluation at public expense, the public agency must,
without unnecessary delay, either--(i) File a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that
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conducting an IEE, the school often chooses the independent evalua-
tor.200 School districts also have no affirmative duty to implement any
changes based on the IEE and are only obligated to consider the results
of an IEE.20' Consequently, IEEs do not afford parents the expert in-
volvement necessary to allow courts to objectively evaluate a child's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
Instead, states must pass legislation shifting the burden of proof to
school districts, or Congress must amend the IDEIA to allow parents to
recover expert witness fees.202 The Supreme Court in Schaffer noted that
states could pass legislation placing the burden of proof on schools in an
IDEIA action.203 Similarly, Ginsburg's concurrence in Arlington sug-
gested that Congress could amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover
expert witness fees.204 Such legislation would lessen the prejudice im-
posed on parents by the combined effects of the Schaffer and Arlington
decisions. For example, if Colorado had legislation shifting the burden of
proof, Drew's parents would not have had the burden of overcoming the
testimony of the school district's two expert witnesses. Instead, the
school district would have had to prove that the fifth-grade IEP was sub-
stantively adequate. If the IDEIA allowed parents to recover expert wit-
ness fees, Drew's parents might have felt more inclined to hire two ex-
pert witnesses instead of one, providing them with equal "firepower"
with which to counter the school district's experts. In either scenario,
Drew's parents would have had a better chance to retain experts that
could match the force of the school district's experts, and present con-
vincing testimony concerning Drew's unique needs, abilities, and cir-
cumstances.
In sum, while experts play important roles in IDEIA actions as-
sessing the substantive adequacy of an IEP, parents have less resources
with which to retain expert witnesses than schools do. Parents requesting
that school districts perform IEEs are not sufficient to correct the disad-
its evaluation is appropriate; or (ii) Ensure that an independent educational evaluation is provided
at public expense, unless the agency demonstrates in a hearing pursuant to §§ 300.507 through
300.513 the evaluation obtained by the parent did not meet agency criteria. (3) If the public agency
files a due process complaint notice to request a hearing and the final decision is that the agency's
evaluation is appropriate, the parent still has the right to an independent educational evaluation, but
not at public expense.").
200. Chopp, supra note 190, at 436 (discussing how school districts "often move to choose the
evaluator themselves or to limit the scope of the evaluation").
201. Id. at 436; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(c)(1) (stating that the results of an lEE "[m]ust be
considered by [the school district] ... in any decision made with respect to the provision of FAPE to
the child").
202. See Thomason, supra note 163, at 485-86.
203. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 61 (2005) (declining to definitively condone states legis-
latively placing the burden of proof on school districts, but noting that "[s]everal States have laws or
regulations" already in place that do just that, leaving open the possibility that states could place the
burden of proof on school districts).
204. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 307 (2006) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) ("The ball ... is ... in Congress'[s] court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant
fees .. . beyond those IDEA and . .. regulations already authorize . . . .").
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vantage parents face in terms of hiring experts. Instead, states must pass
legislation shifting the burden of proof to schools, or Congress must
amend the IDEIA to allow parents to recover expert witness fees.
B. Past Progress as an Indicator of the Substantive Adequacy of an IEP
The Tenth Circuit based its decision that Drew's fifth-grade IEP
was substantively adequate in part on the AU and district court's finding
that Drew made progress under past IEPs with similar goals and objec-
205tives as the fifth-grade IEP. However, neither the district court nor the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether the progress indicated in past IEPs re-
sulted in actual progress in the classroom, considering Drew's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances. Consequently, when assessing
whether past progress indicates that a proposed IEP is substantially ade-
quate under the some educational benefit standard, courts must evaluate
whether a child progressed under the tutelage of the entire IEP instead of
considering one goal or objective in isolation.
1. Courts' Evaluations of Past Progress
As the Tenth Circuit stated in its opinion, under the some educa-
tional benefit standard, past progress on the IEP goals "strongly sug-
gest[s]" that when a proposed IEP is modeled on prior IEPs that had suc-
ceeded in generating some progress, the proposed IEP "was reasonably
calculated to continue that trend."206 However, courts are willing to con-
sider very negligible progress, even progress that does not necessarily
benefit a child, as sufficient to constitute "past progress" for purposes of
this rule. In the article titled Rowley Forever More? A Call for Clarity
and Change, Scott F. Johnson explains that courts using past progress as
an indicator that a proposed IEP is substantively adequate focus on
"whether any progress was made" in any area in which "services were
provided."20 7 Considering this, if a court finds, for example, that a child
made minimal progress on just one goal contained in a past IEP, then the
entire proposed IEP modeled after that past IEP is considered to be "rea-
sonably calculated to" provide the child with "some benefit."208 Courts
make this holding despite that-considering the child's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances and his progress under the past IEP as a
205. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
206. Endrew Hl, 798 F.3d 1329, 1341 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v.
Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)).
207. Johnson, supra note 86, at 32 (discussing how under the some educational benefit stand-
ard, "the court's focus is usually on whether any progress was made in the areas where services were
provided").
208. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42 (rejecting Drew's parents' argument that because "any
progress made" under the tutelage of Drew's past IEPs "was de minimis," the fifth-grade IEP was
substantively inadequate because an IEP simply needs to be "reasonably calculated to enable the
student to make some progress towards the goals within [a] program," and Drew did make some
progress (quoting Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1155)); Johnson, supra note 86, at 39 (discussing how, as
long as there is "[s]ome progress towards meeting some IEP goals," an IEP could be deemed sub-
stantively adequate even if other IEP goals are not met).
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whole-the minimal progress in one area may not have afforded the
child any benefit.
This is reflected in Endrew F.. The district court found that the math
objectives in Drew's fourth- and fifth-grade IEPs demonstrated the pro-
gress he was making, despite that all of the math objectives in his fifth-
grade IEP were the same or only slightly changed from the objectives in
his fourth-grade IEP.209 For example, the word "money" was added to an
objective, and another objective was slightly changed from learning
"multiplication facts 6-10" to learning "multiplication facts 6-12.,,210 The
fifth-grade IEP also contained two fewer objectives than the fourth-grade
IEP 211 suggesting that, while Drew may have achieved some goals and
objectives in his fourth-grade IEP, he would not be progressing in any
new areas under his fifth-grade IEP. Despite these obvious deficiencies,
which the school district conceded to,2 12 and which the Tenth Circuit
noted,2 13 the fifth-grade IEP that was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP
under which Drew made negligible progress was found to be "reasonably
calculated to continue that trend" of progress.214
Considering Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, it is
clear that very minimal progress on objectives, such as multiplication
facts, may not have afforded him any benefit at all. Drew's behavioral
issues were the most significant impediment to his education.215 In this
context, past progress on any IEP objective would not necessarily lead to
more progress under a similarly drafted IEP. For example, Drew had an
"especially rocky fourth-grade year" due to the increased severity of his
behavioral problems, suggesting that he received little to no educational
benefit that year.216 Considering this, it is unclear how the fifth-grade IEP
209. See supra notes I 16-21 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
212. Endrew 1, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *10 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014)
(noting that the school district "concedes that the progress reporting on the IEPs in this case ... was
lacking in details").
213. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1335 (noting that the school district conceded that progress report-
ing in Drew's IEPs "could have been more robust"); see also id. at 1342 (describing the question of
whether Drew progressed under his past IEPs as "a close case").
214. Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540
F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42 (affirming the district
court's holding concerning past progress and finding "sufficient indications of Drew's past progress
to find the IEP rejected by the parents substantively adequate under our prevailing standard").
215. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342 ("Drew's behavioral problems had escalated to such a
degree that they were creating a barrier to his academic progress during his fourth-grade year . . . .");
Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *2 (discussing Drew's escalating behavioral problems that inhibited
"his ability to function at school and access the educational environment").
216. Endrew 1, 798 F.3d at 1333, 1337-38 (describing how Drew struggled during his fourth-
grade year and, "[d]espite the school's prior attempts to manage his behavior, during Drew's fourth-
grade year his behaviors increased," which left Drew's parents "with what they felt was one choice-
-to place Drew in a different learning environment"). There is also evidence that Drew's behavioral
problems increased uring his second- and third-grade years, despite the Tenth Circuit's affirmation
of the ALJ's finding that Drew progressed academically during those years. Id at 1341 (indicating
that the record supports the ALJ's finding that Drew made educational progress during his second-
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would be "reasonably calculated to continue" Drew's educational pro-
gress when it was modeled after the fourth-grade IEP under which Drew
struggled to progress educationally.2 17 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
failed to consider whether, given Drew's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances, the negligible progress indicated in Drew's past IEPs
resulted in actual progress in the classroom.
2. Considering Progress Under the Entire Past IEP
When assessing whether past progress indicates that a proposed IEP
is substantively adequate, courts applying the some educational benefit
standard must consider a child's progress under the tutelage of the entire
past IEP, instead of considering progress towards one goal or objective in
isolation. An analysis of whether, considering a child's unique needs,
abilities, and circumstances, a child has progressed educationally neces-
sarily requires an analysis of an entire IEP, not just part of it. For exam-
ple, as demonstrated by Drew's behavioral problems, which impeded his
educational progress,218 simply focusing on one IEP goal or objective can
lead courts to hold that the child progressed under the tutelage of a past
IEP, when in reality the child was struggling to gain any educational
benefit and may have even regressed.
Further, a consideration of progress under the entire IEP, rather than
progress on just one goal or objective, does not require courts applying
the some educational benefit standard to consider criteria that only courts
applying the meaningful benefit standard take into account. Courts ap-
plying the some educational benefit standard refuse to consider any pro-
gress the child made at a private school placement.219 This would entail
focusing on providing a benefit that "maximiz[es] . . . student potential,"
which is relevant to the substantive adequacy of an IEP under the mean-
ingful benefit standard but not the some educational benefit standard.220
For example, in holding that Drew made progress under the past IEPs,
the Tenth Circuit found evidence that Drew was "thriving" at the private
school irrelevant to the determination of whether the fifth-grade IEP was
substantively adequate.221 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, under the
and third-grade years); Endrew 1, 2014 WL 4548439, at *2 (discussing how Drew's behavioral
problems increased during his second- and third-grade years).
217. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (describing how Drew's behavioral prob-
lems impeded his academic progress during his fourth-grade year); see also Endrew 1, 2014 WL
4548439, at *9 (describing the fifth-grade IEP modeled after the fourth-grade IEP and how the IEPs
were materially similar).
218. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 86, at 36 (de-
scribing how "under the 'some benefit' test, the progress the student made at a private special educa-
tion school, as compared to the progress made at the public school, would not matter").
220. Johnson, supra note 86, at 36 ("As long as the public school provided some benefit, the
fact that the student made better progress at the unilateral placement . .. would be irrelevant and
characterized as the kind of maximizing of student potential that the school is not required to pro-
vide.").
221. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342.
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some educational benefit standard, the IDEIA does not require schools to
"do whatever is necessary to ensure that all students achieve a particular
standardized level of ability and knowledge."22 2 However, had the Tenth
Circuit considered Drew's progress under the IEPs as a whole, it would
have been clear that Drew was struggling to learn and progress in school,
given his worsening behavioral problems that impeded his education, 223
even without considering evidence that he was thriving at another school.
Lastly, Johnson notes that, under the meaningful benefit standard,
an evaluation of past progress requires that the child meet all or most IEP
goals and make significant progress overall.224 Conversely, under the
some educational benefit standard, courts currently focus on "whether
any progress was made" in any area in which "services were provid-
ed."225 However, considering progress under the entire IEP, in light of a
child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, does not require courts
to find that the child made significant progress on all or even most of the
IEP's goals and objectives. It simply prohibits courts from focusing on
one goal or objective, such as math objectives, when assessing whether
the child progressed. It also requires courts to not just pay attention to the
written words in the IEP but also to what actually transpired during the
226course of the child's education. For example, had the Tenth Circuit
declined to confine its analysis to progress towards only a few select
goals and objectives, the panel would have recognized that any minimal
progress made under Drew's past IEPs was likely negated by Drew's
behavioral problems, rendering him devoid of any educational progress
whatsoever.227 Under these circumstances, a finding that Drew made no
progress under the tutelage of the past IEPs would hardly be implementa-
tion of a standard requiring substantial progress on all IEP goals and ob-
jectives.
In sum, in affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit
failed to consider whether the progress indicated in Drew's past IEPs
resulted in actual progress in the classroom in light of Drew's unique
needs, abilities, and circumstances. Therefore, courts applying the some
educational benefit standard must evaluate whether a child progressed
222. Id. (describing how the IDEIA "much more modestly calls for the creation of individual-
ized programs reasonably calculated to enable the student to make some progress towards the goals
within that program" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d
1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2008))).
223. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
224. Johnson, supra note 86, at 39.
225. Id. at 32.
226. The district court focused on how the words in the IEPs changed as evidence that Drew
progressed. See, e.g., Endrew I, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 15,
2014) (discussing how the objectives in Drew's IEPs had changed). However, had the district court
considered progress under the tutelage of the entire IEP and how Drew actually progressed in the
classroom, it would have been clear that he received little to no educational benefit.
227. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (describing how Drew's behavioral issues
worsened during his fourth-grade year and inhibited his ability to learn).
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under the tutelage of the entire past IEP, instead of focusing on progress
towards one goal or objective in isolation, when assessing whether past
progress indicates that a disputed IEP is substantively adequate.
C. Assessing School Districts 'Responses to Behavioral Problems
The rule cited in the Tenth Circuit's decision that there are no sub-
stantive requirements for the contents of BIPs,228 as well as the Tenth
Circuit's failure to consider the school district's choice to not conduct an
FBA,229 conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's discussion of how the school
district addressed Drew's behavioral problems in the context of the sub-
stantive adequacy of the IEP.2 30 By failing to assess all of the school dis-
trict's actions undertaken in response to Drew's behavioral problems, the
Tenth Circuit did not properly consider the substantive adequacy of the
fifth-grade IEP in light of Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circum-
stances.23 ' Considering this, the IDEIA must be amended to include de-
tailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs, and should re-
quire FBAs and BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior im-
pedes his leaming or that of others.232
1. Consideration of FBAs and BIPs in Endrew F.
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit cited the rule that, in order for an
IEP to be substantively adequate, "an IEP must respond to all significant
facets of the student's disability, both academic and behavioral."2 33 Pur-
suant to this rule, the Tenth Circuit evaluated how the school district
addressed Drew's behavioral. problems in the context of determining
whether the IEP was substantively adequate.234 However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit failed to evaluate the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and did
not consider the school district's choice to not conduct an FBA.235 The
Tenth Circuit chose to adhere to the rule that there is no standard by
which courts evaluate the substantive adequacy of a BIP. The Tenth Cir-
cuit also refused to take into account the school district's failure to con-
duct an FBA because the IDEIA required the school district to merely
228. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 129-33, 159 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
231. The Tenth Circuit failed to address the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and the
school district's choice not to conduct an FBA, which are relevant to addressing Drew's behavioral
problems and his unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
232. See Patrick Ober, Note, Proactive Protection: How the IDEA Can Better Address the
Behavioral Problems of Children with Disabilities in Schools, I BELMONT L. REv. 311, 333 (2014).
Currently, the IDEIA requires schools to perform FBAs and develop BlPs when the child has had a
disciplinary change of placement but only requires schools to consider these measures when a
child's behavior interferes with his or other students' learning. See supra notes 50-51 and accompa-
nying text.
233. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d 1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Alex R. v. Forrestville
Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2004)).
234. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 129-33, 147, 159, 231 and accompanying text.
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"consider" conducting an FBA. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to
assess two important measures taken, and failed to be taken, by the
school district in response to Drew's behavioral problems that were rele-
vant to the questions of whether Drew's "IEP . . . respond[ed] to all sig-
nificant facets of [Drew's] disability" and whether the school district
"failed to address" Drew's behavioral issues.2 36 Given that Drew's be-
havioral problems were a significant impediment to his educational pro-
gress, the Tenth Circuit should not have held that the school district ade-
quately addressed Drew's behavioral problems without considering the
substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs and the school district's decision
not to conduct an FBA. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit failed to assess
all relevant actions taken by the school district in response to Drew's
unique needs, abilities, and circumstances.
2. Amending the IDEIA's Provisions Relating to FBAs and BIPs
To ensure that courts properly take into account the entirety of
school districts' responses to behavioral problems when assessing the
substantive adequacy of an IEP, the IDEIA must be amended to include
detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and BIPs. 2 37 Additional-
ly, the IDEIA must be amended to require FBAs and BIPs in every in-
stance in which a child's behavior impedes his learning or that of oth-
238ers.
In Proactive Protection: How the IDEA Can Better Address the Be-
havioral Problems of Children with Disabilities in Schools, Patrick Ober
discusses how the absence of detailed criteria concerning the contents of
FBAs and BIPs influenced the Seventh Circuit's holding in Alex R. that
there is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy of
239BIPs. Ober pointed out that the Seventh Circuit declined to assess the
substantive adequacy of the BIP because neither the IDEIA nor other
federal regulations put forth requirements concerning the contents of
236. Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1342. The Tenth Circuit cited the rule that "an IEP must respond to
all significant facets of the student's disability, both academic and behavioral." Id. (quoting Alex R.,
375 F.3d at 613).
237. See Ober, supra note 232, at 331-32. Ober notes that in Alex R., the Seventh Circuit relied
in part on the absence of detailed requirements for BIPs in the IDEIA to justify its holding that there
is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy of BIPs. Id. Ober observes how this
suggests that "if ... Congress ... were to implement [specific] requirements for a BIP and FBA,
those standards, if not followed by the school district, could then constitute a violation of the
[IDEIA]"). See also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 ("[N]either Congress nor the agency charged with
devising the implementing regulations for the IDEA, the Department of Education, had created any
specific substantive requirements for the [BIP] . . . .").
238. See Ober, supra note 232, at 336 (proposing amending the IDEIA to require school dis-
tricts to, "in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child's learning or that of others," con-
duct an FBA and develop a BIP (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B) (2012))); see also supra notes
50-51, 233 (discussing how the IDEIA currently only requires schools to consider using FBAs or
BlPs when a child's behavior interferes with his or other students' learning).
239. See Ober, supra note 232, at 331-33; see also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615.
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BIPs.240 Consequently, Ober noted that, under Alex R., "as long as [a]
school produce[s] an FBA or BIP" when it is obligated to do so, the
school has not violated the IDEIA.241 However, by basing its decision on
how "Congress . . . had [not] created any specific substantive require-
ments for . . . [BIPs]," the Seventh Circuit suggested that the implemen-
tation of requirements concerning the contents of FBAs and BIPs could
lead courts to assess the substantive adequacy of these particular behav-
-242ioral interventions.
Further, a violation of the IDEIA's detailed procedural requirements
informs a court's analysis of whether an IEP is substantively inade-
quate.243 Therefore, if the IDEIA was amended to include detailed re-
quirements as to the contents of FBAs or BIPs, and required FBAs and
BIPs in every instance in which a child's behavior interferes with learn-
ing, courts would not only be more likely to find a denial of a FAPE
based on violations of these additional procedural requirements but the
substantive adequacy of BIPs and FBAs would be called in to question
more often as well.
Had these amendments been in place, the Tenth Circuit might have
been prompted to assess the substantive adequacy of Drew's BIPs.24
Further, because Drew's behavior impeded his learning and that of oth-
ers, the school district would have been required to conduct an FBA and
to develop BIPs. Not only would Drew have received the benefit of an
FBA but any procedural violation of the more detailed requirements con-
cerning the contents of the FBA and BIPs also would have informed the
analysis of the substantive adequacy of these behavioral interventions
and the fifth-grade IEP in general.2 45 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit
would have more thoroughly examined the school district's response to
Drew's behavioral problems in the substantive provisions of the BIPs
during its analysis of the substantive adequacy of the fifth-grade IEP,
instead of focusing only on actions the school district took outside of the
contents of the BIPs. For example, in holding that the school district's
efforts to address Drew's behavioral problems did not render the fifth-
grade IEP substantively inadequate, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on
240. Ober, supra note 232, at 332; see also Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615 ("[T]he specific compo-
nents of the [BIP] are not identified either in the federal statute or the regulations." (quoting Mason
City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR 193, 199 (Iowa SEA Dec. 13, 2001))).
241. Ober, supra note 232, at 332; see also Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1337-38 (holding that the
school district did not violate the IDEIA because there are no "substantive requirements as to what
[BIPs] must include," and the school developed a BIP when Drew's behavior impeded his educa-
tion).
242. Ober, supra note 232, at 322 (quoting Alex R., 375 F.3d at 615).
243. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
244. Ober discusses how the Alex R. court's reasoning indicates that had detailed requirements
been in place, the Seventh Circuit may have been prompted to evaluate the substantive adequacy of
the BIP in question. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text. Given the Tenth Circuit's
reliance on Alex R.'s rule that there is no standard by which courts assess the substantive adequacy
of a BIP, the Tenth Circuit may also have been inclined to evaluate the contents of Drew's BlPs.
245. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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evidence of the school district's efforts to bring in a behavioral special-
ist.2 46 However, had the panel also considered the school district's failure
to conduct an FBA and the substantive contents of the BIPs as relevant
evidence, the school district's efforts to bring in a specialist may have
been overcome by, for example, insufficiencies in the content of the BIPs
or the harm the school's failure to conduct an FBA inflicted upon Drew's
educational progress. The Tenth Circuit would have considered all rele-
vant actions taken or not taken by the school district in response to
Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances, instead of focusing
only on a few of the school district's actions in response to his behavioral
problems.
In sum, the Tenth Circuit's failure to consider the substantive con-
tents of Drew's BIPs and the school district's choice not to conduct an
FBA conflicted with its discussion of how the school district addressed
Drew's behavioral problems and resulted in an inadequate assessment of
the fifth-grade IEP in light of Drew's unique needs, abilities, and circum-
stances. In order to properly consider all relevant actions school districts
take in response to a child's behavioral problems, the IDEIA must be
amended to include detailed requirements as to the contents of FBAs and
BIPs, and should require FBAs and BIPs when a child's behavior im-
pedes his learning or that of others.
CONCLUSION
The IDEIA's requirement that a public school system tailor a FAPE
to the specific needs of a child with disabilities through an IEP247 is es-
sential to ensuring that children with disabilities have access to an ade-
quate education. However, the Tenth Circuit in Endrew F. demonstrates
how courts applying the some educational benefit standard fail to proper-
ly consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and circumstances when
evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP. The Tenth Circuit thought
that educations for children with disabilities were offered in only two
makes and models: either a Chevrolet or a Cadillac. In order to give chil-
dren with disabilities the education they are entitled to under the IDEIA
and Rowley, courts, state legislatures, and Congress must implement so-
lutions encouraging courts to recognize that appropriate educations
comes in all different kinds of makes and models.
To ensure that courts consider a child's unique needs, abilities, and
circumstances when evaluating the substantive adequacy of an IEP,
states should enact legislation that shifts the burden of proof to school
districts. Further, courts applying the some educational benefits standard
must evaluate whether a child progressed under the tutelage of the entire
past IEP, instead of considering progress towards one goal or objective in
246. See Endrew II, 798 F.3d at 1341-42.
247. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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isolation. Lastly, to encourage courts' consideration of FBAs and BIPs,
the IDEIA must be amended to include detailed requirements as to the
contents of FBAs and BIPs and require these measures when a child's
behavior interferes with learning in the classroom.
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